final Flashcards

Question

What is the difference between dissuasion, deterrence and compellence?

Answer 1

dissuasion can be viewed as a kind of “pre-deterrence” in which the target—which may be an opponent or even an ally—is discouraged, not from employing the military capabilities it possesses, but from creating such capabilities in the first place deterrence is about deterring your adversary from using any capabilities they already have compellence ???

Answer 2

An adversary’s perception of the estimated cost of developing or expanding a threatening capability can also be increased by diverting its available resource stream into higher priority areas. This indirect means of dissuasion was a central feature of the “competitive strategies” approach to long-term competition with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It is important to remember, however, that when crafting dissuasion strategies that impose costs on an adversary, it is necessary to do so in a way that keeps the rival in the competition, rather than driving him out. In this way dissuasion differs from deterrence, where the higher the cost, the better the deterrent.

Answer 3

technological - creation without thought conceptual - innovation to understand the purpose of the tech

Answer 4

because they had already developed a cohesive theory on the revolution of military affairs, which allowed them to use all of the developments of the US tech to their full advantage

Answer 5

they wouldn't be able to do the advancements that sensors brought without the sensor

Answer 6

you cannot have power on land if you do not have air supremacy

Answer 7

an integrated triad of (1) ground, air, and space reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition assets; (2) direct fire elements and deep-strike weaponry; and (3) advanced command-and-control that ensured the delivery of strikes close to real time.

Answer 8

there was an acute need to develop an architecture that would consolidate the reconnaissance systems with high precision, fire-destruction elements, linked through the command and control channels The manifestation of the new concept on the operational level was dubbed the reconnaissance strike complex (RUK) and its tactical expression known as the reconnaissance fire complex (ROK). This combination of sensors and weapons was designed to permit conduct of the war over much greater distances and with greater precision, coordination and pace than ever before.

Answer 9

Recent accounts of innovation in the civilian economy—the creation, commercialization (i.e., marketplace introduction), and diffusion of new goods, services, and organizational practices—commonly embody perspectives associated with Joseph Schumpeter and the phenomenon he described of “creative destruction,” in which newly produced goods and services sweep away their predecessors.

Answer 10

In the context of class, uncertainty represents an indeterminate future in which current weapons are being built. The uncertainty is the anticipated but ultimately unknown future.

Answer 11

For military systems, whether complex or simple, and likewise for commercial products, early design choices largely determine ultimate performance and costs. During preliminary design, engineers work though alternatives, which come in literally uncountable profusion. Some are kept, others discarded. Analytical tools offer limited support at this stage, which is open-ended and fluid. Because there are too many permutations to be explored with even the most powerful computer-based methods, designers rely, as they always have, on tacit know-how and experience-based judgment. As the design takes on more concrete form, it becomes increasingly difficult to revisit the overall concept for reasons including the risk that even the appearance of difficulty or delay could invite political attack. Yet once the overall “architecture” has been defined, no amount of analysis, modification, and refinement can salvage a deficient concept.

Answer 12

business vs technological risk assessment of risks and the projection of the future

Answer 13

The primary distinction between the commercial and defense industries lies in their approach to risk assessment. Commercial ventures benefit from market mechanisms that quickly resolve uncertainties surrounding innovation, while defense investments lack such immediacy, relying on actual combat tests to determine effectiveness. In the commercial sector, businesses primarily encounter market-driven risks, such as product success, competition, and consumer demand. In contrast, the defense industry deals with technological risks, involving the development and integration of complex systems fraught with uncertainties and technical challenges. According to John Alic, the main difference between the commercial industry and the defence industry is that the commercial industry regards technological risks as controllable while involving greater business risk, while the defence industry regards business risks as controllable while involving greater technological risk. In the context of US defence acquisition, the risks of technological failure are significantly higher due to the Department ofDefence’s (DoD) tendency to over-reach or impose incompatible requirements.

Answer 14

We have argued that the dramatic increase in the complexity of military technology observed over the twentieth century has signiªcantly shrunk the advantage of backwardness described by Gerschenkron. On the one hand, the requirements for imitating modern weapon systems have become harder to meet. On the other, the technological knowledge of how to design, develop, and produce modern weapon systems has become less likely to diffuse. As a result, compared to the pre–World War I period, today imitating foreign weapon systems is more difªcult. Countries cannot simply free ride on the research and development of the most advanced states: they ªrst have to develop the industrial, scientiªc, and technological capabilities required for becoming ªrst-tier weapons manufacturers; then, they must go through extensive trial and error to address the multitude of extremely small but challenging problems that weapons development entails.

