Final Exam Flashcards
(117 cards)
1
Q
Incorporation
A
The extent to which the amendments in the Bill of Rights apply to state government.
2
Q
Where does incorporation stem from?
A
Due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.
3
Q
Fundamental rights incorporation
A
court intervenes only when there is a fundamental right at stake
4
Q
Full (total) incorporation
A
Entire Bill of Rights applies to state and local government actors
5
Q
Full incorporation plus
A
Total incorporation plus fundamental rights not articulated in the Bill of Rights
6
Q
Selective Incorporation
A
Determine whether each right in Bill of Rights applies on a case-by-case basis. This is the method of incorporation used by the Supreme Court.
7
Q
Brown v. Mississippi
A
Issue: Are convictions that rest on confessions exacted by torture consistent with 14th amendment due process requirements?
Facts: Lynched/beaten by law enforcement officers before confessions, trial court knew of this.
Holding: State is free to regulate procedure of its courts as it wishes unless its procedure offends a fundamental principle of justice.
8
Q
Powell v. Alabama
A
Issue: Whether the defendants were denied the right to counsel and whether this denial infringes upon the due process clause.
Facts: Scuffle on the train between the white and black boys, black boys ended up being accused of raping two white women, defendant’s argued they didn’t do it, all were sentenced with the death penalty. Evidence the boys weren’t even on the same train.
Holding: Court has a duty to assign counsel in a capital case where the defendant can’t procure his own counsel.
Takeaways: Shows that criminal procedure emerges from extreme failures in the criminal justice system.
9
Q
Purpose of exclusionary rule
A
- Deter unconstitutional investigative practices
- Compel respect for the constitution by government actors
10
Q
Weeks v. United States
A
Issue: Was property obtained in violation of the 14th amendment?
Facts: A neighbor told law enforcement officers where the key was, Weeks did not give permission. Evidence was found and used against him, was the substance of his conviction. One search by local police, one search by federal government actors. No warrant, no permission.
Holding: Grants relief as it pertains to federal government actors, but not the local officers. Local officers were not acting under any claim of federal authority.
Takeaways: No incorporation at this point - only federal actors were bound by the Constitution so the evidence they seized could be excluded.
11
Q
Wolf v. Colorado
A
Issue: Two Issues
1). Does a conviction by a state court for a state offense deny the due process of law required by 14th amendment, solely because evidence that was admitted at trial was obtained in circumstances that would have rendered it inadmissible in federal court?
2). Should the exclusionary rule apply when state actors, rather than federal actors, commit an unreasonable search or seizure?
Facts: Colorado state court admitted evidence that was obtained in a way that would have violated the Fourth Amendment.
Holding: Security of privacy against arbitrary intrusion is a basic right to a free society, but such evidence does not need to be excluded.
Takeaways: The right against freedom from searches and seizures exists at the state level, but the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained in that manner.
12
Q
Mapp v. Ohio
A
Issue: In a state prosecution for a state crime, does the 14th Amendment prohibit the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure?
Facts: Officers arrived at the house looking for suspect in recent bombing. Her attorney advised her not to let them in and they returned with more officers. She did not consent to the search. An “apparent” search warrant was shown, scuffle ensued. Obscene materials were found.
Holding: All evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures is inadmissible in a state court (applies Weeks standard to STATE courts in addition to federal courts; overrules Wolf).
Takeaways: Exclusionary rule is necessary to recognize the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures.
13
Q
Trespass Approach to Searches
A
There is no violation of the Fourth Amendment unless there is a trespass to private property (a physical intrusion)
14
Q
Open Fields Doctrine
A
An open field is unoccupied or undeveloped land outside the curtilage of the home and is not an “effect” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
15
Q
Oliver v. United States
A
Law enforcement trespassed on defendants’ rural property, ignoring “No Trespass” signs and discovering fields of marijuana. Supreme Court held that police entry into open fields does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
16
Q
United States v. Dunn Curtilage Test
A
Four Factor test
1). The proximity of the area to the home
2). Whether the area is in an enclosure near the home
3). The nature of the uses of the area
4). Steps taken to protect the area from outside observation
Curtilage goes vertically too.
17
Q
Third Party Doctrine (Search)
A
Any information shared with a third party is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, so the government can collect information from that third party without undertaking a “search.”
18
Q
Katz v. United States
A
Issue: Whether Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether it constituted a search?
Facts: Federal agents attached a listening device to the outside of the phone booth, Katz was indicted for transmitting wagering information.
Holding: the government’s activities violated the privacy upon which Katz justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a search and seizure.
-What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of fourth amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected” (pg. 97).
-Rejects trespass approach
19
Q
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test (Search)
A
From Harlan’s concurrence in Katz:
- Person exhibits subjective expectation of privacy AND
- Expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
20
Q
United States v. White
A
Issue: Does the Fourth Amendment bar evidence from the testimony of informants who relay the contents of conversations with the defendant?
Facts: Conversations between White and an informant were recorded and transmitted to government agents. These conversations happened in the informant’s home and other places that were seemingly private.
Holding: There is no expectation of privacy regarding the contents of a conversation with a government informant.
-Defendant could not exclude the informant’s actual testimony, so there is no reason he should be able to exclude the recording of the conversation.
Takeaways: One contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police (aka a government informant).
21
Q
Kyllo v. United States
A
Issue: Whether the use of a thermal imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a search within the meaning of the 4th amendment?
Facts: FBI suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana, used a thermal scanner from the public street, garage was much warmer so the judge issued a warrant.
Holding: Obtaining information through sense-enhancing technology about the interior of the home constitutes a search when the technology in question is not in the general public use.
