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Final Flashcards

1
Q

In the Second Meditation, Descartes claimed to know with certainty that

  1. anything that is wax is extended and solid.
  2. anything that is wax is flexible and solid.
  3. anything that is wax is extended and flexible.
  4. wax actually exists
A
  1. anything that is wax is extended and flexible.
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2
Q

According to the “Argument Interpretation” of Descartes’ cogito passage, the first thing that Descartes came to know with epistemic certainty was proposition p (“I exist”), and the way he came to know p with epistemic certainty was by utilizing the “Cogito Argument” (see below). One major problem with the Argument Interpretation is that

Cogito Argument
1. I think.
2. Anything that thinks exists.
C. I exist. [1, 2]

  1. Premise 2 of the Cogito Argument is false, because something could think without existing.
  2. The Cogito Argument is invalid.
  3. If the Argument Interpretation is correct, then Descartes came to know p by intuition.
  4. If the Argument Interpretation is correct, then Descartes would have to know with certainty the premises of the Cogito Argument before he came to know p with certainty.
A
  1. If the Argument Interpretation is correct, then Descartes would have to know with certainty the premises of the Cogito Argument before he came to know p with certainty.
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3
Q

In Meno, Socrates explicitly says that knowledge is

  1. true belief plus giving an account of the reason why.
  2. true belief plus convincing others with an argument.
  3. true belief.
  4. true belief plus having some evidence.
A
  1. true belief plus giving an account of the reason why.
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4
Q

According to Socrates in Phaedo, “the philosophical attitude” with respect to arguments is characterized by one’s goal of

  1. winning the argument.
  2. teaching truth to society in order to improve it.
  3. convincing others to agree with one.
  4. knowing the truth about a matter.
A
  1. knowing the truth about a matter.
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5
Q

In Meno, Socrates argues that true belief is just as good a guide to action as knowledge is.

  1. True
  2. False
A
  1. True
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6
Q

In the First Meditation, Rene Descartes claims that his perceptual beliefs (e.g., I’m being warmed by the fire) can serve as the foundation for everything else he can come to know with certainty.

  1. True
  2. False
A
  1. False
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7
Q

According to what we called the “Epistemic Discovery Interpretation” of Descartes’ cogito passage, Descartes came to know with certainty “I exist” in a moment of intuition (rational insight), as a result of his realization that the ultimate reason to doubt would be that

  1. something occasionally deceives me.
  2. I have always been dreaming.
  3. something is deceiving me as much as its possible for me to be deceived.
  4. my sense perceptions sometimes mislead me into believing false propositions.
A
  1. something is deceiving me as much as its possible for me to be deceived.
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8
Q

As we noted in class, Rene Descartes became disillusioned by his education, because he thought it was full of error. The one subject he was impressed by–and which became his model for gaining knowledge–was

  1. psychology
  2. mathematics
  3. physics
  4. philosophy
A
  1. mathematics
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9
Q

A1 (see below) is a correct analysis of “having a certain indication of being awake”.

 A1:  Person S has a certain indication of being awake if and only if

(i) S has a feature F that cannot be present unless S is awake, and

(ii) F is unmistakably present in S's experience.

As we noted in class, the feature we described as follows: feeling a pinch from oneself:

  1. fails to satisfy condition (i) of A1 and fails to satisfy condition (ii) of A1.
  2. fails to satisfy condition (ii) of A1, but satisfies condition (1) of A1.
  3. fails to satisfy condition (i) of A1, but satisfies condition (ii) of A1.
  4. satisfies condition (i) of A1 and satisfies condition (ii) of A1.
A
  1. fails to satisfy condition (i) of A1 and fails to satisfy condition (ii) of A1.
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10
Q

Descartes believed that, in fact, an evil demon was deceiving him as much as it was possible for Descartes to be deceived.

  1. True
  2. False
A
  1. False
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11
Q

Which scenario–Descartes’ evil genius scenario or Descartes’ dreaming scenario–is the most radical skeptical scenario (i.e., the scenario such that, were you in it, you would have the least knowledge)?

