Financial Statement Analysis Flashcards
ASIAN FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS - C H TAN
Management may determine that a more direct method of maximiz- ing shareholder wealth is to reduce the corporation’s cost of capital. Simply stated, the lower the interest rate at which a corporation can borrow or the higher the price at which it can sell stock to new investors, the greater the wealth of its shareholders. From this standpoint, the best kind of financial statement is not one that represents the corporation’s condition most fully and most fairly, but rather one that produces the highest possible credit rat- ing (see Chapter 13) and price-earnings multiple
Underperformance of key Asian equity indices in spite of resounding economic growth in both countries may be, in part, attributed to the lack of corporate gov- ernance in these markets.
The most common case of fraudulent activity is an overstatement of profits— the first example above. In these cases, an overstatement of assets usually occurs through accounts receivable from customers, inventory, or some sort of intangible or other unique asset. As a result, a common method of detecting fraudulent activ- ity is to look for unusual increases in asset accounts that have not been adequately explained in the footnotes or by management.
The most common result is an overstatement of assets. In the case where revenue is overstated, the most likely asset to be overstated is accounts receivable. In the most extreme case, the company is reporting fictitious revenue for which no cash is ever collected, and the accounts receivable balance grows continuously over time. In other cases, the company may be very aggressive about how it reports rev- enue and report it before a transaction has taken place or before the revenue is truly earned (e.g., reporting revenue when a contract is signed even though deliv- ery is to occur in the future or the contract relates to the use of the asset over time rather than an immediate sale). In such cases, accounts receivable will increase in the current period at a faster rate than it should but would (hopefully) be collected in a subsequent period. Since fraudulent behavior is repetitive, even in these latter cases, the accounts receivable balance will continue to grow at a faster pace relative to what it should.
Satyam: revenue was growing at a very rapid pace, which would be a good thing if it was real. The problem is that the three receivables items on the balance sheet were all growing at a pace much greater than revenue. If the company is doing an adequate job of collecting from customers, then receivables growth should not be materially higher than revenue growth. The rapid growth here indicates a problem (perhaps not fraud, but it is a warning sign that more due diligence is necessary). The most unusual item on the bal- ance sheet is an amount that was reported separate from cash—Investments in Bank Deposits. This is quite unusual and is an indicator that perhaps the auditors were provided with different substantiation for these accounts than what they normally see for cash; there certainly must have been a reason why this amount was treated separately.
In the case where expenses are understated, there is typically a corresponding overstatement of assets. One example is where a company sells goods (inventory) and reports the revenue on the income statement but fails to transfer the cost of that inventory (which is an asset on the balance sheet) to cost of goods sold (an expense) on the income statement. Earnings are therefore overstated, as are assets (inventory). Over time, this results in a large increase in the inventory balance on the balance sheet.
Another method of understating expenses is to defer their recognition on the income statement. This could be done by misclassifying an expense as a purchase of plant, property, and equipment resulting in an asset on the balance sheet or by creating another type of deferred asset. Some companies have created special cat- egories on their balance sheet for these deferred expenses such as “deferred customer acquisition costs.” Sometimes this may be legitimate such as in the insurance indus- try, but other times it is simply a way to avoid reporting marketing expenses on the income statement.
Many analysts focus on subcomponents of earnings rather than the bottom line—net earnings or net profit. For example, it is common to focus on operat- ing earnings to see how the company is doing from its core business. While it is certainly good to understand how much of a company’s profits come from normal recurring operations, we must also understand that companies are aware of this and may try to mislead us. One common ploy of unscrupulous managers is to inappro- priately report non-operating gains as part of operating revenues (and to do so on a gross rather than net basis). (See Exhibit 1.10.) This overstates both revenues and operating earnings but has no effect on the bottom-line net earnings.
