Final Exam Flashcards

1
Q

Briefly describe recent developments in the EU’s Common European Security and Defence
Policy (CESDP) concerning defence industrial cooperation, specifically in PESCO, EDF, and
CARDs.

A
  1. Recent developments in the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) regarding defense industrial cooperation in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) show a trend toward deeper integration and a push for strategic autonomy.
    Here are some key points:
    Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

Launched in 2017, PESCO involves 25 EU member states collaborating to develop and enhance European defense capabilities.1

PESCO acts as a framework for joint projects, encompassing areas like military mobility, capability development, and training.2

It aims to improve the EU’s ability to respond to crises and contribute more effectively to international security.3
European Defence Fund (EDF)

The EDF, established in 2017, provides financial support for collaborative defense projects, promoting innovation and competitiveness in the European defense industry.4

The EDF has a budget of €8 billion for 2021-2027.5

A substantial portion of the budget is allocated to key areas, including:

Air Combat Systems: Investing in next-generation fighter jets and drone technologies, aiming to create fifth- and sixth-generation air combat systems.6

Missile Defense: Collaborative efforts to ensure Europe has advanced defensive measures against missile threats.7

Munitions Production: The EDF has been mobilized to address ammunition shortages, supporting increased production capacity for artillery shells and other critical ammunition.8
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)

CARD is a mechanism for improving the coordination of national defense planning among EU member states.9

It involves data collection and analysis by the European Defence Agency (EDA), leading to recommendations for collaborative capability development.9
Challenges and Future Outlook
While the EU has made progress in defense industrial cooperation, it still faces challenges:

Military Mobility: The EU lacks a seamless system for moving troops and equipment across borders, hampering rapid response capabilities.10

Dependence on Non-EU Suppliers: EU countries often rely heavily on defense equipment from non-EU manufacturers.10
To address these issues, the EU is working on initiatives such as:

The European Defence Industrial Strategy: Aims to increase intra-EU defense trade and procurement from European manufacturers.7

The EU’s Common Munitions Programme: Works to ensure sufficient stockpiles and production capabilities for essential defense supplies within the EU.8
These recent developments demonstrate the EU’s commitment to strengthening its defense capabilities and achieving greater strategic autonomy through enhanced cooperation and a more integrated European defense industry.

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2
Q

9) Compare the institutional authority, the structure and the legal personality of the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Defence Community (EDC)!

A
  • The Western European Union (WEU) and the European Defence Community (EDC) were both post-World War II initiatives aimed at strengthening Europe’s defense, but they differed in their institutional authority, structure, and legal personality.
    1. Institutional Authority:
  • The WEU was a defensive alliance formed in 1954, building on the Treaty of Brussels (1948). Its authority was primarily intergovernmental, meaning decisions were made collectively by member states without transferring sovereignty to a supranational body.
  • The EDC, proposed in 1950, aimed to create a supranational European army. It would have had significant authority, as member states would cede control over their military forces to a unified European structure. However, it failed due to a lack of political consensus, particularly in France.
    2. Structure:
  • The WEU had a simpler structure with a Council of Ministers (representing
    national governments) as its primary decision-making body, supported by a Parliamentary Assembly that advised but had limited influence.
  • The EDC was designed with a more ambitious structure, including a common European army, a single budget, and a shared command, overseen by a European Defence Minister. This structure reflected its supranational vision, which was never realized.
    3. Legal Personality:
  • The WEU had legal personality, allowing it to conclude treaties and engage in international cooperation. However, its role diminished after NATO became the primary defense organization for Europe.
  • The EDC never acquired legal personality because it was never ratified. Its failure underscored the reluctance of European states to fully integrate their defense policies.
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3
Q

8) Describe the political and military institutions of the NATO. Why was the NATO the most successful security organisation of the Cold War era?

A

Political Institutions:
* North Atlantic Council (NAC): The main political decision-making body, consisting of representatives from all member states. It meets regularly and can convene at the ambassadorial, ministerial, or heads-of-state level. Decisions in the NAC are made by consensus, meaning all members must agree.
* Secretary General: The chief administrative officer and spokesperson of NATO, responsible for coordinating the alliance’s activities and facilitating discussions among members.
* Committees: Various specialized committees address issues like economics, partnerships, and emerging threats, providing expertise and policy recommendations.
2. Military Institutions:
* Military Committee: Composed of the Chiefs of Defense from all member
states, it is NATO’s highest military authority. It provides strategic guidance and advice to the NAC.
* Supreme Allied Commanders: Two key commands oversee NATO’s military operations:
* Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR): Based in Belgium, responsible for planning and executing NATO’s military operations in Europe.
* Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT): Based in the U.S., focusing on the modernization and transformation of NATO’s forces.
* Integrated Command Structure: NATO maintains a unified military command that coordinates joint operations and ensures interoperability among member states’ forces.

Why Was NATO the Most Successful Security Organization of the Cold War Era?
- NATO was the most successful security organization of the Cold War era because it effectively united its member states under a shared purpose: defending against the threat of Soviet expansion. Built on the principle of collective defense outlined in Article 5 of its founding treaty, NATO created a strong sense of mutual responsibility among its members. This principle acted as a powerful deterrent, ensuring that any aggression against one member would trigger a unified military response from all.

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4
Q

7) Describe the changing nature of security threats after the end of the Cold War era.

A

During the Cold War, security was primarily focused on the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the main concern being military power and the threat of nuclear war. It was a period dominated by state-centric security issues, where superpowers and their alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) were the central players.
However, with the Cold War’s end, global security became more complex and diverse. Instead of focusing on conflicts between major powers, attention shifted to new and unconventional threats. One of the most noticeable changes was the rise of non-state actors like terrorist groups, organized crime syndicates, and cybercriminals.
Another significant shift was the growing recognition of economic, environmental, and societal security issues. Problems like climate change, resource scarcity, pandemics, and migration began to challenge the traditional understanding of security.

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5
Q

6) What is the Regional Security Complex Theory?

A

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is a framework developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver within the field of International Relations to explain how security is organized and distributed across regions. It argues that the dynamics of security are not globalized but are instead concentrated in distinct geographical regions where states’ security concerns are closely interconnected.
According to RSCT, a Regional Security Complex (RSC) is formed when the security of one state in a region is so interlinked with the security of others that they cannot be meaningfully analyzed in isolation. This interconnectedness stems from shared borders, historical conflicts, cultural ties, and economic or political relations. For example, security developments in the Middle East, such as conflicts between Iran and Saudi Arabia, affect neighboring countries, making the region an RSC.

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6
Q
  1. Describe the current security situation at the South China Sea.
A

The South China Sea (SCS) is a significant geopolitical flashpoint due to overlapping territorial claims, military buildups, and unresolved legal disputes among several Southeast Asian nations and China.

  1. Territorial Disputes: China claims nearly 80% of the SCS via its Nine-Dash Line, lacking legal support. Other claimants include Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, particularly concerning the Spratly and Paracel Islands.
  2. Legal Disputes and International Law: The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines maritime zones that influence resource rights. The 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling stated that China’s Nine-Dash Line has no legal basis, and China has rejected this ruling.
  3. Military Buildup and Security Threats: China has transformed reefs into militarized outposts, enhancing its military reach and threatening freedom of navigation. The U.S. conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations to challenge China’s claims.

4.Environmental and Economic Impacts: China’s island-building has inflicted ecological damage and threatens biodiversity. The SCS is rich in fishing grounds and oil reserves, making control over these resources a key concern.

  1. Current Diplomatic and Security Climate: Recent tensions have escalated with naval incidents and obstructions by Chinese vessels. ASEAN nations, supported by the U.S., pursue diplomatic solutions but struggle against China’s assertiveness.

Conclusion: The SCS is marked by territorial claims, legal disputes, military confrontations, and environmental degradation, with ongoing challenges to regional and global security due to China’s actions.

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7
Q

5- What is “human security” and what is the R2P?

A

Human security
A concept that prioritizes the safety, rights, and well-being of individuals over state security. It aims to protect people from both violent and non-violent threats, ensuring freedom from threats to life and dignity. This universal approach focuses on prevention, addressing root causes instead of relying on military intervention. It involves governments, NGOs, and local communities and encompasses various dimensions, including economic, health, environmental, and political security, with the goal of enhancing survival and improving daily life.
Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a principle asserting that the international community must prevent and respond to mass atrocities like genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It emphasizes that state sovereignty includes the obligation to protect citizens; if a state fails to do so, the international community should intervene. R2P encompasses three main responsibilities: preventing crises, reacting to urgent human needs (including sanctions and military intervention in extreme cases), and aiding in recovery post-conflict.
Military intervention under R2P is considered only for just causes, such as large-scale loss of life, and must follow precautionary principles, including last resort and proportionality. Authorization from the UN Security Council is necessary for legitimacy.
R2P has been applied in various situations, including NATO’s intervention in Libya (2011), international actions in Côte d’Ivoire (2011), diplomatic interventions in Kenya (2007-2008), and ongoing peacekeeping in South Sudan and the Central African Republic.
While R2P focuses on severe human rights violations and state failure, human security addresses broader threats to individual well-being. Both aim to protect individuals and uphold their safety and dignity.

