final study guide

Question 1

Locke Freedom-

Answer 1

“what state men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man” (2T.4);“not a state of license”

Question 2

Locke equality-

Answer 2

“a state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another”

Question 3

Locke Preservation (of self and others)-

Answer 3

“Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully [‘he has not liberty to destroy himself’]; so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind….”

Question 4

State of nature Locke-

Answer 4

The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: Reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.”
- obligated by nature’s law not to harm ourselves and also to aid others if it is compatible with self-preservation.

Question 5

Epistemic status-

Answer 5

First, the premises might be factual, i.e., they might simply purport to describe the world as it is: people are, as a matter of fact, free, equal, and preserving of self and others.

Second, the premises might be self-evident moral truths. Notice the way they are described: “nothing more evident,” “so evident in itself, and beyond all question,” “teaches all mankind, who will but consult it,” etc.

Question 6

Source of obligation:

Answer 6

For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business, they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure.” (2T.6) The importance of this passage to understanding Locke cannot be overstated: we have an obligation to understand (through reason) and obey the law of nature because it and we are the creations of a purposeful, omnipotent being, whom we owe a debt of gratitude and who owns us by virtue of his creation of us (cf. filial duties;

Question 7

Locke no precocial man

Answer 7

locke has no notion of pre-social man, as man in the state of nature lives in a natural community, which is governed by the law of nature.
It’s given effect by an executive power of nature: “The execution of the law of nature is…put into every man’s hands, whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation [‘reparation and restraint’].” (2T.7-8)This is one place where Locke’s natural equality is at work: there’s no “subordination or subjection” in nature, hence no elite to enforce natural law.

Question 8

How peaceful is Locke’s state of nature?

Answer 8

arly in the text, Locke speaks of the “inconveniences of the state of nature, which must certainly be great where men may be judges in their own case….” (2T.13; described in more detail at 2T.124-6: no common rules [apart from natural law], judge, or executive). He amplifies this point later when he argues that “the enjoyment of it [natural freedom] is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others…full of fears and continual dangers.” (2T.123)

Question 9

What rights do men have in the state of nature?

Answer 9

natural rights to their own persons and justly acquired external possessions: “Every man has a property in his own person. This no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property [such appropriation being subject to two provisos: ‘Lockean’ and non-wastage].”

Question 10

Locke social contract part 1-

Answer 10

Civil society Locke distinguishes civil (or political) society from both paternal authority (exercised by parents over children to prepare them for self-rule; cf. Filmer) and despotic authority (slavery: justifiable only as alternative to capital punishment [2T.23] and for captives taken in just war [2T.85]; no voluntary slavery: consent’s limit; cf. Hobbes).Given the “inconveniences” of the state of nature (“judges in…own case”), men have an incentive to enter civil society.They do so by giving up certain powers and rights they have in state of nature: specifically, their executive power of nature and some of their right of self-government (conscription, jury duty, etc.: “for the execution of the judgements of the commonwealth”). (2T.87-8)Thereby “the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules; indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community….” (2T.87; cf. Hobbes: master)The entrance into civil society is for one end, viz. the “preservation of property” (2T.88, 94, 124), with property very broadly defined (“lives, liberties, and estates” [2T.123]). (Cf. Macpherson.)
This first social-contract stage, achieved by universal consent,

Question 11

Men can become members of a civil society only by way of

Answer 11

express consent (“express promise and compact”), which is irrevocable, but their enjoyment of the territory of that society (by travel, residency, ownership of land through purchase or inheritance, etc.) entails a tacit consent to be subject to its laws and government, which is revocable by the mere act of vacating.

