FINAL EXAM (you got this) Flashcards
- W. V. O. Quine denies that fundamentality is a legitimate concern of metaphysics.
He also rejects first philosophy in which one tries to justify reliance on a popular source of beliefs such as physics, chemistry and biology.
Yet he also rejects Carnap’s rejection of metaphysics.
Quine offers a criterion of ontological commitment. Explain the criterion. How did the criterion lead Quine to change his mind on whether there are numbers?
Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment was to commit only that which was necessary for the best of our scientific theories.
Carnap rejects metaphysics: metaphysical questions operate outside systems of knowledge
- Quine argues that questions about metaphysics are answerable within the system, as they are empirical and based on the sciences.
The Vienna Circle skeptics believed in the principle of verification, such that the only things that are true were things that could be verified or verified in principle. Abstract numbers, which could not be empirically verifiable, were not genuinely meaningful.
- Quine originally shared the logical empiricist’s skepticism on numbers, as they are abstract entities.
- Later, Quine realized that numbers are necessary for scientific theories, and thus, he commits them ontologically by his own criterion.
Thomas Bradwardine thinks our freedom must take a backseat to God’s freedom. Explain why. He also thinks space and time must take a backseat to God’s freedom. Explain how.
If god exists, he is all powerful. Anything all powerful has total freedom, since God has all of the freedom, no one else is free. Bradwardine accepts this calculation for primary freedom, people have secondary freedom to ratify God’s actions.
- freedom of one thing leads to restriction of another, if god has total freedom, we are the ones that are restricted
Bradwardine associates space with God’s liberty. God’s omnipotence controls the nature of space itself. Primary freedom requires an absence of constraint.
What goes for space, also goes for time, God must have been free to create the cosmos earlier or later, or position the universe elsewhere
How did the condemnation of 1277 stimulate research into the vacuum? Provide an example of this research.
- The condemnation of 1277 stimulated research into the vacuum because it caused questioning of Aristotle’s ideas and teachings.
- Bradwardine provided an argument that compatibilized void with God: God exists in all creation and in the infinite void. The void depends on God to exist; since God is infinite the void is infinite. God was in the infinite void before creation was created. Void can exist without physical bodies, but not without God.
What did Jean Buridan think of there being an edge of space? If a javelin is thrown at the edge of space will it bounce back? Why does Bradwardine reject Buridan’s answer?
Buridan believed there is an edge of space but it is flexible, shape of space is determined by the objects in it
Bradwardine views the edge of space as a hard and finite boundary, like a wall. Very Aristotelian.
If you throw a javelin at the boundary of space it would bounce back, because the edge of space is like a wall, nothing will penetrate it.
What logical distinction did Boethius draw to reconcile God’s foreknowledge with our freedom? Explain how the distinction was intended to work.
The example was two statements, “necessarily if the librarian foresees you returning the book, then you will return the book” the other “ if the librarian foresees you returning the book, necessarily you will return the book”.
One statement is true, the first one, and the other is untrue. Her foreseeing you return the book did not cause you to return the book. This was meant to show that God can foresee the future, but that fact that he foresees the future does not impede on our free will.
Aristotle’s de Interpretionne discussion of the sea battle problem contains a solution that invokes truth-value gaps. Explain the problem and its solution.
The Sea Battle problem is as follows: Suppose that an individual says there will be a sea battle tomorrow, and another says no there will not be. Necessarily, one of them is correct. Which means that, necessarily, a sea battle will occur, or necessarily it will not. But this can be generalized to say that all events that happen, necessarily happen.
Aristotle argues that truths concerning the future do not have truth values.
- There is a truth value, but it hasn’t been assigned yet (aka there’s a GAP)
Modal logicians deny the validity of the following inference: Necessarily, either p or q. Therefore, either necessarily p or necessarily q. How is this inference relevant to Aristotle’s sea battle problem?
- necessary truth: true in all possible worlds
- incidentally true: it is true in the actual world but perhaps not in all possible worlds
- necessarily either p or q = necessarily in every possible world a battle will happen or will not happen
- either necessarily p or q: either a battle will always happen in every possible world or in every possible world a battle will not happen
How does Newton make atomism more congenial to Christianity? Does he think space is a property or a substance?
