Explanatory Flashcards
What are the core assumptions of RCT?
(Assumption 1-3 Iannaconne)
Assumption 1: Individuals act rationally, weighing the cost and benefit of potential actions, and choosing those actions that maximize their net benefit
- Fundamental but simplifying assumption that all individuals approach actions in the same rational way
Assumption 2: Social outcomes constitute the equilibria that emerge from the aggregation and interaction of individual actions
- Not particular to RCT, there are also other theories that assume that we can explain social phenomena as the outcome of the interaction of individuals (= methodological individualism)
Assumption 3: Ultimate preferences (“needs”) that individuals use to assess cost & benefit tend not to vary much from person to person or time to time
- Can only be defended if looked at ultimate preferences, the very basic needs -ofc our everyday preferences like i.e. favorite dish change BUT the underlying more basic need (food intake?) is assumed to be constant
1st assumption - Critique
- The whole idea of “choice” is not very sociological, we should rather focus on structure, culture, and so forth, which leads us to behave a certain way - bc if we think about it too much as the outcome of a choice process, we miss out on the most important factors that shape human behavior - namely the ones that are not subject to human’s choosings (i.e. structure, culture, etc.) -> counter-critique: there is always an alternative, all about the psychology of how I experience my choices
- Parsons: RCT does not consider culture & norms counter-critique: people don’t need to be self-interested or just material gain, could also feel beneficial to them to act within normative guidelines “if I feel morally good, this is my benefit”
- Not neutral as we have so many biases, so, not about objective cost/benfit rather the perceived cost/benefit (i.e. smoking) subjective rationality (quite a vague concept tho from philosophical perspective)
What’s the purpose of assuming constant preferences?
- Bc explaining change by changing preferences gives no ultimate explanation: Not satisfactory as it does not explain why change happened, instantly raises the question of why the preference changed
- RCT rather argues along changing or different constraints i.e. spicier food in hot areas as a result of trying to preserve food
- Iannaconne: “Over time, most people modify their religious choices in significant ways, varying their rates of religious participation and modifying its character, or even switching religions altogether. Given the assumption of stable preferences, the rational choice theorist is almost never content to explain such changes with reference to changed tastes, norms, or beliefs. The theorist seeks instead to model behavioral change (and interpersonal differences) as optimal responses to varying circumstances – different prices, incomes, skills, experiences, technologies, resource constraints, and the like.”
Corollary of assumptions 1 and 3?:
“Behavioral changes (over time) are the consequence of changed constraints; behavioral differences (across individuals) are the consequence of differing constraints.”
Critique of assumption 3 (“ultimate preferences”)
Goal-framing theory - What ultimate preferences will be salient?
To apply economic models to all kinds of sociological phenomena: 4. Assumption
Constraints take a wide variety of forms, explicit and implicit price, income and ability, physical and capital, technology and so forth
What are constraints?
- Most salient: price & cost (very broad view, could also be implicit price: i.e. forgone opportunities = opportunity costs), income
- Overall state of technology (innovation)
- Additional: actor’s state of knowledge, ability, experience, social position
Lindenberg social production function
Base assumptions
- General economic assumption that individual actors behave as if they were trying to maximize their utility
- Also assumes ultimate preferences or how he calls them “universal goals”, such as physical well-being & social approval: Every human being has the desire for physical well-being and social approval, independent of time and place
Lindenberg social production function
Why production?
there is an input and output
Lindenberg social production function
Conditions of production
- elements of social structure and construction of society
- culture = characteristic social production functions for various social positions in various social situations’ (Lindenberg, 1989: 190)
- fits closely with the concept of cultural goals defined by Merton (1967) since the (cultural) rules of production determine which things are ‘worth striving for’
Lindenberg social production function
What do you need to put in to get social approval?
