Family Code

Question 1

What is marriage?

Answer 1

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.

Question 2

What are the essential requisites of marriage?

Answer 2

1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female
2. Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer

Question 3

What are the formal requisites of marriage?

Answer 3

1. Authority of the solemnizing officer
2. A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title
   - –> point of death, remote areas, man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and without any legal impediment to marry each other
3. A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Question 4

What happens when a.) any of the essential or formal requisites are absent?

b. ) When there is a defect in any of the essential requirements?
c. ) When there is an irregularity in the formal requisites?

Answer 4

a. Marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2)
- –> Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriges were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so

b. ) Voidable marriage under Art. 45
- –> 18-21 without parental consent, unless after attaining the age of 21, such party freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife
- –> either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife
- –> consent of either party obtained by fraud, unless ^^^
- –> consent by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless ^^^
- –> either party physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable
- –> either party was afflicted with STD found to be serious and appears to be incurable

c.) It shall not affect validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Question 5

What are legal impediments under Articles 37 and 38?

Answer 5

Article 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree
2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood

Article 38. The ff. marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree
2. Between step-parents and step-children
3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law
4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child
5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child
6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter
7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter
8. Between the adopted children of the same adopter
9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse or his or her own spouse

Question 6

What if one of the contracting parties cannot sign a marriage certificate because he/she is at the point of death?

Answer 6

It shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer.

Question 7

Who are authorized to solemnize marriage?

Answer 7

1. Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction (Incumbent Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals)
2. Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted him by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect
3. Any ship captain or airplane chief only in cases of articulo mortis (assistant captain has no authority even if captain dies)
4. Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in cases of articulo mortis (must be a commissioned officer starting from second lieutenant)
5. Any consul-general, consul, or vice-consul when both contracting parties are Filipino citizens are married abroad
6. Mayor (or acting mayor in absence) of a city or municipality as provided in LGC in 1992

Question 8

What are the exceptions from getting a marriage license?

Answer 8

1. Articulo mortis (Art. 27)
2. Residence in a remote place (Art. 28)
3. Marriages among Muslims or ethnic cultural communities (Art. 33)
4. Cohabitation by the couple for 5 years with no legal impediments (Art. 34)

Question 9

What happens when a couple obtains marriage license from someplace else that is not within their locality?

Answer 9

It is merely an irregularity and will not affect the validity of marriage.

Question 10

What are specified in the marriage license?

Answer 10

1. Full name of contracting party
2. Place of birth
3. Age and date of birth
4. Civil Status
5. If previously married, how, when, and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled
6. Present residence and citizenship
7. Degree of relationship of the contracting parties
8. Full name, residence and citizenship of the father
9. ^^ of mother
10. ^^ of guardian

Question 11

Can the local civil registrar discontinue issuance of marriage license if there is a known legal impediment?

Answer 11

No. Only the court can order this.

Question 12

What happens to marriage if there is no parental consent?

Answer 12

If between 18-21, it can be annulled unless the contracting parties decide to stay together after turning 21.

If between 21-25, validity shall not be affected but there will be a 3-month delay in the issuance of marriage license after the completion of the 120-days publication

Question 13

When did the Civil Code take effect?

Answer 13

Aug. 30, 1950

Question 14

When shall laws take effect?

Answer 14

Laws shall take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Question 15

What does the clause “unless otherwise provided” mean?

Answer 15

It refers to the 15-day period and not to the requirement of publication. Publication is an indispensable requisite; the absence of which will violate due process as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.

Question 16

What is the difference between “15 days after” and “after 15 days” as to publication?

Answer 16

If the law declares that is shall be effective “15 days after its publication,” it means that its effectivity is on the 15th day after such publication.

If the law declares it shall be effective “after 15 days following its publication,” its effectivity is on the 16th day thereafter.

Question 17

What laws require publication before they can take effect?

Answer 17

PLAC3E

1. Presidential Decrees
2. Laws which refer to all statutes, including local and private laws (laws of general application)
3. Administrative rules and regulations, the purpose of which is to enforce/implement existing laws pursuant to a valid delegation
4. Charter of a city
5. Circulars issued by the Monetary Board, the purpose of which is not merely to interpret but to fill in the details of the Central Bank Act
6. Circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for their violation
7. Executive orders

Question 18

Which laws are exempted from the publication requirement?

Answer 18

SILI + O

1. Supreme Court decisions
2. Interpretative regulations
3. Letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors on rules/guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties
4. Those internal in nature, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency.
5. Municipal ordinances (governed by LGC)

Question 19

Rationale behind publication of laws

Answer 19

1. People are assumed to have conclusively been notified of the law even if they do not read it
2. Section 6 of Bill of Rights
3. To avoid oppression by lawmakers
4. Allows law to be binding and operative

Question 20

Which administrative rules and regulations require publication?

Answer 20

DEP

1. The purpose of which is to implement or enforce existing laws pursuant to a valid delegation
2. Penal in nature
3. Diminishes existing rights of certain individuals

Question 21

Q: Honasan questions the authority and jurisdiction of the DOJ panel of prosecutors to conduct a preliminary investigation and to eventually file charges against him, claiming that since he is a senator with a salary grade of 31, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, which has authority and jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. DOJ claims that it has concurrent jurisdiction, invoking an OMB-DOJ Joint Circular which outlines the authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigations. Honasan counters that said circular is ineffective as it was never published. Is OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 ineffective because it was not published?

Answer 21

A: NO. OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the two offices which outlines the authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigations. It does not contain any penal provision nor prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any under pain of penalty. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general. It need not be published (Honasan, II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ, G.R. No. 159747, June 15, 2004).

Question 22

Q: The Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan enacted an ordinance which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors in Hagonoy. Art. 3 of the said ordinance provided that it shall take effect upon approval. The ordinance was posted from November 4 to 25, 1996. In the last week of November 1997, petitioners were personally given copies and were informed that it shall be enforced in January 1998. The petitioners contended that the subject ordinance was not published as required by law. Did the ordinance comply with the rule of publication?

Answer 22

A: YES. An ordinance which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors has complied with the publication requirement when the same was posted in 3 conspicuous places (Sec. 188, Local Government Code; Hagonoy v. Municipality, G.R. No. 137621, February 6, 2002).

NOTE: Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation: Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places (Sec. 188, Local Government Code).

Question 23

Q: “A” alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Senate invoked the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet. Did the publication of the assailed Rules of Procedure through the Senate’s website satisfy the due process requirement of law?

Answer 23

A: NO. R.A 8792 – Electronic Act of 2000 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as a functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules or regulations (Garcillano v. The House of Representatives Committee on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008).

Question 24

Ignorantia legis non excusat

Answer 24

Ignorance of the law excuses no one

Question 25

If a law is signed on the last hour of June 16, and the law itself says it becomes effective upon approval, was it already effective even during the fi rst hour of June 16?

Answer 25

In Republic of the Phil. v. Encarnacion (L-3936, Dec. 29, 1950), it was held that the answer should be in the affi rmative, otherwise we would be confronted with a situation where the fi xing of the date of effectivity would depend on the unreliable memory of man.

Question 26

FACTS: Po Lay was accused of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank compelling those who had foreign currency to sell the same to the Central Bank. Po Lay alleged that as the circular had not yet been published in the Offi cial Gazette before he committed the act, the circular should have no effect on his act and that therefore he should be acquitted.

Answer 26

HELD: Po Lay is correct for the circular has the force of law, and should have been published. Moreover, as a rule, circulars which prescribe a penalty for their violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation, or circular must fi rst be published, and the people offi cially and specifi cally informed of said contents and the penalties for violation thereof.

Question 27

If there is conflict between a basic law and a rule or regulation, what must prevail?

Answer 27

If conflict exists between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement it, the basic law prevails. Said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. Except for constitutional offi cials who can trace their competence to act on the fundamental law itself, a public offi cial must locate in the statute relied upon, a grant of power before he can exercise it. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.

Question 28

Mistake of fact vs. Mistake of law

Answer 28

Mistake of fact
- mistakes in application or interpretation of difficult or doubtful provisions of law may be the basis of good faith

Mistake of law
- not an excuse, otherwise anyone can easily be relieved of criminal liability

Question 29

What are the exceptions or ‘considerations’ to Article 3?

Answer 29

Art. 526
- mistake upon a doubtful/difficult question of law may be basis for good faith; mitigates but does not extinguish liability

Art. 1334
- mutual error as to the legal effect of an agreement when the real purpose of the parties is frustrated, may vitiate consent

Art. 2155
- payment by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law may come within the scope of the article that pertains to obligation of returning payment by mistake

Question 30

Is there judicial notice of foreign law?