Misuse of Related Parties and Acquisition Accounting
Olympus Corporation is a Japan-based manufacturer of precision machinery and instruments founded in 1919. In 2011, it was discovered that Olympus had engaged in a series of complex maneuvers to keep a significant loss, and hence a liability, off of its financial statements since the 1990s, making its financial position look better than it was for many years. It is estimated that the loss was slightly less than ¥100 billion in 1990. For many years Olympus kept the loss off of its own books by transferring financial assets that have declined in value to a series of companies that were not consolidated into Olympus’s balance sheet. The loss was transferred by having these other enti- ties purchase the financial assets for their accounting book cost rather than the fair market value. The funds used by these other entities came from bank borrowings arranged by Olympus. Olympus therefore did not report any gain or loss on the sale.
Many years later, when the accounting rules changed such that Olympus would need to consolidate these outside entities, Olympus engineered a plan to purchase these entities at a price much greater than their value (due to the embedded loss in those entities). Olympus recorded the excess of the pur- chase price over the fair value as goodwill. At the same time, Olympus over- paid for other acquisitions, apparently paying high “fees” that could be used to further obscure the losses. So, effectively, Olympus kept a liability and loss off of its books for many years (understating liabilities and overstating own- ers’ equity) and when they repurchased the entity and were forced to record the liability, they overstated assets (goodwill) to compensate. As with most accounting games, it came to an end when Olympus finally had to recognize the loss, which they initially did by calling it an impairment loss related to the numerous acquisitions.
A company can try to make itself look better by trying to classify cash receipts as operating activities (rather than say financing) or classifying cash payments as investing activities (rather than operating). For example, a company might borrow money from a creditor using accounts receivable as collateral and report this as a sale of the receivables (operating) rather than a borrowing transaction. The difference between an outright sale and a loan is real. In the case of a sale, the buyer should not have recourse against the seller if all of the receivables are not collected. However, in the borrowing transaction, the company is still obligated for any noncollectible accounts.
Corporate governance and related issues
The themes discussed so far relate to accounting games played to manipulate the financial statements of the company. Another category of problems associated with investing in companies run by others relates to their ability to exert undue influ- ence to benefit or enrich themselves (and sometimes their friends and family) at the expense of other shareholders. We will also include in this category other issues that are not strictly accounting related but should result in a heightened degree of skep- ticism about the company.
Good corporate governance provides a system in which controls are in place to make sure that the potential for conflicts of interests between insiders (principally management) and external shareholders is appropriately managed. An example of good corporate governance would be a strong slate (majority) of external, indepen- dent board members who act in the best interest of shareholders in overseeing the work of management. Good corporate governance also includes a sufficient level of transparency and disclosure such that external investors can best evaluate the finan- cial position of the company and the performance of management. If corporate governance is weak, investors have to raise the level of due diligence they perform when they consider making or continuing an investment in the company. Given the number of investment alternatives that exist, sometimes it is best to avoid compa- nies with poor corporate governance altogether, as the risks can be too high.
Categorization of games businesses play with the Income Statement
Aggressive revenue recognition (too soon)
Deferral of expenses
Classification of non- operating income or non- recurring income as revenue
Classification of operating expenses as non- operating or “special”
The analyst should determine if a company’s policies are consistent with their peers—other companies in the same industry. For example, if two companies are in the computer leasing industry as lessors and Company A structures leases as operating leases where they report income over a multiyear period, while Company B structures leases as capital/ sales type leases where they record all of the revenue at the inception of the deal (when the equipment is installed), then Company B is being more aggressive than Company A, even though they may both be following accepted accounting princi- ples. A more extreme example is when a company records the sale once the contract is signed even though they still have an obligation to deliver the equipment and make sure it is working at a later date. This would be more than aggressive, even improper. Further still would be the company that records a sale when no contract has been signed, no goods and services delivered, perhaps where no customer even exists—fraudulent revenue.
Checklist of Warning Signs and Analysis Techniques:
Aggressive Revenue Recognition
• Examine revenue recognition policy in footnotes relative to peers.
