Final Exam Cases Flashcards
Marbury v Madison
Incumbent President John Adams lost election to Thomas Jefferson.
Adams pending commissions were about to be delivered and received, then-president Thomas Jefferson ordered then-Secretary of State James Madison to withhold nominations → Included Marbury
Marbury sued Madison directly to SCOTUS to compel to accept commission via Writ of Mandamus (Original Jurisdiction)
- Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? > Yes
- If he has a right, and the right has been violated, do United States Laws afford a remedy? > Yes
- If they do, is the remedy a mandamus from the Supreme Court? > No, not within the powers of the court
– Judiciary Act of 1789 granted SCOTUS “Original Jurisdiction” over matters of Writ of Mandamus
– Act re-defines what is original jurisdiction > Unconstitutional - Article 3 > Supremacy Clause
South Dakota v Dole
Commerce Clause Case
- State Legal Drinking Age = 19
- Congress gave “conditions” in grant
– Drinking age = 21 > w/h 5% of transportation funds if non-compliant
- Ruled against State
- Congress may “lay, collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises…”
– Can attach conditions → has historically used grants to “further broaden policy objections by conditioning receipt of fed. monies upon compliance by recipient
– Developed Test on spending
— General Welfare
— Conditioning of funds =
unambiguously
— Grant must relate to Federal
interest → Roads/Alcohol consumption/Commerce Clause
— Other Constitutional Restrictions
— Non-coercive → 5% not coercive - no standard set
Gibbons v. Ogden
- Appellant had license, State Law, for exclusive rights to use steamboats in State Waters
– Appellee got a similar license, but from Fed. Gov’t → used to compete with Appellant in the same state
— sues to enjoin from operating steamboats → Appellee claimed he was operating under a license granted by Congress, and Congress has exclusive power under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 to regulate inter-state commerce - Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce → Steamboat traffic is commerce
– Steamboat traffic between states is INTERSTATE COMMERCE
– Congress can regulate
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp
- National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 → Cong. determined that labor-management disputes related to the flow of interstate commerce
– could be regulated
— NLRB Board charged Jones & Laughlin Stool Co. (JLS) with discriminating against employees trying to unionize
—- JLS owns multiple distribution methods, such as tow-boats, railroads that span many states, and mines.
JLS imports from many states → exports to many states → Company employs over 400K employees → interstate commerce
– NLRB, charged with matters affecting commerce, can persecute JLS → Commerce clause allows Gov’t to regulate
** Companies cannot discriminate against employees for exercising their right to unionize.
** Gov’t can regulate businesses with inter-state impacts
United States v. Darby
Commerce
- Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act 1938 (FLSA)
– regulated wage, overtime, min wage, etc
– Lumber company shipped lumber out of state → violated FLSA
— imported and operated on only one state → Congress cannot regulate
– District Court dismissed → Lumber company is operating within one State
SCOTUS ruled FLSA Section 15 prohibits certain labor-related acts
– Lumber company produces lumber for many states
— this is interstate commerce
** Gov’t can regulate via FLSA businesses that are Intra-State but export to multiple States (inter-state) are within Commerce Clause purview
Wickard v. Filburn
Commerce
- Farmer running a small farm → grows wheat
- Agricultural Act of 1938 → set limits to wheat grown
– allotted 11.1 acres & 20.1 Bushels
— farmer sowed 23 acres and 239 bushels → traded with neighbor for eggs, and other foods
- Behavior is intra-state → no commerce as a business → can’t regulate
- if behavior is aggregated across the nation, this has INTER-state impacts
– Aggregation rule
– Commerce Clause allows Gov’t to regulate, and thus fine farmer
** Gov’t can regulate an individual behavior intra-state if behavior is aggregated and behavior has inter-state impacts
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States
Commerce
- Cong. passed Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA 1964)
- Motel in central city → sued stating CRA unconstitutional pursuant to Commerce Clause → discriminates against blacks
- Motel is central location
– advertises all around State → Adds in magazines nation-wide
– 75% guests are out-of-state → INTER-state commerce →
— if behavior is aggregated, affecting the black population from travel, affecting inter-state commerce
** Gov’t can regulate motels pursuant to Commerce Clause with regard to CRA 1964
Katzenbach v. McClung, Sr. & McClung, Jr
BBQ Restaurant in Alabama → seats 220 → not in central location
- offers seating to white → Take-out only to black
- Restaurant spends $70K (46%) of meat from out-of state
– imports from out of state
- Similar to Heart of Atl.CRA 1964, Gov’t can regulate motels → extended to Restaurants and Retail
– Discrimination on acc. of race affects business from other inter-state businesses
