HUM-478 Emotion and Value 1 Flashcards

1
Q

According to Chalmers, …………………………. reality and
non-virtual reality are equally real. In fact, our world could very well
be a ………………………….. .

A

The world we’re living in could be a virtual world. I’m not saying it is. But
it’s a possibility that we can’t rule out.”

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2
Q

Campbell Brown’s “Two Kinds of Holism”: This discussion paper presents two
ways of being a value holist: ….

A

(i) rejecting value additivism like Moore or (ii) rejecting
value invariabilism like Dancy. It favors (i). [The ice cream, chips, and gravy paper]

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3
Q

Ruth Chang’s “Parity: An Intuitive Case”: This article presents an intuitive case
of parity—namely, a value relation ensuring comparability, yet distinct from…

A

being better than, worse than, nor having the same value as. [The 4G rollercoaster paper]

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4
Q

According to G. E. Moore in the Principia Ethica,
“what has not been recognised is that it is the ultimate and
fundamental truth of moral philosophy.”

A
  1. (…) these complex wholes themselves [i.e., organic unities], and
    not any constituent or characteristic of them
  2. (…) that personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments
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5
Q

Organic unities as the (plural) good
example?

A

An example: the contemplation of beauty.

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6
Q

The Principle of Organic Unities:

A

“The value of a whole must not be
assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts.

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7
Q

Non-additivity[Organic Unities:]:

A

For at least some whole, the value of the whole does
not equal the sum of the values of all its parts

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8
Q

Organic unities (i.e., counterexamples to additivity)?
Examples?

A

An organic unity
is any whole such that its value is not the sum of the values of all its
parts (See Moore 1903, §22).
Examples: human relationships

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9
Q

An example of an organic unity from lectures

A

The Autumn Sonata
Non-additivity: The difference between the positive
value of the whole Sonata and the sum of the values of
its parts is obviously incompatible with equality between
both. (Invariance under shuffling of the parts provides another way to test
for additivity.)

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10
Q

A problematic consequence of value additivity

The Repugnant Conclusion: “For any possible and large
population, say of eight billion, all with a very high quality of
life, there must be some much larger imaginable population
whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better,
and be what we ought to bring about, even though its
members have lives that are barely worth living.”

is intimately related to what?

A

The Mere Addition Paradox.

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11
Q

Hedonism as mistake
Arising from the assumption of value additivity.

A

(i) Pleasure may be involved as a part in all the greatest goods,
which explains the hedonist mistake.
(ii) But pleasure has little value compared to the complex things of
which it is a part, such as human relationships and the
contemplation of the beautiful (Those are typically Moorean
examples.).

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12
Q

Nozick’s conception of organic unity as…

A

unity in diversity

“A good theory is one that tightly unifies (in explanatory fashion)
diverse and apparently disparate data or phenomena, via its
tightly unifying relationships. Scientists sometimes use the
terminology of aesthetics here, speaking of a “beautiful” or
“elegant” theory.”

“Similarly, we can understand why some speak of knowledge
itself as valuable, for knowledge involves a person in a unified
relationship, tracking, with a fact. The deeper the truth, the
more it unifies, and the more valuable is knowledge of it. A
unified field theory, one unified explanatory theory, would be
most valuable.”

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13
Q

What is a fact?

A

An obtaining state of affairs.

All facts involve the actual instantiation of a property* by a thing
(physical or other).

(iii) State of affairs: Lincoln’s pen having been used to
sign the Emancipation Proclamation.
(iv) Fact: Lincoln’s pen was used to sign the
Emancipation Proclamation.

States of affairs that actually obtain/occur are facts.

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14
Q

Why should we care about facts?

A

Implications for the intrinsic vs. extrinsic distinction.

The question of what has value (value bearers) and the question of
what value is (the nature of value) are related.

Here is one way how:
Intrinsic vs. extrinsic: does the distinction between intrinsic
value and extrinsic value collapse if all value bearers are facts?

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15
Q

What does “good thusly” mean?

A

Response: thusly is a shorthand for “in a certain way”
1. This blue sweater is knitted.
2. This blue sweater is hand-knitted.

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16
Q

Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni’s “Homing in on the Emotions”:
This introductory chapter efficiently delineates emotions, in particular
within affective phenomena. Which dimensions considered does it include?

