Final Flashcards

1
Q

What is international security?

A

The amalgamation of measures taken by states, IOs and other actors that affect the mutual survival and safety including military action and diplomatic agreements
An issue at the core of security is political violence

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2
Q

Describe the typology of political violence

A

State vs non state
Perpetrator vs target

Target:state perp:state = interstate war
Target:non state perp:state = state repression, genocide, ethnic cleansing
Target:state perp:non state = organized crime, military coup, mass protests, civil war, terrorism, political assassination
Target:non state perp:non state = inter communal violence, political assassination

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3
Q

What are interests and national interests

A

What actors want to achieve through political action: their preferences over outcomes that might result from their political choices
Interests attributed to the state itself, usually security and power

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4
Q

Rational actor approaches to decision making = assumptions?

A

Actors are purposive: they behave with the intention of producing a desired result
Actors adopt strategies to obtain desired outcomes given what they believe to be the interests and likely actions of others
Rationality refers to the instrumental process of decision making not the goals or preferences that actors adapt to their estimates of success

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5
Q

What is coercion?

A

The threat or imposition of costs to get an actor- a state, a leader of state, a terrorist group, a transnational or international organization, a private actor- to do something it does not want to do
cooperation - positive sum
barganing - negative o zero sum

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6
Q

What is compellence

A

An effort to change the status quo through the threat of force
A compelling threat is used to coerce the target state into making a concession or changing policy

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7
Q

What is deterrence

A

Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy the fear to attack

An effort to preserve the status quo by threatening the other side with unacceptable costs if it seeks to alter the current relationship

Deterrence by denial
Deterrence by punishment

Rationality
Means perception and communication
Credibility

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8
Q

What is nuclear deterrence theory and what are its 3 elements

A

Developed between 1952-1966 by political scientists, economists, military strategists, other scientists, mostly at RAND corporation
Driven by Cold War and fears of nuclear Armageddon
1. precarious
2. its devastating
3. mutually assured destruction

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9
Q

What is a solution to deterrence credibility

A
  1. Burning bridges and irrevocable commitment
  2. Introduce illogic and uncertainty
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10
Q

Rebellion and public goods

A

Rebel groups typically claim public good as their goals like secession, autonomy, democratization, and redistribution appearing to be the most common

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11
Q

What is the rebels dilemma

A

For rebellions to successfully organize individuals have to participate
Participation is a costly
If the rebellion succeeds everyone should benefit from the system change even those who don’t participate
There is strong incentive to free ride and reap the benefits of others

This makes the rebel organization difficult

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12
Q

How can you overcome the rebels dilemma?

A

Increase costs of nonparticipation
Change material incentives to participate
Ideology
Rebel institutions or self government introducing hierarchy

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13
Q

How do we get from rebellion to civil conflict

A

Involves the state and at least one organized and armed non state actor
A contested incompatibility that concerns government and or territory where the use of armed force reaches a certain threshold

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14
Q

Types of conflict and their goals

A

Territorial
Separatist: non state actor wants to separate a territory to form an independent state
Irredentist: non state actor wants to detach a territory from one country and reunite it with the territory of another country
Governmental
Nonstate actors try to seize control of the government

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15
Q

Types of warfare

A

Conventional: military technologies between state and non state actors are symmetric. Non Tate actors can directly confront the state

Irregular: asymmetric military capabilities that privilege the state. Non state actors can challenge and harass the state but lack the capacity to confront in a direct and formal way

Symmetric and non conventional: both sides lack advanced military capabilities

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16
Q

What is bargaining theory

A

It’s about how to divide the object of dispute
There is only win or lose
The existence of a bargaining range implies both players should always have an incentive to locate peaceful settlements that avoid the cost of war
independent of conflict type
neither side is assured victory

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17
Q

What are the 3 solutions to the bargaining puzzle

A

1 incomplete information
Probability of winning or losing
Costs of fighting
How big is the pie
2 commitment problems
it is future proof?
3 indivisibility
All or nothing

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18
Q

How to avoid war according to bargaining model

A

Raising the cost
Increasing transparency
Providing outside enforcement of commitments
Dividing apparently indivisible goods
Raising the utility of peace

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19
Q

When do wars end in bargaining model?