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8
Q
  1. Summarize the nature of military interventions in Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and in Libya (2011).
A

The military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya were driven by distinct geopolitical goals but shared themes of regime change, counterterrorism, and international legal debates. Each intervention had unique contexts, legal justifications, and long-term consequences.
1. U.S.-Led Intervention in Afghanistan (2001-2021)
Context:
The intervention in Afghanistan was a direct response to the September 11, 2001 attacks by al-Qaeda, harboured by the Taliban regime. The U.S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom to eliminate terrorist networks and stabilize the region.
Legal Justification:
UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1386 recognized the terrorist threat and endorsed international action.
U.S. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) allowed broad military engagement against terrorist groups.
Military Strategy:
Initially focused on airstrikes, special forces deployment, and support for the Northern Alliance, a coalition opposed to the Taliban.
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established to stabilize the country.
Outcome:
Despite some initial success, the conflict prolonged due to Taliban resurgence, weak state institutions, and widespread corruption.
The U.S. withdrawal in 2021 led to the Taliban’s rapid takeover, ending America’s longest war.
2. U.S.-Led Intervention in Iraq (2003-2011)
Context:
The U.S. justified the invasion of Iraq based on alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and Iraq’s supposed ties to terrorism, particularly al-Qaeda. Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, was accused of violating multiple UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1441, which mandated disarmament.
Legal Justification:
UNSC Resolution 678 (1990) and Resolution 687 (1991) were cited to revive authorization for military action after Iraq’s alleged non-compliance.
The U.S. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (2002) provided domestic legal cover.
Military Strategy:
Operation Iraqi Freedom began with airstrikes (“shock and awe”) followed by a ground invasion involving U.S. and coalition forces (e.g., the UK, Poland, South Korea).
After Saddam’s removal, the U.S. faced intense insurgency, sectarian violence, and the rise of militant groups like al-Qaeda in Iraq, which evolved into ISIS.
Outcome:
Iraq’s post-war reconstruction faced significant failures due to mismanagement, de-Ba’athification, and disbanding of the Iraqi military.
The war severely destabilized the region, causing long-term humanitarian and political crises.
3. NATO-Led Intervention in Libya (2011)
Context:
The intervention in Libya was framed as a humanitarian mission under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, following Muammar Gaddafi’s violent crackdown on anti-government protests during the Arab Spring.
Legal Justification:
UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, excluding ground occupation.
Military Strategy:
NATO imposed a no-fly zone, conducted airstrikes, and enforced an arms embargo. The operation supported Libyan rebels, eventually leading to Gaddafi’s fall and death.
Outcome:
Libya descended into political chaos due to a power vacuum, weakened institutions, and the rise of armed militias.
The country fractured into rival governments, while external powers like Turkey, Russia, and Egypt intervened, fueling ongoing conflict.
Conclusion
While each intervention had distinct motivations—counterterrorism in Afghanistan, regime change in Iraq, and humanitarian protection in Libya—all resulted in protracted instability. Legal justifications were often contested, and the long-term consequences reshaped regional and global geopolitics.

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9
Q
  1. What are the security and political guarantees needed to end the conflict in Ukraine?
A

Ending the war in Ukraine requires a comprehensive framework of enforceable security, political, and economic guarantees backed by international agreements, credible enforcement mechanisms, and global cooperation. These guarantees must address Ukraine’s defense capabilities, territorial integrity, economic recovery, and international legal protections.
1. Military Security Guarantees
Defensive Military Aid: Continued provision of advanced weapons systems such as Patriot missile systems, NASAMS, and long-range artillery to maintain Ukraine’s defense capabilities.
Collective Defense Commitments: NATO-style guarantees modelled after Article 5, even if Ukraine does not gain full NATO membership. Defence pacts involving key NATO and EU allies could bolster deterrence.
Rapid Reaction Forces: Deployment of international rapid response units in Ukraine or neighbouring countries to counter potential Russian aggression.
2. Economic and Energy Security
Post-War Reconstruction Aid: Comprehensive international aid packages to rebuild Ukraine’s infrastructure and economy, like a modern Marshall Plan.
Energy Security Measures: Integration into European energy grids, reducing reliance on Russian gas through new energy partnerships and renewable energy projects.
3. Diplomatic and Political Guarantees
Non-Aggression Pacts: Legally binding agreements, signed by Russia, Ukraine, and major international guarantors like the US, EU, and China, committing to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and borders.
UN or OSCE Monitoring Missions: Deployment of peacekeeping missions to enforce ceasefires, monitor borders, and ensure compliance.
Security Council Oversight: A UN Security Council resolution providing international guarantees for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
4. Territorial Integrity Safeguards
Demilitarized Zones: Creation of demilitarized areas along contested borders monitored by international bodies.
International Border Recognition: Legal agreements reaffirming Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders, including Crimea, subject to future negotiations.
5. Economic Sanctions as Leverage
Conditional Sanction Relief: Gradual easing of sanctions on Russia, linked to its compliance with withdrawal agreements and ceasefire terms.
Sanction Snapback Mechanisms: Automatic reimposition of sanctions if Russia violates agreements, ensuring continued pressure.
6. NATO and EU Integration Pathways
Accelerated Membership Pathways: Establishing a timeline for Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership, fast-tracking its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.
Enhanced Partnership Programs: Expanding Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO and the EU through security, defense, and intelligence-sharing agreements.
7. Neutrality with Guarantees (If negotiated)
Neutral Status: Ukraine could consider adopting a neutral status similar to Austria’s or Finland’s (pre-NATO membership), provided it is supported by robust international guarantees against future aggression.
International Treaty on Neutrality: Major powers, including the US, EU, Russia, and China, could sign a treaty committing to Ukraine’s territorial integrity while ensuring military neutrality.

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10
Q
  1. Summarize Russia’s war in Ukraine from a geostrategic perspective, outlining its strategic objectives.
A

Russia’s war in Ukraine is driven by complex geostrategic goals centered on political, territorial, security, and economic objectives. These ambitions reflect Russia’s broader desire to reassert influence over its former Soviet neighbors and resist Western geopolitical expansion.
1. Political Objectives:
- Regime Change: Russia aimed to overthrow Ukraine’s pro-Western government to install a pro-Russian regime, ensuring Ukraine’s alignment with Moscow and preventing Western integration.
- Blocking NATO and EU Membership: Russia sought to deter Ukraine’s NATO and EU aspirations by destabilizing the country and supporting separatist regions.
2. Territorial Objectives:
- Annexation of Crimea (2014): Securing Crimea allowed control over the Black Sea Fleet and expanded naval influence.
- Control of Eastern Ukraine (Donbas): Supporting separatists aimed to create Russian-controlled territories, undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty.
- Land Corridor to Crimea: Military efforts focused on establishing a direct land link from Russia to Crimea for logistics and territorial consolidation.
3. Security Objectives:
- Buffer Zone Creation: Controlling Eastern Ukraine serves to create a buffer against perceived Western military expansion, particularly from NATO.
- Protection of Russian-Speaking Populations: Russia frames its military interventions as protection for Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.
4. Economic Objectives:
- Resource and Industrial Control: Controlling Eastern Ukraine’s industrial base and resources enhances Russia’s energy dominance and economic leverage.
Conclusion:
Russia’s actions in Ukraine are driven by geostrategic goals aimed at reshaping the regional power balance, reflecting historical ambitions and immediate strategic calculations.

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11
Q
  1. What are the implications of international sanctions for Russia’s military capabilities in the war in Ukraine?
A

International sanctions imposed on Russia have targeted its military capabilities, economy, and key industries, including defense, technology, and energy. While sanctions have constrained Russia’s war-making ability, several challenges have limited their full effectiveness.
Supply Chain Disruptions and Military Industry Shortages: Sanctions have blocked Russia’s access to essential components like semiconductors, disrupting military production of advanced weaponry, including hypersonic missiles and aircraft. Consequently, Russia resorts to sourcing supplies from less advanced countries like Iran and North Korea and has begun cannibalizing civilian aircraft for parts.
Sanctions Impact: Russia’s oil and gas revenue, nearly US$218 billion in 2022, has significantly declined due to EU sanctions prohibiting Russian oil imports and exports. A US$60 per barrel price cap has led to losses of about €160 million daily. Although alternative buyers like India and China are emerging, trade complexities have impacted global oil supply chains.
Economic and Fiscal Impact: Early sanctions were managed effectively by Russia due to the Bank of Russia’s strategies, but economic pressures are mounting with declining energy exports, inflation spikes, and budget deficits forcing cuts in military spending.
Effectiveness and Limitations of Sanctions: While sanctions have caused setbacks in Russia’s military capabilities, issues like under-compliance and trade through non-cooperative states diminish their overall effectiveness.
Conclusion: International sanctions have disrupted Russia’s industrial capabilities and oil revenue, hampering advanced weapon production. Yet, Russia’s fiscal strategies and reliance on rogue states help sustain its military efforts, albeit at a reduced capacity. The long-term success of its war campaign will depend on strict enforcement and expansion of sanctions.

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12
Q
  1. How does International law interpret the legality of secession of the Crimea?
A

Under international law, Crimea’s secession is considered illegal due to violations of the principles of territorial integrity, sovereign equality, and the prohibition of the use of force. The referendum conducted under military occupation lacked legitimacy and was declared invalid by the international community. Therefore, Crimea legally remains part of Ukraine despite its current occupation by Russia.
4. Right to Unilateral Secession
International law recognizes the principle of self-determination, allowing peoples to choose their political status. However, this right is balanced against the principle of territorial integrity, which prevents states from being divided without consent.
Circumstances When Secession May Be Legal:
Secession is considered lawful if one or more of the following conditions are met:
The region is subject to decolonization.
Secession is allowed by the national constitution.
The territory was occupied or annexed after 1945.
The secessionist group qualifies as a “people” under international law, facing oppression or denial of rights.
The parent state commits flagrant human rights violations against the group.
No other legal remedies are available.
In Crimea’s case:
Crimea is not subject to decolonization.
Secession is not allowed by Ukraine’s constitution.
The Russian population in Crimea is not recognized as a separate “people” under international law.
No evidence suggests systematic human rights violations by Ukraine against the Russian population.
2. The Crimean Referendum of 2014
Parliament Decision: Crimea’s Parliament called for a referendum on secession on March 6, 2014.
Referendum Options: Voters could choose to join Russia or return to Crimea’s 1992 Constitution, maintaining autonomy within Ukraine.
Violation of Ukrainian Sovereignty: The referendum occurred under Russian military occupation, violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
3. International Legal Violations
UN Charter, Article 2(4): Prohibits the use of force against another state’s territorial integrity. Russia’s military intervention breached this rule.
Helsinki Final Act (1975): Ensures the inviolability of borders, a principle Russia had previously committed to.
Budapest Memorandum (1994): Russia, along with the U.S. and the UK, guaranteed Ukraine’s borders in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons. Annexing Crimea violated this agreement.
4. International Recognition and Legal Status
UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 (March 27, 2014): Declared the Crimean referendum invalid and reaffirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Supported by 100 UN member states, this resolution reflects a broad international consensus.
Legal Status: Despite Russia’s de facto control, Crimea remains de jure part of Ukraine under international law.