Takeaways: Supreme Court recognizes that while there is no expectation of privacy interest prohibiting aerial surveillance of a commercial space (Dow), dog sniffing at an airport for narcotics (Place), or visual surveillance of a private residence, there is one that prohibits the thermal imaging of a private residence.
22
Q
United States v. Jones
A
Issue: Whether the attachment of a GPS device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movement on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the 4th amendment
Facts: Jones suspected of narcotics trafficking. Law enforcement used visual surveillance and wiretapping to obtain a warrant authorizing a GPS tracking device for the vehicle. GPS was installed outside of warrant period, tracked him for four months, and got 2,000 pages of data to use for an indictment.
Holding: Revives trespass test - this was a search because it was a physical occupation of private property to obtain information. There are two tests: Katz reasonable expectation of privacy and trespass standard.
Concurrence: Would exclusively apply reasonable expectation of privacy test.
Takeaways: Katz expands on the trespass standard and does not replace it. The reasonable expectation of privacy test and trespass test co-exist.
23
Q
Florida v. Jardines
A
Issue: Does use of a drug-sniffing dog to investigate the contents of a private home from the front porch violate the Fourth Amendment?
Facts: Police investigate a tip that Jardines is growing marijuana in his home. They approached the house with a drug-sniffing dog, which indicated that it smelled drugs when they reached the front porch. This information was used to obtain a search warrant for the house.
Holding: The government’s use of a police dog to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings constituted a search.
Takeaways: Porch was part of the curtilage, which is protected like the rest of the home. Information was gathered by physically entering and occupying the curtilage without the permission of the homeowner.
24
Q
Seizure
A
Meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property
25
US v. Karo
Issue: Does the installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals with the consent of the original owner constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment when the container is delivered to a buyer who has no knowledge of the presence of the beeper?
Facts: With the consent of an informant, DEA agents substituted a can in a shipment with a can obtaining a beeper. It was then passed on to Karo.
Holding: No seizure because the beeper was installed with the permission of the original owner.
Takeaways: There’s a seizure where a possessory interest in property has been implicated
26
Carpenter v. United States
Issue: Whether the government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.
Facts: Law enforcement investigates robberies in Detroit and uses Stored Communications Act to collect data about Carpenter’s location over the period in which the robberies took place.
Holding: There was a search and a reasonable expectation of privacy for these records.
-“A detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years implicates privacy concerns” and constitutes a search that must be supported by probable cause pursuant to the fourth amendment
Takeaways: Third-party doctrine is not applied here. Even though cell phone data goes through the phone company, it has an intimate nature that distinguishes it from other things like banking records.
27
Probable cause
“where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed” by the person to be arrested
28
Spinelli v. United States
Issue: Does the informant’s tip provide sufficient probable cause for a warrant?
Facts: There were four allegations in the search warrant affidavit, had two phones, and information from the confidential informant.
Holding: There is no probable cause here, even when elements of the tip were corroborated.
Takeaways: Reaffirms Aguilar test and requirements for probable cause. In Aguilar, the Court held that a search warrant is inadequate where it fails to set forth the underlying circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate to make an independent judgment of the conclusions in it; and where it does not provide support showing that the informant’s assertions were credible.
(1) veracity/reliability: consider the reliability of the underlying tip
(2) basis of knowledge: consider the underlying circumstances that form the basis of its conclusions
29
Illinois v. Gates
Issue: Can an anonymous letter, that the police have corroborated, provide a basis for probable cause for a search warrant?
Facts: Police received a letter that two individuals were drug dealers and that they were going to pick up $100,000 worth (route was described) Police corroborated this information, had an agent on the plane, and then searched their car and home.
Holding: Warrant was acceptable and probable cause existed given the validation of the anonymous tip.
Rule: An informant’s veracity or reliability and the basis of knowledge “are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality of circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.”
Takeaways: Overruled the Spinelli-Aguilar test and held that probable cause should be evaluated based on the “totality of circumstances.” Individual prongs are still relevant, but you don’t need both of them to establish probable cause.
30
Arrest warrant
issued by magistrate on showing that probable cause exists to believe that the subject of the warrant has committed an offense and thus the warrant primarily serves to protect a person from unreasonable seizure
31
Search warrant
issued upon showing of probable cause to believe that legitimate object of a search is located in a particular place and safeguards an individual's interest in the privacy of his home and possessions against unjustified intrusion of the police.
32
Knock and Announce Rule
Implicit rule in Fourth Amendment that law enforcement officers knock and announce their presence before entering a premises.
33
Payton v. New York
Issue: Whether and under what circumstances an officer may enter a suspect’s home to make a warrantless arrest.
Holding: Although there was probable cause, the nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to effectuate an arrest requires an arrest warrant and reason to believe the suspect is within the premises.
Takeaway: The court distinguished this case from Watson, which held that police can conduct warrantless arrests that are founded on probable cause in public spaces
34
Gerstein v. Pugh
The government “must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.”
Probable cause determinations are required within 48 hours, absent extraordinary circumstances.
35
Johnson v. United States
Holding: When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
36
Lo-Ji Sales v. New York
Issue: Was the warrant that left seizure discretion to the officials conducting the search constitutional?
Facts: During a pornography investigation, the Town Justice accompanied the police officers and participated in the search, reviewing materials as they moved through the store to determine what was obscene. Warrant was open-ended and filled in after the search was complete.
Holding: Open-ended search warrants are impermissible. This particular warrant was not limited to particular items and resembled a general warrant.
Takeaways: There must be a neutral and detached judicial officer assessing whether to grant a search warrant. Here, the town justice allowed himself to become a part of the investigation.
Policy: can handle illicitness versus going back to general warrant.
37
Richards v. Wisconsin
Issue: Whether there should be a case-by-case evaluation of the manner in which a search was conducted to determine violations of the knock and announce rule.