A

Is utility of war is less than of peace
In information asymmetry: war reveals information
Commitment problem: belief that deal will stick

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20
Q

What states fight over

A

Most are about Territory
National policy
Regime type

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21
Q

Militarized interstate disputes

A

A set of interactions between or among nations involving
The threat to use force
The display of force
The actual use of military force

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22
Q

Leaders vs national interest

A

Leaders may have private incentives that diverge from the national interest
Diversionary theory of war: war instigated by a country’s leader in order to distract its population from their domestic strife

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23
Q

democratic peace theory

A

Pairs of democracies are less likely to fight than other pairs of states

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24
Q

Normative explanations to democratic peace

A

Democratic norms promote compromise rather than the elimination of opponents
Non democracies exhibit norms in which political conflicts are more likely to be resolved thorough violence and coercion
To guard against exploitation and to ensure their own survival democracies employ non democratic norms in their relations with non democracies

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25
Q

Institutional explanations of democratic peace

A

Democracies are characterized by institutional constraints

Because wars are costly, wars are generally unpopular among publics
In democracies leaders are generally more reliant on public support than non democracies are
Democracies are less able to bluff because of information and audience costs

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26
Q

Elements of audience costs theory

A

Domestic political audience has the means and incentives to coordinate to punish the leader

Domestic actors view backing down after having made a threat as worse than conceding without having made a threat in the first place

Outsiders are able to observe the possibility of domestic sanctions from backing down

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27
Q

What is delegation

A

An act where one person or group called a principal relies on another person or grew up called an agent to act on the principals behalf

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28
Q

Agency loss

A

Describes the difference between the perfect and actual outcome from delegation. Agency loss occurs from conflicting preferences incomplete information and lack of enforcement mechanisms

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29
Q

Two main problems with principal agent

A

Adverse selection
Problem: information asymmetry between agent and principal
Solutions: ex ante mechanisms
Screening signaling contract design

Moral hazard/agency slack
Problem: divergent preferences may incentivize the agent to act inappropriately
Solution: ex post mechanisms
Sanctions

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30
Q

What is terrorism

A

Highly contested

Ineluctably political in aims and motives
Violent or equally important threatens violence
Designed to have far reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target

Conducted by either an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced motivated or inspired by the ideological aims of examples of s9me existent terrorist movement and or its leaders

Perpetrated by a sub national group or non state entity

Some argue that the target of violence has to be civilians or non combatants while others relax this

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31
Q

Strategy vs tactic

A

Strategy: high level plan to achieve one or more goals under conditions of uncertainty and finite resources

Tactic: a conceptual action implemented as one or more specific tasks

32
Q

Terrorism : attrition

A

Convince an enemy of one’s power or resolve to demonstrate capacity and resilience

33
Q

Terrorism : intimidation

A

Coerce the population by use of force in order to prevent them from siding with the enemy or coerce the population into pressuring the government to concede

34
Q

Terrorism : provocation

A

Provoke the government into an excessive reaction in order to demonstrate that the government is evil thereby garnering public support

35
Q

Terrorism : spoiling

A

Derail or prevent a peace process that embodies an unfavourable settlement by convincing the target that moderates cannot be trusted

36
Q

Terrorism : outbidding

A

Demonstrate real one to one’s own population vis a vis rivaling factions/organizations in order to gain support

37
Q

What is state repression

A

deterrence is at the core of repression
The actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization within the territorial jurisdiction of the state for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personal practices or institutions

Excludes broader understandings of violence: structural, economic, social
Focus on physical sanctions of personal interfaith and political rights

38
Q

Why do states respond coercively

A

Governments are motivated to remain in power
They are willing to take action to increase their own strength and decrease the threat
It’s just one tool

39
Q

Selectorate theory

A

Leaders care about staying in office
Staying in office requires a winning coalition
Winning coalition is a share of the selectorate
Selectorate is a subset of all citizens

In a democracy winning is half the Selectorate
In an autocracy the winning coalition is very small because the Selectorate is very small