  1. Descartes’ dreaming scenario
  2. Neither Descartes’ evil genius scenario nor Descartes’ dreaming scenario is a more radical skeptical scenario than the other.
  3. Descartes’ evil genius scenario.
A
  1. Descartes’ evil genius scenario.
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12
Q

Which of the following is not among Descartes’ four rules of method?

  1. Divide complex problems into their component parts.
  2. Never accept anything as true unless it has been corroborated by at least one other expert on the relevant issue.
  3. Never accept anything as true unless it is clearly and distinctly true.
  4. Go from the simple to the complex.
A
  1. Never accept anything as true unless it has been corroborated by at least one other expert on the relevant issue.
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13
Q

A1 (see below) is a correct analysis of “having a certain indication of being awake”.

 A1:  Person S has a certain indication of being awake if and only if

 (i) S has a feature F that cannot be present unless S is awake, and

 (ii) F is unmistakably present in S's experience.

In class we noted that the feature we described as follows: having one’s brain waves in a waking-only pattern:

  1. satisfies condition (i) of A1 and satisfies condition (ii) of A1.
  2. does not satisfy condition (i) of A1 and does not satisfy condition (ii) of A1.
  3. satisfies condition (i) of A1 but does not satisfy condition (ii) of A1.
  4. satisfies condition (ii) of A1 but does not satisfy condition (i) of A1.
A
  1. satisfies condition (i) of A1 but does not satisfy condition (ii) of A1.
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14
Q

What is Descartes’ philosophical motivation for arguing for God’s reality?

  1. Descartes wants a guarantee that he is never being deceived.
  2. Descartes wants a guarantee that he is not dreaming whenever he thinks he’s awake.
  3. Descartes is considering the existential question of whether or not to be religious.
  4. Descartes wants a guarantee that anything he perceives vividly and clearly is true.
A
  1. Descartes wants a guarantee that anything he perceives vividly and clearly is true.
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15
Q

One premise in Descartes’ ontological argument is the following: “Existence is a perfection”. Which one of the following states what Descartes means by that premise?

  1. Existence is required for anything to be perfect.
  2. It is better for something to exist than not to exist.
  3. If something exists, then that thing is perfect.
  4. Existence makes perfect anything that has existence.
A
  1. Existence is required for anything to be perfect.
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16
Q

Descartes’ ontological argument in the Fifth Meditation is an argument that depends on

  1. facts about what is the best explanation of the existence of the physical world.
  2. facts about what is required to cause the idea of God.
  3. facts about the idea of God.
A
  1. facts about the idea of God.
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17
Q

In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes concludes that

  1. the essence of anything that is a body is extension, and body is indivisible.
  2. the essence of anything that is a mind is extension, and mind is indivisible.
  3. the essence of anything that is a body is extension, and body is divisible.
  4. the essence of anything that is a mind is thinking, and mind is divisible.
A
  1. the essence of anything that is a body is extension, and body is divisible.
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18
Q

According to the Fourth Meditation, which one of the following represents Descartes’ considered view about his own errors?

  1. They are mere negations in Descartes; therefore, Descartes is not blameworthy for them.
  2. They are the result of Descartes’ misusing his free will; therefore, God is not blameworthy for them.
  3. They are privations that are the inevitable result of God’s creating finite things such as Descartes.
  4. They are privations in God; therefore, God is blameworthy for them.
A
  1. They are the result of Descartes’ misusing his free will; therefore, God is not blameworthy for them.
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19
Q

According to Descartes’ conclusion in the Fourth Meditation, which one of the following expresses Descartes’ judgment about whether or not he can avoid erring?

