Final Exam Property Flashcards
A owns Blackacre. A decides to subdivide Blackacre and sell off the middle portion to B, retaining the property on the eastern side of B as well as that on the western side of B’s new land. The original property is bordered on the east by a highway and on the southeastern border by a lake. A wants to continue his access to both of these areas from his home west of B’s land, rather than having to drive around the northern border which is a much longer route. B agrees, but in exchange.
A promises B that he will fix D’s boat which is docked near B’s property. These covenants are recorded on the respective deeds. A later sells the land to C. Which of the following is true regarding whether B can enforce the boat repair covenant against C.
A. none of the above
B. B cannot enforce the promice against C.
C. B can enforce the promise against C as a real covenant that runs with the land.
D. B can enforce the promise against C as an equitable servitude.
B cannot enforce the promise against C
A requirement to maintain property can be enforced through successive owners:
A. through a real covenant that runs with the land
B. all of the above
C. it cannot be enforce
D. through a license
through a real covenant that runs with the land
O, owner of a four acre parcel divided and conveyed two acres to A, keeping the other two acres for herself. The deed, properly recorded, includes mutual covenants by O, her heirs and assigns, and by A her heirs and assigns, that both the conveyed and retained properties will be used for residential purposes only.
If O conveys the retained parcel to B for valuable consideration, which of the following is most accurate?
A. B is only bound by the restriction if A, in fact, used her property for residential purposes.
B. B is not bound by the restricitce covenant, because there is no horizontal privity of estate.
C. B is bound by the restrictive covenant
D. B is not bound by the restriction, because there was no vertical privity of estate
B is bound by the restrictive covenant
O, owner of a four acre parcel divided and conveyed two acres to A, keeping the other two acres for herself. The deed, properly recorded, includes mutual covenants by O, her heirs and assigns, and by A her heirs and assigns, that both the conveyed and retained properties will be used for residential purposes only.
If B takes A’s property by adverse possession, which of the following is most accurate?
A. B is not bound by the restriction, because there was no vertical privity of estate.
B. B is bound by the restrictive covenant
C. B is only bound if O, in fact, used her land for residential purposes
D. B is not bound by the restrictive covenant, because there was no horizontal privity of estate.
B is not bound by the restriction, because there was no vertical privity of estate.
A conveys to B a one-acre lot in fee simple, keeping the adjoining lot for himself. The recorded deed provides that the premises shall be used solely for residential purposes.
The deed provision is:
A. a public encumbrance
B. Not an encumbrance
C. a private encumbrance
D. an encumbrance binding on B, but not binding on B’s successors or assignees.
a private encumbrance
A conveys to B a one-acre lot in fee simple, keeping the adjoining lot for himself. The recorded deed provides that the premises shall be used solely for residential purposes.
A conveys his lot to C in fee simple. B conveys his lot to D in fee simple. Both deeds contain the clause in the original deed from A to B. If D builds a law office out of his house on the lot:
A. C cannot sue D for damages as the law office does not touch and concern the land.
B. C would have to rely on a zoning regulation for damages.
C. C cannot sue D for damages as they are not in privity.
D. C can sue D for damages.
C can sue D for damages
All homes in the Shadyacres development are set back 50 feet from the main road. The original deeds contained notice of the restriction.
A. none of the above
B. A subsequent purchaser will not be deemed to have notice of the restriction if it is not contained in the subsequent deed.
C. Notice will be assumed based on other construction in the neighborhood.
D. A subsequent purchaser will be deemed to have notice of the restriction even if it is not contained in the subsequent deed.
A subsequent purchaser will be deemed to have notice of the restriction even if it is not contained in the subsequent deed.
A conveys to B a one-acre lot in fee simple, keeping the adjoining lot for himself. The recorded deed provides that the premises shall be used solely for residential purposes. A later conveys to C in fee simple and B conveys to D in fee simple.
Assume the deed from A to B was duly recorded. The clause was not contained in the deeds to C and D.
A. C can still sue D because C was a bonafide purchaser for value.
B. C cannot sue D as D took without actual notice.
C. All of the above.
D. C can sue D because D had constructive notice of the clause.
C can sue D because D had constructive notice of the clause.
Which of the following statements are most true of the touch and concern requirement of a valid real covenant?
A. The burden is to the landowner as an individual.
B. None of the above
C. Both the benefit and burden must touch and concern the land.
D. The promise makes the burdened land more valuable
Both the benefit and burden must touch and concern the land
Based upon the latest restatement, at modern law, which of the following types of privity is needed to enforce a properly recorded real covenant?