** Racial discrimination in restaurants had a direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate commerce
Perez v. United States
Commerce
- Gov’t passed Consumer Credit Protection Act → Commerce Clause
- Appellant is a Loan Shark
– organized crime
– Extortionate Credit Transactions
- Technically it’s not commerce, it’s crime
- organized crime provides over $350 million/yr
Perez v. United States
Commerce
- Gov’t passed Consumer Credit Protection Act → Commerce Clause
- Appellant is a Loan Shark
– organized crime
– Extortionate Credit Transactions
- Technically it’s not commerce, it’s crime
- organized crime provides over $350 million/yr
– syphons funds out from businesses
– Loan Sharking is still commerce
– behavior aggregated has national impacts
Gov’t can prosecute Appellant →inter-state commerce
United States v. Lopez
Commerce
- Cong. passed Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZ)
– Fed. offense for any “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm” in school zones
– no commercial activity noted in this bill
- 12 year old student brings gun to school
– arrested under Texas law → dismissed, charged by Feds under GFSZ
- Commerce clause regulates a lot → GFSZ has no mention of commerce or inter-state affairs
– Gov’t: Possession of guns in schools → violent crime → violent schools impact learning, and future commerce
— then all crime would be regulated under commerce clause
— not economic activity → GFSZ exceeds Gov’t power
** Possession of guns in school grounds is not a commercial activity, nor any inter-state activity.
** Cannot be regulated by the U.S. Gov’t. Gun-Free School Zones Act pursuant to Commerce Clause.
United States v. Morrison
Commerce Clause
- Student attended Virginia Tech
– raped by Uni. Football students (Athlete)
- athlete appeals → changed ruling from “sexual assault” to “using abusive language” → no explanation
- Student cited Violence Against Women Act → Congress can regulate Commerce → and crimes under Comm. Clause
** SCOTUS ruled that gender motivated crimes of violence are not economic activity - non-economic, criminal conduct cannot be regulated → even if aggregated
** Case dismissed
Gonzalez v. Raich
Commerce
- California passed the Compassionate Use Act (CUA) → Legalizing Marijuana (MJ) for medical use
– conflicts with Controlled Substances Act (CSA)
– attempts to regulate met with suit → claim that Gov’t cannot regulate intra-state activity when related to Medical purposes
- CSA purpose to regulate a commodity → MJ, medical or not, is a commodity
– applies to MJ → aggregate rule → cultivation and use of MJ can have inter-state effects
** Gov’t can regulate MJ, pursuant to CSA, because of Commerce Clause powers
** MJ is a commodity that can impact interstate commerce
Printz v. United States
Commerce
- Congress passed the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA)
- amended GCA → Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill)
– requiring “local chief law enforcement officers” (CLEOs) → perform background-checks until the A.G. establishes a federal system for this purpose.
- Constitution does not explicitly permit Cong. to issue directives to states to enforce a fed. program
- historically some cases may have happened, but within judicial process, not legislative or executive
- 10th amendment, power not specified to Fed. Gov’t → granted to states
** Congress may not direct states to participate in a federally enacted regulatory scheme
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer
Fed. Exec
- Korean war (1950 - 1953)
- Dispute between Steel companies and United Steelworkers of America
– concern that strike would impact Steel Production
– POTUS signed Exec. Order (EO) 1034 → took possession of steel mill → POTUS notified Congress in writing one day after
- Order issued without Cong. approval → Cong. took no action (Acquiesced)
- No statute prohibits POTUS from possession of private property → not implied by Cong.
– Steelworkers had a right to strike
– no Gong. enactment passed to authorize
– POTUS claimed wartime rules → denied
— POTUS actions are in 3 stages
—- 1. with Constitutional and Cong. authority
—- 2. without Cong. authority but Constitutional backing → Cong. acquiescence is “approval”
—- 3. POTUS action incompatible with Cong. approval → Congress previously made policies about seizing private property
** POTUS cannot seize private property without Congressional consent
United States v. Nixon
Fed Exec
- POTUS ordered to hand over tapes and recordings related to Watergate
- Refused → Exec. Privilege
- Marb. v Madison → SCOTUS must interpret Law, not POTUS → Checks and balances
- there are limits to Presidential immunity
– when no dangers to nation, transparency outweighs Presidential Privacy
— unlimited privilege would nullify checks-and-balances
– There must be a specific need to keep Presidential information safe to prevent it from being shared
** POTUS cannot claim exec. privilege due to
** checks and balances
** confidentiality, unless safety of nation depends on it
Gundy v. United States
Fed Excec power
- Appellant convicted of violating the Sex Offender Reg. and Notification Act (SORNA)
- appellant argued that SORNA was unconstitutional → delegated legislative power to A.G.