Answer 30

No. Such laws must be proven like any other matter of fact.
Doctrine of Processual Presumption: In a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of “processual presumption.

Question 31

Q: Eduardo was married to Ruby. He then met Tina and proposed marriage, assuring her that he was single. They got married and lived together. Tina, upon learning that Eduardo had been previously married, charged Eduardo for bigamy for which he was convicted. Eduardo testified that he declared he was “single” because he believed in good faith that his first wife was already dead, having not heard from her for 20 years, and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. Is Eduardo liable for the crime of bigamy?

Answer 31

A: YES. Eduardo is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married Tina. Mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Eduardo has the burden to prove that when he married Tina, he has a well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Art. 349 of the RPC, in relation to Art. 41 of the FC. Such judicial declaration constitutes proof that Eduardo acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant (Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005).

Question 32

Q: Complainants who were connected with the Daily Informer (a widely circulated newspaper in Western Visayas) were charged before the MTC by Judge Pamonag of the crime of libel. Respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued warrants for the arrest of the complainants. Complainants filed an administrative case against the judge for gross ignorance of the law. They contended that the judge neither has authority to conduct a preliminary investigation nor to issue warrants for their arrest. The judge said that it was his first libel case and that he issued the warrants in good faith. Is the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

Answer 32

A: YES. Judges are expected more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply them properly in good faith. The provisions of Art. 360 of the RPC on the persons authorized to conduct preliminary investigation in libel cases is so elementary. Not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law (Miaque v. Judge Pamonag, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1412, March 28, 2003).

Question 33

Q: Cheong Boo, a native of China died intestate in Zamboanga. He left a property worth P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed on one hand by Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Boo in 1896. Gee introduced in evidence a document in Chinese stating the marriage ceremony that took place in Amoy, China. Is the document presented by Gee sufficient enough to prove the Chinese marriage of Cheong Boo and Tan Dit?

Answer 33

A: NO. The Supreme Court held that the document is not sufficient to prove the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit. Gee only presented a document in Chinese stating the alleged marriage ceremony but there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. Therefore, there is lacking proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage.

Ignorance of a foreign law is not ignorance of the law but of fact because such foreign law must be first alleged and proved as a matter of fact, there being no judicial notice of said foreign law. The Chinese marriage was not adequately proved (Estate of Boo v. Gee, G.R. No. 18081, March 3, 1922).

Question 34

FACTS: The deceased Hodges was a citizen of Texas but a domiciliary of the Philippines. A claim was made by the administrator (PCIB) of his estate that under Texas law, the successional rights to the estate of the deceased would be governed by the law of the domicile (as a result of renvoi — the referring back to our country of the problem). This claim of the administrator was, however, disputed. What should the court do?

Answer 34

HELD: The court must resolve the matter by asking for proof on what the Texas law on the matter is. This proof must be presented before the trial court (the Supreme Court thus remanded the case to the trial court so that the latter might receive evidence re the law of Texas). Be it noted that the foreign law must be proved as a fact unless the court already actually knows what it is, either because it is already generally known, or because it has been so ruled in other cases before it, and there is no claim to the contrary.

Question 35

Subsidiary Issue: Suppose before presenting proof of the Texas laws, the administrator states what said Texas law is, and how the alleged law would affect the administration of the estate, would the administrator still be able to invoke the correct Texas law, if in his previous statement, he had made an error as to what said law was?

Answer 35

HELD: No more, since he would be in estoppel (stopped from asserting the truth, in view of the previous falsity). After all proof of a foreign law needs proof as to a FACT, and in the matter of facts, there can be estoppel. [NOTE: It is believed that while the proving of a foreign law requires the proving of a fact, still once the foreign law is actually proved, what has been proved is a LAW, and not a mere fact. As to law, there is no question that there cannot be estoppel. It is therefore submitted by the annotator that the correct Texan law can still be applied.]

Generally a written foreign law can be proved in our courts by an offi cial publication thereof or by a copy attested by the offi cer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certifi cate that such offi cer has the custody. When however said foreign law has been presented properly in evidence during, say, the probate of a will, the court can take judicial notice of said foreign law in a subsequent hearing of the project of partition, WITHOUT proof any more of such law. (Testate Estate of Bohanan, L-12105, Jan. 30, 1960). However, in other cases subsequently brought, the Supreme Court ruled that it is essential to prove all over again the existence of the foreign law already proved in a prior case. Reason: The foreign law may have undergone changes or amendments since the hearing of the original case.

Question 36

FACTS: Emilio Guanzon borrowed money from the Bank of Taiwan during the Japanese occupation. Security was given in the form of a real mortgage on two parcels, and a chattel mortgage on the crops growing on said parcels. When the Philippines was liberated in 1946, the mortgage credit was acquired by the United States, and later transferred to the Philippines thru the Philippine Property Act of 1946 (of the US Congress, and therefore, a foreign law). The Philippines then filed an action for foreclosure. The lower court dismissed the action, firstly, on the ground that the Philippines is not a party in interest (has no real legal interest in the mortgage loans), and secondly, on the ground that the foreign law cited cannot be taken judicial notice of, and resultantly, cannot be effective in our country.

Answer 36

HELD: 1. The Philippines has legal interest in the mortgage loans, because the mortgage credit was transferred to our government by the U.S. thru the Philippine Property Act of 1946 (a foreign law duly acquiesced in by both the executive and legislative branches of our government). (Brownell, Jr. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 95 Phil. 228 [1954]). 2. Because of such consent, said foreign law can be taken judicial notice of, and therefore can be given effect in our country.

Question 37

Give examples of honest mistake of fact

Answer 37

(a) An honest error made by a lawyer in the interpretation of the law. (Therefore, he cannot be disbarred on this ground.) (In Re Filart, 40 Phil. 205 — “No Attorney is bound to know all the laws; God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or counsel or even a judge is bound to know all the laws. The knowledge we acquire is forgotten at the moment when most needed. The science of law is a most extensive and difficult one.’’). Be it noted, however, that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. (Severino Macavinta, Jr. v. People, L-36052, Dec. 28, 1973). (b) An erroneous belief that a certain court had jurisdiction to grant an absolute divorce. (Marcelo v. Jason, 60 Phil. 442). A subsequent marriage entered into under such erroneous belief will still be one contracted in good faith by such party. (Ibid.) (c) If a girl married without parental consent thinking she was already of a certain age when as a matter of fact she was several years younger, she is not criminally liable, for this is an honest mistake of fact. (U.S. v. Peñalosa, 1 Phil. 190).

Question 38

FACTS: A sheriff has been charged with gross ignorance of the law, an issue not confi ned to judges alone. In a verifi ed letter-complaint, Manuel U. del Rosario, et al., charged Deputy Sheriff Jose Bascar, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City for “Gross Ignorance of the Law, Levying Properties Unreasonably and Unnecessarily Levying Properties with Malice and Abuse of Authority and Gross/Willful Violation of Law.’’ This case originated from a complaint fi led with the then Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, Region VII, Cebu City in HSRC Case REM-0006-210685 entitled “Angel Veloso, et al. v. Esperanza del Rosario, et al.,’’ for violation of Presidential Decree 957, otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree.
A decision was rendered on the aforesaid case on June 10, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads: “WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, respondents Esperanza del Rosario, Manuel del Rosario, Adelaida Kalubiran and Nicolas Kalubiran are hereby ORDERED — jointly and severally — 1. to apply for and secure a Certifi cate of Registration from this Commission within two (2) months from receipt hereof; 2. to accept installment payments from complainants with interest at the legal rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum and to execute a Deed of Sale over subject lots once full payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price is effected; 3. to register the Contract of Sale executed on March 1, 1974 with the Offi ce of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City within one (1) month from receipt hereof; 4. to pay a fi ne of P2,000 for failure to secure a certifi cate of registration and a license to sell from this Commission within one (1) month from receipt hereof; 5. to develop the subdivision open space, parks and playgrounds as advertised within six (6) months from receipt hereof; and 6. to complete development of subdivision roads and underground drainage facilities up to lot lines within six (6) months from receipt hereof.’’ Complainants alleged that respondent Deputy Sheriff is grossly ignorant of the law in implementing the writ of execution of the dispositive portion of the aforecited case which orders specifi c performance and hence, is governed by Section 9 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. They said that under this Section, no levy of personal or real properties is required but thru gross ignorance, respondent executed the writ pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 39 and proceeded to levy on execution three (3) parcels of land having a total market value of P1,236,600 of Miradel Development Corporation wherein Esperanza del Rosario has alleged shares, interest and participation, in order to satisfy the judgment involving specifi c performance. Further, complainants alleged that the levy on execution involved registered lands and hence, must be in accordance with Section 71, RA 496 which requires that levy on execution of registered lands must contain a reference to the number of the Certifi cate of Title of the land to be affected and the volume and page in the registry book where the certifi cate is registered. It is contended by the complainants that respondent is grossly ignorant of the law considering that the dispositive portion of the decision is for specifi c performance and the fi ne of P2,000 is not payable to the prevailing parties but to the Commission. Complainants asserted that the levy on the three (3) parcels of land belonging to the Miradel Corporation with a value of more than P1 million is excessive considering that, apparently, the levy is for the payment of the fi ne of P2,000 and the implementation of the writ was tainted with malice and abuse of authority because he could have just levied on the personal properties of the herein complainants which could satisfy the alleged judgment and costs. Pursuant to a Resolution of the Supreme Court dated Nov. 23, 1988, respondent fi led his comment on the complaint, contending that the levy was not made to satisfy the fi ne of two thousand pesos (P2,000) but to protect the rights of the prevailing parties considering that complainants refused to comply with the decretal portion of the decision. He stated that the lots he levied upon which are portions of the lots in controversy covered by TCTs 55606 and 55607 are vacant and there was malice and bad faith in the transfer of the lots in question to Miradel Development Corporation wherein complainant Esperanza del Rosario is the treasurer. In the resolution of this Court dated Dec. 5, 1990, this case was referred to Executive Judge; Regional Trial Court, Cebu City for investigation, report and recommendation. Executive Judge Godardo A. Jacinto in his report merely admonished respondent deputy sheriff.