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13
Q
  1. What is the definition of asymmetrical/hybrid warfare?
A

Asymmetrical Warfare involves conflicts where opposing forces differ significantly in military strength and tactics. Weaker parties use unconventional methods like guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and cyberattacks to counter stronger adversaries. Examples include insurgencies and cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure.
In U.S. defense strategies, the concept gained prominence after the Gulf War (1991) and was further emphasized after the 9/11 attacks, which highlighted the need to counter-terrorism. The U.S. developed counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan, advanced technological capabilities with drones for precision strikes, and enhanced special operations forces for counterterrorism.
Hybrid Warfare combines conventional tactics with non-conventional approaches, including cyber operations and disinformation, causing ambiguity in conflicts. An example is Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
At the strategic level, it involves balancing brute force and coercion, while operationally, it focuses on how opponents contest ground and employ concealment. Key characteristics include the duration of firefights, proximity to civilians, and distinguishing combatants from non-combatants.
Asymmetrical and hybrid warfare are complementary; the former often involves non-state actors, while the latter includes both state and non-state actors, leveraging unconventional strategies to exploit the weaknesses of stronger opponents.

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14
Q
  1. What are the main challenges that the EU faces regarding the current crisis in Ukraine? How does the DCFTA relate to crisis?
A

Challenges the EU Faces Regarding the Current Crisis in Ukraine
Security and Geopolitical Risks: Russia’s military aggression, hybrid warfare tactics, and destabilization of EU borders create constant security threats
Humanitarian and Migration Crisis: Millions of Ukrainian refugees strain EU social welfare systems, requiring humanitarian aid and long-term resettlement plans
Energy Security and Economic Strain: The war disrupted Russian gas supplies, forcing the EU to diversify energy imports amid rising energy prices and inflation
Political and Policy Fragmentation: EU member states differ on military aid, sanctions, and diplomacy, complicating unified action and long-term policy coordination
Sanctions and Diplomatic Challenges: Sustaining economic sanctions against Russia tests EU political unity and economic resilience
The DCFTA’s Role in the Ukraine Crisis
Key Provisions of the Association Agreement:
Trade Liberalization: The agreement established a free trade area, aiming to remove 99.1% of customs duties on Ukrainian exports and 98.1% of duties on EU goods. Ukrainian sectors like agriculture and industry gained substantial tariff reductions, boosting exports
Regulatory Harmonization: Ukraine committed to aligning its technical regulations, standards, conformity assessments, and market surveillance systems with EU standards. This required incorporating relevant EU acquis into Ukrainian legislation, demanding extensive legal, administrative, and institutional reforms
Institutional Reforms: Ukraine pledged to create a transparent administrative system capable of enforcing EU-aligned policies, including customs and trade facilitation, trade in services, and financial market regulations
Geopolitical Consequences:
Economic Realignment: The DCFTA reduced Ukraine’s economic reliance on Russia, shifting its trade toward the EU. This undermined Russian efforts to integrate Ukraine into its Eurasian Economic Union, a competing economic bloc
Russian Opposition: Viewing the DCFTA as a direct challenge to its influence, Russia imposed economic sanctions on Ukraine and supported separatist movements in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
Trigger for the Crisis: The 2014 Euromaidan protests, sparked by Ukraine’s government suspending the DCFTA’s signing under Russian pressure, escalated into political turmoil, leading to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine

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15
Q
  1. How would you summarize Russia’s role in the European energy security?
A

Russia has historically played a critical role in shaping European energy security, dominating natural gas, oil, and uranium supplies through an extensive network of pipelines and state-owned energy companies.
1. Dominance in Energy Supply
Natural Gas: Russia has consistently been the EU’s largest gas supplier. In 2012, Russian gas made up 24% of the EU’s total gas imports, with some countries like Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland relying on it entirely (100%). In 2016, Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled energy giant, exported 246 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas, much of it to Europe.
Oil and Uranium: Russia supplied 27% of the EU’s uranium for nuclear energy and significant volumes of crude oil, especially through its major oil pipelines
2. Major Russian Pipelines Supplying Europe
Gas Pipelines:
Nord Stream & Nord Stream 2: Subsea pipelines transporting gas from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea. While Nord Stream 1 became operational, Nord Stream 2 was halted in 2022 due to EU sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Yamal-Europe Pipeline: Runs from Western Siberia to Germany via Belarus and Poland.
Blue Stream: Directly connects Russia to Turkey through the Black Sea.
South Stream (cancelled): Planned to bypass Ukraine but scrapped due to EU opposition and the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Bratstvo (Brotherhood) Pipeline: Transports Russian gas through Ukraine to various EU countries.
MEGAL Pipeline: Moves Russian gas from Czech and Austrian borders to Germany and France.
Gazela Pipeline: Carries Russian gas through the Czech Republic to Germany
Oil Pipelines:
Druzhba Pipeline (Friendship Pipeline): The world’s longest oil pipeline, transporting Russian crude oil through Ukraine to Hungary and other European countries, reinforcing Russia’s position as a major oil supplier
3. Strategic and Geopolitical Impacts
Supply Vulnerabilities: Europe’s reliance on Russian energy has caused repeated crises, especially during geopolitical disputes like the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas conflict.
Political Leverage: Russia has leveraged its energy exports to exert political influence, using supply interruptions as a bargaining tool.
EU’s push for diversification and renewable energy development has reshaped this relationship, reducing Russian energy’s influence over Europe.

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16
Q
  1. What are the challenges to the EU energy diversification strategy?
A

Geopolitical Risks: The EU relies on politically unstable regions like Russia, the Middle East, and North Africa for energy. Historical supply disruptions, such as the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis, highlight this vulnerability.
Infrastructure Gaps: Limited LNG terminals and insufficient pipeline interconnectivity hinder diversification. Expanding these facilities is costly and time-consuming.
Market and Economic Factors: High energy import costs (EUR 1 billion/day) and volatile global prices challenge sustainable energy diversification.
Policy Fragmentation: EU member states have different energy mixes and national strategies, complicating unified policy-making.
Environmental Concerns: Balancing fossil fuels, nuclear energy, and renewables remains politically sensitive and environmentally challenging.
The nabucco plan: The original plan to supply Europe from the region and reduce dependency.
Why did it fail?
* Russian diplomacy: Nabucco would have done more for the diversification of gas supplied and lessening of dependence than TANAP & TAP
* Divided EU: no unanimous agreement on Nabucco for a long time
* No energy supplier found – Iran, Turkmenistan, Egypt and Iraq all pulled out
* Azerbaijan & Turkey are behind TAP & TANAP, the pipelines will increase their geopolitical significance, and the decision was made by Azerbaijan
* Nabucco was a bigger project, dropping demand for natural gas made it less economically viable
* TAP & TANAP: smaller number of transit countries → smaller costs and political risks

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17
Q

4- Enumerate the traditional security theories and give detail two of them.

A

Traditional security theories include realism, liberalism, security dilemma, and collective security.
These theories were developed during a time of frequent interstate wars, with the aim of maintaining state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national power. States often pursue alliances, arms races, and other cooperative measures to enhance their security.
The security dilemma: refers to a situation where actions taken by a state to improve its own security inadvertently threaten other states, leading to an arms race and increased insecurity for all. It arises from the uncertainty about other states’ intentions in an anarchic system. Defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz claim that states aim to maintain a balance of power, while offensive realists like John Mearsheimer argue that great powers seek to maximize their power for survival. This dilemma illustrates how attempts to enhance security can lead to greater instability.
Interdependence theory: suggests that as states become more interconnected economically, politically, and socially, the costs of conflict increase, reducing the likelihood of war. This mutual dependency encourages cooperation as states recognize the high costs of disrupting relationships.

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18
Q
  1. What are the key priorities of the EU Energy Policy and the Energy Union?
A

EU energy policy:
* Secure energy supplies to ensure the reliable provision of energy
whenever and wherever needed;
* to ensure that energy providers operate in a competitive environment that ensures affordable prices for homes, business, and industries
* energy consumption to be sustainable, through the lowering of greenhouse gas emissions, pollution, and fossil fuel dependence.

EU energy union (strategy), 2015:
Security, solidarity and trust: Diversifying Europe’s sources of energy and ensuring energy security through solidarity and cooperation between Member States.
A fully-integrated internal energy market: Enabling a free flow of energy throughout the EU through adequate infrastructure and without any technical or regulatory barriers – an efficient way to secure supply and give consumers the best energy deal.
Energy efficiency: Energy efficiency first - improved energy efficiency will reduce our dependence on energy imports, reduce emissions and drive jobs and growth.
Climate action - decarbonizing the economy: An ambitious climate policy is integral to creating the Energy Union. Actions include the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), strong but fair national targets for sectors outside the ETS to cut greenhouse gas emissions, a roadmap towards low-emission mobility and an energy policy which makes the EU world leader in renewables. The EU is committed to a quick ratification of the Paris Agreement, an ambitious new global climate change agreement approved in Paris in December 2015.
Research, innovation and competitiveness: Supporting breakthroughs in low-carbon and clean energy technologies by prioritizing research and innovation to drive the transition of the energy system and improve competitiveness.