A

aboutness
(intentionality),
what-it-feels-likeness (phenomenology),
emotion assessment (standards of correctness, epistemological standards, moral standards).

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17
Q

Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni’s “The Diversity and Unity of Emotions”:
In this second chapter, Deonna and Teroni consider the question of the unity of
the category of emotion.

A

what are key elements of consideration?

the diversity of emotions (e.g., positive/
negative, conscious/unconscious) and one contrast that allegedly threatens
their unity: basic vs. nonbasic emotions.

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17
Q

what L. A. Paul’s “The Paradox of Empathy” paper considers?

A

the risk of
mental corruption inherent to being open-minded and having empathy.

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18
Q

What are three kinds of value holism?

A

“Mooreanism” (organic unities) (Invariabilism+Non-additivity)

Axiological Particularism
(Variabilism + Additivity)

Conditionalism or Contextualism
(Variabilism + Non-additivity)

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19
Q

A problematic consequence of value additivity

A

In B there are twice as many people living as in A, and these people are
all worse off than everyone in A. But the lives of those in B, compared
with those in A, are more than half as much worth living (Parfit)

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20
Q

Why care about how value aggregates?
Answer 4 reasons

A

Reason 1 – Parfit’s
Repugnant Conclusion

Reason 2 – Hedonism
as a value aggregation
mistake

Reason 3 – Scientific
theories as organic
unities

Reason 4 – Many other
things as organic unities

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21
Q

A doubt coming from
mereology and set
theory

A

The whole as nothing over and above its parts.

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22
Q

Incomparability 1: two things a and b are incomparable if
and only if

A

it is neither the case that a is better than b, nor that b is
better than a, nor that a and b are of equal value.

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23
Q

Incomparability 2: Two items are incomparable if it is…

A

false
that any basic value relation holds between them with
respect to a covering consideration, ‘V