Answer 38

HELD: Disagreeing with the investigating Judge’s decision, the Supreme Court said: The deputy sheriff’s unjustifi able acts demand sanction. Respondent acted with gross ignorance of the law in making an unreasonable and unnecessary levy in the process of enforcing the writ of execution of a decision ordering specifi c performance and payment of a fi ne of P2,000. He deviated from what was decreed in the writ by making an unnecessary levy on execution of three lots allegedly forming part of the lots in controversy which were already sold to the Miradel Development Corporation by the complainants. The manner in which respondent conducted the levy leaves no room for doubt that he was unmindful of the rule that in the exercise of his ministerial duty of enforcing writs, it was incumbent upon him to ensure that only that portion of a decision decreed in the dispositive part should be the subject of execution, no more, no less. He made no effort to limit the levy to the amount called for in the writ. Respondent had no reason to make a levy on three parcels of land belonging to Miradel Development Corporation after having found that Esperanza del Rosario, one of the respondents in the HSRC case, was treasurer thereof on the pretext of protecting the prevailing parties whom he claims could eventually lose the lots by reason of the sale thereof by complainants to the said corporation. More importantly, the Court opined, it was not incumbent upon him as sheriff to determine for himself the means to safeguard the rights of the prevailing party in a case for specifi c performance. All that he was called upon to do in such instance was to serve the writ of execution with a certifi ed copy of the judgment requiring specifi c performance upon the party/parties against whom the same was rendered and in case of failure to abide, it is at the prevailing party’s instance not the sheriff’s that the aid of the court may be sought. This Court had said before, and reiterates it here, as it has done in other cases, that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an offi ce charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding justice to the lower clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must only be characterized by propriety and decorum but above all else be above suspicion. Respondent’s actuations in enforcing the Writ of Execution of HSRC Case REM-0006-210685 did not live up to this strict standard.

Question 39

Exceptions to Article 4 that provides laws shall have no retroactive effects

Answer 39

P2UT NICE

1. Procedural or remedial laws
2. Penal laws favorable to the accused; provided that the accused is not a habitual delinquent
3. Unless the law otherwise provides
4. Tax laws when expressly declared or is clearly the legislative intent
5. Laws creating new rights
6. Interpretative Statutes
7. Curative or remedial statutes
8. Emergency laws (authorized by police)

• curative - pertaining to cure of errors or irregularities in judicial or administrative proceedings, transaction of private parties
• remedial - statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage

Question 40

Exceptions to exceptions of Article 4

Answer 40

1. Ex post facto laws or bill of attainder
2. Penal laws not favorable to the accused
3. Substantive laws impairing vested rights and obligation of contracts
   * substantive laws - defines rights and responsibilities in civil law, and crimes and punishments in criminal law
   - set of laws that governs how members of society are to behave

Question 41

Lex prospicit, non respicit

Answer 41

the law looks forward not backward

Question 42

Give an example of a curative law

Answer 42

E.O. No. 111, amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to widen the worker’s access to the government for redress of grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money claims. This amendment, however, created a situation where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters overlapped. As a remedy, R.A. No. 6715 further amended Article 217 by delineating their respective jurisdictions. Under R.A. No. 6715, the Regional Director has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service, or househelper under the Code; (2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and (3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed P5,000.00. All other cases are within the exclusive of the Labor Arbiter. E.O. No. 111 and R.A. No. 6715 are in the nature of curative statutes.51

Question 43

If a procedural law, for example, is applied retroactively–can a person be held liable right then and there for not complying with requirements?

Answer 43

No. One must be given due notice first.

Question 44

In a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms, the accused admitted he had no license or permit but claimed to be entitled to exoneration because he had an appointment as secret agent from the PC provincial commander, said appointment expressly authorizing him to possess and carry the firearm. He contended he was entitled to acquittal because at the time he possessed the firearm (1964) the doctrine then in force was that laid down in People vs. Macarandang (1959), 106 Phil. 713, and People vs. Lucero (1958), 103 Phil. 500. The trial court convicted him, on the ground that this doctrine had been abandoned in the 1967 case of People vs. Mapa (20 SCRA 1164).

Answer 44

Held:
When a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. Accused was acquitted. (People vs. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, February 27, 1974).

Question 45

In People vs. Patalin, et al., G.R. No. 125539, July 27, 1999, 109 SCAD 734, accused were charged with the crime of robbery with multiple rape in 1984. In 1987, when the 1987 Constitution suspended the imposition of the death penalty, the trial has not yet been finished, hence, it was overtaken by the Death Penalty Law effective January 1, 1994. If the accused are convicted, can the death penalty be imposed upon them? The Supreme Court said No and went on to say that before the 1987 Constitution, death penalty as a capital punishment could be imposed on certain heinous crimes like robbery with rape. (Art. 294, Revised Penal Code). From 1987, however, until the passage of the death penalty law or on January 1, 1994, the imposition of death penalty was suspended. In the case of the three convicts, an issue
came up regarding the imposition of death penalty because when they committed the crime in 1984, the death penalty was still in our statute books; but the trial of their case was overtaken by the 1987 Constitution and then later on by the new death penalty law. So, when judgment was finally rendered finding them guilty, the death penalty had been suspended and then reimposed again. The issue they raised therefore was: Can the Court impose the death penalty on them?

Answer 45

Of course No. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect only insofar as they favor a person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, although at the time of the publication of such a law a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

Question 46

FACTS: Under RA 2613, inferior courts had NO jurisdiction to appoint guardians. A subsequent statute, Rep. Act No. 3090, approved in June 1961, sought to correct this oversight, and the new law thus granted to said courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases. Now then in view of the passage of the new law, would a municipal court have jurisdiction over a petition for guardianship fi led in January 1960, when Rep. Act No. 2613 was still in force?

Answer 46

HELD: No, for the new Act should not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause to the contrary. The jurisdiction of a court depends on the law existing at the time an action is filed.

Question 47

What rights cannot be waived?

Answer 47

1. Right to live and and right to future support
2. Right to personality and family rights
3. Right to future inheritance
4. Political rights

Question 48

In which cases can rights not be waived?

Answer 48

1. If waiver is:
   a. Contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs
   b. Prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (e.g. If A owes B P10M, B can‘t waive the loan if B owes C and B has no other assets)
2. If the right is:
   a. A natural right, such as right to life
   b. Inchoate, such as future inheritance.

Question 49

Requisites of a valid waiver

Answer 49

CUE-CPF

1. Waiving party must actually have the right he is renouncing
2. He must have full capacity to make the waiver
3. Waiver must be clear and unequivocal
4. Waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, public morals, etc
5. When formalities are required, they must be complied with.
6. Must not be prejudicial to a third eprson with a right recognized by law

Question 50

Q: A student was granted a scholarship but agreed not to transfer to another school unless he would refund all the benefits he derived out of his scholarship. Is the stipulation valid? Why?