  1. I cannot avoid erring occasionally, because God is a deceiver; but, I can avoid erring whenever I have a clear and distinct perception of the truth.
  2. Because the will God gave me is finite (and thus weaker than God’s will), I cannot avoid erring occasionally; but, I can avoid most errors by believing only what I clearly and distinctly perceive to be true.
  3. I can always avoid erring by keeping at the forefront of my consciousness the realization that there is a slight chance that an evil demon is deceiving me as much as it is possible for me to be deceived.
  4. Because the understanding God gave me is unlimited, I cannot avoid erring occasionally.
  5. I can avoid erring by withholding judgment on anything I don’t vividly and clearly perceive to be true.
A
  1. Because the will God gave me is finite (and thus weaker than God’s will), I cannot avoid erring occasionally; but, I can avoid most errors by believing only what I clearly and distinctly perceive to be true.
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20
Q

In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes argues as follows:

  1. If two things are identical, then they have all their properties in common.
  2. My mind has the property being not-doubtable by me to exist.
  3. My body does not have the property being not-doubtable by me to exist.
  4. If (2) and (3), then it is not the case that my mind and my body have all their properties in common.
  5. It is not the case that my mind and my body have all their properties in common. [2, 3, 4]
    C. It is not the case that my mind and my body are identical. [1, 5]

The objection, which we discussed in class, to this argument is that

  1. the argument is invalid.
  2. the argument fails the circularity test, because premise 2 is true only if the conclusion is true.
  3. premise 3 is false, because Descartes could not doubt that he had a body.
  4. premise 2 is false, because Descartes could doubt his own existence.
  5. the argument fails the circularity test, because premise 3 is true only if the conclusion is true.
A
  1. the argument fails the circularity test, because premise 3 is true only if the conclusion is true.
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21
Q

Descartes’ substance dualism is the view that

  1. we can know that we have a mind but we cannot know that we have a body.
  2. everything that exists is either a property of a bodily substance or a property of a mental substance
  3. there are only two kinds of things that exist: God and the evil demon.
  4. everything that exists is either a bodily substance or a mental substance.
A
  1. everything that exists is either a bodily substance or a mental substance.
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22
Q

In class we noted that Descartes’ ontological argument in the Fifth Meditation requires interpretation, because each of its premises is ambiguous. According to one disambiguated version, the argument is as follows:

  1. The idea of God is such that, in order for it to apply to a being, that being must be perfect in every way.
  2. Existence is required for anything to be perfect in every way.
    C. God exists.

The problem we noted in class with this argument is that

  1. the second premise is open to reasonable doubt.
  2. it is invalid.
  3. the first premise is open to reasonable doubt.
  4. it involves circular reasoning, because the first premise assumes the conclusion.
A
  1. it is invalid.
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23
Q

A theodicy is

  1. a list of the attributes of a god.
  2. a statement of one’s theological beliefs about the physical structure of the world.
  3. an explanation of why there is any error or evil in a world created by an infinite, perfect God.
  4. an argument for the conclusion that there is no God.
A
  1. an explanation of why there is any error or evil in a world created by an infinite, perfect God.
24
Q

Everything with representative reality has intrinsic reality.

  1. True
  2. False
A
  1. False
25
Q

Which one of the following expresses the correct ordering, starting from the most real (on the left) and moving to the least real (on the right), of the scale of “representative reality” that Descartes utilizes in his argument for God’s reality in the Third Meditation?

  1. infinite substance; finite substance; modes; nothingness
  2. nothingness; finite substance; modes; infinite substance
  3. modes; nothingness; finite substance, infinite substance
  4. nothingness; modes; finite substance; infinite substance
A
  1. infinite substance; finite substance; modes; nothingness
26
Q

Which of the following expresses Descartes’ view in the Fourth Meditation?

  1. God has created me with an infinite understanding and an infinite will.
  2. God has created me with an infinite understanding and a finite will.
  3. God has created me with a finite understanding and an infinite will.
  4. God has created me with a finite understanding and a finite will.
A
  1. God has created me with a finite understanding and an infinite will.
27
Q

In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes argues as follows:

  1. All material things are spatially extended.
  2. All spatially extended things are divisible things.
  3. All material things are divisible things [1, 2]
  4. The mind is an indivisible thing.
  5. If (4), then the mind is not a divisible thing.
  6. The mind is not a divisible thing. [4, 5]
    C. The mind is not a material thing. [3, 6]

We noted in class that our knowledge of multiple personality disorder (or, dissociative identity disorder) gives us some reason to think that

  1. the argument fails the circularity test, because premise 2 assumes the conclusion.
  2. premise 2 is false.
  3. premise 4 is false.
  4. the argument is invalid.
A
  1. premise 4 is false.
28
Q

Which one of the following principles of adequate reality does Descartes endorse in the Third Meditation?

