General Flashcards
Ancient Philosophy
Epistemology: what- how justify- source
skepticism: Socrates
Rationalism:
- knowledge comes from reasoning
- Plato
- nativism
- anamnesis/ reincarnation
- universal concepts because of world of ideas
- distinction: true knowledge/ opinion
- everything is changing, we can only acquire doxa, not episteme
- > allegory of the cave: universal concepts apply in world that is ever changing
- Meno anamnesis
probl: very extreme
Empiricism:
- Aristotle
- source of knowledge are the senses
- empiricist principle
- induction + unfailing capacity of the mind that some abstractions are necessary truths (intuitive induction -> universal concepts)
probl: lacks critical view towards general statements
Aquinas tied Aristotle to the bible -> no experiments
Bacon
reaction to: Aristotle& experiments
- new method:
1. abandon prejudices
2. empirical method
-> allowed to do experiments
3. induction
-> mix of perception and understanding (rationalist element)
Good science: use of observation + rationalist inference
-> be careful, check if general claim holds in other settings
Descartes
reaction to: sceptics, Plato (too radical)
less radical rationalism
method to acquire certain knowledge:
- radical doubt
- clear and distinct insights
ideas:
- innate (nativism)
- acquired
- invented
optimism that true knowledge is possible
Newton and Descartes changing the worldview of the time, often mentioned together (mechanization of the word view)
The British empiricists: Locke
- Rejection of inborn ideas
- formulation of the empiricist principle
- perception and reflection - ideas (knowledge)
- simple ideas: senses, reflection, perception
- complex ideas: mode (beauty), substance, relation (family)
problem: we infer properties, not substance, how do we infer substance? - qualities (leave an idea in us)
- primary qualities: properties that exist on their own independent of perception
- secondary qualities: substances that exist because there is a perceiver
The British empiricists: Berkley
Idealism: metaphysical view that reality is mental
To be, is to be perceived
primary properties are also secondary properties
no denial of physical word, but denial of substance
constant observer of the world= god
-> problems in his reasoning
The British empiricists: Hume
knowledge via senses impressions result in ideas in our minds (copy principle) simple and complex ideas problem: non existent complex ideas -> reduction to existing simple ideas
real problem:
- we use causality when we reason about the world (priority, contiguity, necessity)
- necessity can’t be perceived
- > empiricists not justified to use the idea of causality
- > skepticism
- > attempts to save knowledge via induction (constant conjunction) are invalid
=| Bacon: proper science uses induction
Kant
reaction to Hume (who woke him up): tried to save Newtonian laws, optimistic to gather real knowledge
agrees with Hume: we cannot determine through the senses what is true (not able to justify causality with empiricism)
but: there can be knowledge
combination of rationalism and empiricism to justify knowledge
-> different kinds of judgments:
a priori/ a posteriori
analytic/ synthetic
distinction noumenal/ phenomenal world
transcendental philosophy:
- forms of sensation
- categories of reason (quantity, quality, relation (causality), modality
-> synthesis: sensory input classified by reason
- Copernican turn: we impose structure upon the world (we don’t discover its structure)
- a priori (everything comes in time and space and in a category)
one of those is causality, if cannot be otherwise that things appear as causes and effects
synthetic a priori, rescued knowledge
problems:
- no knowledge about noumenal world, sensations, causality (category of phenomenal world)
- synthetic a priori cannot be falsified (Newtonian laws)
- almost agreeing with the sceptics
positivism: Comte
reaction to: success of natural sciences (although still trying to defeat the sceptics) -> what about social sciences?