Answer 50

A: NO. It is void because it is contrary to public policy and morals (Cui v. Arellano University, G.R. L-15127, May 30, 1961).

Question 51

What are the exceptions to acts executed against provisions of mandatory and prohibitory laws as being void?

Answer 51

PAVE

(1) When the law itself authorizes its validity although generally they would have been void. Example: Lotto and sweepstakes.
(2) When the law makes the act valid, but punishes the violator. Example: A widow who remarries before the lapse of 300 days after the death of her husband is liable to criminal prosecution but the marriage is valid.
(3) Where the law merely makes the act voidable, that is, valid unless annulled. Example: a marriage celebrated through violence or intimidation or fraud is valid until it is annulled by a competent court.
(4) Where the law declares the act void, but recognizes legal effects as arising from it. For example, in a void marriage under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the children born thereto are considered legitimate.

Question 52

ISSUE: Are legal provisions prescribing the period within which a decision should be rendered, mandatory or directory?

Answer 52

HELD: They are MANDATORY in the sense that if not complied with, other offi cers concerned may be dealt with administratively. But this is also DIRECTORY in the sense that the judgments rendered after said period would still be valid (unless there be some other important defect). (See also Estrella v. Edaño, L-18883, May 18, 1962).

Question 53

FACTS: An employee of the Philippine Glass Manufacturing Co. incurred TB allegedly in the course of employment. As a result, claim was made for compensation. The claim was not contested (or controverted) in time by the employer. What is the effect of such non-controversion?

Answer 53

HELD: The failure to timely and effectively controvert the claim amounts to a WAIVER or RENUNCIATION of the right to controvert the claim.

Question 54

FACTS: In a criminal action for seduction, the offended party expressly reserved the right to file a separate civil action. The CFI (now RTC) found the accused guilty, and imposed civil liabilities. No motion for reconsideration was filed by the offended party.
ISSUE: Was the imposition of civil liability proper, despite the reservation?

Answer 54

HELD: No, the imposition of the civil liability was not proper because:

(a) there was the reservation as to the civil aspect
(b) the mere failure to file a motion for reconsideration does not necessarily result in waiver or abandonment. Abandonment requires a more convincing quantum of evidence than mere forbearance to actually file the civil action, especially when we consider the fact that the same could be filed even after the decision in the criminal case had been rendered
(c) proof should be given with respect to the amount.

Question 55

FACTS: Because the land he bought had a much smaller area than what had been agreed upon, Padilla sued the seller Dizon either for a refund of the whole amount or for a proportionate reduction in price. Judgment was rendered in Padilla’s favor, giving Dizon the option to choose: refund or reduce. After the judgment had become fi nal, Dizon selected the right to refund the whole amount. But Padilla, apparently realizing that the sale was really in his favor, fi led a motion to waive the decision in his favor, and asked for the restoration of the parties to the status quo.

Answer 55

HELD: This cannot be done because a waiver cannot prejudice the right given to Dizon to make the choice. Dizon here is an example of a third person with a right recognized by law.

Question 56

FACTS: Under Art. 1387 of the old Civil Code, prior to its amendment by the Paraphernal Law (now Art. 140, new Civil Code), a husband had the right to refuse his wife permission to alienate her paraphernal property. Could such a right be waived?

Answer 56

HELD: Yes, since there is nothing in the waiver that would be detrimental to anybody else. (NOTE: Under Art. 140 of the Civil Code, a wife of legal age can alienate her paraphernal property without the consent or permission of the husband.)

Question 57

Types of repeal

Answer 57

1. Express
   - literally declared
   - “all laws and parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly” NOT an express repeal
2. Implied
   - inconsistencies

Requisites:

a. the laws cover the same subject matter
b. the latter is repugnant to the other
* generally not looked upon with favor
* if both statutes can stand together, there is no repeal

Question 58

What happens in case of conflict between a general law and a special law?

Answer 58

1. If general law was enacted PRIOR to the special law = special becomes exception
2. General law enacted AFTER the special law = special law remains unless:
   a. there is an express declaration to the contrary
   b. there is a clear, necessary, and irreconcilable conflict
   c. the subsequent general law covers the whole subject and is clearly intended to replace the special law on the matter

Question 59

What happens when repealing law is repealed?

Answer 59

In EXPRESS
- prior law shall not be revived unless expressly so provided

In IMPLIED
- prior law shall be revived unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise

Question 60

Explain the operative fact doctrine

Answer 60

Before an act is declared unconstitutional, it is an “operative fact” which can be the source of rights and duties. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects.

Question 61

FACTS: Under the Chattel Mortgage Law, a chattel mortgage must be registered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. Under the Motor Vehicles Law, a chattel mortgage on an automobile must be registered in the Motor Vehicles Offi ce (now the Land Transportation Commission). Now then, has the latter law repealed the former?

Answer 61

HELD: No, because the requirement of registration in the Motor Vehicles Offi ce is merely additional to the requirement of registration in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, if the subject matter is a vehicle. The two laws are complementary, not inconsistent. (Borlough v. Fortune Enterprises, Inc., L-9451, Mar. 29, 1957). The failure of a chattel mortgagee to register the mortgage of a car in the Motor Vehicles Offi ce has the effect of making said mortgage ineffective against third persons who have registered in the MVO the purchase in good faith of the car. (Montano v. Lim Ang, L-13057, Feb. 27, 1963).

Question 62

FACTS: A radio broadcaster was accused of libel before the municipal court of Balanga, Bataan, the municipality being one of the places where the broadcast was heard. It was contended that while RA 1289 vested exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases in courts of first instance, still under a later law, RA 3828, municipal courts in provincial capitals were given concurrent jurisdiction over certain crimes (up to a certain penalty).
ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction?

Answer 62

HELD: The Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bataan has jurisdiction. Repeal of the special enactment (RA 1289) by a general but later enactment (RA 3828) is NOT FAVORED, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. This is so, even if the provisions of the general but later law are sufficiently comprehensive to include matters apparently set forth in the special law. Incidentally, the reason why suit must be filed with the RTC of the province is to prevent undue harassment of the accused, in case, for instance, the suit is brought in a very remote municipality, simply because the broadcast was heard there.
The contention that the alleged libel, having arisen from a radio broadcast, is triable only by a municipal court, because Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code talks only of “defamation in writing” and does not say “by similar means” is not tenable, since the contention ignores the basic purpose of the law, namely, to prevent inconvenience or harassment. A radio broadcast may be spread far and wide, much more so than in the case of newspapers, and it is not diffi cult to imagine the deplorable effect (of the harassment) on the accused even if he has a valid defense. [ NOTE: An act passed later but going into effect earlier will prevail over a statute passed earlier and going into effect later. (Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor Union, 72 Phil. 7). This is because the later enactment expresses the later intent.]

Question 63

Stare decisis et non quieta movere

Answer 63

To adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established.

Question 64

If the law is silent, obscure, or insufficient, a judge may base his judgment among the ff:

Answer 64

1. Customs which are not contrary to law, public order, or public policy
2. Decisions of foreign and local courts on similar cases
3. Opinions of highly qualified writers and professors
4. Rules of statutory construction
5. Principles laid down in analogous instances

Question 65

nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege

Answer 65

the judge must dismiss the case if a person is accused of a non-existent crime following this maxim
(there is no crime when there is no law punishing it)

Question 66

dura lex sed lex

Answer 66

the law may be hard, but it is still the law

Question 67

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners-students who have been barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors-teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as “anarchic rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly?”

Answer 67

HELD: Under similar circumstances where students have been refused re-enrollment but without allegation of termination of contracts as in the instant case, this Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or offi cial designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by this Court. Thus, the Court has ruled that the school’s refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite view would do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the Constitution.

Question 68

FACTS: A real estate mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially. The amount received was, however, less than the mortgage indebtedness. The creditor, therefore, sued to recover the defi ciency. Now then, Act 3135 which provides for extrajudicial foreclosure is SILENT as to the mortgagee’s right to recover such defi ciency. ISSUE: May said defi ciency be recovered?

Answer 68

HELD: Yes, for in the absence of a pertinent provision in Act 3135, we may make use of the rule under the Rules of Court that the defi ciency may be recovered in JUDICIAL foreclosures. After all, the principle involved is the same, namely, that a mortgage is a mere security, and does not, even if foreclosed whether judicially or not, effect a satisfaction of the debt. [NOTE: But the rule of pari materia (like matter), which is only an aid to statutory construction, cannot be used to apply a defi ciency of a prescriptive period provided for in another statute; more so, if the two laws are not in pari materia. (Flores, et al. v. San Pedro, et al., L-8580, Sep. 30, 1957).].

