Frege's puzzle - Salmon

Question 1

Cava with a=a and a=b written on the torso

Answer 1

Frege poses the problem that a=a and a=b should give the same information (as they are equal) but they clearly don’t

Question 2

Venus with a planet on either hand

Answer 2

It’s not a problem about identity, but about pieces of information

Question 3

Mom with a piece of paper with a smiling Mentana on a cloud on it, spitting seeds to it

Answer 3

The semantic role of a declarative sentence is to encode information (information content); pieces of information are abstract

Question 4

Smiling Mentana on top of a scale, an arrow from him to one side where there’s Danilo between brackets outside an f; from here an arrow to other side where there’s Ditto; from here arrow to Dr Satne

Answer 4

Information content generates information value; it determines semantic intension, which is a function that determines the extension to any possible world; the extension of a singular term is its referent

Question 5

Scale with Mentana on top and The Dictator on bottom, an arrow from Mentana to one side where there’s Dr Satne

Answer 5

According to the Naive Theory, the information value of a singular term is its referent in that context

Question 6

“Socrates is Wise” in brackets outside an f with Playboy’s ears on top; under it Socrates and Thinker statue appearing from bottom at same time

Answer 6

According to Russel, the sentence states something about propositional functions, which are uniquely and co-instantiated

Question 7

Scale with Mentana holding a piece of paper on top and Cava on bottom, arrow from paper going to one side where there’s Dr Satne doing kettlebell swings; from here an arrow to other side where there’s a street sign on a cloud; arrow from sign to Mentana

Answer 7

According to Frege, a sentence refers to its referent but it does so because it expresses its sense (conceptual representation); referent is what fits the sense in that occasion. The sense is its information value

Question 8

Cava with a=a and a=b on the torso, with a green and b brown on clouds

Answer 8

Frege solves Frege’s puzzle saying that a=b is informative as it is constituted by the senses of a and b, which are different

Question 9

Cava giving the name Babbo to Andrea, clouds above start raining

Answer 9

Frege recognises that which object a proper name names is due only to linguistic usage or human decision; this undermines his theory

Question 10

a in a cloud with arrow going through Paul Pierce spitting seeds to a piece of paper with φa on it; on top there are Playboy’s ears and at bottom Cava

Answer 10

According to both Russel and Frege, the conceptual content of names semantically determines the truth conditions of its containing sentence φa, if the conceptual content of a satisfies φ

Question 11

Lorenzo writing a while saying “deh”, arrow with clouds going from him to Dr Satne

Answer 11

A descriptional term is one that refers by way of properties or concepts

Question 12

S Anna basket field with Mary and Eucharistic instead of baskets; Playboy’s ears and Cava in the middle, Cava on side of Eucharistic and crippled parishioner on side of Mary

Answer 12

Frege and Russel held that proper names and indexical singular terms are descriptional, and only relationally descriptional or thoroughly descriptional (Frege)

Question 13

Dr Satne pointing at Diletta with champagne in glass; they both laugh at Lorenzo writing while saying “deh”

Answer 13

Theory of direct reference, thanks to examples of determining the wrong person (Kripke), says that proper names etc are nondescriptional

Question 14

Mariaelena with Kripke’s beard arm-wrestling with Cava for Dr Satne spitting seeds

Answer 14

Disagreement between orthodox and direct-reference is not about existence of descriptive content, but about its semantic role to secure a referent

Question 15

Scale with Mentana on top, on one side Aristotle with a baby with a spear and on the other Aristotle as judge of Faenza’s championship; difference sign bottom with Aristotle and Lazza

Answer 15

The information value cannot be relativized subjectively (be different from person to person); difference between this and relativization to a particular type of use

Question 16

Elizabeth grandma as robot

Answer 16

Kripke’s argument that knowledge of this kind is a posteriori, instead of a priori and necessary

Question 17

Scale with Mentana on top, arrow to Conte in a piece of paper with text around at bottom, one arrow to Robb Wolf arm-wrestling w/ mom’s dietician in one side, another arrow to me and Chiara Vadacca doing the same in the other

Answer 17

Other theories say that the information value of a name is contextual; one theory says that it is the criteria used by experts (404: they can disagree); another says that it is determined by causal chain of term acquisition (404: it identifies idiolect not cognitive information content)

Question 18

Scale with Mentana on top, arrow to weed bag on bottom with a V on it; one arrow to Debra (puzzled) asking who’s winning at FIFA at babb’house; other to same scene said in English and pointing to “that thing” (lizard)

Answer 18

Verbal theories assert that the information value of a name is the name itself; one says that it is just the name itself (404: two people with same name); another that it is name and referent (404: indexicals and demostratives, other languages)

Question 19

Scale with Mentana on top, arrow to Cava with military outfit holding a coke bottle on bottom; Tim calling it Coke in one side while James soda in the other

Answer 19

The Generalized Frege Strategy refuses that a term’s information value is whatever function of it (e.g. reference) in case of two terms where applies a=a and a=b

Question 20

General Cava, arrow to scale with Mentana on top with a difference sign with two arrows: one, with gluten symbol on it, to Dr Satne, clouds and Helvetica; other with flour to V bag of weed (also gluten one to it)

Answer 20

Applying the Generalized Frege Strategy shows that the information value of names etc are more detailed than referents, conceptual contents, characters and expressions; these at the same time too specific

Question 21

Italy licking an ice cream falling on a mattress with Mentana face on

Answer 21

Take seriously attitudes to information, these are “standing” states (no need of direct subjective experience), e.g. like an ice cream

Question 22

Sarah Banks with two arrows, one to John Brown basketball player (one heart and one broken heart), the other to John Brown robber running away in BMW (two hearts)

Answer 22

Example of wife with husband that has double life; she loves him in both guises before but only in one later (she failed to recognise that it’s same person). We need 3 place relatizived relationship

Question 23

Me having problems to pass automatic passport control; two arrows from this, one to me with a different look (beard, earring, braids) and one to Sarah Banks

Answer 23

All cases of recognition failure have in common change in appearance, either objective or subjective appearance

Question 24

Orthodox Crux above me having problems to pass automatic passport control with empty set symbol at bottom; Marco De Mitri doing a sciattica to me after it

Answer 24

Objection from orthodox theories is that it is impossible to fail to recognise a proposition, but the mode through which one knows a particular object is part of how he apprehends a singular proposition containing that object

Question 25

Elmer Fudd with two arrows: one to Bugs Bunny as thief with papers on the floor (one tick and one cross), another to Daffy Duck at a bar (two ticks)

Answer 25

Elmer knows Bugsy in two different ways and so he has two believes in two different propositions; after June 1 he withholds one but keeps the other

Question 26

BEL conditions

Answer 26

BEL conditions

Question 27

Belen as Venus holding a planet on either hand

Answer 27

The BEL relation explains the problem of the “Hesperus is Phosporous” proposition as being the same proposition about the planet Venus grasped in two different guises

Question 28

Belen with ft(folded hands, S) tattoo behind her neck; dp+blowjob

Answer 28

The x term of the BEL relation is a function of the believer and the way he takes the information at time t: ft(x, S). In our language the dyadic predicate “believes” is not adapt to convey this, but since a triadic one is not available we use it speaking falsely