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19
Q
  1. What are the key challenges to non-proliferation efforts in the context of agreements like ABM, INF, CFE, and START?
A
  1. Geopolitical Tensions and Changing Alliances
    Challenge: Shifting international power dynamics and the emergence of new regional threats can complicate non-proliferation efforts.
    Example: The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent rise of Russia, China, and other regional powers changed the security landscape, rendering some of the agreements (e.g., INF Treaty, signed in 1987, between the US and the Soviet Union) less relevant as new strategic concerns emerged.
    Impact: Countries may withdraw from or undermine arms control agreements due to evolving security concerns, as seen with the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019, citing Russian violations.
    2014: US accused Russia of violating the treaty by developing and deploying the
    9M729 (SSC-8) missile, which the US claimed exceeded INF range limits.
    2019 The US under President Donald Trump announced its withdrawal, citing Russian
    non-compliance.
    Russia denied the allegations but also suspended its participation.
    – Treaty officially ended in August 2019.
    – Raised concerns about a renewed arms race, particularly with the development of intermediate-range missiles by China, which was not bound by the treaty.
    Emerging Security Dilemmas:
    * Proliferation of missile defense systems and intermediate-range missiles by multiple countries.
    * Potential for deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Asia, escalating regional security risks.
  2. Technological Advancements and New Weapon Systems
    Challenge: Rapid advancements in technology, particularly in missile defense, hypersonic weapons, and cyber warfare, challenge the relevance and effectiveness of existing treaties.
    Example: The ABM Treaty aimed to limit the development of missile defense systems, but the development of more advanced missile defense technologies (e.g., THAAD, Aegis) and emerging threats like hypersonic missiles complicate efforts to prevent missile proliferation.
    Impact: New technologies may fall outside the scope of existing treaties, allowing states to pursue weapons development without breaching the terms of older agreements.
  3. Verification and Compliance Issues
    Challenge: Ensuring compliance with the terms of arms control agreements is difficult due to verification challenges and the potential for cheating or clandestine activities.
    Example: The INF Treaty faced problems with verification due to the difficulty in detecting violations related to ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
    Impact: Non-compliance can go undetected for years, weakening the treaty’s credibility and making enforcement difficult. For example, Russia’s alleged violations of the INF Treaty led to its eventual collapse.
  4. Unilateral Withdrawals and Treaty Abandonment
    Challenge: States can unilaterally withdraw from or abandon treaties if they believe the agreement no longer serves their national interests.
    Example: The ABM Treaty was terminated by the U.S. president GeorgeW. Bush in 2002, arguing that the development of missile defense systems was crucial to counter threats from countries like North Korea and Iran.
    Also, it was perceived ageing due to changing security dynamics after the Cold War; Russia strongly opposed the move, warning it would destabilize strategic balance. The US pursued missile defense technologies, which contributed to worsening US-Russia relations.
    Impact: Unilateral withdrawals undermine the stability and predictability that arms control agreements are intended to provide.
  5. Regional Security Concerns
    Challenge: Regional security threats often lead countries to pursue nuclear or conventional weapons outside the framework of multilateral arms control agreements.
    Example: The development of nuclear weapons by countries like North Korea and Iran is driven by regional security concerns and the desire for deterrence, bypassing existing treaties like the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
    Impact: Regional security dynamics often create incentives for countries to build up their military capabilities, especially nuclear and missile systems, leading to proliferation despite international efforts.
  6. Non-Signatory States and Rogue Actors
    Challenge: States that are not parties to arms control agreements, or those that act outside the international norm (e.g., North Korea), continue to develop and deploy weapons, undermining global non-proliferation goals.
    Example: North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, despite international condemnation and efforts to enforce non-proliferation through the NPT and various UN sanctions.
    Impact: Countries outside of treaties often face fewer international repercussions for pursuing weapons programs, which weakens the effectiveness of global non-proliferation regimes.
  7. Political and Domestic Pressures
    Challenge: Domestic political pressures and national security concerns can drive states to abandon or refuse to implement arms control agreements.
    Example: The START Treaties faced challenges in the U.S. and Russia due to domestic political opposition to arms reductions, with concerns about weakening national defense capabilities.
    Impact: Leaders may prioritize national security over international commitments, particularly if arms control agreements are viewed as limiting the ability to modernize or deploy advanced weapons.

The New START Treaty, a pivotal arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, is set to expire on February 5, 2026. As of November 2024, the prospects for its renewal appear uncertain due to several developments:
* Russia’s Suspension of Participation: In February 2023, President Vladimir Putin announced the suspension of Russia’s participation in the New START Treaty, citing concerns over U.S. support for Ukraine. This suspension has raised questions about the future of the treaty and the broader arms control framework.
* Statements on Non-Renewal: In October 2024, reports indicated that Russia would not sign a new treaty to replace New START upon its expiration. An unidentified senior Russian source stated, “We suspended our participation in the START-3 treaty because of Washington’s actions. And we will not sign a new agreement.”
* U.S. Considerations: In June 2024, U.S. officials suggested the possibility of deploying additional strategic nuclear weapons to counter growing threats from Russia and China. This indicates a shift towards a more competitive approach to arms control, potentially complicating future treaty negotiations.
* Calls for Broader Inclusion: Russia has emphasized the need to include other nuclear-capable states in any future arms control agreements, reflecting concerns over the nuclear arsenals of countries like China, France, and the United Kingdom
8. Lack of Multilateral Cooperation
Challenge: Some agreements, such as the CFE Treaty, suffer from a lack of multilateral participation or commitment, particularly in the context of new and emerging powers.
Example: The CFE Treaty, which limited the number of conventional weapons in Europe, became less effective as new NATO members joined and as Russia’s security concerns grew in the 2000s.
Impact: Non-participation by key countries (e.g., China, India, or non-NATO countries) weakens the universality of arms control agreements, leaving loopholes and gaps in the treaty framework.

To alleviate concerns that either alliance would launch a flanking maneuver against the other, the treaty placed specific limits on the number of tanks, ACVs, and artillery for Europe’s southern and northern flanks, including portions of Russia.
Moscow has consistently sought to abolish the flank zone as it considers the limits to be unfair because it is the only country (aside from Ukraine) that has specific limits on where it can deploy TLE in its own territory. Russian concerns
were partially met in 1996 when the CFE parties agreed that Russia’s original flank zone limits would apply to a smaller area, while Russia’s original flank territory would have larger limits. Moscow’s total CFE limits, however, remained the same. Although Russia has been in noncompliance with even the higher May 1996 flank limits, Moscow has remained within its overall treaty limits and has repeatedly stated that its flank noncompliance is only temporary.

2002 NATO Prague Summit - not to ratify ACFE as long as Russia was in non-compliance with the host nation consent principle in Moldova and Georgia
2007 Russia: moratorium, suspended its participation
2008 NATO: „Parallel Action Plan”
– Bring Russia back into compliance with the CFE Treaty and encourage progress on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty.
– NATO countries proposed that they would work toward ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty while Russia would address concerns about its compliance, particularly regarding troop deployments in Georgia and Moldova.
2010 NATO continues the cooperation
2015 Treaty Joint Consultative Group, JCG
2015 Russian completely halts its participation in the Treaty
November 7, 2023 Russia formally withdraws from CFE Treaty
February 9, 2024 Greece suspended its participation
March 29, 2024 Poland suspended its participation.
April 5, 2024 Turkey suspended its participation.

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20
Q
  1. What are the “confidence building measures” in traditional arms control?
A

Tools and practices designed to enhance transparency, reduce the risk of misunderstandings, and build trust among states in the context of conventional arms control. Under the “Vienna Document”, adopted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), these measures are specifically aimed at fostering security and stability in Europe.
Key Confidence and Security-Building Measures in the Vienna Document:

  1. Exchange of Military Information: States must annually exchange detailed information about their military forces, including: Size, structure, and location of units; Major weapons systems and equipment (e.g., tanks, artillery, combat aircraft); Defense budgets and plans.
  2. Risk Reduction: Participating states agree to consult and cooperate in case of: Unusual military activities (e.g., large-scale troop movements); Hazardous incidents of a military nature (e.g., accidental engagements or airspace violations); States can request explanations for military activities that might appear threatening.
  3. Notification of Military Activities: States must notify others in advance of: Large-scale military exercises or troop movements; Thresholds include activities involving:
    • 9,000 or more troops.
    • 250 or more tanks.
    • 500 or more armored combat vehicles.
    • 250 or more artillery pieces.
  4. Observation of Certain Military Activities: States are invited to observe certain military activities exceeding specific thresholds (e.g., large-scale exercises); Observers are granted access to ensure transparency and to verify the scale and nature of activities.
  5. Inspections and Evaluation Visits
    On-site Inspections: States may inspect military units and facilities to verify compliance with the Vienna Document; A quota system limits the number of inspections a state can conduct or receive annually.
    Evaluation Visits: carried out to assess the accuracy of the information provided during the annual exchange of military data.

Limitations and Challenges
Political Will: Effectiveness depends on states’ willingness to share accurate information and engage in inspections.
Modernization of Measures: Some argue the document needs updating to reflect changes in military technology and strategy (e.g., cyber and hybrid warfare).
Compliance Issues: Geopolitical tensions can lead to non-compliance or limited implementation by some states.

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21
Q
  1. After the failure of the MBFR talks why were the parties able to sign the Charter of Paris so quickly? What are the new challenges to the treaty?
A

Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) was signed shortly after the failure of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks because of significant geopolitical shifts and a shared desire among Cold War adversaries to establish a framework for peace and cooperation in Europe.

Reasons for the Rapid Agreement on the Charter of Paris
1. End of the Cold War:
- The collapse of the Soviet Union’s influence in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 created a historic opening for cooperation.
- Both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries recognized the need for a new security framework in a rapidly changing Europe.

  1. Mutual Desire for Stability:
    • European nations wanted to prevent instability during the transition from a bipolar to a more fluid geopolitical order.
    • The Charter was seen as a way to formalize the end of Cold War hostilities and promote stability.
  2. Success of the CSCE Process:
    • The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), established through the Helsinki Accords (1975), provided an effective platform for dialogue on political, military, and human rights issues.
    • The Charter built upon CSCE’s foundation, emphasizing democracy, human rights, and cooperation.
  3. Shared Vision for a New Europe:
    • Both blocs sought to move beyond military confrontation toward economic and political cooperation.
    • The Charter symbolized a common commitment to values like democracy, rule of law, and human rights.
  4. MBFR Talks as a Precursor:
    • While the MBFR talks (1973–1989) failed to achieve concrete arms reduction, they built familiarity and communication channels among participants, easing subsequent negotiations.

Challenges to the Charter of Paris
1. Erosion of Trust:
- Renewed tensions between NATO and Russia, particularly after events like the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, undermine the spirit of cooperation.
- Accusations of treaty violations, such as Russia’s suspension of arms control agreements, weaken trust.

  1. Lack of Enforcement Mechanisms:
    • The Charter relies on voluntary commitments rather than binding obligations, limiting its ability to address violations effectively.
  2. Geopolitical Fragmentation:
    • Emerging powers like China and regional conflicts divert attention from European security.
    • Diverging priorities among European states and between Europe and the U.S. create challenges for unified action.
  3. Hybrid Threats and Non-Traditional Challenges:
    • The rise of cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion presents new challenges not addressed by the Charter.
    • Climate change and migration pressures further strain international cooperation.
  4. Decline of Multilateralism:
    • A global shift toward unilateralism and nationalism weakens the willingness of states to adhere to collective agreements like the Charter.
22
Q
  1. What was the role of the UNSCOM and the UNMOVIC in the Iraq crisis? What type of weapons did Iraq possess and use?
A

UNSCOM (1991–1999)
Established by UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) to verify Iraq’s elimination of chemical, biological, and ballistic missile programs; Monitor compliance and prevent reconstitution of WMD programs.
Activities:
- Conducted intrusive on-site inspections of Iraq’s military and industrial facilities.
- Supervised the destruction of significant quantities of chemical weapons, missile systems, and biological weapon precursors.
Challenges:
- Iraq obstructed inspections, provided false information, and engaged in concealment efforts.
- Reports of non-cooperation led to growing international tensions, culminating in U.S.-led military strikes (Operation Desert Fox) in 1998.
Outcome: UNSCOM’s mandate ended in 1999 amid its inability to achieve full disarmament and Iraq’s continued resistance.