Answer 15

Complexity generates incompatibilities and vulnerabilities. As complexity increases, the number and significance of incompatibilities and vulnerabilities also increase—exponentially. Anticipating, detecting, identifying, understanding, and addressing all possible technical problems when designing, developing, and manufacturing an advanced weapon system pose major challenges. Addressing them without creating new problems is an even greater challenge. More challenging still is the need for weapons producers to design platforms that can incorporate cutting-edge and yet-to-be-developed technologies, and to limit their vulnerability to subtle and effective enemy countermeasures and counter-systems.

Answer 16

The increase in technological complexity over the past 150 years has exponentially raised the requirements to assimilate and imitate foreign military technology, thus cancelling the first necessary condition for states to enjoy the advantage of imitation—relatively low entry barriers for the imitation of state-of-the-art weapon systems. To free-ride on the R&D of a foreign country, a country must be able “to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment.” But as scholarship from other disciplines shows, knowledge and experience are not public goods that can be easily and cheaply appropriated. An imitator must possess an adequate absorptive capacity: material and nonmaterial capabilities such as laboratories, research centers, testing and production facilities, a skilled workforce, and a cumulative technological knowledge base (the stock of knowledge acquired through previous projects).82 Without such absorptive capacity, the imitator will have to develop an advanced industrial, technological, and scientific base before it can copy foreign technologies.

Answer 17

By “specific,” we mean that the laboratories, research centers, testing and production facilities, skilled workforce, and the cumulative technological knowledge base developed for a particular type of production cannot be easily redeployed for assimilating and exploiting foreign know-how and experience in weapon systems.

Answer 18

tacit knowledge comes from lived experiences because it cannot be conveyed through writing etc

Answer 19

they “lag one to two generations behind leading international competitors, and the near-term prospects of narrowing this gap are poor.

Answer 20

the same country that created the F-22 would have to spend $10 billion to restart the production of its ªfth-generation ªghter—equivalent to 25 percent of the total procurement cost for 194 aircraft path dependency

Answer 21

In a jet engine, air is taken in and compressed, then fuel is added and combusted to heat the air, which then turns the rotor blades of a turbine. The hot exhaust is then expelled through a nozzle to create thrust

Answer 22

These turbine blades have had their surfaces etched with acid to reveal their inner structure. The pair at left are single crystals, whereas the pair in the middle are directionally solidified, with all the crystal boundaries going in one direction. The pair at right are made up of small crystal grains, with numerous boundaries. Blades of single crystal have significantly increased life spans under extreme temperature conditions. single crystal blades are difficult to produce because as the single-crystal structure forms, onedimensional heat conduction must be maintained as the mold is withdrawn from the temperature-controlled enclosure. Any heat conducted to the mold’s lateral surfaces can cause localized crystallization, which disrupts the single crystal structure with secondary grains.

Answer 23

They had let go basically everyone who had worked on it before, they didn't have the production capabilities anymore tacit knowledge + path dependence

Answer 24

A transistor is a type of semiconductor device that can be used to conduct and insulate electric current or voltage. It acts as a switch and an amplifier, allowing it to control or regulate the flow of electronic signals. A transistor is composed of semiconductor material, usually with at least three terminals for connection to an electronic circuit

Answer 25

A semiconductor is a material that has an electrical conductivity value falling between that of a conductor, such as copper, and an insulator, such as glass. Its resistivity generally falls as its temperature rises; metals behave in the opposite way.

Answer 26

A microchip is a small electronic device made up of multiple interconnected electronic components such as transistors, resistors, and capacitors, etched onto a small piece of semiconductor material, usually silicon. These components are used to perform specific functions, such as processing information, storing data, or controlling the flow of electrical signals.

Answer 27

The design and manufacturing processes have become extremely long, complex and costly, requiring ever more specialist equipment and knowledge. they power basically all tech these days

Answer 28

The core of our argument is that terrorist violence is a form of costly signaling. Terrorists are too weak to impose their will directly by force of arms. They are sometimes strong enough, however, to persuade audiences to do as they wish by altering the audience's beliefs about such matters as the terrorist's ability to impose costs and their degree of commitment to their cause. Given the conflict of interest between terrorists and their targets, ordinary communication or "cheap talk" is insufficient to change minds or influence behaviour

Answer 29

because they don't have the resources and are committed to committed atrocities to achieve their goals

Answer 30

Attrition Indimidation Provocation Spoiling Outbidding

Answer 31

Regime change Territorial change Policy change Social control Status quo maintenance