Facts: Officers obtained a warrant to search Richards’s hotel room. He opened the door when they knocked, then closed it again. Officers then entered the apartment. Wisconsin S. Ct. held that felony drug searches reasonably justify a no-knock entry blanket exception to the knock and announce rule.
Holding: Rejected blanket rule and said that it should be on a case-by-case basis every time, but in this specific case the no-knock entry was permissible.
38
Concerns about creating blanket exceptions for knock and announce rule
- Considerable overgeneralization – not every drug investigation will pose these substantial risks.
- Exceptions for this category could easily bleed into other categories and totally destroy the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.
39
Warden v. Hayden
Facts: After entering a home immediately after a robbery to apprehend the suspect, police officers searched the home for him and any weapons. They found both.
Holding: Searches without a warrant are permissible where the “exigencies of the situation” make the search necessary.
Takeaway: This is classic example of hot pursuit.
40
Kentucky v. King
Issue: Does the exigent circumstance rule apply when the police knock and announce, causing the occupants to attempt to destroy the evidence?
Facts: An officer watched a controlled buy of cocaine. Officers followed the suspect into an apartment building, but he disappeared and they did not know if he was in the apartment on the left or right side of the hall. They smelled marijuana coming from the apartment on the left, so they knocked and announced. They then heard noises that made them believe that evidence was being destroyed, so they entered and found drugs. The original suspect was in the other apartment.
Holding: one exception to the warrant requirement is where “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the 4th amendment”
41
Chimel v. California
Facts: Three officers arrived at Chimel’s house with an arrest warrant in connection to a burglary. They asked for permission to look around, which Chimel denied. They proceeded to look around the house anyway (opening drawers, etc.) for about an hour.
Issue: While the arrest was valid, was the warrantless search of the petitioner's entire house constitutionally justified as incident to arrest?
Holding: This was an unreasonable search. The search incident to arrest doctrine allows police to search the person of and immediate area within reach of an arrestee. It does not allow the search of an arrestee’s entire house.
Takeaway: General rule is that an officer can search the person arrested and the area where they might reach to get a weapon or evidentiary item.
42
United States v. Robinson
- Court upheld the search of a cigarette packet inside the arrestee’s pocket because the probable cause to justify the valid arrest was enough to justify the additional intrusion of the search of items on the person.
- Robinson adopted a categorical rule permitting an arresting officer to search containers discovered on an arrestees person
43
Riley v. California
Facts: In Case 1, Riley was arrested. His smartphone was found and searched, and officers found texts and images they believed associated him with a gang and that connected him to an earlier shooting. In Case 2, Wurie’s flip phone was used to track his home phone number to an apartment building, which officers then searched and found drugs.
Issue: Whether the police, without a warrant, may search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual they have arrested.
Holding: Declined to extend Robinson to search for data on a cell phone, held officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting a search.
44
Rationale for greater protection of cell phones
- cell phones are mini-computers with lots of personal/intimate information,
- no worry about officer safety
- concerns about destruction of evidence are remote.
45
Where might circumstances justify the search of a cell phone?
Bombing suspect, child abduction, extreme emergency that warrants immediate intrusion.
46
New York v. Belton
Facts: Car was pulled over for speeding. Officers said they smelled marijuana and saw an envelope with a label that referenced marijuana, so the entire car was searched. During the search of the car, Belton’s jacket was found with cocaine in the pocket.
Issue: There is no straightforward rule to apply. The question of the proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants
Holding: Relying on Robinson precedent, the Court held that the search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle falls within the search incident to arrest exception for vehicle occupants who have been arrested.
Takeaway: A single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who only have limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance interests involved in the circumstances they face. Won’t be making case by case assessments.
47
Arizona v. Gant
Issue: To what extent and under what circumstances is the passenger compartment of a vehicle “the area within the immediate control” of the arrestee?
Facts: Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license. After he was handcuffed, police officers searched the car and found a gun and cocaine in a jacket on the backseat.
Under Belton, this would be a constitutional search incident to arrest, but the Court takes a different approach here.
Holding: This was not a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, given the charge he was arrested for and the fact that he was already in handcuffs when they searched his car.
Takeaways: In order to search a vehicle incident to arrest (Thusi’s “two part” rule):
-The arrestee must have control over the passenger compartment of the vehicle during the search OR
-The police must have reason to believe that evidence connected to the crime of the arrest is present in the vehicle.
48
Whren v. United States
Issue: Whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe have committed a civil traffic violation is inconsistent with the 4th amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce traffic laws
Facts: Officers were patrolling a “high drug area” when they noticed a truck waiting at a stop sign for an unusually long time. Officers turned around and the car took off at an “unreasonable” speed. Police pulled the car over for a traffic stop and saw the passenger had crack cocaine. Petitioner argued that the stop was pretextual.
Holding: The subjective state of mind of a police officer is not a factor in determining the reasonableness of a traffic stop objectively supported by probable cause.
Takeaways: Pretextual stops are not unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
49
Chambers v. Maroney
Issue: Can a search made some time after the arrest be justified as a search incident to arrest? Can it be justified on alternate grounds?
Facts: After a gas station robbery, police located the car and arrested its occupants. They drove the car back to the police station and searched it there, finding a concealed compartment containing revolvers and other evidence from the crime.
Holding: The automobile exception permitted the warrantless search of an automobile at the police station, where there was probable cause to support the search at the scene of the arrest.
Takeaways: Police officers with probable cause to search a car at the scene of the initial stop may also search that car at the station house.
Policy: lower expectation of privacy with vehicles, mobility of car necessitates faster search.
50
California v. Carney
Issue: Whether law enforcement agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless search based on probable cause of a fully mobile motor home located in a public place.