UNMOVIC (1999–2007)
Created by UN Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999) as a successor to UNSCOM with a similar mandate to verify Iraq’s disarmament of WMDs; Tasked with resuming inspections and long-term monitoring.
Activities:
- Conducted inspections starting in late 2002 after renewed international pressure.
- Verified Iraq’s declarations about its WMD programs but found inconsistencies and gaps.
- Reported some progress but no definitive proof of active WMD programs before the 2003 Iraq War.
Challenges:
- Inspections were cut short in March 2003 when the U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq, citing concerns over alleged WMDs.
Outcome: After the invasion, no stockpiles of active WMDs were found, undermining the justification for the war.

Weapons Iraq Possessed and Used

  1. Chemical Weapons
    Possession: Iraq developed a significant chemical weapons program in the 1980s, producing agents such as sarin, tabun, VX, and mustard gas. Used chemical warheads on Scud missiles and aerial bombs.
    Use:
    Against Iran: During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Iraq used chemical weapons extensively, especially in the Battle of Halabja in 1988, where thousands of civilians were killed.
    Against Kurds: Deployed chemical agents in its internal repression campaigns, including the infamous Anfal Campaign targeting Kurdish populations.
  2. Biological Weapons
    Possession: Iraq admitted to producing and weaponizing biological agents like anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin in the 1980s. These were loaded onto bombs and missiles for potential use.
    Use: Iraq is not known to have used biological weapons in combat but maintained stockpiles and delivery capabilities.
  3. Ballistic Missiles
    Possession: Developed and imported Scud ballistic missiles, modifying them to increase range (e.g., Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas missiles).These missiles were capable of delivering chemical or biological warheads.
    Use: Used Scud missiles against Iran and during the Gulf War, targeting Saudi Arabia and Israel.
  4. Nuclear Weapons
    Possession: Iraq pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program in the 1980s but had not developed a functional weapon by the time of the Gulf War.
    Use: Iraq did not use or possess operational nuclear weapons but continued attempts to acquire the technology until international intervention halted progress.
23
Q
  1. What is the difference between the “green-light” and the “red-light” approval mechanism in under the BTWC regime?
A

“Red-light” approval mechanism: a majority or supermajority of the Executive Council (the governing body of the future BWC implementing organization) must vote to block a challenge inspection
“Green-light” mechanism: a majority or supermajority of the council must vote to authorize a challenge inspection.
Green-Light Mechanism
* Definition: A “green-light” approval means that a request for a challenge inspection is accepted and allowed to proceed.
* Context: If a state party suspects that another state is in violation of the BWC, it can request a challenge inspection under the BWC’s provisions. If the inspection request is accepted (i.e., the state party being inspected agrees to it), the request is said to have received a “green light.”
* Process: The inspection proceeds, and the inspecting team can visit and inspect the declared facilities or suspect sites, with full access and cooperation from the country being inspected.
Red-Light Mechanism
* Definition: A “red-light” approval means that the request for a challenge inspection is denied or blocked.
* Context: If the state party that is the subject of the challenge inspection refuses to allow the inspection, it is said to have given a “red light.” The state can deny the request if it believes that the challenge is politically motivated or lacks legitimate grounds.
* Process: In the event of a red-light, the inspection does not occur. While the requesting state may escalate the issue, the challenge inspection is not carried out, and no independent verification is conducted.

24
Q
  1. Compare the verification regimes of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
A

Unlike the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the BWC lacks an effective
verification mechanism. Negotiations have been underway in Geneva since 1994 to develop a compliance protocol which would strengthen the BWC. In that time, the Ad Hoc Group has held 23 sessions. The negotiations transitioned in 1997 to negotiations based on a “rolling text” with
the objective of having the final text of a Protocol ready by the fifth BWC Review
Conference which will meet in Geneva in November/December 2001.
Key Differences:
1. Verification and Inspection:
o The CWC has a robust verification system with regular inspections, unannounced visits, and challenge inspections. The OPCW plays a central role in ensuring compliance.
o The BWC, on the other hand, has no formal inspection system. It relies entirely on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), which are voluntary and not legally binding.
2. Enforcement:
o The CWC has a clear enforcement mechanism where non-compliance can result in sanctions or referral to the UN Security Council.
o The BWC lacks an enforcement mechanism and depends on diplomatic measures to ensure compliance.
3. Transparency:
o The CWC enforces transparency through detailed declarations, inspections, and monitoring of chemical weapons programs.
o The BWC promotes transparency through voluntary CBMs but lacks the mandatory, enforceable reporting required under the CWC.
4. Scope of Verification:
o CWC inspections focus on chemical weapons and related production facilities, with rigorous monitoring of disarmament efforts.
o BWC does not conduct inspections of biological research facilities or activities, making verification much more challenging.

25
Q
  1. Explain the difference of the verification regimes between the nuclear, the chemical and the biological weapons conventions.
A
  1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote disarmament, and encourage peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Verification Mechanism:
* International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the primary body responsible for verifying NPT compliance.
* Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements: Countries with nuclear facilities are required to allow IAEA inspections to ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted to weapons programs.
* Additional Protocols: Some countries agree to more intrusive inspections that grant the IAEA greater access to facilities and information.
* Focus: Ensuring nuclear material is used solely for peaceful purposes, monitoring enrichment facilities, and checking for undeclared nuclear activities.
* Challenges: IAEA can inspect declared sites but has limited authority to inspect undeclared or suspected military facilities. Political challenges arise when states resist inspections.

  1. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC): Eliminate chemical weapons and prevent the development, production, and use of chemical agents.

Verification Mechanism:
* Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) oversees the implementation of the CWC.
* Declarations and Inspections: States Parties must declare their chemical weapon stockpiles, production facilities, and research programs. The OPCW can inspect these declarations and verify compliance.
* Challenge Inspections: The OPCW can carry out unannounced inspections at any facility suspected of violating the CWC.
* Destruction of Chemical Weapons: Countries are required to destroy stockpiles of chemical weapons under strict OPCW supervision.
* Focus: Detailed inspections of facilities, verification of chemical weapons destruction, and monitoring the non-use of chemical weapons.
* Challenges: Inspections can be complicated by secretive programs or undeclared stockpiles. Some nations might resist full cooperation, and there is a risk of dual-use technologies being exploited.

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): Prohibit the development, production, and acquisition of biological weapons.

Verification Mechanism:
* No formal verification regime: The BWC lacks an institutionalized verification mechanism like the IAEA (for the NPT) or OPCW (for the CWC). There is no inspection regime or binding protocol for monitoring compliance.
* Confidence-building Measures (CBMs): States Parties voluntarily submit data to promote transparency, such as declarations on biological research and facilities, though participation is not mandatory.
* Annual Review Conferences: Regular meetings allow for dialogue on compliance and enforcement issues, but there are no binding inspection or enforcement powers.
* Focus: Promoting transparency and the peaceful use of biological materials while preventing the development of biological weapons.

  • Challenges: The absence of an enforcement or inspection mechanism makes verification difficult. Dual-use concerns (civilian vs. military applications of biological materials) and the covert nature of biological weapon development make it hard to detect violations.
26
Q
  1. What are the Schedule 1, 2 and 3 chemicals? How did the international community destroy the chemical weapon stockpiles?
A

Comes from the Chemical Weapons Convention
Schedule 1 Chemicals
* Definition: have few, or no uses outside chemical weapons and are primarily designed for chemical warfare. Examples: Sulfur mustard and nerve agents
* Regulation: These may be produced or used for research, medical, pharmaceutical or chemical weapon defense testing purposes but production above 100 grams per year must be declared to the OPCW. A country is limited to possessing a maximum of 1 ton of these materials.
Schedule 2 Chemicals
* Definition: Chemicals with significant potential for weaponization but that also have legitimate commercial applications. Examples: thiodiglycol which can be used in the manufacture of mustard agents, but is also used as a solvent in inks.
* Regulation: Manufacture must be declared and there are restrictions on export to countries which are not CWC signatories.
Schedule 3 Chemicals
* Definition: Chemicals that can be used to produce chemical weapons but are widely used in large-scale industrial applications. Have large-scale uses apart from chemical weapons. Examples: phosgene, which has been used as a chemical weapon but which is also a precursor in the manufacture of many legitimate organic compounds, and triethanolamine, used in the manufacture of nitrogen mustard but also commonly used in toiletries and detergents.
* Regulation: Plants which manufacture more than 30 tones per year must be declared and can be inspected, and there are restrictions on export to countries which are not CWC signatories.

27
Q
  1. Give a short overview of the current status and the challenges of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
A
  1. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
    • The cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime is the NPT, which was first opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The NPT has three main pillars:
      • Non-proliferation: Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to states that do not already have them.
        Restrict the number of states with nuclear weapons to the five recognized Nuclear-Weapon States(USA, Russia, China, France, UK) as of 1st January 1968.
      • Disarmament: Pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament by nuclear-armed states.
      • Peaceful use of nuclear energy: Promoting the peaceful use of nuclear technology while ensuring safeguards against weaponization.
    • As of today, 191 states are parties to the NPT, making it one of the most widely adhered to arms control agreements.
  2. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
    • The IAEA, established in 1957, is responsible for promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and ensuring that nuclear materials are not diverted for military purposes. It carries out inspections and safeguards to verify compliance with the NPT and other agreements.
      Safeguards: Prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; Foster the beneficial uses of atomic energy; Provide confidence and build trust.
    • The IAEA has played a crucial role in monitoring nuclear programs and providing technical assistance, but its ability to prevent noncompliance is limited by political considerations and the need for states to grant full access.
  3. Regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs)
    • Several regions have established NWFZs (e.g., Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia) where countries have pledged not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. These zones contribute to the broader global nonproliferation efforts.
      Nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) is defined by the United Nations as an agreement which a group of states has freely established by treaty or convention that bans the use, development, or deployment of nuclear weapons in a given area, that has mechanisms of verification and control to enforce its obligations, and that is recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
  4. Arms Control Agreements
    Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW):
    Adopted July 7, 2017 at the UN General Assembly. Entered into force January 22, 2021. It aims to totally eliminate the nuclear weapons to prevent catastrophic humanitarian consequences.
    Key Provisions
    * Prohibitions: Development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of nuclear weapons; Assistance or encouragement of prohibited activities.
    * Positive Obligations: Assistance to victims of nuclear use/testing and environmental remediation of contaminated areas.
    Ratified/acceded: 68 states (as of 2024), signatories: 92 states
    Opposition: Nuclear-armed states and NATO members refuse to participate; Criticized for not addressing security frameworks reliant on nuclear deterrence.
    The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (though it has not yet entered into force)
    New START between the United States and Russia.
    These treaties aim to reduce nuclear arsenals and prevent nuclear testing.

