FLK1 Questions to review Flashcards
A motorcyclist is involved in a multi-vehicle accident on a country road and suffered severe injuries. The motorcyclist contends the accident was attributable to the negligence of the driver of a car travelling in the opposite direction.
After receiving a letter of claim from the motorcyclist, the car driver’s insurers instruct solicitors. The solicitors incur significant costs obtaining witness statements, a plan and photographs of the location, and a copy of the police report. It soon becomes clear to them that the accident was not caused by their insured, but rather by the negligence of a van driver who had pulled out in front of the insured’s car.
The motorcyclist accepted that the van driver was at fault. The van driver’s insurers accepted liability and ultimately settled the claim, so the motorcyclist never issued proceedings.
Can the car driver’s insurer recover any of their costs from the claimant or the responsible party?
No, the insurers cannot recover any of the cost from either of the other parties involved in the accident.
It is unlikely that the insurers will be able to recover any cost incurred in the protocol period. Generally, if the parties comply with the appropriate protocols and fail to resolve their issues, but the claimant nevertheless decides not to continue with the claim, it is unlikely that the defendant will be able to recover any costs. (But note that if proceedings were issued and the claim stayed to allow the parties to comply with the protocols, an award to recover some of the wasted costs of complying with the protocols is more likely.)
On incorporation several years ago, a company issued 100 £1 ordinary shares. The company now wishes to issue 100 preference shares to a new investor. The company has Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (unamended) for private companies limited by shares as its articles of association.
Which of the following best describes the members’ resolutions which must be passed before the shares can be allotted?
A members’ ordinary resolution to give the directors the power to allot the shares, and a members’ special resolution to change the articles to include the preference share rights.
The directors have the power to allot shares if the company has only one class of shares. Here the company is issuing a different class, so the directors need the members to pass an ordinary resolution to give them the power to allot the preference shares. Only equity shares are subject to the statutory preemption rights (and not preference shares) so there is no need to disapply preemption rights. The articles need to be changed by special resolution to include the rights enjoyed by the preference shares.
A client and a solicitor enter into a conditional fee agreement (‘CFA’) in a breach of contract claim. The CFA provides for a success fee of 10% and for the client to be responsible for the solicitor’s disbursements, if unsuccessful. The solicitor’s usual hourly rate is £250. During the course of the case, the solicitor incurs disbursements of £400 and undertakes 30 hours of work. The client loses the case and is ordered to pay the opponent’s costs and disbursements.
Which of the following correctly states the client’s liability for his solicitor’s costs under the conditional fee agreement?
The client must pay the solicitor £400 for disbursements only.
The client must pay the solicitor £400 for disbursements. A conditional fee agreement provides that if a case is successful, the solicitor can charge their fee to the client with a percentage uplift (the success fee) beyond the normal fees charged. If the claim is unsuccessful, the client does not pay any fee to their solicitor, although they will be liable to pay the other side’s costs and disbursements and their own disbursements. Here, since the client’s claim was unsuccessful, they are not liable for their solicitor’s fees and no success fee is owed. With regard to the solicitor’s costs, the client is therefore only liable for the disbursements.
Three youths agreed to take a taxi without paying the fare. In the taxi they travelled to the city centre, and when the taxi stopped at traffic lights, two of them jumped out and ran off without paying the fare. The third youth was unable to jump out quickly enough and remained in the taxi. When the taxi driver realised what was happening, he set off at speed in an attempt to make sure the remaining youth did not escape without paying. The youth then jumped from the taxi as it was moving and sustained serious injuries.
In an action in negligence by the youth against the taxi driver to recover damages for his injuries, which of the following best describes the likely outcome?
The taxi driver will not be liable to the youth because the defence of illegality will apply.
The taxi driver will not be liable because the defence of illegality will apply to defeat the youth’s claim entirely. The youth was engaged in criminal activity by acting pursuant to a plan to make off without paying the fare, which had already been partially carried out. The defence of illegality is a rule of public policy which prevents a claimant from recovering compensation for damage suffered as a result of their own illegal actions. So, the claimant cannot recover damages for harm suffered whilst he is taking part in criminal activity (jumping out of the taxi without paying the fare). The defence of illegality is a complete defence, defeating the claim entirely.
A teenager was a spectator at a motorbike race. He was standing next to the track when two of the bikes collided together just in front of him. Debris flew into the air and a piece hit the teenager on the arm, causing a minor injury. The teenager was so shocked that he has now begun to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (‘PTSD’). Evidence shows that the crash was caused by the negligence of the race organisers.
In an action by the teenager against the race organisers to recover damages for the harm he suffered, which of the following best states the likely outcome?