Question 69

In the interpretation of the law, what may be considered?

Answer 69

1. preamble of the statute
2. foreign laws from where it was derived
3. history of framing the law
4. similar laws on the same subject matter

Question 70

FACTS: Romarico had a wife named Katrina from whom he was living separately. Romarico had a parcel of land in Angeles City, purchased with money borrowed from a friend. Katrina, who had been given several pieces of jewelry to sell, was not able to give the selling price to the owner. May Romarico’s land be seized upon?

Answer 70

HELD: No, because the interest of the wife in the conjugal lot (conjugal, because it had been acquired during the marriage) is merely INCHOATE. There should have been first a liquidation of the conjugal assets. Incidentally, in the instant case, the husband was not represented by any attorney in the litigation.

Question 71

Requisites to make a custom an obligatory rule

Answer 71

POPTUN

1. Plurality or repetition of acts
2. Community accepts it such that it is considered obligatory upon all
3. Practiced by great mass
4. Continued practice for a long period of time
5. Uniformity of acts
6. Not contrary to law

Question 72

Rules on computation according to Article 13

Answer 72

1. Year = 12 calendar months (pero dati 365 days)
2. Month = 30 days (unless month is specified, count with how many days a month has)
3. Day = 24 hours
4. Night = sunset to sunrise
5. Calendar week = Sunday to Saturday
6. Week = count 7 days as indicated, not necessarily Sunday to Saturday

Question 73

FACTS: August 31 was the usual last day for payment of registration fees but it was declared a special public holiday by Presidential Proclamation. Now then under the law, the last day for said payment was the last working day in August (ordinarily August 31) but because of the holiday, the last working day in August for the Motor Vehicles Offi ce was on August 30. Now then, may the fees still be paid without penalty on Sep. 1?

Answer 73

HELD: Yes. Since August 31 was declared a holiday, payment could still be made on the next day, under Sec. 31 of the Revised Adm. Code. The “last working day in August’’ for the general public in paying fees is NOT necessarily the same as the “last working day in August’’ for employees in the Motor Vehicles Offi ce.

Question 74

FACTS: Under Sec. 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, approval of Presidential appointments may be reconsidered within ONE DAY after said approval. Approval of the appointment of a certain municipal judge was made Friday, Apr. 27, 1962. Reconsideration was asked on Monday, Apr. 30, 1962, on the theory that under Rep. Act No. 1880, Saturday and Sunday are holidays. Is this a correct interpretation of the provision?

Answer 74

HELD: This is an internal business of the legislature (interpretation of its own rules) which CANNOT be made the subject of judicial inquiry.

Question 75

Discuss the applications of lex nationali, lex rei sitae, lex loci celebrationis

Answer 75

Refer to p. 7 of Mem-Aid

Question 76

What is the renvoi doctrine?

Answer 76

Referring back; occurs when a citizen of another country dies as a domiciliary of another country. Where the conflict rules of the forum refer to a foreign law, and the altter refers it back to the internal law, the law of the forum shall apply.

Question 77

Q: A (Iraqi government) granted B (Domestic corp.) a service contract for the construction of build-ing in Iraq. The bond was guaranteed by C (Domestic corp.). When it was ascertained that B will not be able to finish the project in the scheduled agreement, C paid the bond for failure of B to complete such building. When C was claiming reimbursement, B refused to pay. Thus a case was filed. Should Philippines law govern in determining B’s default?

Answer 77

A: YES. It must be noted that the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of the law that would govern it. In the United States and Europe, the two rules that now seem to have emerged as “kings of the hill” are (1) the parties may choose the governing law; and (2) in the absence of such a choice, the applicable law is that of the State that “has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.” Another authority proposed that all matters relating to the time, place, and manner of performance and valid excuses for nonperformance are determined by the law of the place of performance or lex loci solutionis, which is useful because it is undoubtedly always connected to the contract in a significant way. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether respondent VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However, since that foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the processual presumption, comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours (Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v. V.P. Eusebio Construction, Inc. Et Al, G.R. No. 140047, July 13, 2004).

Question 78

Q: A filed a collection case against B (Phil. corp. that has branch in Japan) in Japan court. The summons, not having been served in Japan, was subsequently received in B’s head office in Manila. However, B still failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Thus, a judgment was rendered in A’s favor and it has become final. The latter now filed a case in Manila for the enforcement of such order. Is the judgment rendered by the Japan Court is valid.

Answer 78

A: YES. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.

It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on Sharp. As to what this law is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon (B) to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand (Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and C.F. Sharp & Company Inc., G.R. No. 112573, February 9, 1995).

Question 79

Q: On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a nonimmigrant. She stated that she desired to take a pleasure trip to visit her great grand uncle. On the date of her arrival, Asher Cheng filed a bond of P1,000 to undertake that Lau would depart the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay or within the period as in the discretion of the Commission of Immigration might properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau was allowed to stay in the country until February 13, 1962. On January 25, 1962, she contracted a marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao, a Filipino citizen. Does Lau, as an alien woman, may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen?

Answer 79

A: YES. An alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) provides that “Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.” Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens (Moy Ya Lim Yao “Alias” Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim And Lau Yuen Yeung v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971).

Question 80

Q: Ernesto S. Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati. Manzano won the elections, however his proclamation was suspended because a certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for the disqualification and alleged that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the US. COMELEC 2nd Division granted the petition and cancelled the certificate of candidacy on the grounds that dual citizens are disqualified from running any elective position under Sec.40 of the LGC. But, COMELEC en banc reversed the said decision. It found that Manzano acquired US citizenship by operation of the US Constitution. He was also a natural born Filipino Citizen by operation of 1935 Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of 6 his parents brought him in the country and registered his as an alien, but this however did not result in the loss of Phil. Citizenship, as he did not renounce Phil. Citizenship and did not take oath of allegiance to the US. A the age of Majority, Manzano registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounce the US Citizenship under American Law. Is Dual citizenship a ground for disqualification?

Answer 80

A: NO. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”, and persons with dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Dual Citizenship is involuntary, it arises out of circumstances like birth or marriage, while dual allegiance is a result of a person’s volition. It is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to 2 or more states.

Also, Manzano upon filing his certificate for candidacy have elected Phil, Citizenship thus terminating his dual citizenship. He made these statements: “I am a Filipino citizen….Natural born. I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country. I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected…I will support the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto…”, thus the filing sufficed to renounce his American citizenship (Mercado v. Manzano & COMELEC, G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999).

Question 81

Q: Teodoro Cruz was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, of Filipino parents making him a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. However, respondent Cruz was enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino Citizenship by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. Thereafter, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Subsequently, Bengson filed a case with House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. The HRET dismissed the petition for quo warranto and declared respondent Cruz was duly elected as a Representative. The HRET also denied Bengson’s motion for reconsideration. Is Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship?

Answer 81

A: YES. Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He may have lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, Section 1, which provides: ”Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship”. Cruz upon taking the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship (Bengson v. HRET and Cruz, G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001).

Question 82

Domiciliary of a child

Answer 82

LEGITIMATE

• parents
• domicile parent

ILLEGITIMATE
- mother

LEGITIMATED
- father

Question 83

Q: Does leasing a condominium unit shows an intention to establish not just a residence but a domicile of choice?

Answer 83

A: NO. While a lease contract may be indicative of the petitioner’s intention to reside in a place, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile.

To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue (Agapito Aquino V. COMELEC, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and Juanito Icaro, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995).

Question 84

Q: On January 26, 2010, Enrico Echiverri filed a petition to exclude Luis Asistio from the permanent list of voters of Caloocan City. Echiverri alleged that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor in 2010 elections. According to him, he found out that the Asistio’s address is nonexistent. In defense, Asistio alleged that he is a resident of No. 116, P. Zamaro St., Caloocan City, and a registered voter of Precinct No. 1811A because he mistakenly relied on the address stated in the contract of lease with Angelina dela Torre Tengco. Should Asistio be excluded from the permanent list of voters of Caloocan city for failure to comply with the residency required by law?

Answer 84

A: NO. The residency requirement of a voter is at least one year residence in the Philippines and at least six months in the place where the person intends to vote. Residence, as used in the law pre-scribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean domicile, importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.

Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan city for more than 72 years. Asistio served in public office of Caloocan City in 1992, 1995, 1998, 2004 and 2007. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan city. There is no showing that he has established, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. Thus, he should remain in the list of permanent voters of Caloocan city (Luis Asistio v. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010).