Current Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

  1. Nuclear Modernization
    • Nuclear-armed states, including the U.S., Russia, and China, are modernizing their arsenals by developing new warheads and delivery systems, which contradicts the spirit of the NPT and raises concerns about a renewed arms race.
  2. Non-NPT Nuclear States
    • Several countries, notably India, Pakistan, and Israel, possess nuclear weapons but are not parties to the NPT. While these states argue that their security needs justify their nuclear status, their existence outside the nonproliferation framework undermines the NPT’s credibility.
    • North Korea is another major challenge. After withdrawing from the NPT in 2003, North Korea has conducted multiple nuclear tests, violating the treaty’s nonproliferation norms and raising concerns about the stability of the region.
  3. Iran’s Nuclear Program
    • Iran, a party to the NPT, has raised international concerns over its nuclear activities. The 2015 JCPOA aimed to limit Iran’s program but was undermined by the U.S. withdrawal in 2018, escalating tensions in the region.
  4. Verification and Compliance Issues
    • The IAEA’s inspection capabilities are vital for detecting compliance issues, yet it struggles with access in countries like Iran and North Korea. Political considerations and national sovereignty often hinder effective action against nuclear proliferation.
28
Q

3- Describe or give a definition of the following expressions: crimes against humanity, genocide.

A

Crimes Against Humanity: These are serious offenses against civilians occurring in peace or war, including murder, torture, slavery, deportation, and persecution. First prosecuted at the Nuremberg Trials, they now fall under the International Criminal Court (ICC) and unlike genocide do not require intent to destroy a specific group, but must involve widespread or systematic attacks against civilians.
Genocide: This refers to the intentional destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, requiring both intent and specific acts, such as killing, causing harm, and preventing births within the group. Defined by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, it is regarded as one of the gravest crimes, prosecuted by the ICC and tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.

29
Q
  1. What are the nuclear weapons free zones? How would you categorise them?
A

The United Nations defines an NWFZ as an agreement that meets these criteria: Bans nuclear weapons in a given area. Has mechanisms of verification and control to enforce its obligations. Is recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
NWFZs can be categorized based on geographical regions:
Latin America and the Caribbean: The Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) established this NWFZ, covering a vast area in the Western Hemisphere.
South Pacific: The Treaty of Rarotonga (1985) created the South Pacific NWFZ, encompassing a significant portion of the Pacific Ocean region.
Southeast Asia: The Treaty of Bangkok (1995) established the Southeast Asia NWFZ.
Africa: The Treaty of Pelindaba (1996) created a NWFZ encompassing the entire African continent.
Central Asia: The Treaty of Semipalatinsk (2006) established the Central Asia NWFZ.
There are also proposed NWFZs:
Central and Eastern Europe (1996): A proposal for a NWFZ in this region was put forward in 1996.
Europe: There have been discussions about establishing a NWFZ in Europe, which would raise complex issues given the presence of nuclear-weapon states (NWS) like the UK and France, and the hosting of US nuclear weapons under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements.
Middle East: Efforts to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East have faced significant challenges due to regional tensions and the lack of consensus among key states.
2+4 Treaty (1991) for Eastern Germany: This treaty, related to the reunification of Germany, included provisions for the denuclearization of the former East Germany, effectively making it a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

30
Q
  1. How would you categorise the non-proliferation treaties? What are the export control
A

Function: Non-proliferation treaties can be grouped by their function, such as test ban treaties, nuclear arms limitation and reduction treaties, and treaties related to specific types of weapons or technologies.
Declarative Treaties: Stating intentions and establishing principles. Like the Geneva Protocol (1925), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) (1972) and Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) (2017)
Nuclear Test Ban Treaties:
The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibits nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) aims to ban all nuclear explosions, including those conducted underground.
Nuclear Arms Limitation and Reduction Treaties:
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and II aimed to limit the growth of US and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals.
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) eliminated an entire class of nuclear missiles.
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I and II reduced the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
The New START Treaty further limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
Treaties related to specific types of weapons or technologies:
The Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit.
The Seabed Arms Control Treaty bans the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material establishes measures to prevent the theft and sabotage of nuclear materials.
Scope: Non-proliferation treaties can also be categorized by their scope:
Global treaties: These treaties aim to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide. The most important example is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Regional treaties: These treaties establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in specific geographic areas. Examples include:
The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Treaty of Rarotonga, which created a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific.
The Treaty of Bangkok, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia.
The Treaty of Pelindaba, which created a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.
The Treaty of Semipalatinsk, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.
Membership: Non-proliferation treaties can be categorized by which states are parties to them:
Universal treaties: These treaties are open to all states for signature and ratification. The NPT is an example of a universal treaty.
Selective treaties: These treaties have limited membership, often based on specific criteria, such as being a nuclear supplier or possessing certain technologies. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) are examples of selective treaties.
Legal Binding: Treaties can also be categorized by whether they are legally binding:
Legally binding treaties: These treaties create legal obligations for states parties. Most non-proliferation treaties are legally binding.
Non-binding agreements: These agreements are political commitments and do not create legal obligations. The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) is an example of a non-binding agreement
Export control regimes aim to limit the transfer of materials and technologies that could contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction or other harmful arms.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): Prevents nuclear proliferation through export guidelines.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): Limits missile technology spread for WMD delivery.
Australia Group (AG): Coordinated export controls for chemical and biological weapons.
Wassenaar Arrangement: Controls conventional arms and dual-use goods to reduce WMD risks.
European Union (EU) controls: Unified export controls for dual-use and military items, coordinating with the US.

31
Q
  1. What is the ABM Treaty and how does the U.S. provide missile defence systems to the European allies?
A

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed in 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union, aimed to limit the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, which were seen as potentially destabilizing to the strategic balance during the Cold War. The treaty restricted each side to having only one ABM deployment area to protect its capital city or a single ICBM field.
How does the U.S. provide missile defence systems to the European allies?
Through NATO:
NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense System -> The US is a key contributor.
Early Warning Systems -> Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system, to detect and track incoming missiles
Interceptor missiles -> Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) and the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)
Advanced Command and Control systems
Through Bilateral Agreements and Deployments:
Poland: The U.S. has deployed a land-based Aegis Ashore system in Poland, equipped with SM-3 interceptors, as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).
Romania: A similar Aegis Ashore site is operational in Romania, enhancing missile defense coverage in southeastern Europe.
Turkey: The U.S. has previously provided Patriot missile defense systems to Turkey, though recent tensions have complicated this cooperation
Through Technology Transfer and Joint Development programmes:
Collaboration with UK, France and Italy -> Aster missile

32
Q
  1. Summarise the North Korean nuclear program.
A

Plutonium Production: North Korea’s primary source of plutonium is the 5 MWe gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon. This reactor, operational since the 1980s, can produce enough plutonium annually for one or two nuclear weapons. The reprocessing facility at Yongbyon separates plutonium from spent fuel, enabling North Korea to accumulate plutonium for its weapons program.
Uranium Enrichment: North Korea revealed its uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon in 2010. This facility, housing thousands of centrifuges, can enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels, providing an alternative path to obtaining fissile material.
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) production capacity is suspected to have expanded, potentially enabling North Korea to produce several bombs’ worth of HEU annually.
Suspicions exist regarding additional undisclosed enrichment facilities, making it difficult to assess the full extent of North Korea’s enriched uranium stockpile.
Testing and Missile Development: North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests, the first in 2006 and the most recent in 2017 (claimed to be a hydrogen bomb).
Missile technology has also advanced significantly, with successful tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2017, capable of reaching the continental United States. In 2020, North Korea showcased a new, larger ICBM during a military parade.
The lack of transparency regarding the size and scope of its nuclear program raises significant concerns for the international community.

33
Q
  1. Please describe the role of the EU during the Iran nuclear negotiations. How would an Iranian atomic weapon destabilise the region?
A

2003-2005 EU-3 (GER, UK, FRA)
2006 P5+1 (EU-3 & China, Russia, U.S.)
4 “baskets”
* Non proliferation issues
* Peace process in the Middle East
* Human rights
* Fight against terrorism
EU was a mediator and facilitator between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States plus Germany). The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, and later Federica Mogherini, led the diplomatic efforts, coordinating with the US and engaging directly with Iranian officials.
The EU served as a crucial communication channel during US-Iran tensions, using its neutral stance to convey messages between hesitant parties. It provided technical expertise on nuclear issues, helping to bridge differences and clarify Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The EU also played a key role in building consensus among P5+1 members, coordinating positions and addressing individual country concerns. Additionally, it was responsible for the complex process of lifting EU sanctions on Iran as part of the JCPOA, ensuring compliance with the agreement’s terms.
The EU’s sustained diplomatic engagement was crucial in achieving the historic JCPOA in 2015. Despite the US withdrawal from the agreement in 2018, the EU continues to play a key role in efforts to preserve the JCPOA and find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
An Iranian atomic weapon would destabilize the Middle East: Iran acquiring nuclear weapons would likely trigger a regional nuclear arms race, as other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, might feel compelled to develop their own nuclear capabilities to counter Iran. Also it would undermine the credibility of the NPT
A nuclear-armed Iran could lead to a more aggressive foreign policy. This situation would significantly increase the chances of mistakes and conflicts between Iran and its regional rivals, like Israel and Saudi Arabia.
The potential for Iranian nuclear material or technology falling into the hands of terrorist groups is a major concern.
Oil and gas production and transit would be at risk, with significant consequences for the global economy.

