Federalism, Preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause - Oct. 10 and 12 Flashcards
In addition to the federal government’s immunity from state taxation and regulation, what are the main federalism-based limits on state authority? (Q)
In addition to the federal government’s immunity from state taxation and regulation, the main federalism-based limits on state authority are:
the Dormant Commerce Clause, which limits the states’ ability to burden interstate commerce; and,
the preemption doctrine, under which federal law generally trumps conflicting state laws.
All three federalism-based limits on state authority derive from the Supremacy Clause.
What does the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibit? (Q)
The Dormant Commerce Clause, also called the negative Commerce Clause, prohibits states from unjustifiably burdening or discriminating against interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause provides that the federal government has the power to regulate interstate commerce. The negative implication is that the states generally do not have the power to regulate interstate commerce.
The dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause means that a state cannot:
impede or interfere with interstate commerce (i.e., burden) or
favor local, in-state commerce over out-of-state commerce (i.e., discriminate).
In the context of the Dormant Commerce Clause, what is a legitimate local objective that a state law may serve? (Q)
In the context of the Dormant Commerce Clause, legitimate local objectives include the subjects of the state’s police power—the general health, safety, and welfare of the state’s citizens. A state may pass regulations that affect interstate commerce, if, among other requirements, those regulations serve legitimate local objectives.
Protection of local economic interests is not a legitimate objective. State laws serving no purpose other than economic protectionism are invalid per se.
If a state law facially discriminates against out-of-state interests, what requirements must be met for the law to be constitutional under the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause? (Q)
To be constitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state law that facially discriminates against out-of-state interests must:
advance a legitimate local purpose and
be the least discriminatory way of achieving that purpose.
Pure economic protectionism (i.e., shielding in-state interests from out-of-state competition) is never a legitimate purpose. Purely protectionist laws are virtually per se invalid. Even if a state has a purportedly legitimate interest in discriminating against out-of-state interests, that interest will be given the strictest scrutiny. To meet the second half of the test, discriminating against out-of-state interests must be essential to achieving the state’s objective. Like the first part of the test, whether there are any possible nondiscriminatory alternatives will be given the strictest scrutiny.
Concerned about the survival of local wild mountain trout, a state government prohibited selling locally caught wild mountain trout to out-of-state purchasers. A restaurant operated just across the state line and regularly purchased wild mountain trout from suppliers in the state. However, the ban on sales to out-of-state purchasers caused the restaurant a significant trout-supply problem that impacted the restaurant’s business. The restaurant sued, arguing that the ban violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Does the ban violate the Dormant Commerce Clause? (Q)
Yes. The ban violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. The ban facially discriminates against out-of-state interests and is virtually per se invalid. States cannot unjustifiably burden or discriminate against interstate commerce. A law that facially burdens or discriminates against out-of-state interests is constitutional only if the regulation:
advances a legitimate local purpose and
is the least discriminatory way of achieving that purpose.
This test creates a rule of virtually per se invalidity that requires the strictest scrutiny.
Here, the ban facially discriminates against out-of-state interests. The conservation of a native fish population is a legitimate local purpose that is advanced by the ban. However, because less discriminatory means also exist to advance this purpose, such as limiting the total number of fish that can be caught, the ban violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.
What must a state seeking to defend a state law against a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge prove if the challenged law does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce? (Q)
If a state law does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce, a state defending the law from a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge must show that:
the law advances a legitimate local objective,
the law is rationally related to the objective, and
the burdens imposed on interstate commerce are not clearly excessive as compared to the local benefits.
In determining whether the state interest outweighs the effect of the regulation, courts consider the extent of the burden on interstate commerce; the local benefits to the state; and the availability of reasonable, adequate, and nondiscriminatory alternatives. State laws imposing severe burdens on interstate commerce tend to be unconstitutional, even if they advance legitimate local interests. State laws imposing incidental burdens tend to be upheld, unless the burdens are clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
In a Dormant Commerce Clause case, how does the court weigh the state’s interest against the burden on interstate commerce imposed by the state law? (Q)
In a Dormant Commerce Clause case, to determine whether the state’s interest outweighs the burden on interstate commerce imposed by the state law, the court will consider:
the extent of the burden or discrimination on interstate commerce;
the local benefits to the state, and
the availability of reasonable, adequate, and nondiscriminatory alternatives.