Question 12

Social contract stage 2: government

Answer 12

Civil society picks form of government to rule it (by majority vote, usually hypothetically: exceptions include the U.S. and France [Fifth Republic]); constitutive power; government = legislative + executive branches.A government can take many forms: democracy (direct or representative), oligarchy, monarchy (hereditary or elective), or a mix of any of these.Does Locke deserve his reputation as a democratic theorist? (examples)A separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches is also endorsed (2T.159).The supreme power of this government is the legislative power

The power delegated to the government is fiduciary power or trust (consisting of a trustor, trustee, and beneficiary).Paternal example: parent as trustor, trust-fund officer as trustee, and child as beneficiary.Political example: civil society is the trustor and beneficiary, while government is the trustee. (Cf. dentist~.)If government abuses this trust, it forfeits its power, which may be reclaimed by civil society and placed in the hands of another who will secure the end for which men entered political society

Question 13

Locke constraints legislative power in 4 ways

Answer 13

it cannot rule arbitrarily, but rather must rule consistently with natural law; it cannot rule by decree, but rather must govern by “settled standing laws”; it cannot deprive a citizen of his property without his consent (more precisely, without the consent of his legislative representatives—so, no taxation without representation; a necessarily democratic element? [2T.140]); and it cannot transfer its law-making power to other hands (delegate).

Question 14

Dissolution of government : Locke distinguishes between two dissolutions

Answer 14

dissolution of civil society, when men return to a state of nature, usually as a result of conquest—it entails the dissolution of government; and
dissolution of government, which usually occurs from within. (2T.211)
Locke discusses two cases in which governments are dissolved:

When the legislature is altered by the executive: This occurs when the executive does any of the following: rules by arbitrary edict in place of laws; hinders the operation of the legislative power (e.g., by keeping it from meeting); manipulates legislative elections or their organization; delivers the government to a foreign power; or abdicates. (2T.212-20)

When the legislature and/or executive acts against the trust reposed in them

Question 15

Locke on sovereignty:

Answer 15

sovereign- one person or body of persons must be the final decision-maker on ALL political questions;

here are some moments (e.g., 2T.149) in Locke’s Second Treatise where he seems to suggest that the people are sovereign in this sense, but this may be misleading….
One could say that there is no sovereignty (so defined) in Locke’s system:
when governments discharge the fiduciary duties that have been assigned to them by the people, the people are obliged to obey, even if they disagree with (say) some of the actions of the legislature (be it elected or not), but
when governments fail to discharge these duties and become a danger to the person and property of citizens, though, the people are released from these obligations—sovereignty “shifts” depending upon the circumstances.

Question 16

Locke’s vulnerabilities:

Answer 16

Atheists, for example, would be unable to accept such a premise—which is perhaps why Locke wanted to exclude them from his (otherwise) broad policy of toleration.
Also, Locke’s particular understanding of an omnipotent, purposive Creator seems to have indelible Judeo-Christian features (e.g., his inference of a duty of transformative labor from Genesis 3:19 (KJV) [“In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread….”]…and from the Book of Nature itself.)
The implications of this may be unacceptable to those from different religious faiths: for instance, the obligation to make “waste lands” productive to support and increase the human population (Chapter 5), which might be intolerable to many, including animists. {Cf. Nozick’s rejection of non-wastage.}
The concept of tacit consent that is developed at 2T.119-22 (and in Chapter 5) seems quite weak, and at several times in the text (e.g., discussions of the conditions under which resistance to established government can be justified), the premise of consent seems to be collapsed into the premise of self-preservation: consent would be (hypothetically) refused in just those cases where self-preservation would be jeopardized (e.g., a predatory state)—one step too many.

Question 17

Locke on reason and revelation-

Answer 17

Revelation:
Genesis 1:26: “And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.”
Genesis 3:19 (to Adam): “In the sweat of thy face, shalt thou eat bread.”
Genesis 9:1 (to Noah): “Be fruitful and multiply.”
Reason {already covered in my first Second Treatise lecture}:
We infer from natural desires (food, drink, and sex), structure of emotions (paternal/maternal instincts; sympathy), and recalcitrance of nature what God’s intentions for us are: namely, that we labor upon the earth for the preservation of ourselves, our children, and our neighbors.
From our need to labor and procreate follow our property rights (broadly construed): by protecting person and possession, we help provide proper incentives for the cultivation and population of the earth’s surface (Garrett Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons,” etc.) More on this in short order…

Question 18

Preservation

Answer 18

Man’s first duty is thee preservation of his own life, he is also under a duty to preserve thee life of others, so long as it does not conflict with his own preseervation
Reason for this is resonably clear and purely theistic: the world and its inhabitants are God’s handiwork, and we are charged with both the maintenance and improvement of them (2T.6).
We follow this calling partly from fear of, but primarily out of love and gratitude towards, our Creator (cf. filial duty).
The phrase “preserve mankind” (and numerous variants of it) is almost a mantra of the Second Treatise, and it is a command that Locke takes with utmost seriousness, calling it at one point the “fundamental law of nature” (2T.16).