34
Q
  1. Describe the main points of the Iran-EU “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”.
A

The JCPOA is an agreement aimed at addressing international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. (Iran Nuclear Deal)
Based on the JCPOA, Iran was allowed to enrich uranium only at its Natanz facility and using only first-generation centrifuges for ten years. It was also required to reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98% and eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium. The agreement restricted Iran’s enrichment levels to a maximum of 3.67%.
Iran agreed to convert its Fordow enrichment facility into a nuclear, physics, and technology center for peaceful purposes. This facility was a major concern because it is underground and could be used for secret activities.
Iran was asked to fill the Arak Heavy Water Reactor’s core with concrete.
The JCPOA also provided the IAEA unprecedented access to Iranian nuclear facilities, allowing for more intrusive inspections and continuous monitoring to verify compliance. Iran also agreed to provide additional information about the steps of the nuclear fuel cycle.
In return for Iran’s verifiable commitments to limit its nuclear program, the JCPOA provided for the lifting of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council, the United States, and the European Union related to Iran’s nuclear activities.
The US, under President Donald Trump, withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and re-imposed sanctions on Iran. This undermined the agreement and led to Iran reducing its compliance. Iran resumed enriching uranium at Natanz and Fordo beyond the JCPOA limits, reaching 60% enrichment in 2022. Now Iran has enough 60% enriched uranium to reprocess into one nuclear bomb.

35
Q
  1. What is the INF Treaty and what are the current challenges to Treaty?
A

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in Washington in 1987. An agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union (during the Cold War) which eliminated an entire class of nuclear and conventional missiles, along with their launchers, with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers ( including the Soviet SS-20 and the US Pershing II and Tomahawk cruise missiles).
Challanges: In 2014, the US accused Russia of violating the treaty by developing and deploying the 9M729 (SSC-8) missile, alleging its range exceeded the treaty’s limits. The US, under Donald Trump, formally withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019, citing Russia’s alleged non-compliance Russia denied the allegations but also suspended its participation. The treaty officially ended in August 2019. This raised concerns about a renewed arms race, particularly with the development of intermediate-range missiles by China, which was not bound by the treaty.

36
Q
  1. What are the main achievements of the SALT and the START processes?
A

SALT I (1972): Limited the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers. While not reducing existing arsenals, it froze further deployments, putting a temporary cap on the nuclear arms race. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty restricted the deployment of ABM systems, a crucial factor in maintaining strategic stability. It stopped both sides from undermining each other’s nuclear deterrence.
SALT II (1979): SALT II aimed to further limit the number of strategic launchers and missiles. The treaty Introduced qualitative limits. It was never ratified by the US Senate because of The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Although it was not fully implemented it laid the groundwork for future arms reduction agreements.
START treaties shifted from limiting growth to actively reducing the size of nuclear arsenals.
START I (1991/1994): First treaty to mandate the reduction of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. The US and Russia were required to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals by approximately 30%. The treaty also established comprehensive verification procedures -> on-site inspections, data exchanges and monitoring.
START II (1993): Further reduced strategic nuclear warheads: Aimed to eliminate land-based missiles with multiple warheads (MIRV’s), which were considered more destabilizing. Although signed, it was never fully ratified.
SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty) (2002/2003): reduced the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Both sides committed to lowering their arsenals to between 1700 and 2200 warheads. The treaty didn’t limit stockpiled or reserve warheads.
New START (2011): Limits the US and Russia to 1550 deployed strategic warheads, 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers for those systems. It also includes verification procedures with inspections and data exchanges. Set to expire in 2026.

37
Q
  1. Give a short overview of the nuclear weapon states’ nuclear capabilities.
A

US and Russia ->Nuclear Superpowers: Each commanding over 5,000 nuclear warheads (former 5244, latter 5889) in their total inventories. Both are bound by the new START Treaty, limiting their deployed strategic nuclear weapons, but they are actively modernizing these arsenals, which could lead to a new arms race. They possess all 3 legs of the nuclear triad.
Land-based ICBMs: The US relies on Minuteman III missiles, while Russia deploys a variety of ICBMs, including the RS-24 Ysarmat.
Sea-based SLBMs: Both countries operate nuclear-powered submarines armed with SLBMs, such as the US Trident II D5 and the Russian Bulava.
Air-launched nuclear bombs and cruise missiles: The US deploys B-61 nuclear bombs and AGM-86 ALCM cruise missiles, while Russia fields Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers equipped with a range of nuclear weapons.
China ->Growing arsenal: Ongoing significant nuclear modernization and expansion. estimated to have approximately 400 (410) nuclear warheads. China is believed to possess a nuclear triad.
Land-based ICBMs: The DF-41, with a range exceeding 12,000 kilometers, can reach most parts of the globe.
Sea-based SLBMs: The JL-2 and JL-3 SLBMs, carried by Type 094 and Type 096 submarines, enhance China’s sea-based deterrent.
Air-launched nuclear bombs: The H-6N bomber, with air-refueling capabilities, can deliver nuclear bombs over extended ranges.
UK and France: The United Kingdom possesses approximately 225 nuclear warheads, while France has approximately 290.
The UK relies solely on sea-based SLBMs, with four Vanguard-class submarines, each armed with up to 16 Trident II D5 missiles.
France, maintains a partial nuclear triad, with air-launched and sea-based components:
Air-launched nuclear bombs: The ASMP-A missiles, deployed on Rafale fighter jets, offer a quick-reaction nuclear capability.
Sea-based SLBMs: The M51 SLBMs, carried by Triomphant-class submarines, constitute the core of France’s nuclear deterrent.
India and Pakistan: India possesses approximately 164 nuclear warheads, while Pakistan has an estimated 170. Both countries have been engaged in a nuclear arms race, adding complexity to regional stability.
India is believed to have a full nuclear triad:
Land-based ballistic missiles: The Agni series, which ranges from short to intercontinental, forms the core of India’s land-based deterrent.
Sea-based SLBMs: The K-15 Sagarika and K-4 SLBMs, deployed on Arihant-class submarines, bolster India’s sea-based nuclear capabilities.
Air-launched nuclear bombs: Fighter jets, including the Mirage 2000 and Su-30MKI, can deliver nuclear bombs.
Pakistan -> partial nuclear triad:
Land-based ballistic missiles: The Shaheen series, with varying ranges, forms the backbone of Pakistan’s land-based nuclear deterrent.
Air-launched nuclear bombs: Fighter jets, like the F-16 and JF-17, are capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
North Korea: North Korea is estimated to have up to 30 nuclear warheads. Primarily land-based (potentially intercontinental). In 2017, North Korea conducted a series of ICBM tests, including the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 missiles. In 2017 North Korea successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. In October 2020, North Korea showcased the Hwasong-16 ICBM. By 2022, it tested the Hwasong-17, capable of striking the U.S. In 2023 -> plans to enhance its nuclear arsenal and develop underwater and stealth capabilities.
Israel: is estimated to possess approximately 90 nuclear warheads. It maintains a policy of nuclear ambiguity, neither confirming nor denying its possession of nuclear weapons. Israel is believed to possess a partial nuclear triad, with land-based and air-launched components:
Land-based ballistic missiles: The Jericho series of missiles, with varying ranges, provides a credible land-based nuclear deterrent.
Air-launched nuclear bombs: Fighter jets, including the F-15I and F-16I, are believed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

38
Q
  1. What is the nuclear fuel cycle? Explain the role of heavy water in the nuclear weapon-making process:
A

The nuclear fuel cycle is the process of generating electricity from uranium in nuclear power reactors, which consists of several steps:
1. Uranium Mining: Extracting uranium ore, a slightly radioactive metal found in the earth’s crust through excavation or in situ techniques.
2. Milling: Extracting the uranium from the ore. Separating uranium oxide concentrate, known as “yellowcake” (U3O8), which contains over 80% uranium.
3. Conversion: Transforming the uranium oxide concentrate into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) by adding fluor, – the enrichment process requires the uranium to be in a gaseous form.
4. Enrichment: Increasing the concentration of fissile uranium (U-235), from its natural level of 0.7% to between 3.5% and 5%. This process creates two streams: low-enriched uranium for reactor use and depleted uranium. To achieve this, Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas is fed into Centrifuges, where Gas with slightly more U-235 is extracted from near the centre, and gas with more U-238 is removed from the edges. The U-235 goes through thousands of centrifuges in a cascade to reach the desired enrichment level. The enriched UF6 gas is collected and converted back into a solid form, typically uranium dioxide, for fabrication into nuclear fuel pellets
5. Fuel fabrication: Enriched uranium oxide (which is sintered (baked) at a high temperature, over 1400°C) Is pressed into ceramic pellets. These pellets are then encased in metal tubes to create fuel rods.
6. Power Generation: The U-235 isotope fissions or splits, producing a lot of heat within the reactor core. The heat creates steam, which drives a turbine and generates electricity. The process also converts some uranium-238 (U-238) into plutonium, providing about one-third of the reactor’s energy output.
7. Used Fuel Handling: Managing and storing the spent nuclear fuel (after 18-36 months the fuel is removed from reactor), which still emits radiation and heat and contains valuable materials like uranium and plutonium. The usable portion of it can be reprocessed.
8. Reprocessing: Separates uranium and plutonium from the waste products and cladding in the spent fuel, allowing for their reuse as fuel. Used fuel still contains about 96% of its original uranium level.
Role of Heavy Water in Nuclear Weapon Production:
Heavy water (D2O) is a type of water where the hydrogen atoms are replaced with deuterium, a heavier hydrogen isotope. It is used as a neutron moderator in heavy water reactors, such as the CANDU and PHWR. Neutron moderators slow down the neutrons released during fission, making them more likely to interact with uranium-238 and convert it into plutonium-239 which is a key material for nuclear weapons. 5 kilograms of it is needed to achieve critical mass, the point at which a self-sustaining chain reaction can occur. This chain reaction releases a tremendous amount of energy—the basis of a nuclear explosion. Weapons-grade plutonium is typically enriched to over 90% plutonium-239. Eg: North Korea is producing several kilograms of plutonium per year (enough for 1-2 nuclear bombs) in the Yongbyon Reactor.

39
Q

2- Describe or give a definition of the following expressions: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, aggression, crime of aggression, war crime.

