Final Exam! Flashcards
(Chapter 17) Explain how vertical integration “may be used strategically to raise the price of inputs for competitors.”
Manufacturers may use vertical integration to maintain products’ high-quality images or to ensure that their retailers provide adequate services.
Discourages entry, thus increasing barriers to entry
(Chapter 17) Using evidence from the section Application 17.4: Free Riding and the Internet, explain how perfume companies used RPM to try to avoid this outcome–the problem of people using the personal service that brick-and-mortar stores provide, but then purchasing the good at a lower price online.
Briefly summarize Carlton and Chevalier’s results regarding RPM in the perfume industry.
Perfume companies refuted this by making online prices equal or higher (in retail price or with S/H costs) than those in brick-and-mortar stores. Carlton and Cevalier found that this act to lower free-riding was a common occurrence in the perfume industry, finding that their claim was consistent (more so for speciality, exclusive, and limited products).
RPM solves free-rider problem
(Chapter 17) Analyze how Toys “R” Us facilitated collusion among toy manufacturers using RPM.
Toys “R” Us ended up colluding with toy manufacturers by creating agreements so they basically get first bids on popular toys and selling closeouts before warehouses, who generally sold toys at significantly lower prices. By doing this, they were able to sell toys at the higher prices and reducing the supply of toys in warehouses to lower their marketshare.
(Chapter 17) Analyze how resale price maintenance to induce service can result in positive and negative welfare effects.
Effects are ambiguous. Agreements are aimed at increasing presale services that have neutral welfare effects, but services could also cause demand to shift out depending on the reservation prices of the consumer. For example, society can be better or worse off when service is used to increase wholesale profits but not retail profits.
(Chapter 17) Explain what resale price maintenance (RPM) and the problem of double marginalization each are.
Explain how RPM can eliminate “the problem of ‘double marginalization’ and improve welfare compared with successive stages of monopoly.”
RPM: An agreement where manufacturer sets a minimum or maximum price.
Problem of Double Marginalization: Double marginalization is when upstream and downstream monopolists charge prices above marginal cost since the marginal revenue curve becomes equal to the demand curve. Consumers and producers are substantially worse off as prices are higher compared to monopoly results because deadweight loss increases.
RPM can improve welfare through vertical integration where firms can maximize profits by seeing a maximum retail price, which ultimately eliminates the problem of double marginalization as well as it increases welfare for both the consumers and producers.
(Monopsony) Analyze how monopsony bargaining power can help explain wage dispersion.
Wage dispersion violates the law of one wage in perfectly competitive markets.
Under monopsony, wage dispersion accounts for varying factors such as geography, experience, and company. Wages are not based on productivity and can be different for two employees doing to same amount of work.
(Monopsony) Analyze how monopsony bargaining power can help explain the market provision of general training.
**(in a perfectly competitive model, it would only be rational for labor to invest in general training for themselves–not for employers to pay for general training for their workforce)
Workers aren’t paid their marginal product under monopsony. There’s no incentive to pay for their general training, but employers have incentive to pay for the training since there’ll be a return on investment and also allows them to pay lower wages.
(Monopsony) Analyze how monopsony bargaining power can help explain racial pay gaps.
Reservation pay - what is your next best option?
Idea is say there’s a racist and non-racist employer (racist employer pays more for white people). Non-racist employer wants to be able to pay black people more, but in response, also needs to pay white people more than black people wages to also capture the white-employee market
non-racist employer reacts to how the racist employer pays their employees
minimize costs. every additional dollar they can save from wages is one more for profit
(Monopsony) Analyze how monopsony bargaining power can help explain how minimum wages often do not lead to decreases in employment.
Setting a “price floor” prevents monopsonist from cutting labor and wages. In turn, minimum wage actually increases employment, which affects employer’s ability to maximize profits.
(Chapter 10) Using evidence presented in this chapter, identify two facts about an industry’s pricing behavior might lead you to suspect that the firms were fixing prices and explain how/why these facts would be associated with price-fixing.
1) Price uniformity - when a firm publicly announces their price ahead of time to tell other firms how to set their prices. This is associated with price-fixing because firms are communicating with each other to reach some agreement that ultimately affects the market.
2) Converging prices at different rates - when firms increase their prices at different times. This is associated with price-fixing because there’s a distinct correlation in the changing rates of prices.
(Chapter 10) Explain how the use of a basing point pricing system can result in suboptimal economic performance.
Analyze which buyers are hurt by a basing point pricing system.
Explain why single basing point systems were generally unstable and most industries ultimately adopted multiple basing point systems.
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(Chapter 10) Distinguish the difference between collusive and barometric price leadership.
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(Chapter 9) Explain why the bigger the increase is in demand (the more demand shifts out or to the right), the harder it can be for firms to maintain collusion.
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(Chapter 9) Explain how the elasticity of demand can affect the ability of firms to collude.
The more elastic the demand is, the harder it is to collude.
(Chapter 8) Explain what it means for there to be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in oligopoly behavior.
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