Howard-Snyder against 'common view' of propositional faith Flashcards
what is the format of propositional faith?
faith that p
what does common view suggest?
‘faith that p’ requires ‘belief that p’, or must be partly constituted by it - ‘belief that p’ is necessary for ‘faith that p’
does Howard-Snyder think that ‘belief that p’ is necessary for ‘faith that p’?
no, he argues against this
outline Howard-Snyder’s view of propositional faith:
it must be constituted by what 4 things?
- positive evaluation of p (considering it to be good that p)
- positive cognitive orientation towards p (wanting it to be true)
- positive cognitive stance towards p (accepting, assuming, or believing that p)
- resilience in the face of counter evidence
what are the 4 aspects of Howard-Snyder’s argument against the common view?
- faith is compatible with doubt
- faith and surprise
- faith and probabilistic belief
- faith and acceptance
against the common view: faith compatible with doubt
To be in doubt about p is to not believe either p or not-p
Faith that p is compatible with doubt about p – can say ‘I have doubt that p but still have faith that p’
Whereas ‘belief that p’ is incompatible with doubt about p – when one believes that p, they have dispositions to assert p when asked whether p, to feel p to be true when considering whether p (these tendencies conflict with doubt)
T/F, having faith that p does not require believing that p because faith that p is compatible with doubt, which belief that p is incompatible with
against the common view: faith and surprise
Faith that p doesn’t require tending to be surprised at learning that not-p
(it does require tendency to be disappointed on learning that not-p)
Whereas ‘belief that p’ does require tendency to be surprised upon learning that not-p
T/F, faith that p does not require belief that p because it does not require tendency to be surprised at learning not-p (which is a requirement of belief)
against the common view: faith and probabilistic belief
One can have faith that p when they believe p is more likely than not-p but don’t believe p
However, one cannot believe p when they believe p is more likely than not-p but don’t believe p
T/F, faith that p does not require belief that p because you can have faith that p when you think it’s just more likely than not, but this is opposed to belief that p
against the common view: faith and acceptance
One can have faith that p when one merely accepts p but does not believe p
Dispositional profiles of acceptance and belief differ – e.g. acceptance is more hesitant
T/F faith that p does not require belief that p because acceptance can take the place of belief, as a positive cognitive stance towards p
evaluation
what is the Obama objection?
Suppose you believe Obama will win the election and think this would be a good thing and want him to win – Howard-Snyder’s account suggests this means you have faith that Obama will win
The issue is you don’t – t/f account must be incomplete; what’s missing?
What’s missing is that nothing counts as belief unless cognitive stance is resistant to contrary evidence
T/F Howard-Snyder’s account is incomplete so cannot stand against the common view
evaluation
Howard-Snyder’s response to the Obama objection
Agrees what’s missing is resilience to contrary evidence but resistance of one’s cognitive stance is not the only (nor a necessary) form of resistance to contrary evidence
Can also be manifested by disposition to behave in certain ways upon discovering new counter evidence
Suppose upon new counter evidence, your belief that Obama will win weakens perhaps to assumption, you can still have faith he will win
This faith shown by e.g. remaining resolved to work to get Obama votes (as we presume you were before the new counter evidence)
If you have faith, counter evidence would not ‘take the wind out of your sails’
T/F Obama objection is mistaken in thinking only measure of resilience of PT is based on cognitive stance
evaluation
propositional faith and disbelief objection
If PT does not require believing that p, is it compatible with disbelieving that p?
If so, this would make Howard-Snyder’s claim far more radical and open up a new area of objection towards his argument
evaluation
response to disbelief objection - PF not compatible with disbelief
dispositional profile of disbelieving that p would involve tendencies to behaviour, feeling, etc, at odds with faith that p
e.g. tendency to assert not-p when asked whether p; tendency to feel that not-p is true
T/F, ‘faith that p’ requires a positive cognitive stance (e.g. belief, acceptance, or assumption) but is not compatible with a negative cognitive stance (e.g. disbelief), though it is compatible with being in doubt about p
T/F this area of objection is shut down before it truly begins
in this essay I will…
s1: outline Howard-Snyder’s view of propositional faith
s2: outline Howard-Snyder’s arguments against common view
s3: evaluate these arguments
conclusion
do find Howard-Snyder’s arguments convincing:
intuitive - can apply it to one’s own ‘faith that p’ examples where one has doubt about p or has felt disappointment at learning not-p but not surprise
also deals well with objections I have covered