• Are customer receivables growing faster than revenues?
• Is operating cash flow significantly lower than accounting earnings?
• Did significant revenues occur late in the year?
Understating/ Deferring Expenses
• Are depreciation/amortization periods longer than peer companies’?
• Are there any deferred expenses listed as an asset on the balance
sheet (other than deferred taxes)?
• Are there any unusual assets or unexplained large increases in
assets such as inventory, particularly relative to revenues
Classification of Non-Operating Income
• Were “gains” included in revenue?
• Is the company’s operating description appropriate?
• Were one-time or nonrecurring items included in revenue?
• Were any gains or revenue based on revaluation of assets?
Classification of Operating Expenses
• Were any expenses or losses listed as “special,” extraordinary, or nonrecurring at the bottom of the income statement?
• Are there unusually high margins relative to peers (also applies to deferral of expenses)?
Related Parties not disclosed, Transactions not arms length
Staffing model that allowed Longtop Financial to transfer the majority of its cost structure off balance sheet to Xiamen Longtop Human Resources (XLHRS).
• As of 31 March 2010, Longtop had 4,258 employees, of which 3,413 (80 percent) were employed by third-party human resources staffing companies. Of the employees at staffing companies, 95 percent (3,235) were from a sin- gle firm called Xiamen Longtop Human Resources Services Co. (XLHRS), but this entity had no verifiable business presence except for Longtop. (The remaining 5 percent were being serviced by Beijing FESCO and Randstad Shanghai Temp Staffing, both of which do have a verifiable business presence beyond Longtop.)
• On 26 April 2011, Citron reported that despite Longtop’s consistently claim- ing that XLHRS was an unrelated party, XLHRS contained the Longtop moniker, used the same e-mail server, and occupied the same building as Longtop, which is their only client. XLHRS was formed in May 2007, just months before Longtop’s IPO. XLHRS was never mentioned in the filings until the annual report filed July 2008, even though it is Longtop’s largest line expendi- ture. Further, Longtop did not have any long-term contracts and did not have to pay any penalties or minimums in its relationship with XLHRS. Longtop termi- nated the outsourcing agency and took all the employees in-house when the out- sourcing agency relationship was questioned. XLHRS had no website and did not appear to be soliciting customers even though it had just lost its only customer.
• Longtop claimed that the outsourcing arrangement was part of the justification of its outsized margins. However, after dumping XLHRS, the company claimed that there would be no financial penalty, no cost, and no margin loss associated with terminating the relationship.
• On 9 May 2011, Citron reported that Longtop’s legal department staff had been signing off on a variety of administrative filings with the government on behalf of XLHRS, which proves that they are related.
• The financials of XLHRS in the SAIC documents stated total revenues (or service fees) of merely RMB$5.1 million, while Longtop’s 20-F stated that XLHRS was to receive a service fee that would amount to RMB$400 to 500 million on a conservative basis. Other SAIC filings also show that XLHRS would be underpaying the government for benefits for Longtop employees.
Longtop’s chairman transferred 70 percent of stock holdings to employees and friends in the first four years of the company’s going public.
• Citron believes that this transaction of 9 million shares, valued at over a quar- ter billion dollars, has an undisclosed “tail.” The money might have been used to pay off Longtop’s hidden liabilities or generate an undisclosed benefit to Longtop’s Chairman Jia.
Key Lessons from the Longtop fraud:
• “Extreme outsourcing” obliterates transparency and is a common characteristic of other stocks in China that have collapsed under findings of fraud. For example, China Media Express claimed that the large advertising sales teams responsible for their huge reported income were outsourced; Duoyuan Global Water and Duoyuan Printing also claimed outsourced distributor networks.
• The outsource maneuver makes it difficult to deconstruct the numbers from an auditing standpoint and makes invisible a lot of metrics that would afford mean- ingful insight into how the company operates, such as ratios of revenues per employee, costs per employee, and so on. Since the entity appears to be a related party, this arrangement makes very little sense from a business standpoint.
