General Hypnosis Flashcards
Increased activation in the *** is the most consistent finding in brain imaging studies of hypnotic suggestions and the hypnotic state.
(e.g. Rainville et al., 1997, 2002; Crawford et al.,
1998; Szechtman et al., 1998; Faymonville et al.,2000; Derbyshire et al., 2004).
Increased activation in the ACC ( anterior cingulate cortex ) is the most consistent finding in brain imaging studies of hypnotic suggestions and the hypnotic state.
(e.g. Rainville et al., 1997, 2002; Crawford et al.,
1998; Szechtman et al., 1998; Faymonville et al., 2000; Derbyshire et al., 2004).
** Second-order dissociated
control theory. **
Whereas dissociated control theory, as originally proposed by Woody and Bowers (1994), focuses on the functional dissociation of lower subsystems of control from executive control (a weakened path b in Figure 4.2), second-order dissociated control theory, as proposed by Jamieson and his colleagues (Jamieson and Sheehan, 2004; Egner et al., 2005; Jamieson and Woody, 2007), focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control from *** ** (a weakened path d)
** Second-order dissociated
control theory. **
Whereas dissociated control theory, as originally proposed by Woody and Bowers (1994), focuses on the functional dissociation of lower subsystems of control from executive control (a weakened path b in Figure 4.2), second-order dissociated control theory, as proposed by Jamieson and his colleagues (Jamieson and Sheehan, 2004; Egner et al., 2005; Jamieson and Woody, 2007), focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control from executive monitoring (a weakened path d)
Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated * theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive **.
Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated control theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control.
Kihlstrom (1994)
noted that using the label ‘**’ for certain psychopathologies is ‘somewhat vexatious,
because the term has a number of meanings
in psychology.
Kihlstrom (1994)
noted that using the label ‘dissociative’ for certain psychopathologies is ‘somewhat vexatious,
because the term has a number of meanings
in psychology.
Social cognitive theorists do not dispute the fact that profound alterations in consciousness can and often do occur during hypnosis.
They differ from traditional ** theorists, however, in that they consider the feeling of an altered state as merely one of the many subjective effects of suggestion.
Social cognitive theorists do not dispute the fact that profound alterations in consciousness can and often do occur during hypnosis.
They differ from traditional state theorists, however, in that they consider the feeling of an
altered state as merely one of the many subjective effects of suggestion.
Hilgard (1977), who appro-
priated the term ‘dissociation’ from Janet (1901), called his theory of hypnosis ‘nd****n
theory’ to distinguish it from some of Janet’s
ideas, such as the concept that people who show dissociation have a particular form of mental ** or biologically based **-mindedness.
Hilgard (1977), who appro-
priated the term ‘dissociation’ from Janet (1901), called his theory of hypnosis ‘neodissociation
theory’ to distinguish it from some of Janet’s
ideas, such as the concept that people who show dissociation have a particular form of mental deficit or biologically based weak-mindedness.
In **, the King of
France, Louis XVI, established a Commission
of Inquiry into Animal Magnetism (the fore-
runner of hypnosis). Known as the ‘Benjamin
Franklin Commission’, because it was presided
over by Benjamin Franklin, then American
Commissioner to France, its aim was to differ-
entiate ‘the instantaneous effects of the fluid
upon the animal frame excluding from
these effects all the illusions which might mix
with them’ (Tintertow, 1970, p. 93; see also
McConkey and Barnier, 1991). Using system-
atic methods of public observation, self-
study, case study and hypothesis testing, the
Commissioners sought to identify the true
causes of the effects of animal magnetism.
*1784
How does hypnotizability vary between children and adults?
Hypnotizability is substan-
tially higher among children than adults, and that it gradually tapers in a stable adult level throughout adolescence (Hilgard, 1970; Morgan
and Hilgard, 1972).
There may be adaptive developmental advantage in an ability to focus
attention in childhood.
A key
aspect of pain is that it grabs attentional
resources in a peremptory way (McCaul and
Malott, 1984). Norman and Shallice (1986) dis-
cuss such attention-grabbing qualities in terms
of the computer science concept of an ****.
A key
aspect of pain is that it grabs attentional
resources in a peremptory way (McCaul and
Malott, 1984). Norman and Shallice (1986) dis-
cuss such attention-grabbing qualities in terms
of the computer science concept of an interrupt.
