Final Flashcards

1
Q

Zuckerberg test for demand futility

A

Demand excused as futile if at least half of demand board answers yes to ANY of the following:
-Director PERSONALLY and MATERIALLY benefit from alleged misconduct?
-SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY that director would FACE LIABILITY for any claims in demand?
-LACKS INDEPENDENCE from someone who personally/materially BENEFITTED or someone substantially likely to FACE LIABILITY
-lacks independence = material ties to person that raises doubts about impartiality

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2
Q

If board creates SLC to dismiss derivative, apply Zapata two step test

A

1) Board has burden to prove committee’s:
-INDEPENDENCE (neither interested nor dependent)
-interested: will receive something from committee’s action that other shareholders will not
-dependent: beholden to interested party or so under their influence that their judgment cannot be trusted
-GOOD FAITH
-INFORMED/reasonable investigation
2) if met, then court can apply their own business judgment

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3
Q

Promoters generally liable for Ks they enter into on corps behalf before incorporation UNLESS

A

1)de facto:
-statute that made incorp possible
-colorable attempt to comply with statute
-use or exercise of corp privilege
2)Corp by estoppel
- third party doing business with Corp is estopped from denying existence if they treated Corp as if it existed
i. Both parties to the contract reasonably believed the corporation existed at the time they signed the agreement;
ii. Both parties reasonable relied on the corporation’s existence (by entering into the contract, this is always true); and
iii. Justice requires that the corporation be held liable on the contract rather than the promoters

3) parties contract otherwise
—Promoter was negotiating an option which corp was free to accept or reject once formed
—Promoter binds themselves to the K, with the understanding once the company is formed it will take his place and relieve him of liability - most likely
—Promoter bind himself personally to the K and hopes corp will indemnify
—Promoters are promising to form new corp, which will ratify the agreement

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4
Q

Veil piercing

A

-fraud/illegality OR
-alter ego
1) single economic entity
—obey Corp formalities?
—used as personal bank account
—undercapitalized
2) element of injustice or unfairness

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5
Q

Firing directors GR + exceptions

A

Directors can be fired with or without cause by majority of shares at any time for any reason UNLESS exceptions apply
-staggered board
-classified stock
-cumulative voting

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6
Q

Unocal trigger

A

Defensive measures/protection devices against hostile takeover

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7
Q

Unocal rules

A

Before BJR presumption can apply to board’s actions, must pass intermediate scrutiny of Unocal.
-board must show
1) reasonable grounds for believing threat to corporate policy or effectiveness
2) AND response proportionate to the threat

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8
Q

Types of Unocal threats

A

-opportunity loss
-substantive coercion
-structural coercion
-good faith + reasonable investigation + reasonableness of conclusion that threat exists

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9
Q

Opportunity loss

A

When a hostile offer threatens to deprive shareholder of chance to take a better deal offered by board or third party

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10
Q

Structural coercion

A

Hostile offer is structured to create a stampeding effect, with two tier front loader offer

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11
Q

Substantive coercion

A

Inadequate price/SH refuse to believe management assurances that company is worth more than hostile acquirer is offering

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12
Q

If no hostile offer

A

Directors have burden to show good faith and reasonable investigation showing reasonableness of conclusion that threat exists

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13
Q

Proportional response test

A

Met when measures are not DRACONIAN, meaning not coercive and not preclusive
-coercive: force SH to take management sponsored alternative
-preclusive: prevents SH from receiving all tender offers
IF either is true, fails Unocal.
If not draconian, apply range of reasonableness test

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14
Q

Range of reasonableness test

A

If not draconian, was response within the board’s statutory power?
If yes, was response proportional to the threat?
If passes Unocal = BIR
If flunks = board action Invalid

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15
Q

14a-9 proxy statements

A

Prohibits any
1)MISREPRESENTATION or OMISSION
—omission of info necessary to make included statement not misleading or correct a statement that has become misleading
2)made w/ scienter (intent/knowledge)
3)reliance causing damage
—met when materiality is proven
4)materiality if misrep/omission
—material when info a reasonable investor would want to know when making investment decision
5) in a proxy statement

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16
Q

10b-5 GR (insider trading)

A

Bars fraud using interstate commerce, the mails, or nat’l securities exchange in connection with purchase or sale of securities

17
Q

10b-5 insider trading elements (about omission)

A

1)purchase or sale of security
2)made in interstate commerce, mails, or nat’l securities exchange that involved
3) OMISSION (duty to speak)
4) of a material fact
5) made w/ scienter
6) reliance/causation

18
Q

Insider trading omission rule

A

Omissions are only fraudulent when there is a duty to speak. A duty to speak comes from a fiduciary duty to keep the information secret and not use it for personal gain.