- Space does not cause anything, therefore it cannot be a substance
- Space cannot be a property because properties are dependent on substances, space existed prior to there being any objects
SO IT’S EITHER
Newton made atomism more congenial to Christianity?
- that God was the space-filler, space was a property of God.
What arguments does Leibniz deploy against the void? What arguments does he deploy against atoms?
Against void:
- Principle of sufficient reason: everything is explainable. Void is unexplainable because it has no properties and no way to distinguish any part from another.
- Relational theory of space: Space is not an actual thing, it is merely a concept defined by relations between objects.
- Continuity and plenitude: “best possible world” if everything is efficient, there would be no need for a void, if there was a void it would collapse on itself
- Thinks that God fills all gaps so God acts as a gap filler; therefore, voids cannot exist with God
Against atoms:
1. Atoms contradict continuity. Atoms must be infinitely divisible.
- Sufficient reason also means that everything must have a cause. Atoms, being material causes of larger things, must also have material causes! Thus, gunk is implied. Knug is loosely implied – all things comprise things yet larger.
Knug: everything gets bigger and bigger - reality has no ceiling
Gunk: everything gets smaller and smaller - there is no bottom
Atoms make gunk impossible, so atomism = false
Leibniz defends the cogency of the ontological argument for God’s existence. Does Leibniz’s solution to the problem of evil then yield the conclusion that there is really one possible world? If so, has Leibniz proved that ours is both the best of all possible worlds and the worst of all possible worlds? Would this be an unwelcome result?
evil is a privation: it is the lack of goodness
- there are possible worlds, but God only actualized one world - Leibniz argues that the evil that exists in this world is really the best outcome, because God exists, he would have chosen the best possible world to actualize.
- since you can’t have good and evil at one time it is just degrees of goodness, it’s a single axis
- yes this is an unwelcome result, bc that means god isn’t omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent
What is Schopenhauer’s solution to the problem of good? How does young Schopenhauer invert Leibniz? How does Schopenhauer modify the inversion as he matures? What aspects of Leibniz’s philosophy survive the inversion – and become part of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics?
Schopenhauer decides to invert Leibniz. He assumes we are ruled by an evil demon, ours is the worst of possible worlds.
- Good is just the absence of evil
- He later decides the will* is a blind driving force rather than an evil one. Before he believed everything has evil in it, he changes from evil to everything having will in it
- panpsychism survives instead of God it’s will
- the principle of sufficient reason: thinks the reason is devilish instead of God
Leibniz and Newton
Leibniz: god fills the void / gaps
Newton: god is the void / gaps
On page 239, Koons and Pickavance describe the pragmatist objection to metaphysics. Can Schopenhauer’s account of metaphysics be offered in reply? Compare his view of metaphysics to G. K. Chesterton’s described on page 239. **
Koons and Pickavance:
The pragmatist objection argues that metaphysics is useless because it seeks to supersede practical context.
There is no absolute explanation or absolute truth, which metaphysics is trying to characterize outside of context.
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How does Franz Brentano distinguish mental phenomena from physical phenomena? How is his method of demarcation jeopardized by emotions such as depression, euphoria, and free-floating anxiety? How do the existentialists attempt to rescue Brentano? Review other attempted rescues.
Mental phenomena is distinct from mental phenomena about intentionality
- depression, euphoria, and free-floating anxiety seem to be mental states that lack intentionality
Existentialists: attempted to rescue Brentano by saying anxiety and depression is coming from intentions, those feelings are directed at the absurdity of life
Other attempts to rescue Brentano’s distinction involve reinterpreting intentionality or expanding the understanding of mental phenomena
How is the cartoon below relevant to Fridugisus? Explain how he reaches his conclusions about the reality of shadows and darkness.
Fridugisus believes that shadows and darkness exist, substantially. Fridugisus primarily relies on biblical texts, arguing from examples (darkness that can be felt, shadows that can be counted, shadows that can be owned, shadows that can be located and be hiding places), as well as from the fact that God names the darkness “night”, which means it must be substantial, because God wouldn’t make a superfluous name in the way that a human might.