Question 85

Law that governs the validity of marriage in case of mixed marriages

Answer 85

Marriage between a Filipino and foreigner ABROAD
- If the marriage is valid under the law of one of the spouses while void under the law of the other, the validity of the marriage should be upheld, unless the marriage is universally incestuous or highly immoral (the same rule as to foreigners who get married abroad).

Marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner in the PHILIPPINES
- The national law of the Filipino – Philippine law should be followed – otherwise the country’s public policy would be violated

Alien woman who marries a Filipino husband
- Ipso facto becomes a Filipino citizen if she does not suffer under any disqualification for naturalization as a Filipino citizen. Personal relations: National law of the husband shall govern (GR).

Question 86

Law that governs the personal relations of the spouses

Answer 86

GR: The personal relations of the spouses are governed by the national law of the husband.

Question 87

What law shall apply to successions?

Answer 87

Whether intestate or testate, national law

1. Order of succession
2. Amount of successional rights
3. Intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions

Question 88

What are the scopes of nationality principle?

Answer 88

1. Family rights and duties
   - parental authority
   - marital authority
   - support for spouses (Art. 68)
2. Status
   - personal qualities and relations
   - more or less permanent in nature
   - not ordinarily terminable at his own will
3. Condition
4. Legal Capacity
   - capacity to enter into contract
   - with various exceptions
   - capacity to inherit will depend on national law of decedent

Question 89

Q: How can a will executed abroad be made effective in the Philippines?

Answer 89

A: A will made in a foreign country may be probated in the Philippines after sufficient proof is presented showing that the will was duly executed in the manner required by law and that the testator had capacity at the same time he executed the will.

Question 90

Q: Linnie Hodges, an American citizen from Texas, made a will in 1952. In 1957, she died while domiciled in Iloilo, Philippines. In her will, she left her entire estate in favor of her husband, Charles Hodges. Also, that should her husband later die, the entire estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister. A certain Avelina Magno, a trusted employee of the Hodges, was appointed as the estate’s administratrix.

When Charles died in 1962, his lawyer, Atty. Gellada filed a motion before the probate court (Linnie’s estate) that Magno be temporarily appointed as the administratrix of Charles’ estate. According to Atty. Gellada, Charles left a will but the same cannot be presently presented. The court granted the motion.

When Charles’ will was later found, a petition for probate was filed for the said will. Magno opposed the said petition contending that Charles should turn over the properties to Linnie’s brother and sister as provided in Linnie’s will. The probate court dismissed the opposition.

Thereafter, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator of Charles’ estate. However, Magno refused to turn over the properties.

According to Magno, Linnie wanted was a citizen of Texas, USA at the time of her death. Thus, successional rights as to linnie’s estate should governed by the law of Texas.

What law should be applied in the case at bar?

Answer 90

A: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas.
Further, the Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court.

The Supreme Court, however, emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable. As to whether the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws must be proven by evidence presented before the court (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Hon. Venicio Escolin, G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974).

Question 91

Q: On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing re-spondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.based executor desig-nated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. CA affirmed.

Can a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed?

Answer 91

A: YES. The law does not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution.

A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. The Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country (Palaganas v. Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011).

Question 92

Exceptions to generality rule

Answer 92

1. Treaty stipulations
2. Laws of preferential application
3. Principles of Public International Law

Question 93

FACTS: On February 28, 1948, Vicenta Escario and Pastor Tenchavez got married in Cebu City before a Catholic chaplain. They did not, however, live under the same roof after their marriage. On June 24, 1950, Vicenta went to the United States and obtained a decree of divorce in Nevada on October 21, 1950. On September 13, 1954, Vicenta married an American and thereafter acquired American citizenship. On July 30, 1955, Pastor filed a complaint for legal separation and damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage with her American husband. On the question of the validity of the decree of absolute divorce obtained by Vicenta, the Supreme Court ruled:

Answer 93

“It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor. Tenchavez and Vicenta Escario remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of “extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escario, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act-No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
‘Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.’
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admittedabsolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book I, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that ‘the marriage bonds shall not be severed’ (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, especially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
‘Prohibitive laws cornering persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.’
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.”99

Question 94

FACTS: Alice Reyes, a Filipino citizen was married in Hongkong to Richard Upton, a U.S. citizen, but established their residence in the Philippines
and begot two children. The couple acquired conjugal properties in the Philippines. The couple went to Nevada to obtain a divorce. Thereafter, Alice Reyes remarried with Theodore Van Dorn. Richard Upton filed a suit against Alice Reyes Van Dorn for an accounting of their conjugal property and for a declaration that he should manage said property. Alice Van Dorn moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that the cause of action was barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings in Nevada. In said divorce proceeding, Upton acknowledged that he and Alice had no community property. Upton contended that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada Court is contrary to the public policy and has no legal validity in the Philippines because the Nevada Court proceedings divested the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree is valid insofar as Upton is concerned. The Court explained:

Answer 94

“There is no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorces dissolves the marriage. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercise jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of the heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.101

Question 95

FACTS: Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married to Erich Geiling, a German national, in Germany in 1979. The couple resided in the Philippines. In 1986, the German husband secured a divorce in a German court. After more than five months after the divorce decree, Erich, the former husband, filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila.

Answer 95

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that since Erich was no longer the husband of Pilapil, he no longer had the legal standing to sue for adultery. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as other crimes against chastity, can be prosecuted only upon the complaint of the offended spouse.

Question 96

FACTS: Frank, an American citizen from Illinois, U.S.A. entered into a contract with the Philippine Government to serve as a stenographer for a period of two years. He served for only six months, and therefore the government sued for damages. Frank presented minority as a defense. The contract was entered into in Illinois and in said state, Frank was considered an adult. Under Philippine laws, however, Frank was still a minor.

Answer 96

RULING: The contract is valid because at the time and place of the making of the contract (lex loci celebrationis), Frank was of age and fully capacitated. Therefore, Frank can be held liable for damages.
[OBSERVATION: The Court should have applied the “nationality principle” following Art. 15 of the Civil Code. In the instant case, whether to apply the national law or the law of the place where the contract was celebrated is immaterial since they happen to be the same. However, if the contract happened to be made in the Philippines; the result would have been different.]

Question 97

FACTS: The testator was born in Nebraska, had properties in California, and had a temporary, although long, residence in the Philippines. In his will executed in Manila, he stated that he had selected as his domicile and permanent residence, the State of Nevada, and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. In his will, he disposed so much of his properties in
favor of his grandson, his brother and his sister leaving only a small amount of legacy to his children and none to his wife. The same was questioned by the surviving wife and the surviving children regarding the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate claiming that they have been deprived of their legitime under Philippine law, which is the law of the forum. With respect to his wife, a decree of divorce was issued between the testator and the wife after being married for 13 years; thereafter, the wife married another man whereby this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator.

Answer 97

RULING: Article 10 of the Civil Code (now Art. 16) provides that the validity of testamentary dispositions is to be governed by the national law of the person whose succession in question. In the case at bar, the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada. Since the laws of said state allow the testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, his testamentary dispositions depriving his wife and children of what should be their legitimes under the laws of the Philippines, should be respected and the project of partition made in accordance with his testamentary dispositions should be approved.

Question 98

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he died, he had made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, the other disposing of his Philippine properties. In both wills, his recognized illegitimate children were not given anything. Texas has no conflict rules governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs and therefore no legitimes. The illegitimate children opposed the wills on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to apply.

Answer 98

RULING: Said children are not entitled to their legitimes for under Texas Law (which is the national law of the deceased), there are no legitimes. The renvoi doctrine cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domiciliary of another. A provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void for his national law, in this regard, cannot be ignored.

Question 99

FACTS: Edward Christensen, born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided for a period of nine years. In 1913 he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary till the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed in the Philippines, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen, as his only heir, but left a legacy of a sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (who in a decision rendered by the SC was declared another acknowledged daughter of his). Counsel for Helen claims that under Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the child Mary Lucy contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Art. 16, par. 2 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose off any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law, the will of the deceased giving the bulk of the property to Maria Lucy must remain undisturbed.,

Answer 99

RULING: Since the conflicts rule of California refers back the matter to the Philippines (the place of domicile), our courts have no alternative but to accept the referring back to us. If our courts will to do otherwise and throw back the matter to California, the problem would be tossed back and forth between states concerned, resulting in “international football.”