Facts: Carney gave a youth marijuana in exchange for sex in his motor home, which was parked in a public parking lot. Police officers approached and searched the motor home without a warrant.
Holding: The search of a motorhome parked in a public place fits within the automobile exception.
Emphasis here on mobility of vehicles and its presence in a public parking lot, which indicates that it is being used for transportation rather than housing.
Takeaways: Dissent argues that while the motor home is not the same as a house, it should still have greater protection equivalent to a hotel room or a vacation cabin.
51
United States v. Chadwick
Issue: Did police officers need a warrant to search the container that they seized from a vehicle?
Facts: Amtrak officials were suspicious of a footlocker that was heavier than normal and leaking talcum powder. At the train’s final stop, federal narcotics agents use a drug dog to confirm presence of illicit substances, then wait until the footlocker is placed in the car to arrest its occupants and seize it. They open the footlocker over an hour later at the police station.
Government tried to argue that this was a search incident to arrest and that the search fell under the automobile exception.
Holding: Luggage is treated differently than automobiles, and police need a search warrant to search a double-locked suitcase (container). Rejects argument that warrant clause only applies to the home.
This holding is refined in a later case.
Takeaways: There was a clear expectation of privacy here because there were multiple locks on the footlocker.
52
California v. Acevedo
Issue: Did officers need a warrant to open the container found in Acevedo’s car simply because they lacked probable cause to search the entire car? *Clarifying Chadwick/Ross standard.
Facts: Police had probable cause to believe that a bag in Acevedo’s possession contained marijuana. He put the bag in the trunk of his car. Fearing the loss of the evidence, police stopped him and searched the car.
Holding: The Fourth Amendment does not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a container within the vehicle. The police may search a container without a warrant where they have probable cause to support the search.
Expansion of automobile exception and is an exception to general warrant requirement for containers.
Takeaways: Establishes a bright-line rule for the benefit of law enforcement.
53
Horton v. California
Issue: Whether the warrantless seizure of evidence of a crime in plain view is prohibited by the fourth amendment if the discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent.
Facts: Officers investigated a robbery and had a search warrant for the proceeds of the robbery. While completing that search, the officer saw the weapons from the robbery in plain sight and seized them.
Holding: The items seized from the petitioner's home were discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant. When they were discovered, it was immediately apparent to the officer that they constituted incriminating evidence . . . the search was authorized.
54
Elements of Plain View Seizure
1. Officers were lawfully present (incident to a lawful search or seizure)
2. Item is in plain view
3. Immediately apparent that the item is contraband or fruit of a crime; and
4. Allows for the seizure of the item.
55
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
Issue: Was there voluntary consent?
Facts: Officer stopped a car and asked the occupants to get out when the driver could not produce a license. Permission to search was granted by a person who said he was a brother of the car’s owner. During the search, the officer found stolen checks linked to one of the passengers.
Holding: The voluntariness of consent is a question of fact, and the prosecution is not required to prove that the defendant knew that she could refuse consent in order to prove voluntariness.
Takeaway: Consent allows for searches without warrant or probable cause. It must be voluntary, but it does not have to be knowing.
56
Georgia v. Randolph
Issue: Is an evidentiary seizure lawful with the permission of one occupant when the other occupant is present at the scene and expressly refuses consent?
Facts: Police were called and wife gave them permission to search the house. Husband refused the search. Husband was indicted for possession of cocaine, which officers found in his bedroom.
Holding: A seizure/search is not unlawful as to the objector where a co-occupant refused to grant consent although the other occupant grants consent.
Takeaway: Search can’t be held against the person who objects to it.
57
Illinois v. Rodriguez
Issue: Was there common authority/joint access or control for the apartment?
Facts: Officers were under the impression that Fischer had authority to consent to the search of an apartment because she had a key, referred to the residence as “our apartment,” and told the police she kept clothes there. In reality, she had vacated the apartment weeks before and did not have such authority.
Holding: Only lawful occupants may grant consent. However, where a police officer relies on the consent of an individual who appears to be a lawful occupant but is not, the reasonableness of such reliance will be evaluated based on the particular facts that supported the police officer’s mistaken belief.
58
Terry v. Ohio
Issue: Whether in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, Terry’s right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure.
Facts: Officer suspected that two men were going to rob a store. He stopped them and patted down the outside of their clothes. He found a revolver in Terry’s pocket.
Holding: Elements of a Terry stop:
Seizure - initial stop
Reasonable suspicion to believe that
Criminal activity is afoot
Search
Reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual is
Armed and
(presently) dangerous
Officer may check outer clothing of person for weapons.
Takeaway: This counts as a seizure, and stop and frisk is not a “petty indignity.”
59
What are the elements of a Terry stop?
1. Seizure (initial stop)
- Reasonable suspicion to believe that
- Criminal activity is afoot
2. Search
- Reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual is
- Armed and
- Presently dangerous
60
Dunaway v. New York
Issue: Whether seizure of Dunaway was an arrest that required probable cause?
Facts: An informant gave police a lead on a robbery/killing. The police did not have enough information to arrest him, but they picked him up and brought him into the station. He confessed in the interrogation room at the police station.
Holding: The police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when they seized petitioner without probable cause and transported him to the police station for interrogation.
Takeaway: This detention is “indistinguishable” from traditional arrest based on all facts of the interrogation.
Treats Terry as a narrow exception, with the reasonableness analysis limited to a narrow set of circumstances.
61
United States v. Mendenhall
Issue: Was there a seizure? Was petitioner’s consent voluntary?
Facts: DEA agents noticed that Mendenhall’s characteristics were that of a drug courier. They approached her and took her ID and airline ticket. They returned these items and asked if she would accompany them to the office. She accompanied them, they searched her handbag, and then searched her person and found drugs.