19
Q

Theories of fiduciary duties: Classic

A

Classic fiduciary duty of officers, directors, 10% shareholders as insiders of company’s stock they purchased

20
Q

Temporary insider

A

Someone working for Corp and given confidential information for corporate purpose

21
Q

Misappropriation

A

• Misappropriates info for securities trading purposes
• for PERSONAL GAIN
• in breach of a duty owed to the SOURCE of the info. To show fiduciary duty, must show:
o Receiver agreed to keep the information confidential OR
o that her relationship with discloser implied a confidential agreement
—history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences”
—family relationship

22
Q

Tipper/tippee

A

if person did not trade, most they can be is tipper
-tipper provides tipee with secret material information
-in violation of tipper’s fiduciary duty to source of material/company that tippee purchased stock in
-tipper personally benefits from disclosure
—Personal benefit defined broadly, includes solidifying a business relationship, enhancing the tipper’s reputation, and even a personal gift.
-tippee liable if knows that tipper violated duty and they traded anyways

23
Q

10b-5 false statement elements

A

-false
-material statement
-made w/ scienter
-in connection w/ purchase or sale of security
-causation/reliance
—causing loss to buyer/seller who reasonably relied on falsity

24
Q

10b-5 causation/reliance

A

P must prove two kinds of causation
-transaction causation: misrep caused to transact
-loss causation: misrep caused the loss

Reliance argument
-fraud on the market theory/presumption: when falsity is publicly released to market, there is presumption that shareholders relied on statement by relying on integrity of market price

25
Q

Staggered board exception

A

Require Cause
-behaviors harming Corp
-procedural reqs: notice to director of the charges and opportunity to respond

26
Q

Classified stock exception

A

-director elected by a certain class of stock can only be removed WITHOUT CAUSE by that class of stock
-if shareholders outside class want to fire, need CAUSE + majority vote

27
Q

Cumulative voting

A

-Minority elected director can only be fired with CAUSE + majority vote
-if the amount of shares voting to keep director (voting no) would be enough to elect the director in actual election then they are a minority director

28
Q

SH power to pass bylaws

A

Limited power to pass bylaws.
Cannot pass bylaws that cause directors to violate fiduciary duty
Can pass:
-advisory/precatory bylaws
-mandatory bylaws that are procedural
—concerning the process by which the corporation makes decisions and the creation of officer positions and how they are selected

29
Q

Requirements for SH proxy proposal

A

-owned at least either $2,000 or 1% of a company’s stock for at least one year
Exceptions apply to keep proposals out
-SH

30
Q

Exceptions to keep shareholder proposals off proxy

A

a. Improper subject for shareholder action under state law
1. Board deals with substance
2. Shareholder deals with mandatory process or precatory substance
—-Exception: but precatory resolutions may get in “board requests”
b. Causes board to violate fiduciary duties
c. Economic irrelevance: if the proposal relates to less than 5 percent of the company’s assets, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales
i. But socially significant proposals may get in anyway if related to the company’s business (Lovenheim)
ii. Sufficiently related to what company does
d. Ordinary business operations
i. Not important enough to bother shareholders with
1. Ex. What kind of staples using in office, time factories open
e. Proposal would cause corporation to violate state, federal or foreign law

31
Q

SH records requests

A

DE s 220 provides that shareholders have access to the corporation’s
books and records for a proper purpose. —A purpose is considered proper if it is reasonably related to the
shareholder’s interest as a shareholder.
—when a shareholder has both a
proper and improper purpose for asking, the proper purpose is sufficient to
establish to the information request.
—if request is for shareholder list, burden is on Corp to show improper purpose. For everything else, burden is on SH

32
Q

Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH)

A

Three different definitions of efficient
1. Weak: market is a random walk – share prices include all information about past share prices (v)
2. Semi-strong: share prices include all publicly available information (v)
3. Strong: share prices include all available information, both public and private (insider trading) (x)

33
Q

c. DGCL §141(a) Core Corporate Governance Principal

A

The business and affairs of every corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors with some exceptions
1. The board chooses/hires/fires the officers (some officers might also be on the board – usually the CEO is also on the board of directors)
2. The board decides dividends

34
Q

Caremark -breach of duty of CARE

A

Under Caremark, to be liable for breach of duty of CARE for failing to engage in corporate oversight, a director must
1) fail to implement any reporting system or 2) fail to monitor an implemented system. Only an utter failure to try to implement a reasonable monitoring system will result in the board’s liability.
1. To show failure to monitor an implemented system, the director must know that they weren’t engaging in proper oversight and thus know they are not making a good faith effort to act in corporation’s interest.
iii. Elements:
1. Critical issue to health of company
2. No regular monitoring system in place

35
Q

Failure to pay dividends

A

The controlling group’s fiduciary duty to the minority is met in regard to the payment if dividends if the decision is made in good faith and reflects legitimate business purposes rather than the private interests of a control group (essentially BJR)
1. Hallmarks of bad faith include (these must be the motivation for the decision to count as bad faith)
a. Hostility between majority or minority
b. Exclusion of minority from employment by the corporation
c. High salaries, bonuses or loans to the control group
d. A desire by the control group to buy out the minority at a low price

36
Q

When can shareholder bring direct suit?

A

Test for if shareholder can bring direct suit:
1. Will wrongdoer remain in control of any recovery? = direct
2. Is low risk of having a lot of lawsuits based on same conduct? = direct
a. If risk of multiplicity of suits = derivative
3. Will creditors be harmed if suit is brought directly?
a. In derivative suit Corp gets recovery and it is then available to creditors, good for creditors
b. In direct suit company never touches recovery bc it goes to shareholders, bad for creditors
c. If company has no creditors = direct
d. If creditors need settlement = derivativ

37
Q

Involuntary dissolution grounds

A
  1. DE sharply limits the availability of involuntary dissolution to when
    a. 2 shareholders
    b. Each owns 50% of the stock
    c. Joint venture (sharing control)
    d. Stockholders unable to agree upon the desirability of discontinuing the joint venture
    e. Certificate does not provide otherwise

i. New York law permits the holders of at least 20% of the outstanding shares of a company whose stock is not traded on an exchange to petition for dissolution under special circumstances (illegal, fraudulent or oppressive conduct)