An indi-
vidual experiencing a hallucination does not
have the conviction of ivss, nor does
an individual who tries to move but cannot
move necessarily have the conviction of external
** (Woody et al., 2005)
An individual experiencing a hallucination does not
have the conviction of involuntariness, nor does an individual who tries to move but cannot move necessarily have the conviction of external
reality (Woody et al., 2005)
EVOLUTION OF DISSOCIATION THEORIES -
JANET’S CONCEPT OF DISSOCIATION (early 1900’s) -
Janet’s (1901, 1907, 1925) original concept of ‘désagrégation,’ translated as dissociation, was a mechanism he proposed to underlie both hypnosis and hysteric disorders, which he viewed, like hypnosis, as suggestive phenomena. In dissociation, one of the subunits of mental life becomes split off from the rest, and thereby separated from both awareness and voluntary control.
HILGARDS NEODISSOCIATION THEORY (mid-late 1900s) -
Hilgard suggested understanding hypnotic dissociation in terms of hierarchal control systems, in brain.
Effective suggestions from the hypnotist take much of the normal control away from the subject. That is, the hypnotist may influence the executive functions themselves and change the hierasrchical
arrangements of the substructures. This is what takes place when, in the hypnotic context, motor controls are altered, perception and memory are
distorted, and hallucinations may be perceived as external reality (Hilgard, 1991, p. 98
DISSOCIATED EXPERIENCE THEORY (late 1900s) -
When the cognitive control system that executes the response to a hypnotic suggestion is dissociated from conscious awareness, [the subject] will experience that response as automatic and nonvolitional… however, that experience is illusory—obviously, there is some executive control involved in hypnotic
responding, even if the hypnotized [subject] does not experience it as such (Kihlstrom, 1992, p. 308). The executive role can remain the same, but actions are experienced as being automatic, due to an illusion caused by disassociation in monitoring process.
DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY (late 1900s)
Originally proposed by Woody and Bowers in 1944. Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated control theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control. The essence of this theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994,
p. 57): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of behavior, but how it is controlled’. According to dissociated control theory, hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of a role for executive control than is typical for otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior. The experience monitoring can be a true reflection of an over-ride of control.
** ** DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY -
Suggests that during hypnosis executive control becomes dissociated from executive monitoring.
Works on the assumption that each executive decision gives birth to a branch of lower level feedback and choices, due to the constantly changing demands that the quest might entail. Eg if i decide to go open the door a set of behavior is set into action, which will require other (lower level) decisions, in order to complete task. These are conflict triggered - eg a shoe in front of door would require a new decision. The disruption in recognizing that original decision (to open door) as being related to lower level decisions (moving foot) could cause experience to fragment, as those lower level dedications to higher level decisions seem like isolated events. This is due to a disruption in recognizing what one is doing as being related to choices one has made.
‘Thus, it stands to reason that if hypnosis increases mismatch due to the functional dissociation of executive control from monitoring, these mismatches would strikingly alter the hypnotic subject’s sense of agency.’
Unlike the original ‘dissociated control theory’, executive control may remain intact. Ie subject may make complex higher level decisions.
EVOLUTION OF DISSOCIATION THEORIES -
JANET’S CONCEPT OF DISSOCIATION (early 1900’s) -
Janet’s (1901, 1907, 1925) original concept of ‘désagrégation,’ translated as dissociation, was a mechanism he proposed to underlie both hypnosis and hysteric disorders, which he viewed, like hypnosis, as suggestive phenomena. In dissociation, one of the subunits of mental life becomes split off from the rest, and thereby separated from both awareness and voluntary control.
HILGARDS NEODISSOCIATION THEORY (mid-late 1900s) -
Hilgard suggested understanding hypnotic dissociation in terms of hierarchal control systems, in brain.
Effective suggestions from the hypnotist take much of the normal control away from the subject. That is, the hypnotist may influence the executive functions themselves and change the hierasrchical
arrangements of the substructures. This is what takes place when, in the hypnotic context, motor controls are altered, perception and memory are
distorted, and hallucinations may be perceived as external reality (Hilgard, 1991, p. 98
DISSOCIATED EXPERIENCE THEORY (late 1900s) -
When the cognitive control system that executes the response to a hypnotic suggestion is dissociated from conscious awareness, [the subject] will experience that response as automatic and nonvolitional… however, that experience is illusory—obviously, there is some executive control involved in hypnotic
responding, even if the hypnotized [subject] does not experience it as such (Kihlstrom, 1992, p. 308). The executive role can remain the same, but actions are experienced as being automatic, due to an illusion caused by disassociation in monitoring process.
DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY (late 1900s)
Originally proposed by Woody and Bowers in 1944. Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated control theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control. The essence of this theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994,
p. 57): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of behavior, but how it is controlled’. According to dissociated control theory, hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of a role for executive control than is typical for otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior. The experience monitoring can be a true reflection of an over-ride of control.
SECOND ORDER DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY -
Suggests that during hypnosis executive control becomes dissociated from executive monitoring.
Works on the assumption that each executive decision gives birth to a branch of lower level feedback and choices, due to the constantly changing demands that the quest might entail. Eg if i decide to go open the door a set of behavior is set into action, which will require other (lower level) decisions, in order to complete task. These are conflict triggered - eg a shoe in front of door would require a new decision. The disruption in recognizing that original decision (to open door) as being related to lower level decisions (moving foot) could cause experience to fragment, as those lower level dedications to higher level decisions seem like isolated events. This is due to a disruption in recognizing what one is doing as being related to choices one has made.
‘Thus, it stands to reason that if hypnosis increases mismatch due to the functional dissociation of executive control from monitoring, these mismatches would strikingly alter the hypnotic subject’s sense of agency.’
Unlike the original ‘dissociated control theory’, executive control may remain intact. Ie subject may make complex higher level decisions.
From a ** **** perspective, the experience of being in a trance is merely a response to suggestion, just like all of the other responses to suggestion that occur during hypnosis.
Specifically, it is a response to a suggestion to
become hypnotized, a suggestion that is termed a hypnotic induction (Wagstaff, 1998). It is for this reason that nonstate theorists (e.g. Kirsch,1997) have endorsed Hilgard’s (1973) proposal that the domain of hypnosis can be defined without reference to the induction of an altered state. If this were accepted, the distinction between waking suggestibility and hypnotic suggestibility would *****.
From a social cognitive perspective, the experience of being in a trance is merely a response to suggestion, just like all of the other responses to suggestion that occur during hypnosis.
Specifically, it is a response to a suggestion to
become hypnotized, a suggestion that is termed a hypnotic induction (Wagstaff, 1998). It is for this reason that nonstate theorists (e.g. Kirsch, 1997) have endorsed Hilgard’s (1973) proposal that the domain of hypnosis can be defined without reference to the induction of an altered state. If this were accepted, the distinction between waking suggestibility and hypnotic suggestibility would disappear.
Mesmer’s theory was discredited in 84, by
a French royal commission chaired by Benjamin ****
- 1784
* * Benjamin Franklin
According to the Oxford Handbook of hypnosis, what are the three most common traits of highly hypnotizable people?
Specific characteristics of the highly hypnotizable individual include the following:
- Being trusting of others. Highly hypnotizable
individuals have been shown to be evaluated
by others as finding it easy to trust (Roberts
and Tellegen, 1973). While this ability to
suspend critical judgment and incorporate
suggestions, instructions or direction from
others could be seen as a vulnerability
(H. Spiegel, 1974), it also represents an apti-
tude for sociability, for co-operation in social
relationships, that has adaptive value for a
species that is thoroughly social. - Intense imagination. Highly hypnotizable
individuals are known for imaginative
involvements (Hilgard, 1970), a proneness to
engage in vivid and seemingly real imagina-
tive experiences. Hypnosis has also been
referred to as ‘effortless experiencing’ (Bowers,
1983, originally published 1976), in which the intensity of imagination is accompanied by a
lack of metaconsciousness, or awareness of
being engaged in attention and imagination
(Spiegel, 1990). This type of mental experi-
ence has the potential to enhance creative
opportunities (Zamore and Barrett, 1989;
Gawler, 1998; Moene and Joogduin, 1999;
Barber, 2000). - Living in the present. Highly hypnotizable
individuals tend to live in the present, rather
than worrying about past and future (Spiegel
and Spiegel, 2004). This capacity to dissociate
past and future concerns in the service of
focus in the present is a highly valued goal of
Eastern Buddhist meditative techniques
(Kabat-Zinn et al., 1985, 1992, 1998; Kabat-
Zinn, 1994). This is seen in Eastern tradition
as producing equanimity, an ability to absorb
and put into perspective the stressors of
everyday life.