The state must prove is that its interest in the legitimate local objective is not outweighed by the law’s discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. State laws imposing severe burdens on interstate commerce tend to be unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause, even if they advance legitimate local interests. In contrast, state laws imposing only incidental burdens on interstate commerce tend to be upheld, unless the burdens are clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
If a state regulation only incidentally impacts interstate commerce, what elements will a court balance to determine whether the regulation violates the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause? (Q)
If a state regulation only incidentally impacts interstate commerce, a court will balance the regulation’s burden on interstate commerce against its legitimate local benefits to determine whether the regulation violates the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause.
The court will find a violation if the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive when weighed against legitimate local benefits. Health, safety, and welfare benefits are local benefits that are legitimate.
A state government enacted a law limiting the length of trains to no more than 100 total cars. Trains longer than 100 cars needed to be reconfigured before entering the state or else be re-routed to avoid entering the state at all. The law’s legislative history said that the legislature believed shorter trains were safer because shorter trains required shorter braking times to stop. However, safety data showed that the most dangerous aspect of freight-train operation was the initial crossing of a train on a street or highway, not the inability to brake quickly. Having more short trains entering crossings was more dangerous than having fewer long trains because of the increased risk of automobile-train collisions.
Does the state law violate the Dormant Commerce Clause? (Q)
Yes. The state law violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. If a facially neutral state law incidentally impacts interstate commerce, the law will violate the Dormant Commerce Clause if the burden the law places on interstate commerce is clearly excessive when weighed against legitimate local benefits.
Here, because the law does not distinguish between interstate and intrastate trains, it is not facially discriminatory. However, forcing all trains in a multi-state region to reconfigure or re-route is a serious burden on interstate train transportation. These burdens are weighed against any legitimate local benefits. However, this law increases the risk of automobile-train collisions. The local benefits are, at most, minimal. The law’s burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive relative to any local benefits. Thus, the law violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.
May states ever pass laws that affect interstate commerce? (Q)
Yes. States may pass laws that affect interstate commerce if those laws are rationally related to a legitimate local objective, and the state’s interests in those local objectives are not outweighed by the burden or discrimination the laws place on interstate commerce. In determining whether the state interest outweighs the effect of the regulation, courts consider:
the extent of the burden or discrimination on interstate commerce;
the local benefits to the state; and
the availability of reasonable, adequate, and nondiscriminatory alternatives.
State laws imposing severe burdens on interstate commerce tend to be unconstitutional, even if they advance legitimate local interests. State laws imposing incidental burdens tend to be upheld, unless the burdens are clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
May a state adopt policies governing the state’s direct participation in a market that favor local interests over out-of-state interests without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause? (Q)
Yes. A state may adopt policies governing the state’s direct participation in a market that favor local interests over out-of-state interests without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause. Under the market-participant exception, if a state is acting as a market participant rather than as a sovereign regulator, then the state can adopt and enforce policies that burden or discriminate against interstate commerce without violating the dormant Commerce Clause. This exception applies to both state and local governments.
However, the state may only regulate direct transactions in the immediate market in which it is buying or selling. The state may not attempt to regulate indirect transactions occurring before its sale or purchase in upstream markets or occurring after its sale or purchase in downstream markets.
A state operated its own colleges. The state also provided a property-tax exemption for a private college if 51 percent of its students were in-state residents. However, the law denied the exemption to all other private colleges because at least 50 percent of the students at those private colleges were not in-state residents. A private college in the state sought to claim the property-tax exemption, but it was denied because 75 percent of its students were from out-of-state. The college sued the state arguing that this denial violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. The state responded that it was in the market of providing college services. The state claimed that this meant the market-participant exception protected it from any Dormant Commerce Clause liability.