A. No privity is needed for enforcement
B. horizontal privity
C. vertical privity
D. perpendicular privity
No privity is needed for enforcement
A real covenant can be terminated in which of the following ways:
A. unclean hands
B. partition
C. ejectment
D. Changed conditions
changed conditions
The most important evidence a client could provide to persuade a court that a real covenant should be terminated based on a change in circumstances is that:
A. The area around the client’s neighborhood has significantly changed.
B. The growth of the area as a whole makes the real covenant impractical.
C. There have been significant changes in the client’s neighborhood itself.
D. The person who originally sold the land was trying to prevent a certain use not intended by the client.
There have been significant changes in the client’s neighborhood itself
A Euclidean zoning scheme protects all of the following EXCEPT:
A. flexible land uses
B. beautification of the community
C. safety of the citizens
D. the environment
flexible land uses
The suburban village of Shady Acres consists almost exclusively of upscale, traditional homes. Most are Colonial, Georgian or Tudor style, and generally consist of 3,000 square feet or more. B purchases one of the last remaining vacant lots in the village and applies for a permit to build his dream home, a 3,800 square foot geodesic dome. An architectural rendering of the home resembles 2/3 of a golf ball sitting on the ground. The home does not violate height, size, or setback requirements and will cost at least as much to construct as the surrounding homes. The building commission refuses to issue a building permit, stating that it is architecturally inconsistent with the surrounding homes, is unsightly, and will decrease property values in the neighborhood. B, claiming that the home is safer, sturdier, and more ecologically friendly than traditional designs, sues to compel issuance of the permit. The permit department defends, citing the preamble to the state legislation authorizing municipalities to issue building permits: “In order to promote the safety, security and general welfare of the citizens of the state, every municipal corporation in this state is hereby authorized to require the issuance of a building permit for all new construction.”
A. In promoting the general welfare of its citizens, the municipality may consider aesthetic considerations, among others. B’s suit will fail.
B. Issuing a building permit is a ministerial function. If the design meets all setback requirements, the permit must issue. B will prevail.
C. The refusal to issue the permit when all requirements have been met constitutes a regulatory taking. The village may refuse to issue the permit, but must compensate B.
D. The refusal to issue the permit constitutes a regulatory taking, but since the value of the lot has increased during the litigation, B is entitled to nothing.
In promoting the general welfare of its citizens, the municipality may consider aesthetic considerations, among others. B’s suit will fail.
A Company purchases 4 parcels of land, totaling 22 acres, in an area in Euclid County, that is zoned L-3, light industrial. Among uses permitted are “metal fabrication and related industries.” A is a company that builds prefabricated metal buildings. They announce plans to construct a new plant on the 22 acres. The County zoning board met and, noting that there were a large number of new residential subdivisions in the surrounding areas, and a need for new schools, rezoned one of the 4 parcels as S-2, limiting the parcel to school uses only.
A. The rezoning is lawful, but constitutes a taking because it destroys the legitimate, investment backed expectations of the owners of the parcels.
B. The rezoning is lawful, as it is necessary to the health and welfare of the residents of the county.
C. The rezoning is unlawful, as it is “spot zoning.”
D. The rezoning is lawful and is not a taking because it only lowers the value of the remaining property rather than destroying it entirely.
The rezoning is lawful, but constitutes a taking because it destroys the legitimate, investment backed expectations of the owners of the parcels.
Hardy owned several acres in the old, dilapidated downtown area of Cocoa, consisting mostly of abandoned warehouse and a few vacant lots. He delighted when the city council decided to try to revitalize the city center, restoring some of the hundred-year-old buildings and creating a mixed use development called, “Old Town,” combining a variety of boutique shops, restaurants, and related businesses with small townhouse developments. Hardy prepared a subdivision of his various parcel, filed a subdivision map showing commercial lots, obtained all the necessary approvals, and began selling commercial-sized lots to merchants and businesspersons eager to join the prosperity of the new “Old Town” development. Each of the deeds conveying lots sold by Hardy contained the following:
“It is hereby covenanted by the seller that the property conveyed shall be used for commercial or residential purposes only, that no industrial, warehouse, or other manufacturing structures shall be erected or maintained thereon, and that this covenant shall bind the buyer, his heirs and assigns, and their successors.”