—
Despite the
implications of the Svengali myth, there is no appreciable **** difference in hypnotizability.
(Weitzenhoffer and Weitzenhoffer, 1958)
Despite the implications of the Svengali myth, there is no
appreciable gender difference in hypnotizability (Weitzenhoffer and Weitzenhoffer, 1958), and any difference there might be should not be taken too seriously, as the literature on gender differences presents a host of interpretive difficulties (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974; Tavris, 1992; Hyde, 2005).
Stereotypically ‘feminine’ individ-
uals are no more hypnotizable than stereotypi-
cally ‘masculine’ ones (Kihlstrom, 1980).
A pure version of dissociated
experience theory stipulates that hypnotic suggestions are enacted voluntarily, in the same way
as nonhypnotic behavior. According to this
account, the crucial difference is that in hypnosis, volition is not *** correctly and hence the subject has the illusion of involuntariness.
A pure version of dissociated
experience theory stipulates that hypnotic suggestions are enacted voluntarily, in the same way
as nonhypnotic behavior. According to this
account, the crucial difference is that in hypnosis, volition is not monitored correctly and hence the subject has the illusion of involuntariness.
Hypnotisability rate among humans is high, which suggests it might have given us an evolutional advantage.
Why might this be?
When being hunted or attacked by a predator, the ability to immobilize oneself or even feign death may enhance the chances of
survival. Also, the ability to focus on critical
tasks involving planning, searching for food and protecting family while avoiding distractions also has survival advantage. Thus, individuals with considerable hypnotic capacity may well have had adaptive advantages that allowed them to procreate successfully and pass on their genes.
From this perspective, hypnotizability is not
some arcane phenomenon elicited only under
unusual circumstances (Mesmer’s paquets, dangling watches or circling spirals), but rather represents a commonly employed alteration in
consciousness.
Second-order dissociated control theory, differs from the original dissociated control theory in that it assumes the phenomenon of hypnosis is caused by a disruption between executive control and executive monitoring, whereas dissociated control theory, as originally
proposed by Woody and Bowers (1994), focuses on the functional dissociation of * **** of control from executive control.
Second-order dissociated control theory, differs from the original dissociated control theory in that it assumes the phenomenon of hypnosis is caused by a disruption between executive control and executive monitoring, whereas dissociated control theory, as originally
proposed by Woody and Bowers (1994), focuses on the functional dissociation of lower subsystems of control from executive control.
The experience of *** is what distinguishes a suggestion from an instruction (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 1980); non-
*** involvement (Shor, 1959, 1962, 1979) is also what distinguishes hypnotic experience
from mere behavioral compliance.
The experience of involuntariness
is what distinguishes a suggestion from an
instruction (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 1980); non-
conscious involvement (Shor, 1959, 1962, 1979)
is also what distinguishes hypnotic experience
from mere behavioral compliance
Hypnosis theories are often dichotomized into ** and *** theories, with social cognitive theories being the most prominent exemplars of ** theories.
Hypnosis theories are often dichotomized into state and nonstate theories, with social cognitive theories being the most prominent exemplars of nonstate theories.
George Estabrooks, a leading authority on hypnosis before its current revival, said of **: ‘We can, I think, make out a very convincing case that basically **’s emotional domination of the crowd … was only the attack of the stage hypnotist one step removed’ (Estabrooks, 1943/1957)
George
Estabrooks, a leading authority on hypnosis
before its current revival, said of Hitler: ‘We can,
I think, make out a very convincing case that
basically Hitler’s emotional domination of the
crowd … was only the attack of the stage hypno-
tist one step removed’ (Estabrooks, 1943/1957,
pp. 120–121).
In 1843 James Braid concurred with the rejection of ** theory, emphasized the role of *** and coined the term ‘hypnotism’.
Braid concurred with the rejec-
tion of magnetic theory, emphasized the role of suggestion and coined the term ‘hypnotism’.
Hilgard (1991, see also 1977, 1979, 1992) argued that ‘most phenomena of hypnosis can be
conceived of as **’
Rather than being the control, its the mog which is disrupted.
Hilgard (1991, see also 1977, 1979, 1992) argued
that ‘most phenomena of hypnosis can be
conceived of as dissociative’ .
He suggested that actions performed under hypnosis might be executed normally, but differ from the waking state in subjects ability to recognize and relate to the choice, due to a process of amnesia.
This became known as the ‘dissociated experience theory ‘.