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24
L. A. Paul’s “The Paradox of Empathy” What does this paper consider?
risk of mental corruption inherent to being open-minded and having empathy
25
What are four families of mental states?
1. Perceptions Examples: seeing, hearing. 2. Cognitions Examples: believing, judging. 3. Desires Also called conative states, see Latin conatus, us m. Examples: desiring, wishing. 4. Affects Examples: having an emotion, being in a mood.
26
[Exploring affect within the mind] Name types of affective episodes with examples
i. Emotions Examples: joy, awe, grief, anger. ii. Moods Examples: anxious, calm. iii. Sensations (also called “feelings”) Examples: sensations of pleasure and displeasure, bodily sensations
27
[Exploring affect within the mind] Name types of affective dispositions.
i. Emotional dispositions ii. Sentiments iii. Character traits iv. Temperaments
28
What is Emotional dispositions affective disposition? [Exploring affect within the mind]
Dispositions to feel specific emotions. * Single-track disposition. * Examples: fear of public speaking, indignation at racism.
29
What is Sentiments affective disposition? [Exploring affect within the mind]
Dispositions to, among others, feel a variety of emotions in relation to a specific particular object (which may be a person). * Multi-track disposition, object-focused. * Examples: love, hatred.
30
What is Character traits affective disposition? [Exploring affect within the mind]
Dispositions to, among others, feel a variety of emotions in relation to a particular value. * Multi-track disposition, value/concern-focused. * Examples: compassionate, callous.
31
What is Temperaments affective disposition? [Exploring affect within the mind]
Disposition to get in a specific mood. * Single-track disposition, value/concern-focused. * Examples: fearful, serene.
32
Desires are mostly understood to be dispositions
act
33
Desire often viewed as part of the...
“passions” like affect. Like emotions and, more broadly, affective states, desires are traditionally associated with “the passions”.
34
One key feature distinguishes desires from perceptions, cognitions, and (other) affects.
GPT - this feature is often the motivational aspect of desires — that is, desires not only involve a feeling of wanting but also tend to motivate or incline us towards taking action to fulfill that want.
35
Emotion broadly conceived:
is sometimes a label that covers one (namely, affects) if not two (namely, affects and desires) of the four families of mental states previously identified (namely, perceptions, cognitions, desires, and affects).
36
Emotion narrowly conceived:
emotions constitute a specific type of affective phenomena, different from, e.g., moods and sentiments.
37
Emotion as a young psychological category.
Both the word “emotion” and the concept associated with the word “emotion” in their contemporary psychological usage are considered to be relatively recent. James: William James’s paper “What is an Emotion?” (1884) in the philosophy journal Mind consecrated the theoretical importance of emotion. The paper was highly influential and controversial. Darwin: “Most of our emotions are so closely connected with their expression, that they hardly exist if the body remains passive” (1872, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 239–240)
38
Phase 1: emotion as bodily changes (vs. feelings of bodily changes).
Emotion as an “uncouth” borrowing from French Emotion as a physical disturbance
39
What is James’s reversal on emotions?
My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion
40
James-Lange theory main thesis?
Emotions are feelings of bodily changes. Example: anger is constituted of feelings of, notably, one’s quickened heartbeat, and one’s quickened breathing rhythm, and one’s muscles tensing.
41
What is The subtraction argument from James-Lange theory?
If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind Explanatory power(stronger than Darwin): The James-Lange theory can account for the variety of emotions through the variety of bodily changes, notably through the variety of possible combinations of such bodily changes.
42
What are main well-being theories?
Hedonism, Experientialism, Desire-satisfaction theory, Objective List Theory
43
What is L. A. Paul’s “The Paradox of Empathy” paper about?
risk of mental corruption inherent to being open-minded and having empathy
44
Three explanations for the occurrence of moods
(a) non-psychological factors: e.g., lack of caffeine; (b) prior emotions: e.g., joy of receiving good news; (c) temperaments, i.e., the “subject’s disposition to slip into certain moods: e.g., someone’s irritable temperament explains their grumpy mood.
45
Exploring the mind (what are criteria?)
-What-it-feels-likeness[remember Mary, the color scientist] - Valence [desire and aversion, positive and negative emotions] - Direction of fit [aboutness+, shopping list vs. the cashier’s receipt]
46
Mental states evaluation based on Three criteria Direction of fit - Valence - What-it-feels- likeness
Perceptions mind to world no yes Cognitions mind to world no no Affects mind to world yes yes Desires world to mind yes no
47
What is Anscombian analogy about?
the shopping list vs cash recipient (2nd must fit 1st)
48
A major feeling theory of emotion
Thesis: emotions are sensations/“feelings” of pleasure and displeasure with varying intensities (e.g., Hume, Goldstein). Mnemonic: Hedonism for emotions!
49
A mental yet minimalist theory of emotion [Belief + desire theory]
Thesis: emotions are combinations of beliefs and desires (e.g. Marks). hope is the combination of the belief that something is possible/adness is the combination of the belief that something is absent
50
What is the problem with Belief + desire theory?
The theory struggles to account for the felt character of emotions since beliefs and desires lack what-it-feels-likeness
51
Judgment theory for emotions
