Gender Flashcards

1
Q

Gender

Shorrocks (2018)
Data/Methodology

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?)

A
  • The analysis combines waves 2–4 of the European Values Study (EVS) and waves 3–6 of the World Values Survey (WVS), producing a data set spanning from 1989 to 2014.
  • 13 European Countries included: Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Finland, West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.
  • Dependent variables are left-right self-placement, and left-wing vote intention, based on who respondents said they would vote for in a general election
  • Independent variables are birth year and female.
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2
Q

Gender

Shorrocks (2018)
Findings

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?)

A
  • There is a gender-generation gap in Europe and Canada; in older cohorts men are more to the left than women, whilst in younger cohorts, women are more to the left than men
  • In all countries except Ireland and West Germany there is a gender generation gap in left-right self-placement, and in all countries except Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France there is a gender-generation gap in vote intention; there is no gender gap or a traditional gender gap among the older cohort, and a new, flipped gender gap among the younger cohorts
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3
Q

Gender

Shorrocks (2021)
Findings

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?)

A
  • Women and men have differing policy positions on many issues; women, especially younger women, are more likely to be supportive of more social spending and redistribution and, policies to protect the environment, and men are more likely to vote for parties which adopt more militaristic stances
  • Political parties that emphasize economically left-wing, pro- environmental, and internationalist policy positions seem the most likely to see gender vote gaps in support
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4
Q

Gender

Yildrim (2021)
Findings

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?)

A
  • There are statistically significant gender differences in most individual policy categories, with the gender gap being larger for issues such as war, health policy, poverty, education, and children’s and family issues (in favour of women, and budget deficit, inflation, and foreign policy (in favour of men)
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5
Q

Gender

Sanders and Shorrocks (2019)
Argument

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?)

A
  • The impact of policies enacted between 2010 and 2017 did have a gendered effect, but this effect was not the same for different generations; whilst younger women were more anti-austerity, more pessimistic about their economic position, and therefore less likely to be supportive of the conservative party than their male counterparts, this did not hold for older women, who were more protected by the coalitions policies on pensions and more similar to men in their assessment of their economic situation
  • The way in which policy affects women does contribute towards the gender gap in political attitudes because the gender gap is most present in women who are most affected by these policies.
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6
Q

Gender

Sanders and Shorrocks (2019)
Data/Methodology

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?)

A

They examine the relationship between economic pessimism and vote choice for the 2015 and 2017 general elections.

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7
Q

Gender

Sanders and Shorrocks (2019)
Findings

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?)

A
  • In both elections, men under 35 were more likely to vote conservative and less likely to vote labour than women under 35, and that once economic pessimism is included, these gender differences shrink significantly, showing that women’s larger financial pessimism than men play a role in accounting for gender gap in the vote.
  • Different levels of economic insecurity also goes some way to explain gaps between older women’s voting and younger women’s voting; the age differences among women also shrink when economic pessimism is included in the model

However: Economic perceptions may be endogenous to party support; those who support the incumbent party (in this case, the conservatives) may be more likely to hold optimistic views on the economic situation.

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8
Q

Gender

Harteveld and Ivarsflaten (2018)
Argument

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?) (RRP)

A

Women are more likely to be motivated to control prejudice than men, and those who are highly motivated to control prejudice are less likely to support extreme right parties

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9
Q

Gender

Harteveld and Ivarsflaten (2018)
Methodology/Data

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?) (RRP)

A

Representative survey data from Europe

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10
Q

Gender

Harteveld and Ivarsflaten (2018)
Findings

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?) (RRP)

A
  • Among virtually all European Radical right electorates, women are underrepresented, often constituting only around a third of their voters
  • Whilst there is not a universally present or substantial gender gap in attitudes towards immigrants, women score significantly higher than men on the scales of motivation to control prejudice
  • When respondent’s motivation to control prejudice is controlled for, the gender gap shrinks to insignificance
  • For the Norwegian progress party, a right-wing populist party which is successful at diffusing charges of inciting prejudice, taking the motivational measure into account does not explain the gender gap in voting. This further supports their claim that for parties that do have a reputation of perpetuating prejudice, motivation to control prejudice affects their vote from women.