Question 19

Property:

Answer 19

Man labors upon the earth and thereby gains title to product of his labor. As Locke states, “each man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The labor of his body and the work of his hands are properly his” (2T.27).
Note the apparent tension between self-ownership here and the God-ownership at 2T.6. Explanation: we own ourselves only relative to other men, who therefore have duties to respect our person; God is under no obligation towards us, however. {orthogonal relations}
The logic of the “labor-mixing” process by which man appropriates from the common store of nature (which has perplexed generations of political theorists, e.g., Nozick) is best interpreted metaphorically rather than metaphysically: it’s about giving proper incentives.↓
This process offers a way to promote the “industrious and rational” over the “quarrelsome and contentious”: those who labor upon the earth should have a right to the product of their labor, for they are following up on God’s mandate to improve the earth and thereby preserve those who dwell upon it (2T.34). {instrumental defense}

Question 20

Non-wastage Proviso and Lockean proviso

Answer 20

Appropriation process is constrained in two ways:
Non-wastage Proviso: man may not waste that which he appropriates (2T.31), and
“Lockean” (or “enough-and-as-good”) Proviso: additionally, he must leave “enough, and as good, in common for others” (2T.27).

Question 21

Charity and Welfare:

Answer 21

Locke repeatedly indicates that property rights are merely instrumental and must be limited whenever the survival of others is at stake, as we are always under an obligation to “preserve mankind,” in or out of the state of nature.
Consider the following:
The poor have a “Title” to the surplus from the goods of the rich when the former’s survival is at stake (1T.42) (charity -> welfare)

Question 22

Rousseau Nature, natural law, natural right -

Answer 22

In the state of nature, where everything is common, I owe nothing to those to whom I have promised nothing, and I recognize as belonging to others only those things that are of no use to me….” (II.6)
Excepting I.4 on slavery, the ideas of natural law and natural right do very little work for Rousseau.
Rousseau offers two distinct pictures of man in the state of nature:

Question 23

asocial and antisocial natural man:

Answer 23

asocial natural man: traveling around free from contact with other human beings, possessing only the two qualities of pitié (pity) and amour de soi (healthy self-concern). (Initial social intercourse and the introduction of property then hasten men down the path to the “false” social contract enshrining inequality and personal dependence—but more on this later. See the Second Discourse for the details.) One finds echoes of this version of the state of nature in the Social Contract—for example:
“men living in their primitive condition of independence have no intercourse regular enough to constitute either a state of peace or a state of war” (I.4); and
man is naturally “complete and solitary” (II.7).
echoes of Locke (“obstacles to their preservation in the state of nature” [I.6]) and esp. Hobbes (“in the state of nature, where every man is inevitably at war and at the risk of his life” [II.4]) as well.

Question 24

general will is understanding the three ways in which it is general:

Answer 24

with respect to its possessor, which is the entire body politic (democratic political sovereign) rather than a mere party or faction. Rousseau says that “either the will is general or it is not; either it is the will of the body of the people, or merely that of a part.” He later states that “the constant will of all the members of the state is the general will; it is through it that they are citizens and free.” (II.2, IV.2)-with respect to its aim, which is the common interest. Thus Rousseau states that “the general will is always rightful and always tends to the public good” (II.3) and “it is what is common to different [private] interests which yields the social bond; if there were no point on which separate interests coincided, then society could not conceivably exist. And it is precisely on the basis of this common interest that society must be governed” (II.1). {Venn diagram; cf. particular wills, be they individual or factional; note Lawgiver’s role}-