Answer 32

Ali used asymmetric strategies, and psychological torment to let the fight drag on and then deliver the final blow

Answer 33

This analysis suggests key policy implications for both weak and strong actors. Because indirect strategies such as GWS rely on social support, weak actors must work tirelessly to gain and maintain the sympathy or acquiescence of a majority of the population in question. Given the risks involved in either aiding or taking part in a guerrilla resistance, this in itself is no mean feat. Additionally, weak actors must have or gain access to the physical or political sanctuary necessary to make an indirect strategy a viable choice. For strong actors, the strategic interaction thesis suggests that weak adversaries employing an indirect defence will be difficult to defeat. The United States must be prepared to fight and win both conventional and asymmetric or “small” wars. The strategic interaction thesis shows why the two missions demand two kinds of armed forces: one to defend U.S. interests in conventional wars, and one to defend them in asymmetric wars. If the United States, in other words, is to win future “boxing matches” against light-weight opponents who use their own version of the rope-a-dope, it will need ªghters with more initiative than discipline, and more endurance than punching power.

Answer 34

Andrew Mack argues that an actor’s relative resolve or interest explains success or failure in asymmetric conflicts. In essence, the actor with the most resolve wins, regardless of material power resources. Mack contends that this resolve can be derived a priori by assessing the structure of the conflict relationship. Power asymmetry explains interest asymmetry: The greater the gap in relative power, the less resolute and hence more politically vulnerable strong actors are, and the more resolute and less politically vulnerable weak actors are. Big nations therefore lose small wars because frustrated publics (in democratic regimes) or countervailing elites (in authoritarian regimes) force a withdrawal short of military victory. This seems true of some conflicts but not of others.

Answer 35

In peacetime, a strong state may act as if its survival is at stake when it is not. Second, the operation of political vulnerability, which Mack uses to explain weak-actor success, presupposes a span of time. But nothing in the interest asymmetry thesis explains why some asymmetric conflicts end quickly, yet others drag on.16 Third, if the interest asymmetry thesis is right, there should be little or no variation over time in the distribution of asymmetric conflict outcomes when relative power is held constant.

Answer 36

Direct attack means the use of the military to capture or eliminate an adversary’s armed forces, thereby gaining control of that opponent’s values. The main goal is to win the war by destroying the adversary’s capacity to resist with armed forces. Both attrition and blitzkrieg are direct attack strategies. Barbarism is the systematic violation of the laws of war in pursuit of a military or political objective. Although this definition includes the use of prohibited weapons such as chemical and biological agents, its most important element is depredations against noncombatants (viz., rape, murder, and torture). Unlike other strategies, barbarism has been used to destroy an adversary’s will and capacity to fight. When will is the target in a strategic bombing campaign, for example, the strong actor seeks to coerce its weaker opponent into changing its behavior by inflicting pain (destroying its values). When will is the target in a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, the strong actor attempts to deter would-be insurgents through, for instance, a policy of reprisals against non-combatants. Strong actors can also target a weak actor’s capacity to sustain an insurgency by, for example, the use of concentration camps.

Answer 37

Direct defense refers to the use of armed forces to thwart an adversary’s attempt to capture or destroy values such as territory, population, and strategic resources. Like direct-attack strategies, these strategies target an opponent’s military. The aim is to damage an adversary’s capacity to attack by crippling its advancing or proximate armed forces. Examples include limited aims strategies, static defense, forward defense, defense in depth, and mobile defense. Guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS) is the organization of a portion of society for the purpose of imposing costs on an adversary using armed forces trained to avoid direct confrontation. These costs include the loss of soldiers, supplies, infrastructure, peace of mind, and most important, time. Although GWS primarily targets opposing armed forces and their support resources, its goal is to destroy not the capacity but the will of the attacker. GWS requires two elements: (1) physical sanctuary (e.g., swamps, mountains, thick forest, or jungle) or political sanctuary (e.g., weakly defended border areas or border areas controlled by sympathetic states), and (2) a supportive population (to supply ªghters with intelligence and logistical support, as well as replacements).