Question 100

“A,” an American citizen, executed a will in Canada leaving his property located in the Philippines to “B,” his friend. What law shall govern (1) “A’s” capacity to execute the will, (2) the formality of execution, (3) the capacity of “B” to inherit from “A,” (4) the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision?

Answer 100

ANSWER:

(1) A’s capacity to execute the will is governed by his national
law. 105
(2) The laws of Canada shall govern the formalities of the execution of the will. 106
(3) The national law of the decedent (A) shall govern B’s capacity to succeed. 107
(4) The national law of the decedent (A) shall govern the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions.

Question 101

Juan, a Filipino citizen, enters into an ordinary contract with Joe, an American citizen. The contract was executed in Canada. What law shall govern: (1) formal validity of the contract? (2) the legal capacities of the parties to enter into such contract? (3) the intrinsic validity of the contract?

Answer 101

ANSWER:

(1) Canadian law, under the principle of lex loci celebrationis.110
(2) Their respective national laws.111
(3) The proper law of the contract (lex contractus), which may either be the law of the place voluntarily agreed upon by the contracting parties (lex loci voluntatis) or the law of the place intended by them expressly or impliedly (lex loci intentionis).

Question 102

Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married one Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada. In 1983, Upton sued her before the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business known as the Galleon Shop, in Ermita, Manila, which Upton alleged to be a conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had “no community property.” From a denial of that motion, she went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Answer 102

Held: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties. The Nevada court had jurisdiction over the parties. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen; hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. While it is true that owing to the nationality principle under Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws petitioner has to be considered still married to him and still subject to a wife’s obligations under Article 109, et seq., of the Civil Code, cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. It must be observed that for Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code to apply, the following requisites must be present: 1. the marriage must be originally a mixed marriage; 2. the foreigner should be the one to initiate the divorce petition, and if granted, it should capacitate him under his national law to remarry. If all these requisites are present, then, the Filipino can also be capacitated to remarry. However, if the Filipino was the one who initiated the petition for divorce, and it was granted, thus capacitating the foreigner-spouse to remarry, the law is inapplicable and the Filipino cannot remarry. This is so because of the strict interpretation and application of our marriage laws. The general rule in Article 15, of the Civil Code would apply.

Question 103

let us say that A and B, both Filipino citizens, are married. A went abroad and later on embraced American citizenship and divorced B. Can B remarry in the Philippines?

Answer 103

The answer is, No. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code does not apply; Article 15 of the Civil Code applies. This situation is a return to the old unfair situation in the Civil Code, prior to Van Dorn vs. Romillo and the Family Code, for what governs the status, condition and legal capacity of B is Philippine law. Something must be done with this situation as it is unfair, because A can now get married without fear of being prosecuted under Philippine laws since he is beyond the reach of the obligatory force of our penal laws. Furthermore, he is no longer governed by Philippine laws since he is now an American citizen. Yet, B is left hanging as she is still considered married from the viewpoint of Philippine laws. Only a legislative enactment can remedy the situation. Or, even if we are to assume that A and B are residing in the U.S.A., still, B cannot marry, because what governs his legal capacity and status is Philippine law. This is so even if the laws of the USA would say that after their divorce, B can get married. The nationality principle would still apply. Note that Van Dorn vs. Romillo was treated as an exceptional situation which triggered the adoption of Article 26(2) of the Family Code, erasing the unfair situation in the Civil Code.

Question 104

Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, got married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, but the marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree on May 18, 1989 issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen and got married to Grace on January 12, 1994. They lived separately without judicial decree. On March 3, 1998, she filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Rederick on the ground of bigamy stating that prior to the marriage, she did not know that her husband had a previous marriage. On July 7, 1998, he was able to obtain a decree of divorce from her, hence, he prayed in his answer to the complaint that it be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. The court dismissed the case on the basis of the divorce which dissolved the marriage and recognized in the Philippines. Before the Supreme Court, she raised the following issues: 1. Whether the divorce between Editha Samson and himself was proven; 2. Whether his legal capacity to marry her was proven. Reiterating jurisprudential rules earlier laid down, the Supreme Court ––

Answer 104

Held: (1) No, Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. (Tenchavez vs. Escano, 15 SCRA 355; Barretto Gonzalez vs. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67). In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” (Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139; Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653). A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. (Van Dorn vs. Romillo, supra.). The same must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. (Garcia vs. Recio, supra.).

Question 105

In Paula Llorente vs. CA, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000, Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Lorenzo was enlisted to the US Army and became an American citizen. His wife was left in the Philippines but when he came back, he found out that she was “living-in” with his brother. He went back to the USA and filed a petition for divorce which was granted. It became final and executory. When he came back to the Philippines, he married Alicia with whom he had children. He executed a will bequeathing all his properties to his wife Alicia and their children. When his will was submitted to probate, Paula filed a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor contending that she is the surviving spouse; that various properties were acquired during their marriage and that his will encroached on her legitime and 1/2 shares in the conjugal property. The petition was given due course. The RTC declared one of the children of Lorenzo as only an illegitimate child entitling her to 1/3 of the estate and 1/3 of the free portion. The CA modified the decision declaring Alicia as a co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased husband may have acquired during their converture.

Is Alicia entitled to inherit? Why?

Is the divorce decree obtained by Lorenzo valid? Why?

Answer 105

Yes, because it is clear from his will that he intended to bequeath his properties to his second wife and children. His wishes cannot be frustrated since he was a foreigner, not covered by Philippine Laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity. As to who inherits from him is governed by foreign law, his national law.

Yes, owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15, NCC which covers only Philippine nationals. Such policy covers foreign divorces which are valid in the Philippines even though obtained abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. (Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139). And since the man was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the former wife lost her right to inherit. (Quita vs. CA, 300 SCRA 406).

Question 106

Facts: Wolfang O. Roehr, a German citizen married Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina in 1980 in Germany. They begot two children. In 1996, Carmen filed an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage. A motion to dismiss was denied but in 1997 while a second motion to dismiss was pending, Wolfang obtained a decree of divorce in Germany and granted parental custody over their children to him. An order granting the Motion to Dismiss was issued because of the dissolution of the marriage. A motion was filed asking that the case be set for hearing for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of their properties. It was opposed on the ground that there was nothing to be done anymore as the marital tie of the spouses had already been severed by the divorce decree and that the decree has already been recognized by the court in its order. The lower Court issued an order partially setting aside the former order for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. This order was questioned on the basis of the contention that the divorce decree obtained in Germany had already severed the marital relations of the parties, hence, nothing can be done anymore. Is the contention proper? Why?

Answer 106

No. In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985) and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 592 (2000), it has been consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989), where the Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. It was held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons. In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. –– The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to give effect to it. Our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office. Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings. More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provisions in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserted that public respondent exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction when it claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: “petitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during the marriage.” Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof. Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy. In sum, it can be said that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which is not an issue

Question 107

This is an appeal from the decision of the lower court dismissing the objections filed by the oppositors, the wife and the two children of the deceased, to the project of partition submitted by the executor, Phil. Trust Co., and approving the said project of partition. The testator was born in Nebraska, had properties in California, and had a temporary, although long, residence in the Philippines. In his will executed in Manila, he stated that he had selected as his domicile and permanent residence, the State of Nevada, and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. In his will, he disposed so much of his properties in favor of his grandson, his brother and his sister, leaving only a small amount of legacy to his children and none to his wife. The same was questioned by the surviving wife and the surviving children regarding the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate, claiming that they have been deprived of their legitime under Philippine law, which is the law of the forum. With respect to the wife, a decree of divorce was issued between the testator and the wife after being married for 13 years; thereafter, the wife married another man whereby this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator.
Issue: Whether or not the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children, which are short of the legitimes given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines are VALID.

Answer 107

Held: Article 10 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 16 of the New Civil Code, provides that the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. In the case at bar, the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada. Since the laws of said state allow the testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, his testamentary dispositions depriving his wife and children of what should be their legitimes under the laws of the Philippines, should be respected and the project of partition made in accordance with his testamentary dispositions should be approved.

Question 108

Facts: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he died, he had made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, the other disposing of his Philippine properties. In both wills, his recognized illegitimate children were not given anything. Texas has no conflict rule governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas Law, there are no compulsory heirs and therefore no legitimes. The illegitimate children opposed the wills on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to apply.

Answer 108

Held: Said children are not entitled to their legitimes for under Texas Law (which is the national law of the deceased), there are no legitimes. The renvoi doctrine cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domiciliary of another. A provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void for his national law, in this regard, cannot be ignored.
Note: Under Article 16, New Civil Code, the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of the will shall be governed by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. Under Art. 1039, NCC, the capacity to succeed shall be governed by the national law of the decedent.

