Final Studies Flashcards
Definition of Love
complacency in the sensible good
definition of hatred
a dissonance of the appetite from what is apprehended as repugnant or harmful
definition of desire
movement towards the sensible good as absent
definition of aversion
movement away from the sensible evil as absent
definition of joy
rest in the sensible good as possessed
definition of sadness
movement consequent upon apprehension of a present evil that deprives one of some good
definition of hope
a movement towards a future, difficult, yet attainable good
definition of despair
a movement away from a future difficult unattainable good
definition of audacity
movement towards an impending future evil to overcome it
definition of fear
disturbance of the mind caused by teh apprehension of impending future evil
definition of anger
movement of the sensitive appetites for revenge attendant upon sadness and motivated by justice
Passions:
movement of the sensitive appetites, arising from a knowledge of a good or evil, accompanied by a bodily transformation
How are concupisible passions opposed?
with respect to object of passion ipse
How are irascible passions opposed?
based on approach or withdrawal from object
The Object of passions of conc power:
sensible good or evil, ordinary passions
the object of passions of irasc.
sensible good or evil as arduous
Irascible passions are for the sake of…
removing obstacles that hinder the concupiscible appetite from obtaining object.
Four conditions for the principle of double effect?
- object good or morally indif
- the good effect must come directly from the object and not from evil eff
- only the good must be intended
- There must be a proportionally grave reason
Direct Voluntary
an act that comes from the power itself, expressly/directly willed. The effect is foreseen and intended.
Indirect Voluntary
an act which is not willed direclty but willed in its cause. A consequent effect of some act forseen at least in some way. The effect is foreseen but unintended.
WITH REGARD TO THE OBJECT AND THE INTENTION, WHICH ASPECT OF THE MORAL ACT IS MORE FORMAL? MORE SPECIFIC? MORE GENERAL? [Q. 16]
A. Object : intention :: material : formal.
B. Object – specific.
C. Intention – general.
Object End
- Takes a species from the exterior act.
- Material.
- Specific difference is more specific.
- Morality derived from reason.
End
- Takes a species from the interior act of the will.
- Formal.
- Specific difference is more general.
- Morality derived from the will.
WHERE DOES THE OBJECT TAKE ITS SPECIES FROM? WHERE DOES IT DERIVE MORALITY? THE REASON OR THE WILL?
A. The object takes its species from exterior action / commanded act.
B. The morality of the object is derived from reason.
DEFINE OBJECT OF AN ACTION. WHAT PART DO CIRCUMSTANCES SOMETIMES PLAY IN THE DETERMINATION OF NEW OBJECTS?
A. Object (finis operis) is that to which an act primarily and naturally (i.e., per se) tends to as its term and from which it is named; it gives the natural species of the act.
B. Some circumstances, when they enter into the essence of an act, change the object.
C. “Object” expresses the notion of the completed exterior act.
R2. WHERE DOES THE PRIMARY AND ESSENTIAL MORALITY DERIVE FROM?
A. The primary and essential morality of an act is derived from its object, which gives the natural species of the act.
R1. WHAT ARE THE THREE FONTS OF THE MORAL ACT?
A. Object, intention, circumstances.
a. All three must be good for an act to be good.
