Gobbets Flashcards
CIA, Minutes, SECRET, “Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States Concerning Cuba,” 19 January 1962 (Richard Helms)
Memo for CIA director; post Bay of Pigs government wanted to “lay low”; looking at whether Castro could be overthrown - RFK in support; belief in dissatisfaction among Cubans, and suggested attack on sugar crop to keep Castro distracted
DOD, Memorandum, TOP SECRET, “Cover and Deception Plans for Caribbean Survey Group,” 19 February 1962 (Operation Northwoods)
Discussion about how to overthrow Castro - sugar crop came up again; focus on creating psychological fear of US invasion and internal unrest; wanted to destroy Castro from inside out; 4 strategies: psychological/economic harrassment, military readiness, funds and forces, plan to take precedence.
NSA Memo no. 181: “Presidential Directive on actions and studies in response to new Soviet Bloc Activity in Cuba” 23 August 1962
Addressed to Secs. Rusk and McNamara, RFK, Gen. Taylor and Dir. Of CIA; Kennedy’s response to Soviet activity in Cuba; encourages information gathering and supports escalation of Operation Mongoose; asks for analysis of impact of missiles and options for response
USSR Draft Directive to the Commander of Soviet Forces in Cuba on transfer of II-28s and Luna Missiles
8 September 1962
Notification that the USSR are sending more missiles to Cuba
DOD Transcripts “Meetings of the joint Chiefs of Staff Dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis” October - November 1962
Collation of notes from 2 months of meetings; JFK didn’t want military action due to Bay of Pigs legacy; didn’t want to do what Britain/France did in Suez; Soviets attempting to escalate nuclear situation without direct risk of retaliation; struggle between various parts of government
CollCIA Intelligence Estimate “Major Consequences of Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba” 20 October 1962
Various consequences of US actions (what Kennedy asked for in NSA memo no. 181); options are warning, blockade (partial or total) or use of force
Robert McNamara “Notes on Meeting with the President” 21 October 1962
In the midst of crisis (Oct 16-28); discussion of air-attack concept, but wouldn’t be able to take out all missiles - prbably 90%; couldn’t afford estimates because playing with nuclear war - nature of military and standards of war changed with nuclear weapons; any left over missiles would be launched at US city
JFK Speech on the Missile Crisis in Cuba 22 October 1962
Televised address to the nation to inform them of the Cuban situation; because televised not just addressing own nation but effectively foreign policy statement to globe; America to enact naval quarantine; extremely specific in details - and makes sure to demonstrate he is in control (repeated use of I)
Washington Post
American public scared and fearful as they believed themselves to be on the brink of nuclear war - many began hoarding food and gas in preparation
Dillon Group paper on “Scenario for Airstrike Against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in Cuba” 25 October
Day after naval blockade began; breaks down advantages and disadvantages of an airstrike; recommended airstrike, but that would be US act of aggression against small country; Dillon Group = ExComm (headed by Dillon)
Castro letter to Khrushchev 26 October 1962
Private letter urging Khrushchev to initiate a nuclear first strike against the US; believed US invasion of Cuba was imminent, and that airstrike could happen in 24-72 hours
Cable from Turkey ambassador Hare to State Dept. regarding Turkish missiles 26 October 1962
Hare encourages government to remove missiles from Turkey in order to contain the crisis to Cuba, and to maintain Turkey as an ally to the West
Cable to USSR Foreign Ministry with report of Dobrynin meeting with RFK on Worsening Threat 27 October 1962
Conversation carried out between Dobrynin and RFK on behalf of Khrushchev and JFK; followed news that unarmed American plane had been shot down over Cuba; RFK offers to repeal quarantine if Soviets halt missile building (also potentially the removal of Turkish missiles?); this report suggests RFK distressed
USSR Directive Presidium Instructions to Pliyev in Response to his Telegram 27 October 1962
Several telegrams sent between Khrushchev and USSR representatives in Cuba; mentioned that Castro willing to shoot down American aircraft; Castro willing to engage militarily, USSR agrees
USSR Directive Prohibition on Use of Nuclear Weapons without Orders from Moscow 28 October 1962
Telegram sent to Cuba from Moscow at 16:30, directing that nuclear weapons cannot be used without express orders from Moscow; makes clear who was in charge of events in the crisis; Cuba were a proxy; demonstrates how seriously the USSR took the crisis (and RFK’s threats?)