Question 25

Self legislation causes

Answer 25

positive freedom -

Question 26

Positive freedom

Answer 26

is freedom from two things: lawless desire and personal dependence. In a passage from Émile, Rousseau explicitly links these two impediments to freedom together:“But it is in this precisely that my freedom consists—my being able to will only what is suitable to me, or what I deem to be such, without anything external to me determining me.” (Émile, 280)
I want to discuss Rousseau’s views on self-legislation and positive freedom in more detail over the next few slides, taking the latter’s two constituents—mastering one’s desires & eliminating personal dependence—in turn, as they are absolutely central to Rousseau’s political thought.
Mastering one’s desires-Cf. Plato’s Republic, which Rousseau praises as “the most beautiful educational treatise ever written” (Émile, 40). {tripartite soul, etc.}
Rousseau contends in the Social Contract that “man acquires with civil society, moral freedom, which alone makes man the master of himself; for to be governed by appetite alone is slavery [cf. Hobbes] while obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself is freedom” (I.8).

Question 27

Self-legislation (i.e., autonomy),

Answer 27

obedience to a law one gives to oneself, is a concept that plays a major role in Rousseau’s writings, especially the Social Contract and Émile. The self-legislator “obeys no one but himself” (I.6), an obedience that entails a certain kind of freedom—viz., positive freedom.

Question 28

self-legislation and positive freedom in more detail over the next few slides, taking the latter’s two constituents

Answer 28

mastering one’s desires & eliminating personal dependence—in turn, as they are absolutely central to Rousseau’s political thought.
Mastering one’s desires-Cf. Plato’s Republic, which Rousseau praises as “the most beautiful educational treatise ever written” (Émile, 40). {tripartite soul, etc.}
Rousseau contends in the Social Contract that “man acquires with civil society, moral freedom, which alone makes man the master of himself; for to be governed by appetite alone is slavery [cf. Hobbes] while obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself is freedom” (I.8).

Question 29

Two sorts of dependence:

Answer 29

dependence on things, which is from nature; dependence on men, which is from society. Dependence on things, since it has no morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices. Dependence on men, since it is without order, engenders all vices, and by it, master and slave2 are mutually corrupted. If there is any means of remedying this ill in society, it is to substitute law for man and to arm the general will with a real strength superior to the action of every particular will

Question 30

Republicanism:

Answer 30

is a political form guaranteeing the integrity of self-legislation. After asserting in the Social Contract that “all legitimate government is republican,” Rousseau goes on in a footnote to give a rudimentary definition of republican government:
“a government directed by the general will, which is law…. [such a] government must not be united with the sovereign, but must serve it as a ministry” (II.6)

Question 31

Rousseau, the government is merely the executive

Answer 31

all legislative authority remains in the hands of the sovereign people.
Rousseau is hotly opposed to representation of the sovereign (e.g., the election of legislators)—he’s a (legislative) direct democrat: “Sovereignty cannot be represented, for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; its essence is the general will, and will cannot be represented—either it is the general will or it is something else; there is no intermediate possibility…. Any law which the people has not ratified in person is void; it is not law at all.” (III.15)

Question 32

Lawgiver-

Answer 32

in countless ways, the deus ex machina of the social-contract state. Rousseau says that “God would be needed to give men laws,” and indeed the Lawgiver materializes with god-like skill amid a group of disparate individuals and makes of them a people, shaping their political institutions and fitting their characters to communal life, before removing himself from the scene (II.7; e.g., Lycurgus in ancient Sparta, Rousseau’s favorite example; cf. U.S. Founders).

the Lawgiver can be seen as adjusting the affections of a nascent citizenry, bringing them into alignment with one another (thereby creating civic fellowship) and directing them towards their proper object, the political community. {inculcating patriotism}

Question 33

Parochialism:

Answer 33

a “confinement of one’s interests to the local sphere; lack of global perspective; narrowness of view; petty provincialism.” (OED2)

Question 34

Rousseau’s parochialism or anti-cosmopolitanism in five areas:

Answer 34

Militarism (but not imperialism, irredentism, etc.)
Patriotism (nationalist, not civic/constitutional)
Cultural and Political Isolationism
Economic Autarky and Anti-Commercialism
Civil Religion (though Enlightenment influence evident)

Question 35

Militarism:

Answer 35

martial virtues:
he condemns the spread of the arts and sciences, because under their influence “true courage is enervated, military virtues disappear” (First Discourse, 54);
he speaks of “that warlike ardor and that spirited courage which suit freedom so well and whet the appetite for it” (Second Discourse, 81);
he recommends “a spirit that is martial but not ambitious” to the Poles (Government of Poland, 68);
he admires “a certain martial spirit befitting free men” to be found at ancient Spartan festivals (Letter to D’Alembert, 135); and
he says the following of Spartan education, with evident appreciation (and not a little relish):
This was the education of the Spartans: instead of being glued to books, they began by being taught how to steal their dinner. Were the Spartans as a result crude when grown? Who does not know the force and saltiness of their rejoinders? Always made to conquer, they crushed their enemies in every kind of war; and the Athenian babblers feared their words as much as their blows. (Émile, 119)

Question 36

Patriotism

Answer 36

Rousseau’s idiosyncratic militarism is merely an instrumental good, designed to promote patriotism and fellow-feeling among the citizenry.
Rousseau considers an exclusionary love of one’s country and fellow countrymen to be the genuine cement of political life, as evidenced by many of his writings, especially The Government of Poland. In it, he writes:
The newly-born infant, upon first opening its eyes, must gaze upon the fatherland, and until his dying day should behold nothing else. Your true republican is a man who imbibed love of the fatherland, which is to say love of the laws and of liberty,

Question 37

The exclusivity of this “love of the fatherland” has two aspects:

Answer 37

First, as I’ll show in the next slide, love of country for Rousseau is inextricably connected to disdain for all that is foreign and alien. He expresses the proper attitude of the patriot toward foreigners in the passage from Émile in the title slide: “they are nothing in his eyes” (39).
A second aspect is Rousseau’s insistence that the fatherland should come to monopolize (or at least dominate) the affections of citizens and that this kind of monopolization could best be achieved through an all-consuming civic life.

Question 38

Cultural and Political Isolationism

Answer 38

An essential buttress for Rousseau’s patriotism is isolationism, or the desire to insulate a nation from outside influences and contacts. This isolationism is motivated by contempt for foreign ways, by a parochial confidence that “our ways are best.”
As with his patriotism, his isolationism is expressed most fully in The Government of Poland. In this work, he encourages rulers to cultivate in their peoples “an instinctive distaste for mingling with the peoples of other countries” and holds up Moses as an example of a ruler who succeeded in doing so (6, 14).
As Rousseau argues, the fruits of such a policy are a people forever separated from their neighbors—but, more than that, a people who are chauvinistic, and a people who find “unbearably tedious…every moment spent away from home.” He relates the following story as an example of this praiseworthy provincialism:

Question 39

Autarky and Anti-Commercialism

Answer 39

Part and parcel of Rousseau’s overall isolationism is his economic isolationism, i.e., his support for autarky (i.e., self-sufficiency).
Although Rousseau attacks the division of labor throughout his writings, he does not fully explain his opposition to it until The Constitutional Project for Corsica (1765). Here, Rousseau argues against the division of labor, both domestically and internationally:
What local magistrates and heads of families should do in each region, parish, and household to make themselves independent of the rest, the central government of the island should do to make itself independent of neighboring peoples…. With any movement of trade and commerce it is impossible to prevent destructive vices from creeping into a nation.

anti-commercialism:
he complains bitterly that “ancient politicians incessantly talked about morals and virtue; those of our time talk only of business and money” (First Discourse, 51);
he speaks approvingly of the Romans’ “contempt alike for commerce and the pursuit of profit” (IV.4);
he complains that “in this age of enlightenment, everyone knows how to calculate to the penny the worth of his honor and his life” (Letter to D’Alembert, 71); and
he also asserts that “of all interests…that in pecuniary gain is the most evil,

Question 40

Civil Religion

Answer 40

Rousseau believes that Christianity, by separating political authority from religious authority, has produced endless conflict within the nations that embrace it. Like Hobbes, he believes the only solution to this problem is Erastianism: recombining them. First, Rousseau distinguishes between:
The Religion of Man, that of the Gospels, which says all peoples are children of one God, obligated by universal morality and reunited after death. It is “holy, sublime, and true,” but “contrary to the social spirit”:
“Christianity preaches only servitude and submission. Its spirit is too favourable to tyranny for tyranny not to take advantage of it. True Christians are made to be slaves; they know it and they hardly care; this short life has too little value in their eyes.”
The Religion of the Citizen that “joins divine worship to a love of the law, and that in making the homeland the object of the citizens’ adoration, it teaches them that the service of the state is the service of the tutelary God.”