Does the market-participant exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause apply to the state? (Q)
No. The market-participant exception does not apply. The Dormant Commerce Clause generally prohibits states from discriminating against out-of-state interests. However, under the market-participant exception, a state can adopt and enforce policies as part of its direct participation in a market that discriminate against out-of-state interests without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause. This exception only applies to actions taken as an ordinary market participant, like preferring in-state suppliers. Imposing a tax is virtually always a sovereign action.
Here, the state is in the market of providing college services. However, most colleges do not impose taxes on other colleges. This tax was imposed by the state in its sovereign capacity, not in its role as fellow provider in the market of college services. Therefore, the market-participant exception does not apply.
For state regulations that impact interstate commerce, does the market-participant exception apply to both direct markets and related markets that are downstream from the direct market? (Q)
No. The market-participant exception does not apply to both direct markets and related markets that are downstream from the direct market. The reach of the Dormant Commerce Clause is limited to a state’s direct transactions in an immediate market and does not extend to state activity in a related, downstream market.
Thus, even if the state is acting as a participant in a particular market, the state cannot impact or regulate downstream transactions in a way that discriminates against out-of-state interests. Restrictions on downstream markets are treated as regulatory in nature and subject to the same rules that apply to any other facially discriminatory state regulations that burden interstate commerce.
In the context of evaluating a state tax on interstate commerce under the Dormant Commerce Clause, under what circumstances does a taxed person or entity have a substantial nexus with the state? (Q)
A taxed person or entity has a substantial nexus with the state if the business on which the tax is based constitutes a substantial availment of the privilege of conducting business within the state. Substantial availment can be based on the volume of business conducted, and may include both physical delivery of goods and a significant online presence. The validity of the tax does not depend on whether the taxpayer has an actual physical presence within the state. The substantial nexus requirement limits the reach of the state’s taxing authority to prevent undue or unnecessary burdens on interstate commerce.
May a state tax interstate commerce without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause? (Q)
Yes. A state government may impose a tax on interstate commerce without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause if the tax:
is applied to a person or activity that has a substantial nexus with the state,
is fairly apportioned,
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and
is fairly related to the services provided by the state.
The U.S. Supreme Court has reasoned that the fair apportionment and nondiscrimination requirements prohibit taxes that impose an unfair share of the tax burden on interstate commerce. The substantial nexus and fairly related requirements limit the reach of a state’s taxing authority to prevent undue burden on interstate commerce.
What does the Supremacy Clause provide? (Q)
The Supremacy Clause establishes the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties as the highest law of the land. This clause establishes a hierarchy of law under which valid federal law preempts state law in the event of a conflict, regardless of the relative wisdom of the competing federal and state policies or the strength of the state’s regulatory interest versus that of the federal government.
The Supremacy Clause is one of the most important constitutional manifestations of federalism, as it explains that the laws of the federal government trump the laws of the states.
What is preemption? (Q)
Under the doctrine of preemption, valid federal law will preempt, meaning supersede or replace, conflicting state law. Preemption may be express or implied. The doctrine of preemption originates in the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which establishes the Constitution, federal law, and treaties as the highest law of the land.
Does the existence of the Dormant Commerce Clause stem from the Supremacy Clause? (Q)
Yes. The Supremacy Clause is essentially the rationale behind the Dormant Commerce Clause. The supremacy of federal laws on interstate commerce over state laws yielded the Dormant Commerce Clause’s restrictions on state laws burdening or discriminating against interstate commerce.
If a state law conflicts with a valid federal statute or treaty, is the state law preempted? (Q)
Yes. If a state law conflicts with a valid federal law, then the state law is preempted and invalidated by the conflicting federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal laws and ratified treaties are the supreme law of the land.
What is express preemption? (Q)
Express preemption occurs when a federal statute expressly states that it preempts applicable state law. Statutes using an express-preemption strategy may use language such as “notwithstanding state law to the contrary,” “despite any state law to the contrary,” or state that the federal law “supersedes any and all state laws.”