Leaders with large winning coalitions are more interested in broad support of the population
Leaders with small winning coalitions are more interested in keeping small circles of elites happy and the rest quiet

40
Q

Cooptation vs repression

A

It’s an alternative choice
Intentional extension of benefits in exchange for loyalty
Patronage
Institutions that draw rivals into the regime apparatus
Helps keep enemies close and anticipate and correctly estimate threats

41
Q

Repression in democracies

A

Targets: perceived outsiders and minorities are most at risk
Methods: hard to detect methods less visible victims
Accountability: blame shifting
Delegation: outsourcing repression to militias private etc

42
Q

What is a civilian

A

Anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or of an organized armed group

43
Q

What is violence against civilians

A

Broadly any acts that though the use of force, harm, or damage civilians or civilian targets including lethal as well as non lethal forms of violence

44
Q

What is genocide

A

The promotion execution and or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal political, or politicized ethnic group

45
Q

What is ethnic cleansing

A

A purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas

Not recognized independent crime under international law

46
Q

What are mass killings

A

Defined as the intentional killing of a massive number of non-combatants
A massive number is defined as at least 50,000 intentional deaths over the course of five years or less

47
Q

One sided violence

A

Civilians that are deliberately and directly targeted by governments or non state groups

48
Q

selective vs indiscriminate violence

A

Selective: targets are chosen on the basis of individualized suspicion
Indiscriminate: targeting is not based on individualized suspicion

49
Q

What explains violence against civilians in interstate wars

A

Desperation: in protracted wars, civilian victimization is a tactic that inflicts costs on non-combatants to coerce an armed actor to cease fighting
Conquer and annex: where civilians share nationality of the enemy in areas a belligerent wishes to annex, violence against civilians is intended to crush local subversion and force mass eviction

50
Q

What are the three warfare strategies in violence against civilians

A

Draining the sea
Purposive oh employed military strategy to physically disrupt if not eliminate civilian supports if the enemy

Control coercion punishment
Shape civilian behaviour indirectly through violence that encourages denunciations and collaboration from oppressed civilians and deters collaboration with the enemy

Selective violence
Collaboration and denunciation provides information used to selectively target civilians
Controlled areas experience more selective violence

51
Q

The commanders dilemma

A

Create a fighting force that is capable of great unhesitatingly violence
Maintain control over the level forms and targeting of violence
Armed group institutions can help align preferences of combatants and commanders
Political education and strong consistent institutions helps explains restraint exercised by armed groups

52
Q

What is a cyber attack

A

Deliberate actions to alter disrupt deceive degrade or destroy computer systems or networks or the information and or programs resident in or transiting these systems of networks

53
Q

Key features of cyber attacks

A

No direct attack on target: damage caused by attack on computer/information
No physical limitation: one attack can reach multiple targets
Attacks by exploiting vulnerabilities in systems
Use and lose code

54
Q

A typology of cyber attacks

A

Availability attacks: aimed at affecting the availability of a network

Confidentiality attacks: attacks aimed at gaining access to networks in order to monitor activities and withdraw information

Data integrity attacks: aimed at gaining access to networks in order to manipulate or sabotage information

55
Q

3 conventional beliefs about cyber warfare

A
  1. Asymmetry
    Low entry barrier for weak actors
    Offensive capabilities are easy to procure and open source intelligence social media are readily available for all actors
    Anonymity can protect weak actors
    Advanced industrial eco monies are more online and this have more vulnerabilities
  2. Offensive dominance
    Cyber attacks are easier than cyber defence
    Few security considerations in the design of the internet
    With growing networks offensive capabilities grow faster than defensive capabilities
    Attacks will be faster than defence can detect and patch vulnerabilities
  3. Deterrence failure
    Nuclear deterrence works because attacks fear counter attacks
    Attribution of attacks extremely slow and complex
    If attribution is not accurate, assured retaliation will be hard to implement
    Prerequisite for successful deterrence: ability to disclose military capabilities
    Since cyber attacks build on the targets vulnerability, signalling credible ability of attacks may disclose enough information for the target to neutralize the attack
56
Q

Cyber operations as subversion

A

Unlike warfare or diplomacy, subversion relies on exploitation of vulnerabilities
Strength: reliance on secrecy and indirect reliance on the enemy’s systems