The
essence of dissociative control theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of
behavior, but how it is controlled’.
According to dissociated control theory,
hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of
a role for executive control than is typical for
otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior.
Thus, a pure version of this theory stipulates that the hypnotic subject’s experience of nonvolition and effortlessness—rather than being merely an illusion, as in dissociated experience theory—accurately reflects a genuine change in the usual *** of *** that governs behavior.
The
essence of dissociative control theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of
behavior, but how it is controlled’. As mentioned
earlier, according to dissociated control theory,
hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of
a role for executive control than is typical for
otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior.
Thus, a pure version of this theory stipulates that the hypnotic subject’s experience of nonvolition and effortlessness—rather than being merely an illusion, as in dissociated experience theory—accurately reflects a genuine change in the usual hierarchy of control that governs behavior.
A pure version of dissociated
experience theory stipulates that hypnotic suggestions are enacted **, in the same way
as *** behavior.
According to this
account, the crucial difference is that in hypnosis, volition is not *** correctly and hence the subject has the illusion of ****.
A pure version of dissociated
experience theory stipulates that hypnotic suggestions are enacted voluntarily, in the same way
as nonhypnotic behavior. According to this
account, the crucial difference is that in hypnosis, volition is not monitored correctly and hence the subject has the illusion of involuntariness.
Hilgard’s
‘hidden **’ is a metaphor for the continuing subconscious representation of the pain
stimulus.
Hilgard’s
‘hidden observer’ is a metaphor for the continuing subconscious representation of the pain
stimulus.
What is the hypnotizability rate of people with schizophrenia?
Interestingly, hypnotizability is generally
quite low among people with schizophrenia
(Lavoie and Sabourin, 1973; Spiegel et al., 1982;
Pettinati et al., 1990; Frischholz et al., 1992),
who lack the ability to control attentional
processes and maintain awareness of informa-
tion at different levels of abstraction (Shakow,
1974; Spiegel and Spiegel, 2004)
Although ** is
a frequent metaphor used in hypnotic inductions, and **** is a typical accompaniment
to hypnosis, we now know that neither is neces-
sary for hypnosis to occur (Banyai and Hilgard,
1976; Alarcon et al., 1999).
Although sleep is
a frequent metaphor used in hypnotic inductions, and relaxation is a typical accompaniment
to hypnosis, we now know that neither is necessary for hypnosis to occur (Banyai and Hilgard,
1976; Alarcon et al., 1999).
Is dissociation a common everyday occurrence?
Can it be dangerous?
In and of itself, dissociation is not pathological.
It is a universal phenomenon that has a biological
base and carries adaptational value for survival.
It is ubiquitous in children as a coping strategy.
Its temporary, mild use in adults can be protective and helpful. However, when dissociation
takes over one’s perceptual and cognitive style;
when it becomes one’s primary coping strategy;
or when it becomes so severe that a person
ceases to track entering and exiting dissociation,
and no longer maintains awareness of experi-
ences held within different subjective realms,
then dissociation becomes problematic
The Franklin Commission’s studies of the role of imagination in mesmerism are recognized today as the first experiments in ** (Kihlstrom, 2002)
The Franklin Commission’s studies of the role of imagination in mesmerism are recognized today as the first experiments in psychology (Kihlstrom, 2002)
Although Puysegur had
offered a psychological theory of animal magnetism, in terms of the influence of the magne-
tizer’s will on the subject, ** (1855) also
offered the first psychophysiological theory of hypnosis, involving ***—the concen-
tration of attention on a single object.
- Braid
- Monoideism
Although Puysegur had
offered a psychological theory of animal magnetism, in terms of the influence of the magne-
tizer’s will on the subject, ** (1855) also
offered the first psychophysiological theory of hypnosis, involving monoideism—the concen-
tration of attention on a single object.
Following his experiments in 1933, on subjects who had undergone formal hypnotic induction vs those who had not, what did Hull conclude?
Following his experiments in 1933, Hull concluded that ‘no phenomenon whatever can be produced in hypnosis that can-
not be produced to lesser degrees by suggestions given in the normal waking condition’ .