Emotions are judgments that an object instantiates a certain value (e.g. Stoics, Plato, Solomon, Nussbaum). Example: to fear the furry spider is to judge that the furry spider is dangerous.
52
What is problem with Judgment theory for emotions?
theory struggles to account for the felt character of emotions since judgments (as cognitions) lack what-it-feels-likeness. struggles to account for the cognitive impenetrability of emotions.
53
What is Hedonic (tone) theory in the context of theories of emotions?
Hedonic (tone) theory in emotions proposes that emotions can be understood as sensations of pleasures and displeasures. It aligns with the theory of well-being known as Hedonism, where pleasure and pain are the primary indicators of an individual's well-being.
54
How does the James-Lange theory view emotions, and how is it related to experiences in theories of well-being?
The James-Lange theory views emotions as the sensations and feelings that arise from our bodily changes in response to stimuli. This theory relates to Experientialism in well-being, which values a breadth of "positive" experiences, as it suggests emotions are rooted in physical experiences.
55
What is the Belief-Desire theory of emotions, and how does it relate to the Desire-Satisfaction theory of well-being?
The Belief-Desire theory of emotions holds that emotions are representations of the belief-desire framework, where emotional states correspond to the satisfaction or frustration of desires. This parallels the Desire-Satisfaction theory of well-being, which posits that well-being is about having your desires fulfilled.
56
What are the Judgment, Perceptual, and Attitudinal theories of emotions, and how do they compare to the Objective List Theory of well-being?
The Judgment, Perceptual, and Attitudinal theories of emotions view emotions as evaluations: value judgments, value perceptions, or evaluative attitudes, respectively. These theories align with the Objective List Theory of well-being, which suggests that well-being is derived from achieving specific objective goods or values in life.
57
Perceptual theory on emotions
Thesis: emotions are perceptions of values instantiated by an object (e.g. Döring, Tappolet, Goldie). Example 1: to fear the furry spider is to perceive the dangerousness of the furry spider. Example 2: to admire the snowy mountain is to perceive the beauty of the snowy mountain.
58
What is the problem with Perceptual theory on emotions?
Problem: Perceptions are causally constrained, whereas emotions are not (see, e.g., emotions about the past, such as regret, or the possible, such as hope).
59
How do emotions relate to values according to the intuitive link?
Emotions are perceptions of evaluative concerns; for instance, fear is linked to danger, and admiration is linked to beauty. This connection explains the intelligibility of emotions and their correctness based on whether the value perceived is appropriate to the situation.
60
What do the formal affinities between values and emotions indicate, and how do they differ from obligations?
Values and emotions share formal affinities such as gradability (varying degrees), polarity (positive, negative, neutral), and variety (different types like moral, aesthetic, etc.). Unlike obligations, which are binary (obligated or not), values and emotions can be experienced and judged on a spectrum. For instance, one can feel varying levels of fear, and certain things can be more or less valuable.
61
How to understand emotions in terms of value?
Aboutness and the mental state vs. content distinction. aboutness (or “intentionality”) is the property that many mental states have of being about something (“directed at something”). Both the perceptual theory of emotions and the judgment theory of emotions locate the evaluative dimension in the content
62
How to understand emotions in terms of value? [How to understand emotions in terms of value?]
According to the attitudinal theory, emotions are sui generis mental states: emotions are not perceptions or judgment but mental states of a different, evaluative kind. They are “felt evaluative bodily stances”.
63
Attitudinal theory
Thesis: emotions are evaluative attitudes (e.g. Deonna and Teroni 2012). These evaluative attitudes are (i) bodily stances (ii) that prepare the body for action, (iii) get the object that they are about from a cognitive base such as perception or belief (direction of fit criterion, see the Anscombian example involving the shopping list and the receipt for this notion), (iv) are essentially evaluative and, therefore, valenced (valence criterion), (v) and are felt (what-it-feels-likeness criterion). ex - for you to fear the furry spider is for you to have the negative sensation of your body preparing you to react to the dangerous furry spider
64
Attitudinal theory problem
the theory is less economical than the other theories considered since it is anti-reductionist.
65
The problem of transformative experience
An experiential knowledge gap
66
What Experience Teaches?
The Knowledge Argument if Mary learns some information when she sees color for the first time, then physicalism is false. Physicalism or materialism: the thesis that the world is entirely physical, which entails that complete physical knowledge is complete knowledge +New abilities
67
The Problem of Transformative Experience
Experiential knowledge gap and suspect testimony 1. The experiential knowledge gap complicates the evaluation of your options (as a reminder, becoming a vampire forever or not) 2. A conflict between the core preferences of your human self and those of your vampire friends is likely. Therefore, the testimony of your vampire friends might not be relevant to you.
68
Transformative experience - definition?
An experience is transformative if and only if it is both epistemically transformative(teaches you something you could not have learned without going through that type of experience) and personally transformative(changes you fundamentally, including by impacting your core preferences).