Holding: A person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.
62
California v. Hodari
Issue: Whether with respect to a show of authority as with respect to application of force, a seizure occurs though the subject does not yield.
Facts: Officers pursued Hodari when he ran away from them. Just before the officer reached him, he threw what appeared to be a rock. It was actually cocaine. He was arrested after throwing the cocaine.
Holding: Since defendant did not yield to show of authority, there was no seizure at the point in time when Hodari threw the rock.
63
Alabama v. White
Issue: Whether the informant’s tip justified the stop of the car--what does totality of circumstances look like for reasonable suspicion?
Facts: Police received a tip that White would be leaving a particular place at a specified time with cocaine in a briefcase. They saw her leave the building (without the case), then followed her and stopped her car. She gave them permission to search the car, and they found the case with cocaine inside.
Holding: The totality of circumstances can establish reasonable suspicion with a little less information than would be required for probable cause. The same factors can be considered.
Takeaway: Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause.
64
Illinois v. Wardlow
Issue: Did officers have reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative Terry stop?
Facts: Officers observed Wardlow standing next to a building. He fled when he saw them, and the officers pursued him and patted him down. They pursued him because it was a high crime area and he fled without apparent reason.
Holding: Unprovoked flight from a police officer may provide reasonable suspicion to support a Terry investigative stop.
A person’s presence in a high crime area alone is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion, but it is a relevant factor in considering the context of the seizure.
65
Maryland v. Buie
Issue: Could police conduct a warrantless protective sweep of the home?
Facts: Officers executed an arrest warrant at Buie’s house. Officer shouted into basement and Buie came upstairs. The officer then checked the basement to make sure nobody else was hiding there. In the basement, evidence was found and seized.
Holding: A warrant is not required to conduct a protective sweep. Incident to arrest officers can, without any suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack can be launched.
There must be articulable facts that would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area could harbor an individual who posed a danger to people on the scene of the arrest.
Takeaway: Allows for cursory inspection of areas where a person could hide.
66
United States v. Place
Holding: Where the authorities possess specific and articulable facts warranting a reasonable belief that a traveler’s luggage contains narcotics, the governmental interest in seizing the luggage briefly to pursue further investigation in substantial.
In this case, the length of the detention and the agents’ inability to give Place details about his luggage went beyond the authority of officers.
Takeaway: A stop can become unreasonable even when there is a satisfactory initial justification. Law enforcement officers can detain someone suspected of having narcotics in their luggage. BUT their authority only allows officers to briefly detain luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics
67
Maryland v. King
Issue: DNA cheek swab
Holding: When officers made an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
68
Camara-See Doctrine
Administrative Searches: In general, government officials may not enter residences and commercial buildings for administrative code violations without an administrative search warrant.
69
New York v. Burger (administrative searches)
When the privacy interests of the owner are weakened and the government interests in regulating particular business are concomitantly heightened in which case the warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
70
New Jersey v. TLO
Two public school students were caught smoking on school grounds. They denied smoking. The vice principal searched the purse of one for cigarettes and found cigarette rolling paper.
Court held that neither the warrant nor probable cause requirements apply to searches by school officials.
71
Special Needs Test
Where a careful balancing of governmental and public interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.
Public school teachers and administrators may search students without a warrant if two conditions are met:
(1) there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school AND
(2) the search is not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.
72
Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding
Student was subjected to strip search because school official suspected she had ibuprofen, which was against the school rules.
Court held this search was excessive in light of the age of the student and nature of the infraction.
73
United States v. Ramsey
Border Searches: A person may be stopped and her belongings searched without a warrant and in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself from the entry of person and things dangerous to the nation.
74
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte
Border Searches: Roving patrols near the border require individualized suspicion, but individuals may be stopped for questioning near the border “at fixed checkpoints without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”
75
Michigan Department of State Police v. Stitz
Issue: Are these stops in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Facts: Michigan State Police started sobriety checkpoints to find drivers who exhibited signs of intoxication. All vehicles passing through the checkpoint were briefly stopped.
Holding: DUI checkpoints are okay under the Fourth Amendment because the government has such a strong interest in promoting highway safety.
76
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond
Issue: What is the constitutionality of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics?
Facts: Indianapolis operated checkpoints in certain areas based on crime statistics and stopped cars for an average of 2-3 minutes to look for signs of driver impairment or obvious drugs in the vehicle. The purpose of the checkpoint was general law enforcement.
Holding: Regular law enforcement activities should be conducted through normal procedures with individualized suspicion rather than through checkpoints.
Takeaway: Narcotics checkpoints and any checkpoints to investigate ordinary crime are not okay.
77
Rakas v. Illinois
Issue: Could passengers move to exclude the evidence (did they have standing)?
Facts: Officer stopped a car and ordered occupants out. After searching the car, they found rifle shells in the locked glove compartment and a rifle under the front passenger seat. The petitioners were the passengers and moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
Holding: Passengers had no standing because they failed to show that they “had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or the area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers.”
Takeaway: The person articulating a Fourth Amendment violation must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises.
Language mirrors Katz’s assessment of whether a search occurred.
This test applies to the particular individual and whether they have an attachment to the place or thing.
78
Minnesota v. Carter
Issue: Should Minnesota v. Olson apply to this situation, where visitors are not spending the night and are there for a primarily commercial interaction?
Facts: Officers investigated a tip from an informant and observed the bagging of drugs through an apartment’s blinds. The petitioners had come from out of town solely for the purpose of bagging drugs and had only been in the apartment 2.5 hours prior to their arrest.
Holding: “In order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable.”
Petitioners did not have standing. Rationale included that petitioners were not overnight guests, transaction was purely commercial in nature, petitioners were on the premises for a relatively short period of time, and there was no prior connection between the householder and the petitioners.