Question 41

public civil religion

Answer 41

two-level religious system that combines the benefits of both of these categories of religion while avoiding their drawbacks. This system would operate as follows, with a public religion superintending private religions:
PUBLIC (CIVIL) RELIGION: First, each citizen would be obligated to make a strictly civil “profession of faith,” designed by the sovereign people (or Lawgiver) to be an expression of “social conscience.” Its key features:
This profession would be a prerequisite of citizenship; those who recanted would be put to death.
Its positive dogmas would be “the existence of an omnipotent, intelligent, benevolent divinity that foresees and provides; a life to come; happiness of the just; punishment of sinners; the sanctity of social contract and the law.”
Its sole negative dogma: “no intolerance.” The negative dogma sounds ironic given the content of the positive dogmas

Question 42

PRIVATE RELIGIONS:

Answer 42

Second, each citizen could (if they so desired) hold a private religion, so long as it tolerated other religions AND was fully consistent with the civil profession of faith. This must be why Rousseau says that the civil profession is “without explanations or commentaries”: this feature makes it consistent with a variety of interpretations, rituals, organizational forms, etc. (embellishment)
The result is a strange hybrid (Locke meets Hobbes?) of the religions of man and citizen—but hybrids are sometimes improvements….
Rousseau’s goal here is obvious:
He wants all of the benefits of the religion of the citizen (e.g., the unity and love of country it produces) with none of the costs (e.g., militant, potentially aggressive hatred of foreigners).
He also wants all of the benefits of the religion of man (e.g., sublimity) with none of the costs (e.g., indifference to tyranny and tendency to intramural religious conflict).
You will have to judge whether he has succeeded or not!

Question 43

four features of Rousseauean politics:

Answer 43

public festivals,
the Lawgiver (review the first set of Rousseau slides),
civil religion (review the second set of Rousseau slides), and
small republics.

Question 44

Public festivals:

Answer 44

As we’ve already seen, Rousseau’s political writings (especially his later ones, e.g., Government of Poland) are virtually drenched in emotional language.
His most emotional language by far, however, is to be found in the Letter to D’Alembert. In this work he repeatedly returns to the image of spontaneous and emotionally-charged public gatherings, which appear to serve as an opportunity for bonding among citizens. Note, for instance, his amusing suggestion for “republican entertainment” (vs. Genevan theaters):

Question 45

The general will doesn’t emerge from an atomized mass of individuals, with no affective ties to the state or to one another;

Answer 45

rather, it emerges from a united body of citizens, joined tightly together by bonds of civic affection—bonds that have been initially created and nurtured under the watchful eye of the Lawgiver. {general will vs. mere will of all}

Question 46

Lawgiver and civil religion

Answer 46

As I suggested in my description of the Lawgiver, he creates an affective framework within which the post-foundational, day-to-day politics of a democratic social-contract state will operate.
The political conversion that a Lawgiver effects in creating his people is parallel in numerous ways to religious conversion—and as Rousseau’s discussion of civil religion indicates, the two are not really distinct.

Question 47

Parochial social contract:

Answer 47

The reason for Rousseau’s opposition to cosmopolitanism should by now be clear. A condition for Rousseau’s social-contract state is affective ties among citizens and between citizens and the state, but such ties can only be created by the Lawgiver in a very small republic, because face-to-face contact among citizens is essential for the formation of emotional bonds.
As the last slide indicates, Rousseau cannot conceive of emotional ties among citizens “who are mostly strangers.” He would thus consider the idea of an extended republic like our own, which is composed of millions of strangers who share little in the way of a common civic life, to be a chimera (lion/goat).
According to Rousseau, large states are not fit for political liberty. The ties of community in such states are weak or nonexistent and must be replaced by alternative motivations of “force or self-interest.”