The teenager is likely to recover damages for both the cut to his arm and the PTSD because the PTSD was a consequence of his physical injury.
The teenager will likely be able to recover all of his damages in a negligence action. The organiser owed the teenager a duty of care in respect of the personal injury which he suffered, and this duty extends to psychiatric harm which is consequential on physical injury. The facts show that the duty was breached and that this caused the teenager’s damage, both the physical injury and psychiatric harm.
A double glazing company agrees with a home owner to install new windows in the homeowner’s house on 15 August. On 12 August, the double glazing company telephones the homeowner and says that the windows will not be ready for installation until 22 August. The homeowner reluctantly says that they accept the delay.
Can the home owner change their mind on 14 August and enforce the contract based on the original installation date?
No, the homeowner has expressly waived their right to insist on the original date.
The homeowner will not be able to enforce the original date because they waived their right to insist on the original date. Generally, for a variation of a contract to be enforceable, it must be supported by consideration to be enforceable. However, equity provides a way around this. Where a party promises not to enforce the other party’s obligation, the courts may conclude that the agreement is at least temporarily effective through waiver. The waiving party can reinstate the original obligation. However, they must give reasonable notice. Here, the homeowner agreed that the company could delay installation, which would constitute a waiver. It is unlikely that the court would find giving notice of reinstate the day before performance was reasonable.
A man is employed to drive a lifting truck in his employer’s warehouse. One day, the windscreen on the truck shattered suddenly. A piece of glass flew into the man’s eye and injured him. The employer had purchased the truck from a reputable supplier and had carried out regular checks and maintenance. Expert tests have not revealed why the windscreen shattered and have not been able to identify any defect or lack of care in its design or manufacture.
In an action by the employee against the employer to recover damages for his injury, which of the following best states the likely outcome?
The employer is not likely to be liable to the employee because the employee cannot prove that anyone was negligent in the design, manufacture, or use of the truck.
The employer is not likely to be liable. An employer owes its employees a duty to take reasonable care to provide them with safe work equipment. This duty is expanded by statute: The Employers’ Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 (‘the 1969 Act’) provides that where an employee suffers personal injury in the course of his employment caused by defect in equipment provided by his employer for the purposes of the employer’s business, and the defect is attributable to the fault of a third party (whether identified or not), the injury shall be deemed to be also attributable to negligence on the part of the employer. On these facts, however, the employee cannot prove that the failure of the truck windscreen was caused by fault on the part of anyone. Because there is no fault to be attributed to the employer under the statute, the employer does not appear to be in breach of its duty and is not likely to be liable to the employee.
A car enthusiast is looking for engine oil suitable for their 1958 Jaguar. They find a supplier advertising specialist oil for vintage cars. They telephone the supplier to check that the oil is suitable for the Jaguar and the supplier says that it is. They complete the supplier’s order form and send it to the supplier with payment. The supplier then delivers the oil. It turns out the oil is not suitable for the Jaguar. The supplier’s order form contained an exclusion clause which says ‘The statutory implied condition of satisfactory quality is hereby expressly excluded’. The car enthusiast nevertheless claims the supplier breached their contract.
Can the supplier rely on the exclusion clause?
No, because the clause does not cover the breach.
The enthusiast’s claim will be for breach of the implied statutory condition of fitness for purpose. The condition applies in this case because the enthusiast has made their purpose known expressly to the supplier. The exclusion clause covers only satisfactory quality, so it does not cover the breach that has arisen. (A) is incorrect because this seems to be a consumer contract, so it is subject to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (‘CRA’), rather than the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (‘UCTA’). (If the UCTA had applied, then the clause would have been subject to the reasonableness test, not void; under the CRA it is void.)
A car dealer advertises a car for sale in the newspaper. The advert states ‘beautifully maintained Aston Martin DB9 previously owned by James Bond actor Daniel Craig - £100,000 or near offer’. A James Bond enthusiast sees the advert and offers the car dealer £95,000 which the car dealer accepts, telling him it had always been his dream to drive a car owned by 007. On delivery of the car, the enthusiast notices in the registration document that there have been no previous owners by the name of Daniel Craig.
Can the enthusiast bring the contract to an end?
Yes. The term regarding previous ownership goes to the root of the contract and is therefore a breach of a condition which would entitle the enthusiast to repudiate the contract.
The fact that the car was owned by Daniel Craig is the reason the James Bond enthusiast purchased it. It is therefore so fundamental that it goes to the root of the contract, and so would be classified as a condition. Breach of a condition entitles the innocent party to terminate the contract.