In Hull’s studies, the
exact same hypnotic suggestions were given
with and without induction of hypnosis. These
experiments revealed that the effect of inducing hypnosis is relatively small—‘probably far less than the classical hypnotists would have supposed had the question ever occurred to them’ and that hypnotic and
nonhypnotic suggestibility is very highly corre-
lated. Hull’s research has since been replicated
in several other laboratories (Weitzenhoffer
and Sjoberg, 1961; Barber and Glass, 1962;
Hilgard and Tart, 1966; Tart and Hilgard, 1966;
Braffman and Kirsch, 1999, 2001), all using
the same basic design and yielding the same
basic results
Perhaps the most interest-
ing developmental finding to date is of an age-by-gender interaction, such that women of
*** age tend to be more hypnotizable
than their male counterparts (A. H. Morgan and
Hilgard, 1973).
Perhaps the most interest-
ing developmental finding to date is of an age-
by-gender interaction, such that women of
childbearing age tend to be more hypnotizable
than their male counterparts (A. H. Morgan and
Hilgard, 1973). On the assumption that most of
these women were in fact stay-at-home moth-
ers, one interpretation of this finding is that
a capacity for hypnosis is sustained in parents—
male or female—who participate in their chil-
dren’s imaginative involvements (J. R. Hilgard,
1970).
EVOLUTION OF DISSOCIATION THEORIES -
JANET’S CONCEPT OF DISSOCIATION (early 1900’s) -
Janet’s (1901, 1907, 1925) original concept of ‘désagrégation,’ translated as dissociation, was a mechanism he proposed to underlie both hypnosis and hysteric disorders, which he viewed, like hypnosis, as suggestive phenomena. In dissociation, one of the subunits of mental life becomes split off from the rest, and thereby separated from both awareness and voluntary control.
****’S NEODISSOCIATION THEORY (mid-late 1900s) -
** suggested understanding hypnotic dissociation in terms of hierarchal control systems, in brain.
Effective suggestions from the hypnotist take much of the normal control away from the subject. That is, the hypnotist may influence the executive functions themselves and change the hierasrchical
arrangements of the substructures. This is what takes place when, in the hypnotic context, motor controls are altered, perception and memory are
distorted, and hallucinations may be perceived as external reality (*, 1991, p. 98
DISSOCIATED EXPERIENCE THEORY (late 1900s) -
When the cognitive control system that executes the response to a hypnotic suggestion is dissociated from conscious awareness, [the subject] will experience that response as automatic and nonvolitional… however, that experience is illusory—obviously, there is some executive control involved in hypnotic
responding, even if the hypnotized [subject] does not experience it as such (Kihlstrom, 1992, p. 308). The executive role can remain the same, but actions are experienced as being automatic, due to an illusion caused by disassociation in monitoring process.
DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY (late 1900s)
Originally proposed by Woody and Bowers in 1944. Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated control theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control. The essence of this theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994,
p. 57): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of behavior, but how it is controlled’. According to dissociated control theory, hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of a role for executive control than is typical for otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior. The experience monitoring can be a true reflection of an over-ride of control.
SECOND ORDER DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY -
Suggests that during hypnosis executive control becomes dissociated from executive monitoring.
Works on the assumption that each executive decision gives birth to a branch of lower level feedback and choices, due to the constantly changing demands that the quest might entail. Eg if i decide to go open the door a set of behavior is set into action, which will require other (lower level) decisions, in order to complete task. These are conflict triggered - eg a shoe in front of door would require a new decision. The disruption in recognizing that original decision (to open door) as being related to lower level decisions (moving foot) could cause experience to fragment, as those lower level dedications to higher level decisions seem like isolated events. This is due to a disruption in recognizing what one is doing as being related to choices one has made.
‘Thus, it stands to reason that if hypnosis increases mismatch due to the functional dissociation of executive control from monitoring, these mismatches would strikingly alter the hypnotic subject’s sense of agency.’
Unlike the original ‘dissociated control theory’, executive control may remain intact. Ie subject may make complex higher level decisions.
EVOLUTION OF DISSOCIATION THEORIES -
JANET’S CONCEPT OF DISSOCIATION (early 1900’s) -
Janet’s (1901, 1907, 1925) original concept of ‘désagrégation,’ translated as dissociation, was a mechanism he proposed to underlie both hypnosis and hysteric disorders, which he viewed, like hypnosis, as suggestive phenomena. In dissociation, one of the subunits of mental life becomes split off from the rest, and thereby separated from both awareness and voluntary control.
HILGARDS NEODISSOCIATION THEORY (mid-late 1900s) -
Hilgard suggested understanding hypnotic dissociation in terms of hierarchal control systems, in brain.