79
Minnesota v. Olson
The Supreme Court held that “an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home and this merely recognizes the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share.”
80
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree (from Walder v. United States)
The government cannot violate the Fourth Amendment and use the fruits of unlawful conduct to secure a conviction. Nor can the government make indirect use of such evidence for its case, or support a conviction on evidence obtained through leads from the unlawfully obtained evidence.
81
What are the exceptions to fruit of the poisonous tree (where evidence can still be admitted)?
Independent source - If an independent source leads to the same fruit, then the evidence can still come in even if there was unlawful conduct.
Inevitable discovery
82
Murray v. United States
Issue: Whether the search pursuant to arrest was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence at issue here.
Facts: Agents were surveilling Murray and co-conspirators and saw them enter a warehouse. The agents entered the warehouse, saw contraband without touching it, left and got a warrant, then came back to seize the evidence. Entering the warehouse without a warrant was a Fourth Amendment violation.
Holding: Where law enforcement officers have an independent source for a search or seizure that was initially the fruit of unlawful conduct, that independent source renders the search unreasonable.
Takeaway: The Fourth Amendment violation did not taint the other aspects of the investigation
83
Wong Sun v. United States
Issue: Was any of the evidence admitted fruit of the poisonous tree?
Facts: Hom Way was under surveillance for 6 weeks and then arrested for heroin possession. He implicated “Blackie Toy” as a drug dealer and stated that Toy owned the laundry at a particular address. James Wah Toy owned the laundry at that location, so federal agents rang his doorbell. When he answered, the agents showed their badges. He slammed the door shut and ran away, and the agents followed him into his living quarters. When they searched his residence, they did not find any narcotics. Agents informed Toy that Hom Way implicated him as a drug dealer, and he said that he knew somebody who did have narcotics: Johnny Yee. At Johnny’s house, they find heroin. He stated that the heroin had been brought to him by Toy and another person, “Sea Dog.” Toy said that Sea Dog was Wong Sun. At Wong Sun’s home, officers searched for narcotics and found nothing. All characters were charged and arraigned and then released on their own recognizance. Federal agents interrogated all of them and prepared statements, but they all refused to sign. Wong Sun acknowledged the accuracy of the statement. Hom Way did not testify. Johnny Yee was offered as a witness, but refused to testify and repudiated his statements.
Holding: evidence that is the fruit of the unlawful law enforcement conduct is inadmissible, so long as the individual challenging its admission is the victim of that initial unlawful conduct (fruit of the poisonous tree)
84
What should you consider in determining whether the connection between the violation and the fruit has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint?
- The length of time that has elapsed between the initial illegality and the seizure of the fruit
- The flagrancy of the initial misconduct
- The existence of an intervening cause of the seizure of the fruit
- The presence of an act of free will by the defendant resulting in the seizure of the fruit
85
Utah v. Strieff
Issue: Does warrant serve as a basis for attenuation since the stop had no basis, and thus was unlawful? Were drugs inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree?
Facts: Anonymous tip that drug activities were occuring at a specific residence, was placed under surveillance. One officer accosted Strieff and requested identification. Called dispatch, saw outstanding arrest warrant. Conducted a search incident to arrest and discovered drug paraphernalia.
Holding: the officer’s discovery of the [valid] arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest
Takeaway: Evidence seized upon learning that the stopped individual has an outstanding warrant is still admissible although it was the result of an unlawful stop
86
United States v. Leon
Issue: Whether exclusionary rule should apply when officers were acting in reasonable reliance on a warrant that was ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.
Facts: Officer received a tip about drugs and obtained a warrant. The evidence was subsequently seized in good faith, but the warrant was found to be insufficient to establish probable cause at trial.
Holding: Officers reasonably relied on a warrant that appeared to be valid, so exclusionary rule does not apply.
Takeaway: when law enforcement officers execute an invalid warrant based upon a good faith reliance on the search warrant, evidence obtained because of the warrant is not render inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. when law enforcement officers execute an invalid warrant based upon a good faith reliance on the search warrant, the exclusionary rule does not apply to the seized evidence.
87
Hudson v. Michigan
Issue: Whether violation of the knock-and-announce rule requires the suppression of all evidence found in the search.
Facts: Police had a warrant to search for drugs and firearms at Hudson’s house and discovered both during their search. When they arrived to execute the warrant, they announced but waited only 3-5 seconds before entering the home.
Holding: Finds that the evidence is admissible, although there was a violation.
Attenuation occurs when the causal connection between violation and the evidence that is found is remote OR when the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by the suppression of the evidence obtained.
Exclusionary rule only applies where its deterrent benefits outweigh its “substantial social costs.”
Takeaway: A violation of the knock-and-announce rule will not result in the exclusion of evidence seized following such violation.
88
Herring v. United States
Issue: Whether the exclusionary rule should apply when an arrest is conducted based on a mistaken belief
Facts: Officer checked for a warrant for Herring. His county did not have a warrant, but a neighboring county did have a warrant for Herring’s arrest. He arrested Herring and searched him incident to arrest, but there was a clerical error and no actual arrest warrant.
Holding: When police mistakes are the result of negligence rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements the exclusionary rule does not apply
89
Hector v. State
Issue: Whether trial court should have excluded testimony of a confession (was the confession voluntary)?
Facts: Hector was accused of burglary. He was whipped and tortured by a group of people before he confessed. The only evidence was the confession elicited duringt his torture.
Holding/Takeaway: Confessions elicited through torture are inadmissible.
Involuntary confessions and torture undermine the legitimacy of judicial proceedings.
90
Lisenba v. California
Issue: Whether the use of the confessions rendered petitioner’s conviction a deprivation of his life without due process of law.