Although the lots did not sell as rapidly as Hardy had hoped, he mad regular sales as the new downtown area gradually filled in and become widely publicized in the greater metropolitan area. Two years after he had first subdivided, two of the new lots remained unsold, a little over two acres. Because he was experiencing cash flow problems in his other enterprises, Hardy was forced to raise funds immediately, and sold the remaining two lots to Development Properties, Inc. (DPI), a real estate speculation firm. The deed to DPI did not contain any language restricting the use of the property. DPI then sold the property to a giant supermarket chain, which intended to construct a warehouse and distribution center for its retail operations in the western states. The warehouse would involve the constant movement in and out of large trucks 24 hours per day, seven days a week. Suzzie, who had purchased a lot from Milt that was located next to the proposed warehouse, operated a coffee shop specializing in reggae entertainment and poetry readings. She brings a suit against the supermarket chain seeking to enjoin construction of the warehouse. Her attorney argues that the lots sold by Hardy to DPI and then to the supermarket chain are bound by the same restrictions on use that are contained in the deed by which Suzzie took her property.
What is the likely outcome of this litigation
A. Suzzie will win is she can show that Hardy established a common development scheme for this entire subdivision.
B. Suzzie will win unless DPI and the supermarket were not aware of the restriction when they purchased the property.
C. Suzzie will lose because the restriction in the her deed binds only the purchaser of the land.
D. Suzzie will lose because the deed by which DPI took the property from Hardy did not contain the restrictions on use.
Suzzie will win if she can show that Hardy established a common development scheme for this entire subdivision.
Osman owned Gatoracre, an unimproved parcel of wooded land, in fee simple. He orally agreed to sell Gatoracre to Batman under an installment land contract whereby Batman agreed to pay $5,000.00 down and $100.00 a month for the next 10 years, and Osman retained the deed until Batman finished paying the installments. Because Osman and Batman were friends, they saw no need for a written contract and shook hands on the deal. After making the down payment, Batman moved onto the property and began clearing some of the trees for a road and a cabin. Ten months later, Batman, who had regularly made the monthly payments, was killed when a tree he was cutting fell on him. His estate consisted of a small quantity of personal possessions, $200,000.00 in cash, and his interest in Gatoracre. His properly executed will conveyed his real estate to Reed and the remainder of his estate to Patrick. During the next several month, Batman’s estate failed to make payments on the installment contract. Osman then notified the estate that he was rescinding the deal and asserting ownership of Gatoracre, and offered to return the amount Batman paid him, less expenses, as restitution.
Batman’s estate initiated a quiet title action, naming Osman, Reed, and Patrick as parties. Papers filed in the court by the estate indicated that it was prepared to pay the accelerated full balance of the contract from the proceeds of the estate in order to complete the conveyance and take title of the land, which it was permitted to do so by the state’s equity of redemption statutes.
If the court determines that Reed will receive title to Gatoracre in fee simple free of any obligation of the installment contract, which of the following doctrines will the court use to reach this determination?
I. Doctrine of equitable conversion.
II. Doctrine of part performance.
III. Equitable mortgage Doctrine.
A. I, II, and III
B. I only
C. II and III
D. I and II
I and II
A deed reciting that A conveys Blackacre to B “for no consideration whatsoever” is
A. invalid as a conveyance to defraud creditors.
B. valid as between the parties, but not recordable since it does not state value for tax purposes.
C. invalid, since there is no consideration.
D. valid, as a deed is not a covenant and requires no consideration.
Valid, as a deed is not a covenant and requires no consideration.
In Florida:
A. a seller must disclose all defects noticeable or not
B. a seller need not disclose defects, if a buyer is having an inspection done.
C. a seller must disclose only those defects readily observable by a potential buyer.
D. a seller has no obligation to disclose defects.
a seller must disclose all defects noticeable or not
In the late 1980s, O, a well-known vintner, divided his massive vineyard into two parcels, Grapeacre and Vineacre. The vineyard had been irrigated with the water from a single well. When he subdivided the property he purposely drew the boundaries so that the well fell on the border of the two properties. O then conveyed Grapeacre to M by a deed that contained the following covenant: “If the well located on the boundary of Grapeacre and Vineacre continues to be used for irrigation purposes and becomes in need of repair or replacement, the grantee, his heirs, and assigns and the grantor, his heirs, and assigns each promise to pay one-half of the cost of such repair or replacement. This covenant shall run with the land.” The deed from O to M was not recorded, and O did not record a copy with the records for Vineacre. M later sold Grapeacre to S, S’s deed did not contain the covenant about the well. After many years of use by the owners of both Grapeacre and Vineacre, the well began to fail. S took in upon himself to have the well repaired. He accepted the lowest bid on the job, which was $30,000. About two weeks later, he was rummaging through the files at his winery and discovered the deed from O to M. By this time, Vineacre had passed to O’s son E by inheritance, and again to E’s son J by inheritance from the now-deceased E. J knew nothing of the covenant concerning the well. S presented J with the bill for the well repair with a copy of the O/M deed and a note that said he expected to be reimbursed for $15,000. J refused to pay, and S sued. The jurisdiction has a 10-year statute of limitations for acquiring property by adverse possession, and the following recording statute:
“Any conveyance of interest in land shall not be valid against any subsequent purchaser for value, without notice thereof, unless the conveyance is first recorded.”
The court is most likely to rule in favor of:
A. J, because the deed from O to M was never recorded.
B. J, because S had acquired the well by adverse possession.
C. S, because the covenant runs with the land.
D. S, because he is a bona fide purchaser without notice.
S, because the covenant runs with the land
Developer D created an exclusive residential subdivision, Woodlake. In his deed to each lot, the following language appeared: “Grantee agrees for himself and assigns to use this property solely as a single family residence, to pay monthly fees as levied by Woodlake Homeowners’ Association for upkeep and security guard services, and to keep the backyard of this property unfenced so that bicycle paths and walkways may run through each backyard, as per the Woodlake master plan [adequately described], for use by all residents of Woodlake.”
D sold lots to A, B, and C. All deeds were recorded. A in turn sold to E by deed that omitted any mention of the foregoing covenants, and E had no actual knowledge thereof. Shortly thereafter, E started operating a commercial swimming pool sales operation out of his home. B in turn sold to F, who knew of but refused to pay the monthly fees levied by the homeowners’ association. C leased her property for 10 years to G, who erected a fence around the backyard, unaware of the covenant against such fencing.
If F sues G to remove his backyard fence:
A. G should win because he erected the fence in good faith and without actual knowledge of the restrictions.
B. F should win because the deed language about fencing created an equitable servitude enforceable against G.
C. F should win because F is in vertical privity with B.
D. G should win because there is no privity between B and G.
F should win because the deed langauage about fencing created an equitable servitude enforceable against G.
A purchaser wished to construct an industrial complex. On August 15, a seller and the purchaser entered into a written agreement that provided, among other things, as follows: “The seller hereby agrees to sell the seller’s unimproved property consisting of 40 acres to the purchaser for the price of $400,000. The seller shall convey good and marketable title. Closing of escrow is to occur no later than December 1. This agreement will be null and void if the purchaser is not the owner of, and does not hold legal title to, the subject property on December 1.”
On October 20, the seller discovered a 20-year-old easement running through the center of the property that a former owner had granted to the city when a mass transit rail line had been in the planning stages. The rail system had been abandoned when voters refused to support an increase in a local tax to finance construction. The seller immediately notified the purchaser of the easement and that she had begun negotiations with the city manager and the city planning commission to repurchase the easement and thereby extinguish it. On November 20, the purchaser telephoned the seller and asked about progress on the easement repurchase. The seller stated that a few holdovers on the planning commission were arguing to retain the easement, but that she had the votes to swing the commission her way, given enough time. “Do your best,” was the purchaser’s only response. Due to the Thanksgiving holiday, the planning commission did not vote on the easement repurchase issue until November 30, but voted to sell the easement back to the seller. The city manager’s office could not process the paperwork necessary to effectuate the sale of easement rights to the seller until December 2, on which day the seller deposited into escrow a warranty deed conveying good and marketable title to the subject property to the purchaser. The purchaser refused to pay the purchase price and declared that the contract had been rescinded. The seller sought specific performance in an appropriate legal action.
Assuming the seller prevails, which of the following is the best support for the court’s decision?
A. Time was not of the essence in the agreement between the seller and the purchaser.
B. The purchaser would be unjustly enriched if permitted to rely upon one day’s delay in performance as justification for rescinding the contract.
C. Delayed performance can never be considered a total breach of a land sale contract.
D. The purchaser led the seller to believe that strict adherence to the time of the essence clause would not be insisted upon.
the purchaser led the seller to believe that strict adherence to the time of the essence clause would not be insisted upon
