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poly sci 14u > Game Theory > Flashcards

Game Theory Flashcards

1
Q

assumption about players

A

assumed to be rational actors: ordered/complete/transitive preferences. Players maximize according to their preferences.

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2
Q

unitary actor assumption

A

states with a single set of preferences

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3
Q

utilities

A

units of value realized by players at outcomes (situations the players’ decisions lead to)

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4
Q

strategies:

A

series of choices players follow in games (more complicated = more strats.)

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5
Q

Nash Equilibria Solution concepts

A

best response

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6
Q

normal form/ extensive form games:

A

matrix v. tree representation style (should allow us to anticipate what players will do)

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7
Q

game of chicken

A

i.e. reduce nuclear armaments or dire scenario pollution

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8
Q

cooperation game

A

climate change, need some sort of commitment mechanism

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9
Q

extensive form games

A

permits more complicated actions, represents sequences and info constraints (i.e. 2 players deciding to demand/not then force/not then resist/not) can include crisis/conflict subgame)

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10
Q

war started by your side

A

is better than war started by their side

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11
Q

apology game

A

both issuing apologies, worst outcome is neither issuing apologies

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12
Q

hero game

A

leader unselfishly takes cost/ supplies reward to other player (i.e. friendly fire)

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13
Q

prisoner’s dilemma

A

neither= bad individual benefits, long term losses (tit for tat) they would need to communicate with one another to cooperate. i.e. arms races, security dilemmas,

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14
Q

no nash equilibrium

A

a player with no payoff

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15
Q

assurance game

A

need institutional or other arrangements or else (there are these collective action failures)

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16
Q

Olson Logic

A

size proportions, (large= difficult to form), group composition problem (large members pay more, hetero = success more likely), institutional recommendations, smaller= less anonymity (easier to observe freeriding) and coordi. is easier to achieve

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17
Q

exploitation hypothesis

A

if they’re all the same they can’t benefit one another as much

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18
Q

private inducements/ selective incentives

A

complementary may reduce free-rider tendency, joint products, institutional structures. Cost sharing induces collective action

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19
Q

robert axelrod

A

situations are iterated/repeated= higher success for cooperation (tit for tat)

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20
Q

tit for tat

A

wins because can be provoked, not complicated, (never varies)nice, (never 1st to defect) forgives

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21
Q

private goods

A

food consumed, energy burned (yes)

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22
Q

inexhaustible

A

language, software (no)

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23
Q

common goods

A

fisheries, pastures, atmosphere (yes)

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24
Q

collective/public goods

A

IOs, peace & security, clean air, fresh water (no)

25
Q

logic of collective action

A

since every member enjoys provided goods, incentive to freeride, (Olson)- could be underprovided or not at all

26
Q

institutional recommendations

A

can be rewarded for contributing, i.e. NRA

27
Q

homogenous groups

A

more likely to survive (put a higher value on a good)

28
Q

priveleged actor

A

provides collective good for the rest of the group (ie. NATO)

29
Q

environmental freeriding

A

montreal protocol(CFC regulation), Kyoto protocol (greenhouse gas), long-range transboundary air pollution agreement

30
Q

tragedy of the commons

A

any commonly available resource will be overused b/c the benefits of overuse are private and costs are public i.e. pastures, fisheries, atmostphere (closure movement in britatin)

31
Q

solutions to tragedy of the commons: moral persuasion

A

social pressure or public interest campaigns (not expected to save the commons) ie. blood donations

32
Q

solutions to tragedy of the commons: privatization:

A

cost of it not being commons, can save commons

33
Q

solutions to tragedy of the commons: coercive regulation

A

penalizes over-users to make cost of overuse private (creates disincentive)

34
Q

examples of solved commons: whales

A

int’l whaling commission, not privatization, weak sheriff at best (norway and Japan pay other states for their quotas)

35
Q

examples of solved commons Ozone:

A

montreal protocol (UV light, krill)

36
Q

examples of solved commons int’l law of the sea

A

“exclusive economic zones” 200 nautical miles out to sea, seize vessels out harvesting (even fossil fuels)

37
Q

ostrom’s rules for commons management

A

clearly defines boundaries and membership, rules have to make sense locally, members/those affected must be in on rule modification, monitors have to be members, graduated sanctions, no interference from above.

38
Q

when threshold included all countries

A

nash equilibrium is the social optimum

39
Q

free market assumptions

A

large # of small “buyers” small “sellers”, perfect mobility, perfect knowledge, homogenous product, unrestricted entry/exit

40
Q

sources of market failure (noncontributers are externalities?)

A

externalities (unprices costs/benefits), non-competitive, pure public goods, commonly owned property rights incomplete info. market distortions (ie. tariffs or subsidies)

41
Q

externalities

A

uncompensated interdependency among 2 or more agents (reg. transboundary pollution, flows of refugees from civil war, pos. state A eliminates a drug cartell that operated in multiple states.)

42
Q

problem w/ externalities

A

too many negative and too few positive ones , positive ones aren’t rewarded, collective good characteristics

43
Q

imperfect/assymetric info

A

one actor is better informed about interaction, prevents market from correctly pricing goods-

44
Q

hidden action: imperfect/assymetric info

A

uninformed actor cannot observe actions of informed actor, moral hazard

45
Q

hidden type:imperfect/assymetric info

A

uninformed doesn’t know informed actor’s type/preferences- adverse selection problems: only extremists (no moderate)

46
Q

aggregation tech and public goods

A

agg. tech. indicates how individual contributions affect the overall level of public goodavailable for the group, usually assume a summation tech where add each others contribution (i.e. great lakes in US and Canada is prisoner’s dilemma, natural disasters chicken)

47
Q

national good

A

us gov’t provides domestic infrastructure

48
Q

regional public good

A

EU provides infrastructure, governance, environmental protection

49
Q

global PG

A

UN provides peacekeeping missions, global governance, knowledge/tech sharing

50
Q

national= favorable

A

state gov’ts have direct incentive, loans from developmental banks can be helpful

51
Q

regional: moderately favorable

A

“new regionalism” many new IGOs that coord. group action, small group, iteration (ie. all island states)

52
Q

trans-regional: challenging

A

high transaction costsacross regions due to distances, less iteration, larger group (more languages etc)

53
Q

global: moderately favorable

A

strong IGOs that coord. higher prob of a privileged actor.

54
Q

subsidiarity

A

promotes matching of IGOs jurisdiction w/ spillover range (doesn’t always include all affected by good, too little of good will provided.) no recipients are charged= inefficent
doesn’t usually work b/c of rainforests (carbon sequestriation, rainforest benefits)

55
Q

irrational behavior

A

blood donation in US, voting in nat’l elections, volunteering for public causes, failing to exploit an exhaustible resource, recycling, tipping waiters on vacation

56
Q

utility equations

A

risk averse, neutral and loving (coin flip for money or nothing for $4)

57
Q

kahneman and Tversky’s Alternative prospect theory

A

losses vs. gains

58
Q

ultimatum game

A

$10 to 2 players, p 1 picks, p2 accept/reject, worse than 70/30 was rejected.

poly sci 14u (5 decks)

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