However: A gender gap still exists even when motivation to control prejudice doesn’t contribute significantly to it, such as in Norway, suggesting that this is not the only reason in the gender gap in the vote for radical right parties

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11
Q

Gender

Oshri et al (2022)
Argument

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?) (RRP)

A
  • Women tend to vote for radical right parties less than men because women are more risk averse, and risk averse voters are less inclined to vote for radical right-wing parties.
  • Voting for populist radical right parties is risky because they have a significantly smaller chance of winning seats in parliament, so voters will risk wasting their vote and because these parties have little parliament experiences and question and campaign against the political establishment.
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12
Q

Gender

Oshri et al (2022)
Data/Methodology

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?) (RRP)

A
  • Data from the European Social Survey and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
  • To operationalize PRRPs’ electoral strength, they employed the following three measures: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if these parties had ever entered parliament in the past, PRRPs’ vote share in the last national election preceding the survey, the share of seats in the national legislature, determined at the last national election preceding the survey
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13
Q

Gender

Oshri et al (2022)
Findings

What is the Gender Gap in ideology/vote choice? (/and why?) (RRP)

A
  • Risk averse voters are less likely to support the populist right and that women are more risk averse
  • There is a smaller discrepancy in vote populist right parties which are deemed less risky to vote for; when parties had previously entered parliament, the probability for female voters to support them was more than double what it was when they had not previously entered parliament

**However: Different electoral systems have different levels of risk attached to voting for extreme parties – maybe should take this into consideration **

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14
Q

Gender

Edlund and Pande (2002)
Argument

Gender Differences in Political Attitudes - Change over time

A
  • Decreased marriage rate and increased divorce rate has changed women’s economic position, leading them to now have preferences for left-wing parties over right-wing parties.
  • Not being married makes men richer and women poorer, causing more unmarried than married women to support left wing policies and parties and vice versa for men, creating a change in the gender gap as marriage rate decreases over time.
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15
Q

Gender

Edlund and Pande (2002)
Data/Methodology

Gender Differences in Political Attitudes - Change over time

A
  • Survey data from the biennial National Election Studies (1964-1996) to examine whether changes in aggregate divorce risk affected male and female political preferences differently
  • Three waves of the Youth Parent Socialization Survey to directly examine how changes in marital status affect an individual’s party affiliation
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16
Q

Gender

Edlund and Pande (2002)
Findings

Gender Differences in Political Attitudes - Change over time

A
  • There is a correlation between divorce risk and the gender gap that is robust to controls of labour force participation and individual’s attitudes on social and religious issues.
  • Divorce had a significant gender differential effect on political preferences, turning men, but not women, away from the democratic party.
  • These effects are confined to only the middle-income group, for whom the economic effects of marriage are significant enough to affect people’s political preferences, suggesting this is because of the effect of marriage on women’s and men’s economic position
17
Q

Gender

Emmenegger and Manow (2014)
Argument

Gender Differences in Political Attitudes - Change over time

A
  • Religiosity is a powerful predictor of voting decisions, especially in countries with a strong religious cleavage.
  • Competition over religious voters is restricted, as left parties with their anticlericalism are simply not an electoral option for voters with any attachment to the church.
  • Given the higher degree of religiosity among women, women could not credibly threaten to become socioeconomic swing voters and switch to a left party, allowing religious parties to ignore women’s socioeconomic interests; as the degree of religiosity declined in the electorate, including amongst women, political parties began to compete for the female vote by catering more towards women.
18
Q

