Family Code Flashcards
When did the Family Code take Effect
August 3, 1988
Before Family Code Properties
Conjugal Gain of Partnership
After Family Code Properties
Absolute Community of Both
Recite Sect 1 of the FC
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this code.
Essential Requisites of a marriage
- Legal Capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female and
- Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
Formal Requisites of a marriage
- Authority of the Solemnizing Officer
- A valid marriage license except in the cases between section 27-34.
- A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any answer.
Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita filed a complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code.
Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband William subjected her to physical violence like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her head against the concrete wall and been violent towards their three children. He would scold them using his belt buckle to beat them. One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house which she did.
Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly established. He can derive no personal gain from pushing for the financial interests of her family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and the companionship of her husband and children
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated in the said provision
Private respondent filed for legal separation against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court presided over by respondent judge. Private respondent invoked concubinage as a ground. The court rendered the decision ordering petitioner to pay his wife and child support pendente lite. The court also denied his petitioner’s petition to suspend hearing pending the criminal case filed against him by his wife for concubinage.
Petitioner contends that the 1985 Rules of Court provide that civil cases are suspended such as legal separation and the incidents attached to it like support pendente lite pending a criminal case arising from the same offense until final judgment has been rendered. Petitioner also claims that the presiding judge was biased and should no longer preside over the case by reason of his decision and his denial of petitions to suspend the hearings.
Whether or not a civil action must be suspended pending a criminal action for the same offense.
No. A civil action for legal separation can proceed simultaneously with a criminal case arising from the same offense because said civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability” arising from the offense even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.
For abandonment to exist there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
Petitioner, a US Navy serviceman, began receiving letters informing him of the alleged acts of infidelity of his wife, the respondent. He admitted that respondent even informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. Petitioner, then, sought for his wife and when the two met, they both proceeded to a certain house where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day. Then they repaired to the petitioner’s house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the following day, petitioner tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery. But respondent, instead of answering the query, merely packed up and left, which the petitioner took as confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on his wife. Petitioner went to Ilocos “to soothe his wounded feelings.” Petitioner, then, filed for legal separation against his wife, who in turn filed a motion to dismiss on ground of condonation.
Yes. Pursuant to previous jurisprudence, there is condonation to the alleged adultery on the part of the husband. Article 56 of the Family Code provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. Further, single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 14 March 1947, the date of the filing of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant to be a married woman (criminal case No. 426). The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on 17 September 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17 September 1948, the date of the filing of the second complaint (criminal case No. 735). On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if the second places complaint the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this defendant was a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.
Jose de Ocampo and Seferina Florenciano got married on 1938 and as a result of such union, they begot several children. Sometime in 1951, Ocampo discovered that his wife was maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. But because of his love to his wife, he forgives her and even sent his wife to manila to study beauty culture. Again, Ocampo discovered that aside from Jose Arcalas, Serafina was going out with several other men. Serafina left Ocampo after she finished her study and since then the two lived separately. After Ocampo caught his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelsom Orzame on 1955, he signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation. Serafina conformed to his intention provided that she will not be charged with adultery in a criminal action.
Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.
Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession.
Article 36
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Article 37
Incestuous Marriages