For cyber operations to work
1. Identification of vulnerabilities
2. Exploitation without detection
3. Establishment of access and controls without detection
4. Maintain control to achieve outcome

57
Q

How do information operations act as regime activism

A

Counter mobilization
Economic performance, nationalism, anti western ideology

Discourse framing
Overwhelming, discrediting, demoralizing, Astro turfing

Preference divulgence
Surveillance, network analysis, opinion polling

Elite coordination
Responsiveness to bolster legitimacy

58
Q

Toblers first law of geography

A

Everything is related to everything else but near things are more related than distant things

59
Q

What is the conflict trap

A

Conflict begets conflict
The same countries tend to be afflicted over and over again
Many conflicts are directly related to previous conflict in the same location or between the same actors

60
Q

Galtons problem

A

Clustering could be due to

Common shock
Because of interdependence (conflict diffusion)

61
Q

Negative vs positive diffusion

A

Positive externalities induce strategic substitution relations
- negative interdependence

Negative externalities induce strategic complements
- positive interdependence

62
Q

What are the mechanisms of diffusion

A

Competition
- races to top or bottom
Coercion
- dominant actors directly coerce weaker actors
Learning
- adopting policies with beneficial outcomes
Emulation
- norms, social knowledge, social construction
Transnational actors

63
Q

How could refugees have mechanisms leading to conflict

A

Direct fighting
- refugee flows may imply the direct importation of combatants arms and ideologies

Indirect support
- rather than fighting openly, refugee populations can provide resources and support to domestic opposition groups or similar ethnicity or political faction

Changing balance of power
- can change ethnic balance
- minority groups may feel that the influx of foreigners further dilutes their strength

Refugees as a threat
- may lose an actual or perceived negative economic externalities
- immigrants compete with locals over scarce resources

64
Q

Principles of peacekeeping

A

Consent of the parties
Impartiality
Non use of force except in self defence and defence of the mandate

65
Q

Generations of peacekeeping

A
  1. Non violent
    Main tasks: monitoring borders, establishing buffer zones between conflict parties
  2. Included military and or police
    Beyond safeguarding: temporary security presence
  3. Permission to use force to defend mandate
    Monitor and assist human rights and elections
    Training police forces
    Demobilization, disarmament, reintegration of combatants
    Normative objectives (consent is less important)
  4. Brahimi report
    More strategic operations
    More resources and staff
    Rejection of too small understaffed dysfunctional operations
66
Q

Why could peace fail

A

Aggression
Fear
Accident
Exclusion

67
Q

Why do individuals rebel?

A

fear - loss of life
oppression
social norms
dissatisfaction with the status quo
relative deprivation of political opportunity

68
Q

ex post inefficiency of war

A

in theory they should never go to war, they should always find a peaceful settlement

69
Q

the process model

A

defines that war is the product pf escalation. This starts with the context, historical or setting, which may define a conflict of interest, which starts a dispute, which may escalate to a militarised interstate dispute (MID). Threat, then mobilization of forces (display) and then to actually use of force (if death goes beyond 1000 then it’s war)

most interactions do not escalate to war

70
Q

why delegate?

A

Delegation allows principals to benefit from expertise and abilities of others
- Efficiency gains associated with specialization
Cost saving device
Delegation avoids direct accountability

71
Q

In armed conflict, when does the ‘substitution’ argument predict more sexual
violence to be used by combatants?

A

It occurs when there are no female combatants

72
Q

what does the traditional view of female presence in combatant groups

A

that if they are there then the men are less likely to commit acts of sexual violence because of shame

73
Q

what is the selection argument of female presence in combatant groups

A

belligerent types of people chose to be in these groups and actively seek out this violence

74
Q

what is the combatant socialization argument of female presence in combatant groups

A

regardless, if there is low social cohesion there will be acts committed to raise morale, ties etctetc

75
Q

explain the strategic subversion dilemma of cyber attacks

A

speed, intensity, control

76
Q

what are the 4 recommendations from the brahimi report

A

primacy of politics
responsive operations
strategic partnerships
field focused and people centered