positivism: apply method for natural sciences to social sciences
Comte’s law of three stadia
-> scientific stage: explanation in terms of causal and mechanical effects
Hermeneutics: Dilthey
reaction to: positivism arose, criticized by hermeneutics which is too subjective and not a science
people are more than just physical objects, they fall outside of order of cause and effects
verstehen/ erklaeren
problems:
- never getting rid of own background and interpretations -> not objective (contemporary hermeneutics)
- not possible to say anything about inner life of others (not able to check) (neo-positivists)
- interpreting others sometimes not possible if lack of subjective understanding. Erklaeren always possible (hempel on verstehen)
Logical positivism & Wittgenstein 1
before: Kant (safe knowledge), positivism (Comte), hermeneutics (Dilthey)
Wittgenstein 1:
- interested in the “higher”, separation of sense and nonsense
- meaning depends on reference (correspondence theory of truth and meaning)/ picture theory of meaning
- we cannot say anything about the higher
Logical positivism: (get rid of incomprehensible philosophy) (empiricists)
- Rejection of meaningless statements
- > if not meaningful, remove. psychology = behaviorism because can be checked - Logic
- positivism
- > philosophy of science - unified science
- > DN model - Need for demarcation criterion (verifiability/ confirmability)
problems:
- no good demarcation criterion
- DN: induction
- DN: theoryladenness
Popper
reaction to: LP, induction free science & better demarcation criterion
LP: observation -> general law (via ind.) -> confirmation (via ind.) = looking for support
Popper: problem -> hyp. -> try to refute = look for refutation
critical rationalism:
- Falsification (4 points)
- Nativism (and Induction)
- inborn expectations - critical rationalism
- exp -> dogmatic thinking (induction machines). Be careful! accept if possible to falsify
- knowledge is always hypothetical - critical rationalism
- accepts innate knowledge
- science is rational and tries to falsify (uses deduction)
problems:
- pseudoscience also makes falsifiable claims
- falsification based on induction (black swan)
-> no progress of science without induction
-> modern emp. (LP) as well as modern rationalism (popper) -> scientific method to acquire knowledge
but fail to provide demarcation criterion
constructivism & relativism (Wittgenstein 2)
W 1: meaning depends on reference
W 2: meaning depends on use
meaningful within a context (a language game to illustrate)
- private language argument
- LP: possible
- W 2: not possible (because needs to be checked)
- > not really a constructivist/ relativist but influenced the real constructivists
constructivism & relativism (Kuhn)
reaction to LP and popper failing with demarcation criterion: descriptive science
paradigm: theory-laden, like a language game but about science
- prescientific period
- normal science (paradigm accepted)
- abnormal science (crisis)
- revolution (new paradigm), back to 1
- paradigms exclude each other (incommensurability)
- change like a rift, in the middle of the night, no two paradigms at the same time
- progress =| change (progress only within paradigm)
- Kuhn says that theory-ladeness determines what there is (not just what I see compared to the objective facts)
- > no access to objective facts
- > not better, just different (new paradigm)
Problems:
- no way to compare paradigms to find consensus (gestalt switch) but: rejecting one means comparison judgement (even though we can’t compare)
-> dem. crit: having a paradigm (psychology then not really a science)
constructivism & relativism (Feyerabend)
traditions = Kuhns paradigms
traditions follow each other but are not better
against method: pro sciences, against monopoly of knowledge
anything goes: methodological anarchism
- knowledge as a sea of alternatives
- freedom of methodology in education
problems with relativism and constructivism:
- Kuhn: compared paradigms although he can’t (incommensurability)
- everything is relative, truth depends on paradigm (but should then be generally true) (contradiction of relativism)
- science is not a democratic method, not the majority rules
pro relativism:
- different background theories lead to different observations (rabbit duck example)
- > find demarcation criterion instead of saving science from relativism
constructivism & relativism (Lakatos)
reaction to: save normativity of science, improve falsification as demarcation criterion of Popper
(popper not strong enough, Kuhn denied progress)
sophisticated falsificationism:
- dogmatic falsificationsim
-> problematic because of theory-ladeness of observation
- methodological falsificationism
=> problematic because is should not be theory vs experiment but theory vs theory vs empirical basis
- sophisticated falsificationsim
- research programs
- trying to stick to core of RP
- incommensurability theses incorrect, we can compare Rps and we try to find out which are better (with heuristics)
- positive and negative heuristics
- progressive and degenerative RP
- progressive: predicts more & successful. real RP and series of scientic theories
conclusion:
- Kuhn and Feyerabend: relativists and constructivists (severe problems with these ideas)
- Lakatos: attempt to make poppers falsificationism stronger, accept set of demarcation criteria
- according to Kuhn: not a normative alternative to his views
Lakatos’ demarcation criteria:
- working with a research program
- should be progressive
- abandon degenerative research programs
psychology a science?
not entirely clear:
what is a RP
is it progressive? -> replication crisis