Effective suggestions from the hypnotist take much of the normal control away from the subject. That is, the hypnotist may influence the executive functions themselves and change the hierasrchical
arrangements of the substructures. This is what takes place when, in the hypnotic context, motor controls are altered, perception and memory are
distorted, and hallucinations may be perceived as external reality (Hilgard, 1991, p. 98
DISSOCIATED EXPERIENCE THEORY (late 1900s) -
When the cognitive control system that executes the response to a hypnotic suggestion is dissociated from conscious awareness, [the subject] will experience that response as automatic and nonvolitional… however, that experience is illusory—obviously, there is some executive control involved in hypnotic
responding, even if the hypnotized [subject] does not experience it as such (Kihlstrom, 1992, p. 308). The executive role can remain the same, but actions are experienced as being automatic, due to an illusion caused by disassociation in monitoring process.
DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY (late 1900s)
Originally proposed by Woody and Bowers in 1944. Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated control theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control. The essence of this theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994,
p. 57): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of behavior, but how it is controlled’. According to dissociated control theory, hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of a role for executive control than is typical for otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior. The experience monitoring can be a true reflection of an over-ride of control.
SECOND ORDER DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY -
Suggests that during hypnosis executive control becomes dissociated from executive monitoring.
Works on the assumption that each executive decision gives birth to a branch of lower level feedback and choices, due to the constantly changing demands that the quest might entail. Eg if i decide to go open the door a set of behavior is set into action, which will require other (lower level) decisions, in order to complete task. These are conflict triggered - eg a shoe in front of door would require a new decision. The disruption in recognizing that original decision (to open door) as being related to lower level decisions (moving foot) could cause experience to fragment, as those lower level dedications to higher level decisions seem like isolated events. This is due to a disruption in recognizing what one is doing as being related to choices one has made.
‘Thus, it stands to reason that if hypnosis increases mismatch due to the functional dissociation of executive control from monitoring, these mismatches would strikingly alter the hypnotic subject’s sense of agency.’
Unlike the original ‘dissociated control theory’, executive control may remain intact. Ie subject may make complex higher level decisions.
How did Benjamin Franklin’s report, the first biological theory of hypnotism, conflict the popular view of mesmerism which went before it?
It specifically dismissed Mesmer’s theory of magnetic influence, but not the interpersonal power of the imagination.
A major transition in conceptions
of hypnosis had begun in 1784, even before the
Franklin Commission had completed its work,
when Puysegur magnetized Victor Race, a
young shepherd on his estate. Instead of under-
going a magnetic crisis, Victor fell into a sleep-
like state in which he was nonetheless responsive
to instructions, and from which he awoke with
*** for what he had done
*Amnesia
In the 190s and 190s, social cognitive theorists (Sarbin,; Barber) began to elucidate an alternative understanding of hypnosis,
one that rejected the idea that a special state of consciousness is needed to explain either the experience of hypnotic suggestions or the increase in suggestibility following the induction of hypnosis.
In the 1950s and 1960s, social cognitive theorists (Sarbin,; Barber) began to elucidate an alternative understanding of hypnosis,
one that rejected the idea that a special state of consciousness is needed to explain either the experience of hypnotic suggestions or the increase in suggestibility following the induction of hypnosis.
*** is central to hypnosis. On the
HGSHS:A and SHSS:C, hypnosis is induced by
suggestions for relaxation, focused attention
and eye closure; and hypnotizability is measured
by response to suggestions for arm catalepsy,
age regression, auditory hallucination, post-
hypnotic amnesia, and the like. The connection
between hypnosis and ** is so strong
that the two domains have been concatenated
throughout the modern history of the field
(Bernheim, 1886/1889; Hull, 1933; Weitzenhoffer,
1953; Braffman and Kirsch, 1999; Kirsch and
Braffman, 2001)
Suggestion is central to hypnosis. On the HGSHS:A and SHSS:C, hypnosis is induced by suggestions for relaxation, focused attention
and eye closure; and hypnotizability is measured by response to suggestions for arm catalepsy, age regression, auditory hallucination, post-hypnotic amnesia, and the like. The connection between hypnosis and suggestion is so strong that the two domains have been concatenated throughout the modern history of the field
(Bernheim, 1886/1889; Hull, 1933; Weitzenhoffer,
1953; Braffman and Kirsch, 1999; Kirsch and
Braffman, 2001)
