Final Exam Flashcards
The protection afforded to an automated information system in order to attain the applicable objectives of preserving the integrity, availability and confidentiality of information system resources
Computer Security
Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information
Confidentiality
Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, including ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity
Integrity
Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information
Availability
A potential security harm to an asset
Threat
A system configuration issue or a mistake in software that allows access to information or capabilities that can be used by a hacker as a stepping-stone into a system or network
Exposure
A weakness in the computational logic (e.g., code) found in software and some hardware components (e.g., firmware) that, when exploited, results in a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, OR availability
Vulnerability
A flaw in the specification, design, implementation, or operation of information system / asset
Bug
A threat that uses a vulnerability or exposure to violate the security of system
Exploit
Address a vulnerability typically though code changes, but could also include specification changes or even specification deprecations (e.g., removal of affected protocols or functionality in their entirety)
Mitigation
Attempt to learn or make use of information from the system that does not affect system resources
Passive Attack
Attempt to alter system resources or affect their operation
Active Attack
A subject should be given only those privileges that it needs in order to complete its task.”
Least Privilege
Unless a subject is given explicit access to an object, it should be denied access to that object. (Whitelisting)
Fails-Safe Default
Security mechanisms should be as simple as possible. (KISS principle)
Economy of Mechanism
Requires that all accesses to objects be checked to ensure that they are allowed.
Complete Mediation
Security of a mechanism should not depend on the secrecy of its design or implementation
Open Design
A system should not grant permission based on a single condition.
Separation of Privilege
Security mechanisms should be designed so that users understand
Principle of Least Astonishment
Security Implementation
Identify, Prevent, Detect, Respond, Recover
the act of taking the low level technical artifact and abstracting logic to understand what the program does
Reverse Engineering