Answer 38

either rigorous or narrow, or broad and un rigorous it rests on proxies for war capability which are not necessarily representative and bias the theory they are imply mutually consistent policies and therefore cannot maximize technological sophistication and numerical preponderance simultaneously

Answer 39

Assessments focusing solely on materiel will radically overestimate well-equipped but poorly handled armies

Answer 40

Though influential, neither systemic nor dyadic technology theories have been extensively tested empirically. Offense-defense theory has long suffered from a lack of systematic empirical work. Official capability models are almost wholly untested empirically. Most models in widespread use by the Defense Department are far too complex for determinate testing: the Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s TACWAR model, for example, uses more than a thousand independent variables, almost none of which are included in standard historical databases, making systematic empirical work effectively impossible. Attempts to test simplified versions have been inconclusive; in more than a dozen studies dating back to the 1950s, the basic Lanchester equations have generally failed to correspond with available historical data, but since modern models use extended versions of the equations, this failure has usually not been considered decisive.

Answer 41

“state of the art” in the international system at any given time, rather than the particulars of individual states’ holdings. the difference between the era of the tank and the era of the horse, for example, is the key, not which side’s tanks are better than the other’s. Offense-defense theory is the best known of these views. It holds that changing technology shifts the relative ease of attack and defense (the “offense-defense balance”) for all states in the international system. Dyadic: if A enjoys a technological edge over B, then A prevails—whether A attacks or defends. Whereas systemic technology theorists see technology as favoring attack or defense across the international system, dyadic theorists see its chief effect as favoring individual states over others, depending on their particular holdings

Answer 42

The modern system is a tightly interrelated complex of cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit independent maneuver, and combined arms at the tactical level, and depth, reserves, and differential concentration at the operational level of war. Taken together, these techniques sharply reduce vulnerability to even twenty-first century weapons and sensors. Where fully implemented, the modern system damps the effects of technological change and insulates its users from the full lethality of their opponents’ weapons.

Answer 43

destructive fire is meant to kill, suppressive fire is not—it merely keeps the defender from firing while other attackers maneuver into position to kill. Defenders forced to duck, to cower in deep dugouts, or to reposition to an unspotted location cannot fire in the meantime, and thus their weapons, whatever their nominal lethality, are temporarily harmless. Suppression’s central advantage is its tremendous efficiency relative to destructive fires against dug-in targets: even in 1977, to destroy a dug-in infantry platoon required over forty rounds of 155 mm howitzer fire; to suppress the same position can require fewer than four. The destructive barrage at Messines in 1917 required 383,000 rounds per mile of front to pulverize the German trenches; the suppressive barrage at Amiens the following year used fewer than 43,000 per mile, or about 10 percent as many. This in turn restored surprise to the battlefield: suppression, unlike destruction, could be achieved without weeks-long bombardments that gave away the point of attack.

Answer 44

The modern system is a tightly interrelated complex of cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit independent maneuver, and combined arms at the tactical level, and depth, reserves, and differential concentration at the operational level of war.

Answer 45

Battle transparency refers to the openness and clarity of an organization’s or individual’s actions, decisions, and motivations during a conflict or competition. It involves being transparent about one’s goals, strategies, and methods, as well as the reasoning behind them. This can include sharing information about the decision-making process, the data used to inform those decisions, and the potential biases or conflicts of interest that may influence those decisions.

Answer 46

two-way voice communications real-time striking known locations - maximum speed lots of practice mock jamming drills not going after any target unnecessarily

Answer 47

It is the result of concomitant developments in electronics, materials, and propulsion that have brought about dramatic improvements in detection, communication, precision, and destruction. The resulting unforgiving lethality, in turn, has led to a hider-finder competition between air forces and air defenses, which entails hiding from enemy sensors while finding enemy targets. This hider-finder competition rewards those who can masterfully employ the tactics, techniques, procedures, technologies, and capabilities that limit exposure to enemy fire while successfully detecting and targeting the enemy. In comparison to land warfare, the modern system of force employment is much more challenging in air warfare, for both air defense and even more for air penetration.

Answer 48

the lethality of air warfare has led to a “hider-finder” competition between air defense and air penetration. This competition imposes high costs on those who fail to master the set of tactics, techniques, procedures, technologies, and capabilities necessary to limit exposure to enemy fire and to detect enemy targets—borrowing on Biddle’s work, we call it the modern system of force employment in air warfare. Rather than representing a rupture with the past, our framework suggests that drones are part of the evolution of air warfare, whose fundamental principle remains to avoid exposure to enemy fire. We maintain that drones do not by themselves produce the revolutionary effects that many have attributed to them.

Answer 49

Air defense must detect, locate, identify, track, and, if needed, engage intruders, while avoiding being degraded by an enemy’s cyber and electronic countermeasures (e.g., hacking, jamming, or spoofing) and being targeted by an enemy’s suppression of enemy air defense assets. Detecting targets while avoiding detection is very challenging for two sets of reasons.

