Gambling behaviour - Cognitive theory Flashcards
Cognitive Theory of Gambling Addiction:
Key Assumptions
The Cognitive Approach focuses on how we process information and explains gambling behaviour in terms of cognitive distortions or maladaptive thought patterns i.e. faulty thinking and cognitive biases, which become habitual and therefore lead to the development and maintenance of the behaviour.
Cognitive explanations assume that all individuals are equally susceptible to developing addictions, unlike certain biological models e.g. genetic predisposition.
Cognitive explanations are thought to offer a better account of behavioural addictions, such as gambling.
GAMBLING: FAULTY THINKING
According to this approach, gambling addiction is the result of faulty judgements, e.g. we will win or at least be able to control the odds, using our “lucky numbers” on the lottery - so lucky that you’ve never won anything with them!
The Gambler’s Fallacy
Assuming previous events will influence future events, which are in fact entirely random e.g. coin toss – assuming that three heads in a row will be balanced out by the opposite outcome (same number of tails), when in fact the flips are independent.
Illusions of Control
The individual believes that they can directly manipulate the outcome of the event through superstitious behaviours e.g. kissing dice before throwing. They might also show an exaggerated self-confidence in their ability to influence chance e.g. believing they can ‘beat the system’.
The ‘Near Miss’ Bias
the gambler may think that they are constantly nearly winning, not constantly losing.
Recall Bias (Availability Bias)
Remembering and overestimating wins; forgetting about/rationalising losses (losses won’t necessarily act as a disincentive for future gambling).
Flexible Attributions
When the gambler explains wins as due to his/her skill and losses to other influences e.g. bad luck.
‘Just World’ Hypothesis
Gamblers believe they ‘deserve’ to win having lost so often on previous occasions.
Griffiths (1994): aim
To investigate cognitive biases involved in gambling behaviour
Griffiths (1994): procedure
The study took place in an amusement arcade.
Griffiths compared 30 regular gamblers (who played fruit machines more than once a week) with 30 non-regular gamblers (who played less than once a month) – this was the main independent variable.
Each individual was given £3 to spend playing a fruit machine (‘Fruitskill’) in the arcade. Each gamble was 10 pence (30 gambles).
They were given the objective of staying on the machine for 60 gambles and making back the £3, which would enable them to continue gambling if they wished to do so.
Griffiths recorded the gamblers’ verbalisations (what they said they were thinking) whilst they were playing – ‘thinking aloud’ method. This was the main dependent variable, although he also made objective measurements of skill (how skilled they actually were on the machine), as well as subjective measures of skill perception (how skilled they ‘thought’ they were) by conducting post-experimental interviews.
Griffiths (1994): findings
Regular gamblers believed they were more skilled than they actually were.
Regular gamblers were more likely to make irrational statements during play. For example:
‘the machine hates me’
‘this fruity is in a good mood’
‘I had a feeling it was going to chew up those tokens fairly rapidly’
26 of the 30 regular gamblers believed success was either due to skill or equally chance and skill, whereas the majority of the non-regular gamblers believed the game was ‘mostly chance’ and none believed it involved any ‘skill’.
Regular gamblers also explained losses by seeing ‘near misses’ as ‘near wins’ to justify their continuation.
One-third of the regular gamblers continued playing until they had lost all their money, whereas only two of the non-regular gamblers did so.
Griffiths conclusions
He concluded that gambling may be maintained through irrational beliefs, e.g. regular gamblers thought that they were more skilful than they were (exaggerated self-confidence) and that they could manipulate the fruit machine (illusions of control).
This is due to the faulty attributions gamblers make. They also had cognitive distortions about how close they came to winning and the nature of the machine they were using.
Griffiths (1994): Evaluation of procedure
A major strength of this study was the amount and type of data collected:
The behavioural data such as fruit machine gambling was quantitative, allowing for comparisons and statistical analysis.
The qualitative data collected from the verbalisations were quantified using content analysis, again allowing statistical comparisons.
The transcripts and the post experimental semi-structured interview also provided qualitative data allowing the research greater insights into the heuristics used by the participants.
The ’thinking aloud’ method was a very useful way of assessing private thought processes as participants gambled. However, this technique may not have captured all of the thoughts of the participants, for example, some participants may have censured their thoughts, would not be able to put their thoughts into words and there were periods of time (up to 30 seconds) when the participants were silent.
High ecological validity: The study was carried out in an actual amusement arcade on a typical fruit machine.
Low inter-rater reliability of the coding system - Griffiths completed the coding of the verbalisations himself and had a second researcher code the same results, but the inter-rater reliability was low.
Demand characteristics: The participants were aware they were being studied and may have responded when verbalising their thoughts, playing the fruit machine or responding to the interview in ways they thought the experimenter wanted them to.
Social desirability bias, particularly with the regular gamblers – they may have been dishonest about their gambling activities to researchers.
Sample bias: As with all volunteer samples we can question whether the participants are representative. There was only one female in the regular gamblers condition, although young males are far more likely to be involved in regular fruit machine gambling than females.
Research support for the role of cognitive biases in problem gambling
There is a large body of evidence (Griffiths, 1994; Rogers’, 1998) demonstrating the presence of high rates of cognitive biases in populations of problem gamblers, suggesting that irrational beliefs are what sustains the gambling habit.
what did rogers do
Rogers (1998)
Examined cognitive biases amongst those who buy lottery tickets.
He found evidence of cognitive biases in the reasoning behind buying a lottery ticket.
For example, a belief in personal luck, the illusion of control, unrealistic optimism and gambler’s fallacy (assuming previous events will somehow influence future events).
This suggests that cognitive biases exist across other forms of gambling, not just those who play on fruit machines.