General Defences Flashcards

1
Q

Bowater v Rowley Regis Corporation

A

Scott LJ: a man cannot be said to be truly ‘willing’ unless he is in a position to choose freely, and freedom of choice predicates, not only full knowledge of the circumstances on which the exercise of choice is conditioned, so that he may be able to choose wisely, but the absence from his mind of any feeling of constraint so that nothing shall interfere with the freedom of his will.

Plea of volenti failed as the claimant did not have the freedom to make a choice. He was forced to obey the foreman’s orders.

Obiter: if an employee is paid ‘danger money’ to undertake employment with a risk of considerable danger to the employee, the defence of volenti may succeed. In such a case, the employee had a free choice on whether or not to embark on that employment.

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2
Q

Smith v Baker

A
  1. The claimant was not in a position to make a free choice as to whether he should continue working in a situation with a risk of injury to himself.
  2. In the early 19th century, employees were assumed to consent to the risks attached to their jobs as the courts did not believe that the relationship of employer/employee was an equal one and an employee may have been afraid not to go to work for fear of losing their job.
    > As a response to societal and political changes at the end of 19th century, judicial thinking changed as in this case.
    > The approach taken in this case has been followed since it is unusual for a volenti defence to succeed in an employer/employee situation.
    > The defendant raised the defence of volenti, alleging that the claimant knew that it was a dangerous practice and had complained that it was dangerous but continued anyway.
    > The court rejected this argumnt because although the claimant knew of the risk and continued to work, there was no evidence that he had voluntarily undertaken the risk of injury.
  3. Merely to work does not indicate voluntary consent.
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3
Q

Nettleship v Weston

A

Defence of volenti did not apply; as the friend had checked the defendant’s insurance cover, that meant that he did not abandon his rights to compensation. His damages were reduced by 50 er cent to reflect the degree of his own fault.

Lord Denning: Knowledge of the risk of injury is not enough. Nothing will suffice short of an agreement to waive any claim for negligence. The plaintiff must agree expressly or impliedly to waive any claim for any injury that may befall him due to lack of reasonable care by the defendant: or more accurately due to the failure by the defendant to measure up to the duty of care which the law requires of him.

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4
Q

White v Blackmore

A

It is rare for the courts to imply agreement to accept a risk.

Defence of volenti did not succeed as he had agreed to the risk of racing but not the negligent construction of the spectator area. However, the notices were effective in excluding liability for his death.

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5
Q

Wooldridge v Sumner

A

The claim failed as there was no breach of duty. However, the court said that consent to risk of injury is not enough as there must be consent in full knowledge of the nature and risk of property.

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6
Q

Pitts v Hunt

A

Volenti was not available due to the provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1988, and the claim failed.

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7
Q

Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell

A

Defence of volenti succeed because the employee was not under pressure to take a risk but deliberately chose a dangerous way in which to work.

The claimant and his brother had not taken the recognised precautions when testing detonators.

Defence succeeded, because the claimant was fully aware of the risk he was taking by not taking precautions and had consented to the risk and potential damage.

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8
Q

Condon v Basi

A

Question for the court: what was the standard of care expected of a football player? As part of this, the court considered what risks were acceptable.

The court decided that the standard of care varies, according to the level of expertise the player has.

The defendant was in breach of duty as the tackle was reckless, even with regards to the standard expected of a local league player.

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9
Q

Sayers v Harlow Urban District Council

A

Claim in false imprisonment failed but she succeeded in negligence. However, her damages were reduced, as she had been contributory negligence when she tried to escape. Has she not done so, she would not have been harmed at all.

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10
Q

Jayes v IMI (Kynoch) Ltd

A

A claimant can be 100 per cent contributory negligence and this would have the same effect as the defence of volenti.

The claimant was held to be 100 percent contributory negligence, after he admitted that he knew that what he had done was foolish.

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11
Q

Anderson v Newham College

A

It suggested that Jayes had been decided per incuriam and it should not be followed.
> If the fault lies entirely with the claimant, the defendant cannot be at fault as the chain of causation has been broken.
> A claimant’s contributory negligence should reduce the defendant’s liability, not get rid of it completely.

The college was found to have failed to keep the floor free of articles likely to cause a trip. However, the claimant was greatly to blame, as he was not looking where he was going.

At trial, the claimant’s damages were reduced by 90 per cent for his contributory negligence. Both the claimant and the defendant appealed.

The court held there was a breach of duty. Liability was apportioned at 50/50, because it would have been reasonably practicable to turn the board around and the claimant should have been looking where he was going.

The court aid that Jayes should not be followed by trial judges and it should continue to be ‘a decision which probably is confined to its own facts’.