69
What is Philosophy?
- Philosophy as the Armchair Discipline - Philosophy as the Parent of All Sciences
70
The main claim and its three parts about virtual reality
Virtual reality is genuine reality -Virtual worlds are not illusions or fictions, or at least they need not be. What happens in VR really happens. The objects we interact with in VR are real. [reality claim] - metaphysical -Life in virtual worlds can be as good, in principle, as life outside virtual worlds. You can lead a fully meaningful life in a virtual world. [value claim] - ethical -The world we’re living in could be a virtual world. I’m not saying it is. But it’s a possibility that we can’t rule out.” [knowledge claim] - epistemological
71
Potential reasons not to plug into the experience machine and why they can be irrelevant for VR?
Disconnection from reality (No, assuming virtual things are real.) Disconnection from non-artificial reality(Yes, but some/many of us already strive in artificial environments.) Agreeing to self-deception(No, virtual reality typically does not deceive you into thinking that virtual reality is non-virtual.) No personal development possible(Personal development would be possible since advanced VR would not be preprogrammed.)
72
Way to categorize values?
Intuitively, instrumental, intrinsic, and personal values do not constitute value families similar to the other value families below
73
Well-being Four options (popular in Western philosophy)
Hedonism - well-being as involving—overall—more pleasure than pain Experientialism - well-being as involving positive experiences. Desire-satisfaction Theory - well-being as involving satisfaction of desires. Objective List Theory - well-being as involving specific goods, such as human connection, the enjoyment of beauty, knowledge, etc.
74
Three (rough) ways of talking about goodness
Values as abstractions - properties such as liberty, equality and beauty Values as attitudes - when we speak of someone’s values, I believe we mean, roughly speaking, their preferences Values as quasi-quantities - we often speak of value in comparative, quasi-quantitative terms
75
Value characterization (2 criterions)?
- Quantitative criterion: a property F, such as liberty or compassion, is a positive value if the more our world contains of it, the better our world is. - Quantitative criterion: a property F, such as alienation or Schadenfreude (pleasure in someone’s else suffering), is a negative value if the more our world contains of it, the worse our world is.
76
What are Value categories?
moral aesthetic personal
77
Are Moral values and personal values connected?
There seems to be a connection between whether an act is right and the personal value it produces in others.
78
What is Instrumental value?
the value that something has as a means / for the sake of something else (e.g., the instrumental value of money).
79
What are Five dimensions of emotions in general and of being moved in particular?
Aboutness, general object, what-it-feels-like, (associated with certain)action-tendencies, and function.
80
Is being moved an emotion?[4 theories]
Theory 1: “Being moved” refers to a specific emotion. This is Julien Deonna’s claim in the paper. Theory 2: “Being moved” is a general phrase that covers any emotion. We use the phrase to refer to an emotion that we struggle or do not care to identify specifically or, possibly, an emotion that is metaphysically indeterminate. Theory 3: Being moved refers to an affective phenomenon. But that phenomenon does not qualify as an emotion. Theory 4: Being moved refers to a phenomenon. And that phenomenon is not affective. It might give us some intuitive access to value. Kevin Mulligan would speak of “being struck by value”.
81
Is being moved an emotion?
I was proven in class [Deonna] that it fits 5 criteria (dimensions of emotions) => then yes but there are Genevan disagreements (between Claparède and Deonna) [ being moved has no clear function]
82
What is Instrumental Value Regress?
The instrumental value of X derives from the instrumental value of Y, which derives from that of Z, and so on to infinity.
83
What are Challenge and a Response to instrumental value?
Aristotelian Challenge: We must identify the good(s) able to stop the Instrumental Value Regress. Traditional Response: All and only good(s) instantiating intrinsic value are able to stop the Instrumental Value Regress.
84
What are Eight intuitions for The intrinsically good?
Deontic (normative) accounts - Lovability(The Mona Lisa) Duty of Existence(justice) Modal accounts Isolation(happiness) Necessity(justice) Unimprovability (happiness vs. pleasure.) Unqualifiedness(The Good Will vs. happiness) Foundational accounts - Finality(happiness vs. money) Internality(organic unities such as human connection)
85
What skepticism does Feldman express towards the eight intuitions involving goodness?
Feldman is skeptical because he believes that the intuitions fail to account for the complexity of value. He argues that an item's goodness being considered intrinsic does not exclude it from also having non-intrinsic value.
86
How does Feldman respond to the interpretations of goodness in the definien as 'all-things-considered' and 'partly in itself'?
For the 'all-things-considered' interpretation of goodness, Feldman argues that something can have value beyond just its intrinsic worth. In response to the 'partly in itself' interpretation, he contends that partial goodness doesn't suffice for intrinsic value. The exception is with the 'Unqualifiedness' intuition, where he points out the problematic vagueness of 'intrinsic'.
87
Objetions to Feldman Feldman assumes (1) that only one type of value, namely moral value, should be intrinsic value. In the same vein, Feldman assumes (2) a narrow understanding of “moral philosophy” (or “ethics”) as focused on moral values narrowly understood. Feldman assumes (3) that intrinsic value must be necessary value.