  1. Any cause of an idea must have at least as much representative reality as the idea has intrinsic reality.
  2. Any cause of an idea must have at least as much intrinsic reality as there is representative reality in the idea.
  3. Any cause of an idea must have more representative reality than the idea has representative reality.
  4. Any cause of an idea must have more intrinsic reality than the idea has representative reality.
A
  1. Any cause of an idea must have at least as much intrinsic reality as there is representative reality in the idea.
29
Q

In the Third Meditation, Descartes supposes that he has found the distinguishing mark of knowing something for certain. What is it?

  1. realizing that one is not dreaming
  2. perceiving a proposition very vividly and clearly as true
  3. having some evidence for a proposition
  4. having a reason to think a proposition is true
A
  1. perceiving a proposition very vividly and clearly as true
30
Q

Descartes’ ontological argument in the Fifth Meditation uses the notion of an essential property. Accordingly, “X is an essential property of Y” if and only if

  1. Y could not exist without X.
  2. X is a sufficient condition for Y.
  3. X could not exist without Y.
A
  1. Y could not exist without X.
31
Q

In class we noted that Descartes’ ontological argument in the Fifth Meditation requires interpretation, because each of its premises is ambiguous. According to one disambiguated version, the argument is as follows:

  1. God, who is the topic of the idea of God, is a being perfect in every way.
  2. Existence is required for anything to be perfect in every way.
    C. God exists.

The problem we noted in class with this argument is that

  1. it fails the circularity test, because premise two assumes the conclusion.
  2. it fails the circularity test, because premise one assumes the conclusion.
  3. it is invalid.
  4. the second premise is open to reasonable doubt.
A
  1. it fails the circularity test, because premise one assumes the conclusion.
32
Q

The following argument is one interpretation of Descartes’ cosmological argument in the Third Meditation.

  1. I have an idea of God.
  2. Every idea has a cause.
  3. My idea of God has a cause. [1, 2]
  4. All causes must have at least as much intrinsic reality as their effects have representative reality.
  5. The cause of my idea of God must have at least as much intrinsic reality as my idea of God has representative reality. [3, 4]
  6. If (5), then God is the only possible thing with enough intrinsic reality to cause my idea of God.
  7. God is the only possible thing with enough intrinsic reality to cause my idea of God. [5, 6]
  8. If (7), then God exists.
    C. God exists. [7, 8]

Which objection shows that the argument above fails to prove its conclusion?

  1. Premise 6 is false, because Descartes has at least as much intrinsic reality as his idea of God has representative reality.
  2. Premise 5 is false, because Descartes has at least as much intrinsic reality as his idea of God has representative reality.
  3. The argument is invalid.
  4. Premise 4 is false, because some effects are not about anything at all.
A
  1. Premise 6 is false, because Descartes has at least as much intrinsic reality as his idea of God has representative reality.
33
Q

In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes concludes that external, physical objects

  1. do not exist.
  2. exist but are not exactly as they appear to him via his five senses.
  3. may or may not exist.
  4. exist and are exactly as they appear to him via his five senses.
A
  1. exist but are not exactly as they appear to him via his five senses.
34
Q

John Locke says that the identity of a substance across time consists in

  1. the continuous, uninterrupted existence of that substance across time.
  2. the continuous, uninterrupted existence of an immaterial soul across time.
  3. a slowly changing body across time along with a slowly changing self-concept involving one’s body across time.
  4. a relation of 1st person consciousness across time.
A
  1. the continuous, uninterrupted existence of that substance across time.
35
Q

Which one of the following best expresses John Locke’s definition of “person”?