Facts: Snake bite, double indemnity, drowning the wife case. Multiple interrogations. 11 days apart. April 19-21, then May 1 and 2.
Holding: A confession following an extensive interrogation was held to be voluntary, where there was no threat of violence during the interrogation that elicited the confession.
The Court was particularly concerned about federalism issues and the reliability of the confession
Takeaway: Analyzes interrogations through due process, not through Fifth Amendment.
91
Spano v. New York
Issue: Whether the confession was properly admitted into evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts: Spano involved with murder after a bar fight. During the interrogation, they bring in Spano’s friend Bruno to assist in the interrogation. Bruno says that he is going to lose his job with the police department and that his wife and children will be destitute if Spano does not confess.
Holding: A confession elicited following an eight-hour interrogation of an immigrant with low education, using a “false friend,” was held to be involuntary and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Court was concerned with fairness, not just reliability.
Crime had already been solved; this interrogation was about getting a statement for conviction purposes
92
What are the rationales for suppressing involuntary confessions?
- Prevent unreliable evidence from reaching trier of fact
- Prevent the use of statements taken through overbearing police pressure
- Prevent statements taken with minimal “mental freedom”
93
Bram v. United States
Issue: Was the confession voluntary? Was it incorrectly admitted?
Facts: A murder occurred on a ship in the Atlantic. One suspect, Bram, was stripped to be searched for evidence of the murder and was questioned either while taking his clothes off or while completely naked. He was told the other suspect had seen him do the murder from the ship’s wheel, and Bram said it was impossible for the other man to have seen him from that position.
Holding: We find that an influence was exerted, and, as any doubt to whether the confession was voluntary must be determined in favor of the accused. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination bars the use of involuntary confessions.
Not relying on due process violations like the prior cases – switch to a focus on Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Takeaway: Prior to this, 14th/5th Amendment due process violations during interrogations were considered. This case marks a transition to consideration of the 5th Amendment self-incrimination clause.
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Miranda v. Arizona
Issue: Whether Miranda’s confession was inadmissible where the police did not inform him of his right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation.
Facts: Miranda was arrested and taken to the police station. He was identified by the victim and they interrogated him without informing him of his rights. At the end of a two-hour interrogation, they have a signed statement from him.
Holding: The statements were obtained from Miranda under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards. Individuals must be advised of:
The right to remain silent.
Anything said can and will be used against the defendant in court.
Right to an attorney. And
That if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed
Individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
95
How does the Miranda court define a custodial interrogation?
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way
96
What is the process for analyzing potential Miranda violations?
1. Is there a custodial interrogation?
- Was the person in custody?
- Was there an interrogation?
2. Was there a miranda violation?
3. Was there a waiver?
4. If there was a violation, how do we treat the fruits of the violation?
5. Is there an exception?
97
Schmerber v. California
Holding: the forced extraction and analysis of a blood sample following a DUI arrest is not compelled testimony that implicates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
98
Lie detector tests
- Admissibility: Most courts do not allow introduction (some do) because of issues with scientific reliability
- May raise a 5th amendment concern because they elicit testimony
- Oregon v. Mathiason: police lying about finding the suspect’s fingerprints at the scene was fine. BUT, it is a fact intensive, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry.
99
Berkemer v. McCarty
Issue:
1. Whether Miranda applies when a suspect is accused of a misdemeanor traffic offense.
2. Whether the roadside questioning of a motorist during a routine traffic stop is a custodial interrogation.
Facts: State trooper observed vehicle weaving in and out of traffic. Asked McCarty to exit the vehicle after he asked him to exit the vehicle. Could not stand unaided, freedom to leave the scene was terminated as Trooper determined he would charge. McCarty mentioned he had consumed both alcohol and marijuana. A Miranda warning was never given
Holding:
1. Therefore, that a person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in miranda, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrest.
2. Persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not in “custody” for the purposes of miranda. McCarty was unable to demonstrate that between the time of the initial stop and the official arrest that he was subject to restraints similar to a formal arrest.
Takeaway: Test is how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood their situation.
100
JDB v. North Carolina
Holding: the age of the person being questioned is relevant in assessing whether a person was in custody.
In this case, a child was being questioned by police.
101
Rhode Island v. Innus
Issue: Whether the discussion arose to an interrogation?
Facts: Taxicab armed robbery/murder case. Suspected person arrested, in custody, in the car. Officers discussing their concern of a disbaled child finding the gun. After hearing this conversation, suspected individual offered to show them where the gun was.
Holding: "It must also be established that a suspect’s incriminating response was the product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. This was not established in the present case."
Takeaway: Test: Words or actions that the police officer should have known were likely to elicit an incriminating response.
102
What is the test for whether an interrogation occurred?
Words or actions that the police officer should have known were likely to elicit an incriminating response.
103
North Carolina v. Butler
Issue: Whether defendant waived his Miranda rights.
Facts: FBI read Miranda rights after arresting Butler. He acknowledged that he understood his rights but refused to sign the waiver, then made inculpatory statements.
Holding: An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.
Takeaway: The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated
104
Berghuis v. Thompkins
-Facts: Thompkins incriminated himself in the last fifteen minutes of a three-hour interrogation. Prior to that, he had remained largely silent and did not answer questions.
-Issues:
Whether Thompkins invoked his right to remain silent
Holding: he did not invoke this right because it must be invoked unambiguously.
Whether he waived the right by responding to the officer
Holding: Yes, he waived this right by not explicitly invoking the right to remain silent and by speaking
Whether the police were obligated to end the interrogation in the absence of an explicit waiver.
Holding: Police may interrogate a suspect who has neither waived nor invoked their Miranda rights.
-Takeaway: A suspect who has received and understood the Miranda Warnings and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waived the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police.