Gender

Emmenegger and Manow (2014)
Data/Methodology

Gender Differences in Political Attitudes - Change over time

A
  • Data from the World Value Survey and the Eurobarometer Surveys - Eurobarometer is a biannual survey conducted in all EU member states with around 1,000 respondents per country
  • Focus on Church attendance for indicator for religiosity (it ties religiosity to existing institutions instead of more abstract religious concepts and values, captures the element of social control that is central to our argument, enables them to use the same variable in both datasets and across all countries)
19
Q

Gender

Emmenegger and Manow (2014)
Findings

Gender Differences in Political Attitudes - Change over time

A
  • Religiosity has a strong negative effect on the intention to vote for left parties.
  • Religiosity is a more powerful predictor of vote intention than labour-market position and marital status
  • In countries where there is a strong religious cleavage the effect of religiosity, such as Italy and West Germany, the effect on left-right self-placement is greater than in countries without a strong religious cleavage, such as Great Britain
  • Gender differences in voting substantially decrease once religiosity is controlled for
20
Q

Gender

Shorrocks (2018)
Argument

Gender Differences in Political Attitudes - Change over time

A
  • Secularisation has played a key role in the changing of gender gaps in political attitudes over time
  • It is not women’s changing ideology or policy position that is accountable for the change in voter gap, but a change in the way in which these ideologies are translated into votes.
21
Q

Gender

Shorrocks (2018)
Data/Methodology

Gender Differences in Political Attitudes - Change over time

A
  • The analysis combines waves 2–4 of the European Values Study (EVS) and waves 3–6 of the World Values Survey (WVS), producing a data set spanning from 1989 to 2014.
  • 13 European Countries included: Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Finland, West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.
  • Dependent variables are left-right self-placement, and left-wing vote intention, based on who respondents said they would vote for in a general election
  • Independent variables are birth year and female.
  • Religious self-identification and church attendance are measures of religiosity.
22
Q

Gender

Shorrocks (2018)
Findings- Religiosity

Gender Differences in Political Attitudes - Change over time

A
  • Older cohorts of women are more religious than their male counterparts, causing them to be more right-wing, whereas in younger cohorts, religiosity declines, the gender gap in religiosity decreases, and the salience of religiosity for political positions declines.
  • The new gender gap emerges because of women’s greater support for economic equality, redistribution, and state intervention
  • Once religiosity and its salience are accounted for, the difference between older men and women becomes insignificant and the change in the size of the gender gap across cohorts is much reduced
  • Women of all cohorts have more left-wing economic attitudes than men, but this is not translated into votes for women of older cohorts as their greater religiosity overrides these positions

However: Religiosity could be endogenous to changing ideology

23
Q

Gender

Gillion et al (2018)
Argument

Gender Differences in Political Attitudes - Change over time

A

The partisan gender gap arose due to ideological party sorting driven by liberal and conservative social movements increasingly associating with the democratic and republican parties, respectively. They claim that men have consistently held more conservative policy views than women, and these differences caused women and men to sort into parties that matched their ideologies.

24
Q

Gender

Carreras (2018)
Findings

Gender difference in Political Participation

A

Women are more likely to vote but less likely to participate in other ways

25
Q

Gender

Dassonneville and McAllister
Data and Findings

Gender difference in Political Participation

A

Data:

  • Cross-national survey data from the CSES over 106 election years, and the ESS across a sample of 27 years

Findings

  • Men are more knowledgeable about politics in every single instance bar one - Chile in 2005.
  • Result occurs even when controlling for compositional differences such as age and education.

However: Women more likely to report ‘don’t know’ (see Mondak)

26
Q

Gender

Mondak (2004)
Argument and Findings

Gender difference in Political Participation

A
  • Women are less likely to guess answers than men on both multiple-choice and free-response questions, they get lower scores for factual knowledge quizzes.
  • Rerunning the 1998 NES Pilot quiz without the ‘don’t know’ option reduces the observed gap by approximately 50%.
27
Q

Gender

Weeks
Argument

Gender difference in political participation

A

Mental load is uneven among men and women in the household as women take on more child-rearing roles that require more of an ongoing mental engagement – this bigger cognitive load crowds out space for women’s political engagement