• In cost-competitive China, if margins are spectacularly high, it is probably too good to be true.
• Do not rely on management forecasts of revenue and growth numbers.
Sino-Forest:
Use of AIs lies at the heart of the allegations, as it allows the company to report sales, purchases, and forest reserves without third-party verification.
AI = Authorized Intermediaries which were third parties between suppliers on the one had and customers on the other. Many of these were the same and may have been related to Sino Forest enabling round tripping of cash and offset of receivables and payables.
Same companies with offset of payables and receivables
• Despite reporting positive cash flow from operations, cash expenditure on acqui- sition of timber holdings has consistently outstripped cash flow generation.
• Receivables account has registered significant increases over the past four years, as did investment in timber holdings. As the following table shows, while revenue was up 169 percent from 2007 to 2010, receivables were up over 500 percent and would have been up higher had the company not offset receivables and payables. Note that on a combined basis receivables and timber holdings were up almost 200 percent. Also note the similarity between receivables and payables balances over the four-year period.
Key Lessons from Sino Forest:
• In hindsight, there were several red flags that should have alerted investors:
• Listing through reverse takeover, thus avoiding typical IPO due diligence. • Complex and opaque business structure with unidentified counterparty transactions.
• Consistently negative free cash flow generation.
• Repeated capital raisings since listing; no return of capital to shareholders.
• Limited management ownership; chairman owned less than 3 percent of the company.
• Presence of well-known investors no guarantee of safety:
• Paulson, Davis Advisors, and Capital Group were substantial shareholders pre-allegations.
• Richard Chandler and Wellington both bought substantial stakes after the alle- gations were published.
A method of understating both assets and liabilities involves shifting accounts receivable (assets) off the balance sheet in a borrowing transaction. If a company sells its receivable to another entity at a discount for cash (called factor- ing) and the other entity has no recourse if it fails to collect, then this is a legiti- mate sale of receivables. Receivables are replaced on the balance sheet with cash. However, if a company borrows money against those same receivables and contin- ues to bear the credit risk of collections, then the receivables stay on the balance sheet and a loan is recorded. Some companies attempt to make a borrowing transac- tion look like a sale and hence understate assets (accounts receivable) and liabilities (the loan). This is sometimes accomplished through the use of special-purpose enti- ties to permit sale treatment under accounting standard
Olympus Corporation incurred a loss in the early
1990s due to a decline in the value of financial assets. Rather than recogniz-
ing the loss recording the decline in value directly on the balance sheet of
Olympus, the financial assets and a corresponding amount of bank borrow-
ing were effectively transferred to another entity that was not consolidated.
Eventually, the company was forced to consolidate this entity and had to play
additional accounting games to disguise the loss.
PP&E are initially recorded at cost upon acquisition. Subsequently, the com-
pany can then choose whether to measure the asset under either a cost model or a
revaluation model. The revaluation model is designed for those assets for which a
fair value can be measured reliably. For the cost model, the company maintains the
original cost, which is adjusted periodically for depreciation or impairments. For
the revaluation model, the asset is reported on the balance sheet at its current fair
value. If the value declines, the balance sheet is balanced by having the loss reported
on the income statement and included in retained earnings—assets go down and
owners’ equity goes down. If the value increases, the gain is reported in other com-
prehensive income—a holding account that is part of owners’ equity on the balance sheet. This permits the balance sheet to balance since the gain is not reported on the
income statements.4 In the case of property held for investment, there is a similar
choice of a cost of fair value model. If the fair value model is chosen for investment
property, then all gains and losses are reported in the income statement and hence
retained earnings.
Intangible assets are initially recorded at their acquisition costs. Subsequently,
the company may report these assets using either a cost model or revaluation
model. Under the cost model, adjustments are made for any amortization or
impairment in future years. Under the revaluation model, they are reported in the
future at fair value, with gains and losses treated similarly to PP&E.