How to OLG (normal case with PAYG-system later on)
Maybe all of this is not necessary with Lagrangian and Euler, because the tax is not timed on consumption. Therefore we could just write up the two new budget constraints and plug them into the optimal savings and capital accumulation.
Comment on the difference from without the PAYG: When we introduce a tax we will get lower savings and capital accumulation. The old people in period t_0 will support the PAYG system, due to the current young transfer a contribution directly to the current old. The current old will get a higher consumption, and interest benefit of that the they newer had to pay a contribution.
Sidenote: In contrast the current young will diasprove the new system, due to the assumed rate of interest is higher then the rate of return of social security, when r>n. They would be better off if they could invest the contribution in the private market. If then n was growing and higher then r, the young would approve the new system.
How to OLG (PAYG system, with migration)
The government makes a higher tax, to cover the greater number of people.
Same procedure up until optimal capital accumulation. the higher amount of people.
How to argument for dynamic efficiency
Are the current old individuals better or worse off in OLG (PAYG system and fully funded system, with migration).
No extra tax from the government, just migration of young and no fixed amount of capital.
Under PAYG:
Assuming all newcomers are employed and will be paying part of their salary as a social contribution, Current old people would be better off, because they receive a higher amount of benefits.
Under fully funded:
Because you have done the calculations with PAYG, you have to do the same with the fully funded system. The same as normally
budgets constraints look like this:
c_1t + s_t =(1-tax)w
c_2t+1 = R(s_t + tax*w)
In this case, the current old would be worse off, as there are no benefits for them in the fully funded system, where you pay your own benefits.