A manufacturer in England enters into a contract with a shipowner to transport a consignment of machine parts to a buyer in Japan. The contract contains a clause excluding liability for any damage to the machine parts caused by the shipowner or anyone else involved in their carriage. The shipowner enters into a separate contract with a port operator to load the machine parts onto the shipowner’s ship. The port operator’s employees damage the machine parts whilst loading them.
Can the port operator rely on the exclusion of liability in the contract between the manufacturer and the shipowner?
Yes, because the port owner can rely on the Contracts (Rights Against Third Parties) Act 1999 (unless it has been excluded).
This question is about the doctrine of privity of contract. The port operator is not a party to the contract between the manufacturer and the shipowner. However, under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, a third party has a right to enforce a provision of the contract if they were named in the contract (specifically or by class) and it appears the term was intended to be enforceable by the third party. Here, the contract excludes liability for the shipowner and for “anyone else involved” in carriage of the goods. The port operator appears to be within the described class (that is, someone involved in carriage of the goods), and the clause clearly applies to third parties. Even before the 1999 Act, in cases such as this, the courts have found that there is an implied collateral contract with a person who is intended to benefit from an exclusion clause
Three business associates form a general partnership. A supplier brings a successful breach of contract claim against the partnership and the partners.
How can the supplier collect the judgment?
The supplier will be able to collect the judgment from the personal assets of all the partners.
A partnership creditor can recover the debt from the partnership or from any of the partners, as each partner is liable for the debts of the partnership. (A) is incorrect because a partnership does not have limited liability, and therefore a creditor can pursue the partners personally for their debt.
A bartender, who was also an aspiring musician, admired a violin that a street performer played on the street outside his pub for several weeks. Based on the violin’s appearance and the quality of the sound that it produced, both the street performer and the bartender genuinely believed that it was an old Italian violin, but the matter was never discussed between them. Eventually, the performer agreed to sell the violin to the bartender for a large sum of money. After receiving the violin, the bartender took the violin to be appraised and discovered that it was actually a modern reproduction worth considerably less than he had paid for it.
Is the bartender entitled to claim that the contract is void?
No, because this is a mistake as to the subject matter of the contract. Such contracts cannot normally be set aside.
The circumstances in which a court will find a contract void due to a common mistake as to the quality of the subject matter (as opposed to its existence) are very limited. A contract for the sale of an old master which subsequently turns out to be a modern copy is mentioned by the courts as an example of a mistake that would not render the contract void. Similarly, if a violin turns out to be a modern replica rather than an old Italian violin, this is a mistake as to the quality of the subject matter that would not render the contract void.
At trial, a witness called on behalf of the claimant gives evidence that contradicts evidence previously given in their signed witness statement. This evidence seriously undermines the claimant’s case.
How should trial counsel for the claimant proceed?
Ask the judge to declare the witness a ‘hostile’ witness so that counsel can cross-examine the witness to prove they made an inconsistent statement in the past.
The best option is for the court to declare the witness a ‘hostile’ witness. If the judge is happy to do so, this will enable the barrister to cross-examine the witness on the facts of the case.
Three friends set up a partnership 10 years ago. On 1 April, one partner retires and is replaced by a new partner. The partnership notified existing creditors of the change on 31 March, and a notice was published in the London Gazette on 6 April.
The partnership entered into two contracts to buy goods on 2 April, one with an existing supplier and one with a new supplier.
Which of the following best describes the liability of the new partner and the retiring partner?
The new partner will be liable for both debts and the retiring partner will be liable for the debt to the new supplier.
The new partner will be liable for both debts and the retiring partner will be liable for the debt to the new supplier. A partner is liable for all debts incurred whilst they were a partner. Here, the new partner came into the partnership on 1 April and both debts were incurred on 2 April. Therefore, the new partner is liable for both debts. A retiring partner is liable for debts incurred by the partnership after they retire until the correct notice is given: existing suppliers are entitled to actual notice of retirement, whereas a notice in the London Gazette is sufficient notice for anyone who has never dealt with the partnership whilst the retiring partner was a partner. Here, a notice was published in the London Gazette on 6 April, and the contract with the new supplier was made before that–on 2 April. So, the retiring partner is liable on that debt. On the other hand, the contract with the existing supplier was made the same day (2 April) and that supplier was given notice earlier, on 31 March. So, the retiring partner is not liable on that debt. It follows that the other choices are incorrect.
The High Court has to interpret a regulation that has been preserved as direct EU legislation. In a judgment from 2021, the CJEU authoritatively provided a definition of a key part of the regulation. This part of the regulation is relevant to the case before the High Court.
Which of the following best explains how the High Court should approach the CJEU judgment?
The High Court may follow the CJEU judgment even though the regulation is retained EU law.