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12
Q

Gough v Thorne

A
  1. Lord Denning: there is no age under which a child cannot be held to be contributory negligence. However, the expected knowledge and awareness of a child at a particular age will be considered.
  2. At trial, the claimant’s contributory negligence was assessed at 30 per cent, but on appeal, the Court of Appeal disallowed the deduction.
    > Lord Denning: a very young child cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. An older child may be; but it depends on the circumstances. A judge should only find a child contributory negligence if she was old enough that she could reasonably be expected to take precautions for her own safety: a child, even at 13, has not the same road sense as an adult.
  3. The court held that taking into account her age, she had not fallen below the expected standard of care and was not contributory negligence.
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13
Q

Yachuk v Oliver Blais Co. Ltd

A

The court held the seller liable. The child was not found to be contributory negligence at all, as he could not be expected to know the dangers of playing with petrol.

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14
Q

Evans v Souls Garage

A

Defendant was found to be negligent when he illegally sold petrol to underage boys, but damages were reduced by one-third for contributory negligence, as the claimant knew that playing with petrol was dangerous.

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15
Q

Probert v Moore

A

Claimant was not contributory negligence in any way.

Pittaway QC J: an ordinary 13 year old should not be expected to consider taking the same level of precautions as an adult. It would be asking too much of her to say that she should not have started to walk home at all, waited for her mother or accepted a lift, or should not have started to walk home without borrowing a high visibility jacket, reflective markings or torch from stables.

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16
Q

Jackson v Murray and Another

A

Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 was considered.

Lord Reed confirmed that S1(1) gives very little discretion to the courts when apportioning blame. However, in his judgement, he stated that the court should take into account the blameworthiness of the parties and the relative importance of the claimant’s actions.

On the last appeal, damages are to be reduced by 50% as the claimant did not look left before stepping out and it was unreasonable for a child at the age of 13 to do so.

17
Q

Froom v Butcher

A

Claim succeedd but damages were reduced by 20 per cent.

Lord Denning: whenever there is an accident, the negligent driver must bear by far the greater share of responsibility. It was his negligence that caused the accident. It also was a prime cause of the whole of the damage. But in so far as the damage might have been avoided or lessened by wearing a seatbelt, the injured peson must bear some share.

The share of blame would depend on the level of injury.

Lord Denning suggested that the reduction in damages should range between 15 and 25 per cent.

18
Q

Smith v Finch

A

Griffith J’s obiter dicta: cyclists who are not wearing helmets when they suffer an injury should be held liable for those injuries, if it can be shown on the balance of probabilities hat a helmet would have prevented them.

The court applied the logic in Froom v Butcher: that is, if motorists had to wear seatbelts then cyclists had to wear helmets.

It also looked to the Highway Code, which says that cyclists should wear helmets, but a cyclist is not legally obliged to wear a helmet.

In this instance, the injuries responsible for the claimant’s disabilities were caused by an injury from which a helmet would not have protected the claimant. So there was no reduction for contributory negligence.

19
Q

HC Sinclair v Joyner

A

The claimant was 25 per cent contributory negligent as she had failed to assess and act upon what would have been a clear hazard to her. As the defendant had hit the claimant, it would have been clear that there was insufficient room to pass.

However, in relation to the claimant’s contributory negligence, the court said: ‘No court has yet decided that failing to wear a helmet amounts to contributory negligence, although they have come close.’

20
Q

Ashton v Turner

A

The court denied compensation to the claimant for reasons of public policy.

21
Q

Kirkham v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester

A

The claim succeeded but the court said that the defence covered both illegal and immoral acts.

22
Q

F v West Berkshire Health Authority

A

The patient is able to give consent but refuses treatment, the doctor may face a battery claim if this refusal is ignored.

23
Q

Southwark London Borough Council v Williams

A

Case law shows that the courts are reluctant to allow a defence of necessity to succeed, as it means that a loss may be inflicted on the claimant, oarticularly in relation to trespass to land.

Lord Denning: if homelessness were once admitted as a defence to trespass, no one’s house would be safe. Necessity would open a door which no man could shut. It would not only be those in extreme need who would enter. There would be others who would imagine that they were in need or would invent a need, so as to gain entry.

24
Q

Roe v Minister of Health

A

Mistake.

The question is whether the risk of harm is foreseeable at that time.

25
Q

Road Traffic Act 1988

A

S149: volenti is not available where a passenger in a car sues the driver and the driver should have compulsory insurance.

26
Q

Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945

A
  1. Less willing to use the defence of volenti as they apportion blame using this Act.
  2. Contributory negligence has become a partial defence.
  3. S1: the damages recoverable: ‘shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage’.