  1. A person is any particular human being.
  2. A person is an immaterial, thinking soul substance that has the power of reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.
  3. A person is a thinking, intelligent being with reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.
  4. A person is a thinking, intelligent biological being with a particular human organizational structure of parts as expressed in its DNA.
A
  1. A person is a thinking, intelligent being with reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.
36
Q

John Locke says that human identity across time consists in

  1. the sameness of a human’s organizational structure of parts across time.
  2. the continuous, uninterrupted existence of a human’s physical parts across time.
  3. a relation of 1st person consciousness via memory across time.
  4. the continuous, uninterrupted existence of a person’s conscious immaterial soul across time.
A
  1. the sameness of a human’s organizational structure of parts across time.
37
Q

I have a clear, vivid memory experience of being on a fishing trip with my father when a pair of water moccasins (poisonous snakes) rose up out of the water in an attempt to eat some fish my father and I had recently caught. Several years after my remembered fishing trip, during a conversation with my parents, I mentioned this episode in my life. My father then said: “Son, you didn’t go on that fishing trip: that was your brother”, a claim that was later confirmed by my brother. My memory experience was

  1. an instance of veridical memory but not an instance of seeming memory.
  2. an instance of seeming memory and an instance of veridical memory.
  3. an instance of seeming memory but not an instance of veridical memory.
  4. neither an instance of seeming memory nor an instance of veridical memory
A
  1. an instance of seeming memory but not an instance of veridical memory.
38
Q

Whose theory best fits with our common-sense belief that a tree maintains its identity across time despite changes in its substance?

  1. Thomas Reid
  2. John Locke
A
  1. John Locke
39
Q

If Thomas Reid’s account of personal identity across time is correct, then person A at time1 is the same person as person B at a later time10 only if B has a memory of A’s first-person conscious experience.

  1. True
  2. False
A
  1. False
40
Q

According to Thomas Reid, the only kind of identity is the kind defined by John Locke as

  1. human identity
  2. substance identity
  3. personal identity
A
  1. substance identity
41
Q

Thomas Reid says that personal identity across time consists in

  1. a relation of 1st person consciousness via memory across time.
  2. the sameness of the organizational structure of one’s conscious brain across time.
  3. the continuous, uninterrupted existence of one’s divisible, conscious brain across time.
  4. the continuous, uninterrupted existence of the indivisible self across time.
A
  1. the continuous, uninterrupted existence of the indivisible self across time.
42
Q

What is the defect in the following argument?

  1. If some heavenly person in the future will veridically remember my current conscious experience, then that heavenly person in the future will be me.
  2. Some heavenly person in the future will veridically remember my current conscious experience.
    C. That heavenly person in the future will be me. [1, 2]
  3. It fails the circularity test, because premise 2 is true only if the conclusion is true.
  4. It fails the conclusive premises test, because we have good reason to doubt that premise 1 is true.
  5. It is invalid.
  6. It fails the circularity test, because premise 1 is true only if the conclusion is true.
A
  1. It fails the circularity test, because premise 2 is true only if the conclusion is true.
43
Q

Which slogan best expresses Gretchen Weirob’s theory of personal identity across time?

  1. same bundle of perceptions, same person
  2. same first-person consciousness, same person
  3. same soul, same person
  4. same slowly changing personal body, same person
A
  1. same slowly changing personal body, same person
44
Q

In class we noted that some Lockeans about personal identity across time have responded to Reid’s brave officer objection, by

  1. claiming that the old-man-made-a-General is not the same person as the young-boy-who-stole-from-the-orchard, because the old-man-made-a-General could not remember everything the young-boy-who-stole-from-the-orchard experienced.
  2. broadening the first-person consciousness relation to include not only direct memory of past experiences but also indirect memory of past experiences.
  3. claiming that Locke’s theory of personal identity across time is fine as it is, because contradictions can be true.
A
  1. broadening the first-person consciousness relation to include not only direct memory of past experiences but also indirect memory of past experiences.
45
Q

What is Thomas Reid’s explanation of why we say that a ship is the same ship across time even after a change in anchors, sails, and masts?

  1. We can tell that objects of sense such as a ship can remain the same across time even if some of its parts change across time.
  2. Because our language cannot afford a different name for every different material state of what we call the ship, we do it for the convenience of speech.
  3. The anchors, sails, and masts are not essential to the ship’s identity across time. The ship maintains its identity across time despite changes in its anchors, sails, and masts.
A
  1. Because our language cannot afford a different name for every different material state of what we call the ship, we do it for the convenience of speech.
46
Q

In A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Gretchen Weirob tells the following story:

Julia North’s body was badly mangled in a streetcar accident, but her brain was undamaged. At about the same time, Mary Frances suffered a massive stroke, which vitiated her brain but left the rest of her body undamaged. Surgeons replaced Mary Frances’ brain with Julia North’s brain, which carried with it Julia North’s mental states (including her memories, values, dispositions, etc.).