- delegation to A.G. satisfies “intelligible principle” requirement → requires A.G. applies SORNA requirements to “all sex offenders uniformly”
** Cong. may delegate authority to a Gov’t department if non-delegation doctrine is satisfied by a sufficient “intelligible principle”
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha
Exec Power
- immigrant (appellant) overstayed visa → faced deportation proceedings
– Cong. passed resolution (under legislative veto provision) suspending appellant deportation
- SCOTUS ruled legislative veto violated separation-of-powers
- Cong. passes laws, Exec. enforces them
- Cong. was exercising executive power
** Congress may not unilaterally veto Exec. action without due process.
Morrison v. Olson
Exec Power
- Cong. passed Independent Counsel Act of 1978 (ICA)
- defendant challenged → claiming violation of sep-of-powers
– grants exec. powers to officer outside of POTUS control
- ICA sets a temporary role with one function
– reports to A.G. → can be removed by A.G. → controlled by POTUS
– ICA doesn’t impermissibly intrude on SCOTUS role → Counsel is an exec. officer, not a judge
** Designation of independent counsel, which reports to A.G., and is terminated upon completion or with good cause is permissible
NLRB v. Canning
Exec Power
- NLRB held Soft drink bottling company subject to appear in board meeting for adjudication
- Soft drink bottling company challenged in court → NLRB board lacked appropriate appointments
– appointments happened in “pro-forma” sessions
- POTUS may appoint members of cabinet with Cong. approval, barring recess and when vacancies happen
- Recess
– Main recess (Major recess)
– Pro Forma - when vacancies happen
– Vacancy during session
– Vacancy out of session
– Vacancy prior to end of session → addressed next session - SCOTUS ruled length of time w/o session must be more than 10 days
** POTUS cannot appoint (and approve) during pro-forma session w/o Cong. Approval
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
Fed. Exec Powers
- Export company indicted → violated a joint resolution of Cong. → prohibiting sale of arms to countries in conflict in S. America
- SCOTUS ruled POTUS has “broad powers in foreign affairs”
– negotiating treaties and imposing embargoes
– Cong. can regulate foreign commerce → can delegate some foreign affairs to POTUS - States do not have international powers, that is for POTUS and Cong.
– POTUS represents the nation
** POTUS can enforce this joint authorization by powers vested in office of POTUS to regulate foreign affairs
Zivotofsky v. Kerry
Fed Exec. Power
- 1948: POTUS formally recognized Israel in a signed statement of recognition
- over last 60 years, various claims of ownership over “Jerusalem”
- Cong. passed Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FAM)
– subsection allows citizens born in “Jerusalem” to list in passport “Jerusalem, Israel”
- Petitioner born in Jerusalem to U.S. Citizens → requested passport to list place of birth “Jerusalem, Israel”
- based on Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
– 3 stages to presidential power
— this is the 1st stage
— power of recognition of foreign nations is “central” and “exclusive” to POTUS
— Cong. Act telling POTUS how to recognize a foreign nation is a violation of sep-of-powers
— foreign relations is only a power of Exec → Cong. cannot send diplomats w/o POTUS approval
** Cong. cannot exercise power of recognition on behalf of POTUS
** FAM section 214(d) infringes this power
Dames & Moore v. Regan
Fed. Exec Power
- Nov. 4, 1979 → American Embassy in Tehran seized → diplomatic personnel captured
- Negotiations between nations occurred → Agreement signed
– terminate all litigation as between the Government of each party and the nationals…” → settlement and termination of all such claims through arbitration.”
