features of mental states Flashcards
what is the traditional way of understanding the mind?
composed of everything I am conscious of.
what is intentionality?
the quality of certain mental states which directs them beyond themselves and to things in the world. it is what makes mental states such as believes ABOUT something.
what are intentional properties?
these are properties of mental states that allow them to represent things, properties and states of affairs.
what are phenomenal properties?
some mental states have subjective experiences that come along with them
- e.g. sensations such as pain come with a WHAT IT’S LIKENESS (QUALIA)
what is substance dualism?
since mind and bodies are different, they must be of different substances.
- human beings are composed of two distinct types of substances.
mind and body can exist separately of each other.
what is a substance (for Descartes)?
a substance is a thing that can exist on its own and doesn’t depend on anything else (except god) for it’s existence.
what is the indivisibility argument?
the indivisibility argument is one for substance dualism and makes use of LEIBNIZ’S LAW (if two things share all the same properties, they must be the same thing) and since bodies have a property of divisibility that minds lack, they must be different.
what is an example for the indivisibility argument?
Kier Starmer and Prime Minister are two different names for the same person. anything that is true for one would be true for the other and if it were not the same then they are not the same person.
what is the standard form of the indivisibility argument?
p1) my mind is indivisible
p2) my body is divisible
c) my mind is not my body
what is the response that the mental is divisible?
experimental evidence has showed that the brain has been divided successfully to aid in the prevention of epilepsy.
what is the attack from Hume?
Descartes claims that we are conscious of what we call our self and we feel it’s existence but, Hume claims that when he introspects he does not find such a thing. he argues that when introspecting all i am aware of is a series of conscious experiences.
- we have no immediate consciousness of an indivisible self, but instead i am just a collection of experiences.
what would be the response to the mind is divisible response?
i cannot imagine my consciousness dividing and remain aware from two perspectives at once.
- although split brain patients are not aware of two perspectives and the fact that i cannot imagine it does not mean it is not possible.
what is the criticism that not everything thought of as physical is divisible?
the inference from the fact that it is difficult to make sense of the idea of dividing the mind to concluding that they cannot be physical is not valid.
- the solubility of sugar is not something that makes sense to divide, but it would not follow that solubility is an indivisible non-physical substance.
although it makes no sense to talk about splitting the mind does not show that it is a special kind of indivisible stuff.
define actual
the way the world happens to be
define physically possible
all the ways the world could have been consistent with the laws of physics
define logically possible
all the ways the world could have been consistent with the laws of thought e.g. 5 sided triangles
can be found a priori
how to work out metaphysical possibility
if something is logically possible, it must be metaphysically possible and vice versa
- it should be possible to work out metaphysical possibility a priori by looking for contradiction in conception.
what is the conceivability argument?
p1) if i can clearly and distinctly conceive of the essential natures of two things separately, it must be metaphysically possible to separate them.
p2) i clearly and distinctly perceive myself (my mind) to be a thinking and unextended thing
p3) i clearly and distinctly perceive my body to be essentially an extended and unthinking thing
d) it must be metaphysically possible for mind and body to be separated thus they must be separate substances
what is the response that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible?
an argument is made about Pythagoras theorem that a person naïve to the theory may believe that the line creating the hypotenuse is the same length as another line.
- even though this is logically possible for them, it is not metaphysically possible.
what my nature is recognized as may not be right
- this argument only works if descartes’ conceptions of mind and body are confused like the triangle but if they are vivid and clear (as he emphasized) he can conclude with confidence that they are different.
what is the masked man fallacy?
descartes puts forward two differences between mind and body
- mind is thinking and body is not
- body is extended and mind is not
by applying leibniz’s law descartes has tried to prove that there are distinct however leibniz’s law does not apply with INTENTIONAL CONTEXT
- argument involves the intentional properties of being aware of his body and mind.
the fact that i am unaware of my brain doing something does not mean that it is not doing it.
what is the response that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world?
if dualism were metaphysically possible, this tells us nothing about the actual world.
metaphysically possible ≠ physically possible
dualism is conceivable but so is physicalism
- so which world do we live in
we cannot use a priori reasoning to make empirical claims