A

Jus ad Bellum: Governs when war can be justly initiated. Key criteria include having a just cause (like self-defense), acting with right intention (aiming for peace), proper authority (a transparent declaration by a legitimate body), and ensuring war is a last resort after exhausting non-violent options. There must also be a reasonable probability of success and proportionality, where benefits outweigh expected harm.-
Jus in Bello: ensures that war is conducted ethically, ensuring adherence to humanitarian principles and international law. Key principles include discrimination (distinguishing between combatants and civilians), proportionality (use of force aligning with military objectives), and compliance with international laws, including humane treatment of prisoners of war. It strictly prohibits torture, genocide, and reprisals against civilians.
Aggression
The use of armed force by one state against another without justification under self-defense or other legally recognized exceptions. This includes acts like invasion, military occupation, bombardment, blockades, and attacks on another state’s armed forces. It also covers unauthorized deployment of forces in violation of agreements and using one state’s territory to launch attacks on a third state. Designated as a “crime against peace” during the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, the UN General Assembly (Resolution 3314, 1974) recognizes aggression as the “supreme international crime,” embodying the evils of war crimes.
Crime of Aggression
The crime of aggression involves individual accountability for acts of armed force by one state against another’s sovereignty or territorial integrity, as defined by the 2010 Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute. The International Criminal Court (ICC) can prosecute this crime when the UN Security Council is inactive or with the Assembly of States Parties’ approval. The ICC’s jurisdiction, which became active in 2018, covers crimes committed after July 17, 2018, involving states that are ICC members or have accepted its jurisdiction.
War Crime
A war crime is a serious violation of the laws and customs of war, including actions like murdering or mistreating civilians and prisoners of war, forcing protected individuals to serve hostile forces, killing hostages, punishing people without fair trials, and destroying areas without military necessity. These actions violate international humanitarian law, as outlined in treaties like the Geneva Conventions.

40
Q
  1. What is “common solidarity” in the Treaty of the European Union?
A

“Common solidarity” reflects the EU’s commitment to mutual support in crises, emphasizing:
a. Cooperation during terrorist attacks or natural disasters.
b. Collective defense of democratic values and sovereignty.
If you need further elaboration or examples for any specific answer, feel free to ask!
involving severe human rights violations and state failure. Both concepts, however, share the underlying goal of protecting individuals and ensuring their safety and dignity

41
Q
  1. Compare the mutual defense/assistance mechanisms of NATO and the EU.
A

a. NATO: o Article 5 ensures collective defense against external attacks.
i. Strong enforcement mechanism with U.S. military leadership.
b. EU:
i. Article 42.7 (Lisbon Treaty) requires mutual defense but lacks NATO’s enforcement capabilities.

42
Q
  1. Describe the military-industrial cooperation of the EU (e.g., EDA, military projects).
    a. European Defence Agency (EDA):
A

i. Promotes defense R&D and capability development.
b. Joint Military Projects:
i. Eurofighter Typhoon (multinational fighter jet).
ii. Galileo satellite system (navigation and timing services).

a. European Defence Agency (EDA)
Established in July 2004, the EDA plays a central role in coordinating and fostering cooperation among EU member states in defense research, development, and procurement. The EDA works to enhance the competitiveness and efficiency of the European defense industry, with a focus on capability development, armaments cooperation, and strengthening the technological base.
Here are some key aspects of the EDA’s work:

Identifying Capability Requirements: The EDA analyzes future defense needs and identifies areas where collaborative projects can address capability gaps.

Promoting Harmonization: It encourages the standardization of military requirements and equipment to improve interoperability among EU forces.

Supporting Collaborative Projects: The EDA facilitates joint research, development, and procurement programs, such as those funded by the European Defence Fund (EDF).

Strengthening the Industrial Base: The EDA works to foster a competitive European defense equipment market, promoting innovation and collaboration between defense companies.
Key EDA Programs and Initiatives
The EDA has launched several important programs and initiatives, including:

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): The EDA serves as the secretariat for PESCO, supporting the implementation of collaborative defense projects.

Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD): The EDA plays a key role in data collection and analysis for CARD, identifying opportunities for joint capability development.

Capability Development Plan (CDP): The CDP provides a comprehensive overview of EU defense capabilities, guiding decision-making at both EU and national levels.

Key Capability Programmes: The EDA manages specific programs focused on critical capabilities, such as air-to-air refueling, remotely piloted aircraft systems, and cyber defense.
The EDA’s work contributes to the EU’s overall goal of achieving greater strategic autonomy and a more integrated European defense industry.

43
Q
  1. Does the European Union have an army?
A

The EU does not have a standing army. Instead, it relies on:
1. National militaries of member states.
2. Collaborative frameworks like EU Battlegroups.


Treaty of Lisbon (2009): This treaty introduced the concept of “collective solidarity” and a “mutual defense clause” (Article 42.7). This clause means that all EU countries are obligated to assist another EU country if it is attacked. This collective defense commitment is a key characteristic of a military alliance.

European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Established in 1999, the ESDP aims to develop the EU’s military capabilities for crisis management and peacekeeping operations. While not a standing army, the ESDP has led to the creation of:

EU Battlegroups: Rapid reaction forces designed for short-term deployments.

EUFOR (European Union Force): A deployable force used in various operations, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) and Macedonia (EUFOR Concordia).

European Gendarmerie Force: A specialized force with military police functions, focused on crisis management.

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): Launched in 2017, PESCO allows willing EU member states to collaborate more closely on defense projects. While PESCO itself is not an army, it contributes to the development of a more integrated European defense structure.

European Defence Fund (EDF): The EDF provides funding for collaborative defense projects, strengthening the European defense industry.
Challenges and Limitations:
Despite progress in military integration, the EU faces limitations:

No Unified Command Structure: The EU lacks a single, centralized command structure for its military forces. Decisions on military deployments are made by member states.

Reliance on NATO: The EU still relies heavily on NATO for collective defense.

Varying Levels of Commitment: EU member states have different levels of military spending and capabilities

44
Q
  1. What are the “Petersberg Tasks” and the “Helsinki Headline Goals”?
A

a. Petersberg Tasks (1992): Defined EU missions, including humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, and crisis management.
b. Helsinki Headline Goals (1999): Set EU military objectives, such as deploying a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force.

45
Q
  1. Describe how the EU, NATO, and WEU approached each other during the 1990s.
A

a. EU: Strengthened its defense identity through the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).
b. NATO: Shifted focus from territorial defense to crisis management, cooperating with the EU.
c. WEU: Gradually transferred responsibilities to the EU, ceasing operations by 1999.

Maastricht Treaty (1992/1993): This treaty, which established the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), recognized the WEU as an “integral part” of the EU’s development. This acknowledgment marked a significant step toward integrating European defense efforts.

Development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO (1996): At the Berlin summit in 1996, NATO and the WEU began working together to develop the ESDI, a concept aimed at strengthening Europe’s capacity to manage crises and contribute to international security.

Treaty of Amsterdam (1997/1999): This treaty further integrated the WEU into the EU framework, granting the EU the “Petersberg tasks” – humanitarian, peacekeeping, and crisis management operations. This move solidified the EU’s role in European security and defense.

46
Q
  1. What is PESCO in the EU, and does it relate to the EU intervention force?
    PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation):
A

PESCO, or Permanent Structured Cooperation, is a framework established by the Treaty on European Union that allows willing and capable EU member states to collaborate more closely on defense matters. Introduced in 2017, PESCO aims to enhance the EU’s defense capabilities and move toward greater strategic autonomy. A framework introduced by the Lisbon Treaty for EU members to collaborate on defense projects.
b. Relation to Intervention Force:
i. Supports initiatives like EU Battlegroups, which serve as rapid deployment units.

47
Q
  1. What is the Berlin and the Berlin Plus agreement, and which capabilities were offered to the EU via the agreement?
A

Berlin Agreement (1996):
a. NATO allowed the EU to use its assets for peacekeeping missions.
Berlin Plus Agreement (2003):
b. Formalized this arrangement, granting the EU:
1. Access to NATO’s military assets and intelligence.
2. Use of NATO’s planning structures for EU-led operations.
3. Coordination of EU and NATO activities.

48
Q

10) Describe the political and military institutions of the EU from the Nice Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty.

A

Political Institutions
1. European Council: The Nice Treaty formalized the European Council as the primary decision-making body for strategic matters, including foreign and security policy. Heads of state and government met regularly to define the EU’s political direction.
2. Council of the EU: The Council continued to play a key role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), requiring unanimous decisions for defense matters. The Nice Treaty introduced qualified majority voting in certain areas, though defense remained excluded.
3. High Representative for CFSP: Established by the Amsterdam Treaty, the role was further defined post-Nice, giving the High Representative more visibility in coordinating EU foreign policy.
4. European Parliament: While its role in defense was limited, the
Parliament gained greater influence in areas like approving treaties and scrutinizing the budget, including aspects of defense spending.
Military Institutions
1. European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP): Building on the Saint-Malo Declaration, the ESDP became operational post-Nice, enabling the EU to carry out peacekeeping and crisis management missions independent of NATO. Key operations during this period included missions in the Balkans and Africa.
2. EU Military Committee (EUMC): This was the highest military body within the EU, providing advice to the Council on military strategy and overseeing operations.
3. EU Military Staff (EUMS): Responsible for planning and conducting military operations, as well as intelligence gathering and crisis response.
4. European Defense Agency (EDA): Created in 2004, the EDA aimed to improve defense capabilities, coordinate military research, and enhance cooperation between member states.

49
Q

1- How did the international community establish the new security architecture after the Second World War? What is the role of the UN in this order?

A

The international community restructured global security to prevent future conflicts, centering around multilateralism and the United Nations (UN), established in 1945. The UN’s primary role is to maintain peace and security through its Security Council, facilitating collective action and peacekeeping missions. Economic stability was further supported by institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, with initiatives like the Marshall Plan aiding war-torn regions.
Over time, the concept of security expanded beyond military threats to include human security, addressing issues like economic instability, environmental degradation, and pandemics. The Regional Security Complex (RSC) Theory, proposed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, emphasizes how regional factors, such as power distribution and cooperation patterns, influence security. This theory highlights the role of regional organizations like NATO and the EU in the global security framework.

In the post-Cold War era, focus shifted from state-centric issues to global challenges like terrorism and climate change, prompting the UN and regional organizations to seek cooperative solutions.

50
Q
A