105
Edwards v. Arizona
Issue: Did defendant waive his Miranda rights?
Facts: Edwards was arrested and informed of his rights. He stated that he understood his rights but asked for an attorney. The questioning ceased, but officers returned to the jail the next morning, informed him of his Miranda rights again, and then Edwards implicated himself.
Holding: When an accused has invoked the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he was advised of his rights.
Takeaway: After such invocation, the accused should not be subjected to further interrogation until counsel is provided.
106
State v. Demesme
Concurring opinion: In my view, the defendant’s ambiguous and equivocal reference to a “lawyer dog” does not constitute an invocation of counsel that warrants termination of the interview and does not violate Edwards v. Arizona.
107
New York v. Quarles
Issue: Whether police were justified in failing to make available to respondent the procedural safeguards associated with the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination since miranda.
Facts: Officer knew the person had a gun, but it was not on his person. Officer asks where the gun is, but the person had not been Mirandized at that point.
Holding: Public safety exception to the Miranda warning. Public safety issue, immediate concern - gun was loose in the store.
Takeaway: Police may interrogate a suspect without miranda warnings when required to protect the public safety from an imminent threat
108
Oregon v. Elstad
Issue: How to treat the second statement because there was a Miranda violation from the first statement. Whether an initial failure of law enforcement officers to administer the warnings required by Miranda, without more, taints subsequent admissions made after a suspect has been fully advised of and has waived his Miranda rights.
Facts: After a burglary, an 18-year-old was implicated. Officers went to his home and asked if he knew why they were there. They asked if he knew the home had been burglarized, and he said “Yes, I was there.” He was not read his Miranda rights until after he was transported to the police station. At that point, he acknowledged his rights and gave a full statement admitting his guilt.
Holding: We must conclude that, absent deliberately coercive of improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant presumption of compulsion.
Second warned incriminating statements are admissible when voluntarily given
Takeaway: Miranda violations have no “fruit”
109
Do Miranda violations have "fruit"?
No
110
Missouri v. Seibert
Facts: The police had a protocol of interrogating suspects without giving Miranda warnings. They would elicit an unwarned confession, issue the warnings, and cover the same ground again during a second warned interrogation after reminding the suspect that they already had incriminating information.
The interrogation technique was designed to circumvent Miranda.
Holding: The second warned statements were inadmissible, addressing a hole created by Elstad.
111
Dickerson v. United States
Issue: Did Miranda announce a constitutional rule or did the Court merely exercise its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction?
Facts: Dickerson was indicted and moved to suppress statements he made to the FBI before receiving a Miranda warning. An act of Congress, however, said that admissibility of such statements turned on their voluntariness. The Fourth Circuit held that Congress could have the final say on admissibility via statute and that Miranda was not a constitutional holding.
Holding: Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. Following the rule of stare decisis, we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.
Takeaway: This case is about the separation of powers and the limits of the congressional power to interpret the Constitution.
112
Massiah v. United States
Issue: Whether the sixth amendment right to counsel was violated.
Facts: Indicted for federal narcotics law, retained lawyer, pleaded not guilty, released on bail. Colson, the co-defendant, cooperated with the government. The government put a listening device in Colson’s car. Colson and Massiah had a lengthy conversation in car, prearranged with Colson but unknown to Massiah, which the government listened to. Petitioner made several incriminating statements that were used against him at trial.
Holding/Takeaway: He was denied the basic protections of the sixth amendment when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.
113
United States v. Henry
Issue/Facts: Indicted for bank robbery and held in jail, government workers contacted a fellow inmate who had been a paid informant before. Informed the agent he was in the same cellblock. Nichols then testified at trial that Henry told him about the robbery. Was requested to pay attention to Henry’s statement, not to question him.
Holding: Was deliberate elicitation. Must have known that such propinquity would lead to the result. Government deliberately put an agent in a situation where it was likely he would make incriminating statements.
Takeaway: Court rejecting the narrow meaning of deliberate elicitation - Nicoles was “More seriously imposed upon because he did not know that his co defendant was a government agency”
114
Kuhlman v. Wilson
Deliberate Elicitation
Holding: Clear that informant must do more than merely listen
Takeaway: "Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks"
115
Brewer v. Williams
Issue: Did the Christian burial speech amount to a Sixth Amendment violation?
Facts: Ten-year-old girl was kidnapped by Williams, who later turned himself in. The police went to the city where he had turned himself in to collect him and bring him back to Des Moines. The police were not supposed to interrogate Williams on the way back to Des Moines, but one of the detectives gave the “Christian burial speech.” After the speech, Williams led the detectives to the girl’s body.
Holding: The defendant’s provision of incriminating statements after the defendant was charged with a crime and after the defendant invoked his right to counsel, in response to police statements eliciting incriminating information, is not a valid waiver of 6th amendment right to counsel
Takeaway: Here, Williams had clearly invoked his right to counsel by consulting with two attorneys and the adversary proceeding had commenced. His consistent reliance on the advice of counsel refutes any suggestion that he waived the right to counsel.
116
Patterson v. Illinois
Facts: On two separate occasions, petitioner elected to forgo the assistance of counsel, and speak directly to the officials concerning his role in the murder (petitioner’s waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary)
Holding: petitioner was meticulously informed by authorities of his right to counsel, and of the consequences of any choice not to exercise that right.
117
Montejo v. Louisiana
Holding: The Miranda warnings provide adequate notice of the 6th amendment right to counsel and the consequence of waiving this right in the post-indictment context.
Takeaway: Overruled Michigan v. Jackson, which held that once a defendant invoked the right to counsel, there is a presumption against waiver. The court reasoned that Edwards and Miranda provided adequate protection for the right to counsel.