- April 1981 → Dames & Moore sued claiming declaratory and injunctive relief to stop agreement → $3 Million debt from Iran
- SCOTUS ruled Congress implicitly approves practice of claim settlement
– Enacted to Int’l Settlement Act of 1949
– Over years Cong. updated and amended Act → Continuous acceptance - POTUS here has power to settle foreign relation disputes
** Cong. implicitly supported POTUS action
** POTUS has foreign relations powers to settle foreign disputed
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Fed. Exec. Power
- Sept. 11, 2001 → al Qaeda attacked Twin Towers
- Congress passed Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
– prevent future attacks
– Subdue al Qaeda
- Appellant → U.S. Citizen moved to Saudi Arabia as child → living in Afghanistan by 2001 → apprehended by Northern Alliance → turned over to U.S. Military → Transferred to Guantanamo Bay
– When learning he is a U.S. Citizen → transferred to Charleston, S. Carolina
- Father pressed charges → appellant being held without due process indefinitely without formal charges
- POTUS action needs no approval → granted by AUMF
- Detention of enemy combatants important → prevents return to enemy forces by combatants
- appellant claims AUMF doesn’t authorize indefinite detention
– applied Matthew v Eldridge test
— decided on Some Evidence standard for citizen detainee to have some due process under AUMF
— burden on proof shifted to accused
** Executive doesn’t have the authority to detain citizen “enemy combatants” indefinitely w/o trial
Boumedine v. Bush
Fed. Exec. Power
- petitioners are “Enemy Combatants”
– detained in Guantanamo Bay
– Under AUMF → POTUS authorized to use all necessary force… against terrorism
- Per Hamdi v. Rumsfeld → Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) established
– During appeals, Congress passed Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) 2005
– no court shall have jurisdiction application for writ of Habeas Corpus
— only D.C. Court shall have jurisdiction
- Petitioners can request Habeas Corpus (H.B.) → except in times of war
– petitoners are prisoners in Guantanamo Bay
— has court, is island, officers live there with families, fortress, safe space to review hearings - Sovereignty of Guantanamo Bay
– US has De facto jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay → Cuba has not disputed territory
– is this is U.S. Jurisdiction, then the laws of the land apply
— unlike in Eisentrager Court, US has de facto sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay - US Gov’t cannot suspend Writ of H.C. unless extraordinary circumstances (Suspension Clause)
- Assessing CSRT proceedings
– hardly any due process
– DTA not good enough replacement for H.C.
— because at times of war, POTUS powers must be held in check → H.C. applies in land where legal US reach applies → proceedings can happen in Guantanamo Bay → Writs of H.C. Essential as defense against tyrannical gov’t
** DTA violates the Suspension Clause
** CSRT doesn’t provide adequate substitution for Writ of H.C.
** petitioners do not need to exhaust review under DTA before seeking H.C.
Trump v. Hawaii
Fed. Exec. Power
- Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) → vetting process necessary for foreign nationals seekign to enter the U.S.
– POTUS claims necessary to impose entry restrictions on nationals of countries that
— Do not share adequate information for an informed entry determination or…
— That otherwise present national security risks.
- POTUS signed EO-1 → to protect US from terrorist nations
– placed Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen in list banned from entry
– stayed by District Court
— EO-1 revoked → signed EO-2 → added Chad, North Korea and Venezuela - Plaintiff claims that no person shall be discriminated against on account of race, sex, nationality, etc…
– EO-2 discriminates against muslims
– rallies and presidential campaigns, called muslim ban
— TV interviews
— POTUS tweeted 3 anti-multim propaganda video links - SCOTUS ruled
– Foreign nationals do not have a right to entry
– text of EO says nothing about religion
– Nations in list have been in the list of monitored nations by Congress for years prior to EO
– Nations banned constitute only 8% of Muslim population
– OE is not at all related to Korematsu v United States
** OE is valid and constitutional
** Entry policy doesn’t violate the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment
Nixon v. Fitzgerald
Fed Exec Power
- Nov. 1968 → respondent appeared before committee
– testified that C-5A transport plane costs far more than expected
- January 1970 - respondent lost job → POTUS admitted it and justified it on National TV
– internal memorandum recommending to fire respondent
– next day, White House announced a redaction of statement
- sued for damages during presidency
- Historically, POTUS has been protected from civil suits during service
– unique office requires immunity
– diversion of energies is counter-productive to running the nation
– easily identifiable target for civil suits - Alternative mechanisms for keeping POTUS in check exist
** POTUS endowed with absolute immunity
Clinton v. Jones
Fed Exec. Power
- POTUS elected in 1992 → re-elected in 1996 → term expires in 2001
- Respondent was an employee when POTUS was governor
– then Governor invited respondent to hotel and made sexual advances → declined by respondent → mistreated afterwards
— sued for actual damages of $75K and punitive damages of $100K
- then-Gov-now-POTUS claims dismissal on grounds of Presidential Immunity
- SCOTUS ruled POTUS is not immune from civil suits of events that happened “before” his terms
– hearings will accommodate POTUS busy schedule
** a sitting president is not absolutely immune from actions taken before assuming the office of the Executive.
