FRP Flashcards
You have entered the FRP and determined that PBA-S03 will be powered by the B EDG in order to start the ‘A’ HPSI pump.
Describe standard appendix 58 including AO actions, important communication points, and coordination efforts to start ‘A’ HPSI as soon as possible.
Direct and AO to perform attachment 58-A.
Ensure major breakers on both PBA and PBB are open.
Place containment fans in pull to lock.
Attachment 58-A will disable ‘A’ EDG, and reset relays on PBA-S03.
Then the AO will verify all major breakers open, then will disable breakers by opening 125VDC control power breakers. At this point they will report that breakers will be disabled. The AO will continue the attachment by tripping 86 LO relays and reenergizing control power with the 1st being ‘A’ HPSI pump.
When the AO reports all breakers has been disabled, the RO will have the AO clear the room, and then re-energize PBA-S03. When ‘A’ HPSI has control power indication, the RO will have the AO stand clear. ‘A’ HPSI will then be reset from the control room and should automatically start.
The AO will then continue tripping 86s for all remaining breakers.
A loss of off-site power has occurred.
NBN-X03 has had a sudden over pressure trip.
AFA-P01 was tagged out for maintenance.
‘A-EDG tripped on electrical differential.
‘B’ EDG tripped on low lube oil pressure and oil is reported to be all over the room.
What safety functions will be jeopardized.
What standard appendix will be used to mitigate the event?
MVAC-4, HR-1.
Standard Appendix 83, Align Unit 2 DGA to Unit 1 PBB-S04.
The unit is in a blackout condition.
AFA-P01 had an overspeed trip in the AO has been unsuccessful in attempting to reset the trip.
It has been 1.5 hours since the blackout has occurred.
What is directed by the FRP?
An ELAP is in progress. Go-To 40EP-9EO08.
A small break LOCA has occurred. ‘A’ HPSI pump was tagged out for maintenance.
‘B’ HPSI pump tripped on 86 lockout.
The FRP has been entered.
List which safety functions will be jeopardized and what the success path will be to mitigate the LOCA
IC-2
PC-1
HR-2
The success path to mitigate the event will be to cool down and depressurize the RCS to less than 200 psia to allow LPSI flow.
A Large Break LOCA has occurred.
CET are indicating 1300F.
What does the FRP direct and why?
GO-TO 40MG-9ZZ01-001 Main Control Room SAG-1: Initial Response.
When the representative CET indicates RCS coolant is superheated, core uncovery has begun and subsequent fuel degradation is expected. If core
cooling cannot be maintained, SAMGs are entered for recovery guidance.
This condition indicates that attempts under the current guidance to restore core cooling have failed, core damage is imminent, and the operator should go to the SAMGs for further direction.
A SGTR event is in progress on the No.1 SG.
Suddenly a safety valve sticks open on the No.1 SG.
What action will be taken to mitigate this event and why?
When must this action be taken by.
As soon as the FRP is entered, the CRS should pull up the step to initiate feed to the No.1 SG at a rate of 1360-1600 GPM.
In the event a SG with a tube rupture is uncontrollably steaming to atmosphere, UFSAR section 15.6.3.2 assumes that within 16.7 minutes from the start of the rupture, the operator overrides the delta-p lockout and supplies feed to the affected SG.
This action is needed to fill the SG to above the level of the tubes. Covering the SG tubes reduces the amount of leaking RCS fluid directly going to atmosphere, and is instead mixed with the water in the SG.
This reduces the offsite dose.
A LOCA is in progress.
The ‘A’ CS Header isolation valve is stuck closed.
The ‘B’ CS pump has tripped off due to an 86 LO.
What safety function(s) will be jeopardized and what actions will be taken to mitigate the event.
CTPC-2 will be jeopardized.
‘B’ LPSI pump will be lined up to provide CS flow.
Flow is verified only by pump amps <60A and containment pressure lowering.