Who would John Locke say woke up from the surgery?

  1. A philosophical zombie (i.e., something that looks and acts human but actually has no conscious states)
  2. Neither Julia North nor Mary Frances but rather a new person
  3. Julia North
  4. Mary Frances
A
  1. Julia North
47
Q

According to John Perry’s A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, which of the following expresses Gretchen Weirob’s own view about life after death?

  1. There is no telling whether there is life after death; we’ll just have to wait and see.
  2. There is no personal life after death, because there are no persons to begin with.
  3. There is no personal life after death, because at death a person goes out of existence, never to exist again.
  4. There is personal life after death, because death does not destroy one’s immaterial soul.
A
  1. There is no personal life after death, because at death a person goes out of existence, never to exist again.
48
Q

Thomas Reid’s “brave officer objection”, to John Locke’s theory of personal identity across time, concludes that

  1. Reid’s theory of personal identity across time is true.
  2. Locke’s theory is faulty, because the boy who was flogged for stealing, the young officer who stole the enemy’s standard, and the old man made a general, are obviously the same person.
  3. Locke’s theory is faulty, because it implies that the old man made a general is, and is not, the same person as the boy who was flogged for stealing.
  4. Locke’s theory is faulty, because it wrongly implies that the the boy who was flogged for stealing, the young officer who stole the enemy’s standard, and the old man made a general, are the same person.
A
  1. Locke’s theory is faulty, because it implies that the old man made a general is, and is not, the same person as the boy who was flogged for stealing.
49
Q

In John Perry’s A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Gretchen Weirob claims that a proponent of the immaterial soul view of personal identity has no more reason to believe hypothesis H1 than to believe H2 or H3.

H1: a single soul has been associated with this body I call “mine” since birth.
H2: a single soul was associated with this body I call “mine” until 5 years ago, and then another soul, introspectively indistinguishable from the first, has been associated with this body I call “mine” ever since.
H3: every 5 years a new, introspectively indistinguishable soul takes over this body I call “mine”.

In class we evaluated Weirob’s claim as follows:

  1. We are in no position to make a reasonable judgment about Weirob’s claim.
  2. Weirob is correct: the reasons anyone could have for believing H1 or H2 or H3 are equally good.
  3. Weirob is incorrect: H1 is the simplest hypothesis among its rivals; thus, it is the most reasonable explanation among its rivals.
  4. Weirob is incorrect: one can tell by introspection that H1 is true.
A
  1. Weirob is incorrect: H1 is the simplest hypothesis among its rivals; thus, it is the most reasonable explanation among its rivals.
50
Q

Thomas Reid says that one’s best evidence for believing that one is the same person now as a person who existed in the past is

  1. the testimony of other people, such as one’s parents or friends.
  2. one’s belief that one has an immaterial soul.
  3. one’s memory of a past, first-person conscious experience.
  4. one’s belief that one has the same body as someone who existed in the past.
A
  1. one’s belief that one has an immaterial soul.
51
Q

In class we considered the following thought experiment:

Suppose that today you die suddenly and unexpectedly. One-thousand years after your death, a person comes into existence who both has the same mental states you have (i.e., has the same memories, values, preferences, etc., that you have) and whose bodily states are indistinguishable from yours the instant before your sudden, unexpected death.

Given his theory of personal identity across time, how would Thomas Reid respond to the following question: is the person described in the thought experiment the same person as you, or not?

  1. The thought experiment does not provide enough information to be able to tell whether or not that person one-thousand years from now is you.
  2. No, because a future person’s veridically remembering being you is not sufficient to make that future person the same person as you.
  3. Yes, because the thought-experiment story is impossible unless your soul is the same as the soul that informs the body of the person one-thousand years later.
A
  1. The thought experiment does not provide enough information to be able to tell whether or not that person one-thousand years from now is you.
52
Q

Which of the following does John Locke say confirms his theory of personal identity across time?

