Fifth Amendment Cases

Question 1

United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Company; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 1

(1896) The Court ruled that the acquisition of the national battlefield at Gettysburg served a valid public purpose. This was the first significant legal case dealing with historic preservation.

Question 2

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 2

(1922) The Court found that if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. This was the first takings ruling and defined a taking under the 5th Amendment.

“the state exceeded its police powers by significantly diminishing the value of the land estates without having a strong public interest reason to do so.”

Question 3

Berman v. Parker; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 3

(1954) The Court held that aesthetics is a valid public purpose. The Court also found that urban renewal is a valid public purpose.

Question 4

Fred French Investing Co. v. City of New York; New York Court of Appeals

Answer 4

(1976) In this case, the city had put in place a regulation that required the placement of a public park on private property, leaving no income producing use of the property. The Court invalidated the regulation, but it was not ruled as a taking that should receive compensation.

Question 5

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. The City of New York; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 5

(1978) The Court found that the New York City Landmark Preservation Law as applied to the Grand Central Terminal did not constitute a taking. The Court found that a taking is based on the extent of the diminution of value, interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. The Court weighed the economic impact of the regulation on investment-backed expectations and the character of the regulation to determine whether the regulation deprives one of property rights.

Question 6

Agins v. City of Tiburon; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 6

(1980) The appellants had acquired five acres of unimproved land for residential development. The zoning ordinance placed the appellants’ property in a zone with density restrictions (one single-family residence per acre). The appellants brought suit against the city in state court, alleging that the city had taken their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeking a declaration that the zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional. The Court upheld a city’s right to zone property at low-density and determined that the zoning was not a taking.

Question 7

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 7

(1982) The cable television company installed cables on a building to serve the tenants of the building and to serve other buildings. The property owner brought a class action suit claiming that allowing the cable company to occupy the land was a taking. The Court found that the government authorized a permanent physical occupation of private property that therefore constituted a taking requiring just compensation.

Question 8

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 8

(1987) The Court found that if a property is unusable for a period of time, then not only can the ordinance be set aside, but the property owner can subject the government to pay for damages. The Court found that the County could either purchase the property out-right or revoke the ordinance and pay the church for its losses during the time of the trial.

Question 9

Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 9

(1987) Pennsylvania’s Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act prohibits coal mining that causes subsidence damage to pre-existing public buildings, dwellings, and cemeteries. The Act requires that 50 percent of the coal beneath four protected structures be kept in place to provide surface support. The Coal Association alleged that this constituted a taking. The Court found that the enactment of regulations did not constitute a taking and was justified by the public interests protected by the Act.

Question 10

FCC v. Florida Power Corporation; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 10

(1987) Public utilities challenged a federal statute that authorized the Federal Communications Commission to regulate rents charged by utilities to cable TV operators for the use of utility poles. The Court found that a taking had not occurred.

Question 11

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 11

(1987) The question before the Court was whether the California Coastal Commission’s requirement that owners of beachfront property seeking a building permit need to maintain beachfront access constitutes a property taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court agreed that a legitimate interest is served by maintaining a “continuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the coast,” but that California must provide just compensation to beachfront property owners for the public use of their land.

Question 12

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 12

(1992)

The Court found that there is a taking if there is a total reduction in value (no viable value left) after the regulation is in place (except where derived from the state’s law of property and nuisance). The Court found that Lucas purchased the land prior to the development regulations being put in place, and so the regulation constituted a taking.

Question 13

Dolan v. Tigard; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 13

(1994)
The Court overturned an exaction that required dedication of a portion of a floodplain (to create a greenway and bicycle path) by a commercial business that wanted to expand. The Court found that there was not enough of a connection between the exaction requirement and the development. Conditions that require the deeding of portions of a property to the government can be justified, but there has to be a clear relationship between the nature and extent of the proposed development. The “rough proportionality” test was created from this case: “an exaction is legitimate only if the public benefit from the exaction is roughly proportional to the burden imposed on the public by allowing the proposed land use.”

Question 14

Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 14

(1997)
The Court, in this case, was answering the question of whether an owner must attempt to sell their development rights before claiming a regulatory taking of property without just compensation. The petitioner owned an undeveloped lot near Lake Tahoe, and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency found that the lot could not be developed under the agencies’ regulations, but that Suitum could sell the development rights under the Transfer of Development Rights program. The Court ruled that Suitum did not have to attempt to sell developmental rights before filing a regulatory taking suit.

Question 15

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd.; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 15

(1999)
The Supreme Court upheld a jury award of $1.45 million in favor of the development based on the city’s repeated denials of a development permit for a 190-unit residential complex on oceanfront property. The development was in conformance with the city’s comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. The court found the repeated denials of permits deprived the owner of all economically viable use of the land.

Question 16

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 16

(2001)
The question before the Court was whether a property owner who acquired title to a property after regulations were in place could still bring a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. The property owner claimed inverse condemnation against the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council because the landowner was denied a permit to fill 18 acres of coastal wetlands to construct a beach club. The Supreme Court found that acquisition of title after the effective date of regulations does not bar regulatory taking claims.

Question 17

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. et al. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency et al.; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 17

(2002)
The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency imposed two moratoria on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while the agency formulated a comprehensive plan for the area. A group of property owners sued, claiming a taking. The Court found that the moratoria did not constitute a taking requiring compensation.

Question 18

Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc.; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 18

(2005)
The Court overturned a portion of the Agins v. City of Tiburon precedent (see above) declaring that regulation of property does effect a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests. The Court found that Takings clause challenges had to be based on the severity of the burden that the regulation imposed, not the effectiveness of the regulation in furthering the governmental interest.

Question 19

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams; U.S. Supreme Court

Answer 19

(2005)
The Court ruled that a licensed radio operator that was denied a conditional use permit for an antenna could not seek damages because it would distort the congressional intent of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

Question 20

Kelo v. City of New London; US Supreme Court

Answer 20

(2005)
The Supreme Court ruled that economic development, even if it involves taking land for private development, is a valid use of eminent domain. The Court reasoned that it is not in a position to determine the amount or character of land needed for a particular public project.

Question 21

Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection

Answer 21

(2009)
The Supreme Court ruled that submerged lands that would be filled by the state for beach reclamation did not constitute a taking of property without just compensation (in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).

Question 22

Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Management

Answer 22

(2012)
Mr. Koontz requested a permit from the St. John’s River Water Management to develop additional land beyond what was allowed under the original permit. St. John’s agreed to issue the development permit on the condition that Koontz deed the rest of his property into a conservation area and complete additional mitigation work. Koontz refused to undertake the mitigation work and St. John’s denied the application. The key question facing the Court was whether the government is liable for a taking when it denies a permit until a landowner agrees to dedicate land for public use. The Supreme Court found in favor of Koontz, noting that there was no specific regulation requiring the dedication and mitigation work and that a taking had occurred.