Question 109

FACTS: On Sept. 10, 1950, at about noon time, a Philippine customs patrol team on board Patrol Boat ST-23 intercepted fi ve (5) sailing vessels on the high seas between British North Borneo and Sulu, while they were heading towards Tawi-tawi, Sulu. The vessels were all of Philippine registry, owned and manned by Filipino residents of Sulu. The cargo consisted of cigarettes without the required import license, hence, smuggled. They were seized by the patrol boat. ISSUE: May the seizure be made although the vessel was on the high seas?

Answer 109

HELD: Yes, for the following reasons: (a) The vessels were of Philippine registry, hence under the Revised Penal Code, our penal laws may be enforced even outside our territorial jurisdiction. (b) It is well-settled in international law that a state has the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory, but extending to the high seas. (Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187, 234).

Question 110

FACTS: The sale of shares of the capital stock of the Pampanga Sugar Mills was negotiated, perfected, and consummated in San Francisco, California. ISSUE: May our Government impose income tax on said sale?

Answer 110

HELD: No, since all the factors (negotiation, perfection and consummation) took place in California, said place is deemed to be the source of the capital gain. Therefore, this is income derived from abroad. Under our present laws, only corporate income derived from Philippine sources may be taxed in our country.

Question 111

FACTS: Idonah Slade Perkins died domiciled in New York on March 27, 1960; because she has properties both in New York and in the Philippines, a domiciliary administrator was appointed in New York by the New York courts, and an ancillary administrator was appointed in the Philippines by the Philippine courts. Now then, to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors, the Philippine ancillary administrator asked the New York administrator to surrender to the former two stock certifi cates owned by the deceased in a Philippine corporation, the Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Although said New York administrator had the stock certifi cates, he refused to surrender them despite the order of the Philippine court, prompting the court to consider said certifi cates as LOST for all purposes in connection with the administration of the deceased’s Philippine estate. The court then ordered the Benguet Consolidated, Inc. to cancel said certifi cates and to issue new certifi cates deliverable either to the ancillary administrator or to the Philippine probate court. The company refused to issue the new certifi cates on the ground fi rstly, that after all, the old certifi cates still really exist, although in the possession of the New York administrator; and secondly, that in the future, the Company may be held liable for damages because of the presence of confl icting certifi cates. ISSUE: Should the company issue the new certifi cates?

Answer 111

HELD: Yes, the company must issue the new certifi cates because of the following reasons: (a) While factually the old certifi cates still exist, the same may by judicial fi ction be considered as LOST — in view of the refusal of the New York administrator to surrender them, despite a lawful order of our courts. To deny the remedy would be derogatory to the dignity of the Philippine judiciary. The ancillary Philippine administrator is entitled to the possession of said certifi cates so that he can perform his duty as such administrator. A contrary fi nding by any foreign court or entity would be inimical to the honor of our country. After all, an administrator appointed in one state has no power over property matters in another state. (Leon and Ghessi v. Manufacturer’s Life Ins. Co., 99 Phil. 459 [1951]). (b) The Company has nothing to fear about contingent liability should the new certifi cates be issued. Its obedience to a lawful court order certainly constitutes a valid defense.

Question 112

In country X, even recognized illegitimate children are not allowed to inherit. A citizen of country X dies in the Philippines, with some of his parcels of land located in our country. Under our laws, recognized illegitimate children can inherit. Will Y, a recognized illegitimate child of the deceased, be entitled to inherit?

Answer 112

ANSWER: No, because under the law of his father’s country, he has no right to inherit. This is so even if the lands are found in the Philippines. What should control is the national law of the deceased. (Art. 16, par. 2, Civil Code).

Question 113

FACTS: An alien testator (Turk) who made his will in the Philippines stated in the will that his property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that of his nation. Is the provision valid?

Answer 113

HELD: No, for Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property. This is clear under Art. 16.

Question 114

If a Filipino dies leaving lands in China, should the inventory of his estate required by our courts include the lands in China?

Answer 114

The conventional answer is “Yes’’ because we have to know the total value of his estate for eventual distribution to his heirs. As a matter of fact, under Art. 16, par. 2, it is our law that should govern their disposition. This answer would be all right, provided that Chinese courts would respect the decisions of our courts. But what if they do not? It should be observed that we can hardly do anything about it since the lands are in China. The problem of possible unenforceability and ineffectiveness is precisely a defect of the second paragraph of Art. 16. To eliminate the possibility of “no-jurisdiction,’’ it is clear that Art. 16, par. 2 can apply only to properties located in the Philippines. (See Gibbs v. Government, 49 Phil. 293).

Question 115

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, the other, disposing of his Philippine properties. In both wills, his recognized illegitimate children were not given anything. Texas has no confl icts rule (rule of Private International Law) governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas Law, there are no compulsory heirs and therefore no legitimes. The illegitimate children opposed the wills on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes (to which they would be entitled, if Philippine law were to apply). ISSUE: Are they entitled to their legitimes?

Answer 115

HELD: (1) Said children are NOT entitled to their legitimes — for under Texas Law which we must apply (because it is the national law of the deceased), there are no legitimes. (See Art. 16, par. 2, Civil Code). (2) The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, Adolfo Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963, cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death. So that even assuming that Texas has a confl icts of law rule providing that the law of the domicile should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law because the deceased was BOTH a citizen and a domiciliary of Texas. Nonetheless, if Texas has a confl icts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the confl icts
Artof law rule in Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. (Lim v. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re: Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500). (3) The contention that the national law of the deceased (Art. 16, par. 2; Art. 1039) should be disregarded because of Art. 17, par. 3 which in effect states that our prohibitive laws should not be rendered nugatory by foreign laws, is WRONG, fi rstly because Art. 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 are special provisions, while Art. 17, par. 3 is merely a general provision; and secondly, because Congress deleted the phrase “notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article’’ when it incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change, the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been its purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specifi c provision in itself, which must be applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. (4) It has been pointed out by the oppositor that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent’s intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it will NOT ALTER the law, for as this Court rules in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with the Philippine law and not with his national law, is
Artillegal and void for his national law, in this regard, cannot be ignored.

Question 116

FACTS: A married woman, Linnie Jane Hodges, a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group contended that Texan law would result in the renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was possible). Should the laws of Texas on the matter be ascertained?

Answer 116

HELD: Yes, for what the law of Texas is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate Court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at any other time) must be proved. [NOTE: While in the Amos Bellis case, the Court partially discussed the law of Texas, still it is needful to prove in the instant case what that law precisely was — at the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges’ death. After all, the law may have been different. Besides, in Amos Bellis, the deceased was a citizen and domiciliary of Texas; here, she was a citizen but not a domiciliary of Texas.].

Question 117

FACTS: A power of attorney was executed in Germany giving the recipient authority to bring an action in the Philippines. Said power of attorney was not authenticated by a notary public. In Germany, no such authentication was needed, contrary to Philippine rules. Question: Was the power of attorney properly made insofar as form was concerned?

Answer 117

HELD: Yes, because it was executed in Germany. There is no reason why the lex loci celebrationis should not apply.

Question 118

In Japan, a Chinese sold to a Filipino a parcel of land located in the Philippines. The law of which country governs the formalities of the sale?

Answer 118

ANSWER: The law of the Philippines because the land is located here. This is (Art. 16, par. 1), an exception to lex loci celebrationis.

Question 119

FACTS: A applied for a life annuity. The insurance company accepted, and intended to mail its acceptance, but never actually mailed the same. So the applicant never received the letter of acceptance. Later, the applicant died. Was the contract ever perfected?

Answer 119

HELD: No, because acceptance was never made known to the applicant. This rule in the Civil Code, which requires knowledge by the offeror of the acceptance, can be applied because the Insurance Law (a special law) contains no rule on the matter. In other words, the Civil Code can supply the defi ciency.
[NOTE: (a) When the action of a plaintiff against a shipowner is upon a civil tort, Art. 2180 of the Civil Code applies; but when the case involves tortious conduct resulting in maritime collision, it is a maritime tort, and the liability of the shipowner is governed by the provisions of the Code of Commerce. (Manila Steamship Co. v. Abdulhamar,

L-9534, Sep. 29, 1956). (b) Under the Veterans Guardianship Act, RA 390 (a special law), guardianship of a minor terminates only upon reaching the age of 21 (age of majority is now 18), not upon marriage. Therefore, in a case involving monetary benefi ts from the Veterans’ Act, the special law must prevail. (Estate of Daga, L-9695, Sep. 10, 1956).].