  1. There are no cases in which legal courts punish a man who cannot remember having committed a crime.
  2. Legal courts don’t punish a sane man for an insane man’s crime (even when they are the same man), because the sane man’s consciousness is disconnected from the insane man’s consciousness.
  3. Legal court decisions are based on whether a man’s immaterial soul can, or cannot remember, having committed a crime.
  4. Legal courts never punish a man when a lie detector test indicates that the man cannot remember committing a crime.
A
  1. Legal courts don’t punish a sane man for an insane man’s crime (even when they are the same man), because the sane man’s consciousness is disconnected from the insane man’s consciousness.
53
Q

John Locke’s theory of personal identity across time implies, and therefore requires, that you are a conscious, immaterial soul.

  1. True
  2. False
A
  1. False
54
Q

John Locke considers the following objection to his theory of personal identity across time: “But isn’t a man drunk and sober the same person? Why else is he punished for what he does when drunk, even if he is never afterwards conscious of it? He is just as much a single person as a man who walks in his sleep and is answerable, while awake, for any harm he did in his sleep.”

 Locke responds to the objection embedded in the quotation above, by arguing that
  1. The courts can justly punish a man who cannot remember what he did while drunk, because his bad actions can be proved against the man, whereas his lack of consciousness of his bad actions cannot be proved for the man.
  2. The courts cannot justly punish a man for what he did while drunk, because the total set of conscious states that he had when drunk is different than the total set of conscious states he has when he stands trial.
  3. The courts can justly punish a man who can’t remember what he did while drunk, because the man-when-drunk is the same person as the man-when-sober, even if the man-when-sober cannot remember anything that the man-when-drunk did.
  4. The courts never punish a man for what he does when drunk, because such a man is out of his mind.
A
  1. The courts can justly punish a man who cannot remember what he did while drunk, because his bad actions can be proved against the man, whereas his lack of consciousness of his bad actions cannot be proved for the man.
55
Q

In A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Gretchen Weirob tells the following story:

Julia North’s body was badly mangled in a streetcar accident, but her brain was undamaged. At about the same time, Mary Frances suffered a massive stroke, which vitiated her brain but left the rest of her body undamaged. Surgeons replaced Mary Frances’ brain with Julia North’s brain, which carried with it Julia North’s mental states (including her memories, values, dispositions, etc.).

Weirob says that she was offered the same surgery that Julia North had. Why did Weirob reject the offer?

  1. Weirob was deeply worried that the surgery would make her life extremely difficult psychologically, just as it was for Julia North.
  2. Weirob thought that the person who survived the surgery was neither Julia North nor Mary Frances.
  3. Weirob thought that no one survived the surgery.
  4. Weirob thought the person who survived the surgery was not Julia North but rather Mary Frances.
A
  1. Weirob thought the person who survived the surgery was not Julia North but rather Mary Frances.
56
Q

Suppose you had your brain transplanted into another human’s body. Gretchen Weirob thinks that its being your brain is irrelevant to whether the person after the brain transplant is you. What is her reason for thinking that?

  1. Although your brain is part of your body, your brain plays no role in your self-concept involving your body.
  2. Although your brain is part of your body, your consciousness does not inhere in your brain but rather in your immaterial soul.
  3. Although your brain is part of your body, your personhood does not consist in the same brain across time but rather in a bundle of perceptions across time.
  4. Although your brain is part of your body, your brain’s parts are constantly undergoing changes (as brain cells are replaced by new brain cells).
A
  1. Although your brain is part of your body, your brain plays no role in your self-concept involving your body.
57
Q

John Locke defines “person” as he does, because he considers

  1. the term “person” to be a forensic term having to do with the justice of praise/blame or reward/punishment.
  2. all non-humans as persons.
  3. the term “person” to provide a way to exclude psychopaths from having any right to life.
  4. all humans as persons.
A
  1. the term “person” to be a forensic term having to do with the justice of praise/blame or reward/punishment.

Phil230 (2 decks)

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