Answer 50

tech needs are greater its harder to hide in the sky

Answer 51

The modern system of force employment is even more daunting for penetrating aircraft than for air defense. Critically, the air domain does not offer opportunities for cover from enemy. Because aircraft can tolerate little structural damage, they need to avoid detection altogether. Moreover, in contrast to the land domain, the air domain offers only limited opportunities for concealment. To radar systems, aircraft appear significantly different from the background in which they operate, the sky. As a result, penetrating aircraft are generally easier to detect and target than land-based air defense systems because of the differences between their surrounding environments—simple for aircraft and complex for ground-based systems. Finally, air penetration is heavily dependent on technologies that reduce an aircraft’s exposure to enemy firepower, both for limiting detection and for avoiding interception once detected

Answer 52

air defense requires advanced technologies for detecting, locating, identifying, tracking, and engaging enemy aerial intruders—such as early-warning and target acquisition radars, as well as antiaircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles

Answer 53

Specifically, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms must detect and locate an enemy’s air defense outposts and share the latter’s exact coordinates in a timely manner with mission planners. In this way, mission planners can identify path profiles that minimize the risk for penetrating aircraft, by either exploiting existing gaps in radar coverage or creating them through suppression of enemy air defense systems and electronic warfare assets that target and degrade critical nodes in the enemy’s network

Answer 54

cyberattacks to interfere with either the whole defense network or part of it, decoys and spoofing to deceive radars, jamming to degrade radars and communications, specific tactics such as flying at very low altitude to delay or reduce the chance of detection, and suppression assets to destroy radars or to force them to limit emissions and/or to relocate

Answer 55

to deceive an enemy’s air defense systems into activating their acquisition radars and thus revealing their positions, which allows suppression assets to detect and target them

Answer 56

airland battle

Answer 57

Anti-radiation missiles are guided missiles designed to detect and home in on an enemy radio emission source, typically targeting enemy radar systems. They are employed to identify and neutralize sources of enemy radio emissions, primarily used against enemy radar systems.

Answer 58

The purpose of EW is to deny the opponent the advantage of—and ensure friendly unimpeded access to—the EM spectrum. EW can be used to attack an enemy’s ability to use the EM spectrum, disrupt their communication and radar systems, and gain an advantage in battle. frequency-hopping and low-probability-of-intercept capabilities “to see without being seen for electronic countermeasures to be effective, they need to be more advanced than the enemy’s electronic countermeasures, which entails taking part in a never-ending technological race

Answer 59

to achieve air supremacy

Answer 60

use the resources not stupidly

Answer 61

use early warning aircraft/systems not super precise succession of different systems redundancy

Answer 62

integrated air defence systems multiple radar systems that compensate for each-others weaknesses/blind spots

Answer 63

to detect objects early track and finish the kill chain of stealth tech

Answer 64

the electronic counter-countermeasures are effectiuve to the point where you need to counter them as well

Answer 65

to know who you're looking at

Answer 66

you need to be able to communicate effectively at an operational level need backups

Answer 67

superior leadership, organization, tactical adroitness, adaptability front and back radars

Answer 68

In summary, early warning radar is designed for strategic surveillance and detection, while fire control radar is focused on precise tracking and guidance for weapon systems.

Answer 69

limitations to airspace availability typically made for high predictability on the part of attacking NATO aircraft, and prohibitions against collateral damage frequently prevented the use of the most tactically advantageous attack headings they did not get the clearance to hit them

Answer 70

a bowtie - typical reduced rcs signature type The hypothetical signature type may still be smaller in front and rear aspects,and larger from the side.That would form something like a Bowtie,as shown at left. To capture this concept in simplified form,the theoretical Bowtie shape has a 15 dBSM reduction in RCS over front and rear aspects. packman - front-aspect reduction The Pacman signature type is a simplified approximation of a conventional aircraft that has been retrofitted to reduce its signature in the front aspect only fuzzball - theoretical signature type The Fuzzball shape is a theoretical signature that is reduced evenly,from all angles. It is representative of the magnitude of detection reductions that are possible with a perfect shape—a perfect shape that probably would not conform to any actual aircraft design.

Answer 71

In practical terms, this means an LO aircraft can reduce its RCS for early warning radars. But it may great‑ ly reduce the RCS for fire control radars that direct SAM shots, for example. This difference means that although the enemy air defense network may know a stealth aircraft is present, the network may not have the means to track and engage it with fire control radars.

Answer 72

trickingthe defence system to show itself