- depends on which society you live in at which times, varies quite a bit from society to society and times to times, in some society it is prestige in others income is more important
- HOWEVER, it does not mean that the universal goal, here social approval, has changed
Lindenberg social production function
Analogy to crime
We won’t say a person is psychologically ill, at least not as first explanation, rather as sociologists we assume they have the same universal goals as we do and so we ask ourselves why is a criminal reaction the most adequate response for them -> quite humanistic view
Lindenberg social production function
View on society
- society = chain of production, in which lower-level goods/goals are invested in order to produce higher-level goods/goals
- input factors are instrumental to production, so they become goals (intermediate goals) themselves
- Everyone tries to be happy, but one cannot always choose one’s own way rather must deal with social constraints -> view of society as constraining people’s choices
- Produces a high level of conformism as straying away from productive way might lead to sanctions/inefficiency
Lindenberg social production function
Alternative to “Investment”
“Consumption” view of human behavior, more fruitful to think of consumption as production, we constantly consume to produce
Example: studying law to become a lawyer, consume brands to produce status
Lindenberg social production function
Hierarchy of social production function + Inequality
- Same idea but more comprehensive depiction: Hierarchy of social production function (vgl. Ormel et al. 1999)
- People differ in the kind of resources they have and can(not) accumulate through their investments which allow for a better/worse need satisfaction –> that’s ultimately why inequality is a problem, some people can live a fulfilled life while others struggle with a low level of subjective well-being
Lindenberg social production function
How can we use hierarchy theoretically?
- Assuming stable higher-order goals, one can use price theory (substitution analysis) to explain changes in behavior (e.g., due to retirement, unemployment)
- Example:
1. How will high-status employees react to retirement? Retirement = external shock loss of status, bc can no longer exercise power & status in occupational field. As social well-being was impacted, the person has to find other ways (substitutes) to fill the void, i.e. through crazy dinner parties or becoming head of the local tennis club, but highly dependent on resources s.o. is equipped with
2. Also useful to understand how different immigrant groups have different strategies not due to culture but bc have different resources (i.e. language, legal status, social networks) and trying to make the best out of those
RCT and Abstraction
One can criticize them in many aspects but RCTs know about the value of abstraction (informational content)
-> willing to disregard certain empirical details (aspects, dimensions) to better fulfill explanatory goals
How & why of abstraction
- How: model-building always means to abstract from empirical details (i.e. map of Germany –> disregard details like trees)
- Ultimate goal: Generate informative and testable implications (when abstract models fail aka implications contradict data, slowly and cautiously replace with more accurate assumptions, e.g., Lindenberg 1992).
Household production model
Assumption 5
Iannaconne analyzes isolated household decisions like church attendance, financial contributions (consciously disregarding interactions & equilibria - there is no strategic interaction in the manner of “I’m not donating bc my neighbors already give so much”
Assumption 5: Individuals/households produce religious commodities by combining money input (for goods and services) + time input
- Testable implication (applying the principle of input substitution): The higher the value of time, the more likely it is that the household will substitute time-saving money-intense forms of production for time-intense money-saving forms
- Meaning: Rich people will invest more money than time as their time is more “valuable”, again about opportunity costs, one could spend the same time making more money therefore more likely to give money than time
Skewness of Giving
Usage of Implication of Assumption 5
Used implication of Ass. 5 to explain: “Skewness of giving” (macro level phenomenon) - 20% of church members account for 80% of financial support, highly skewed (even more than income distribution)
How are rel. commodities produced?
Production function of rel. commodities = f (church attendance, financial contributions)
- Higher income = higher financial expenditures
- Time investment = less sensitive to income
- Propensity to consume religious commodities = largely independent of income
–> high income household will have more expensive vacations but not longer ones. Analogy to church: you will give more, but you won’t spend more time there
Skewness of Giving
Why is it so skewed?
- Church attendance only dependent on underlying religiosity WHILE financial contribution depends on: Household income & underlying religiosity (multiplicative relationship!, i.e. if religiosity = 0, there will be no dollar contribution)
- Furthermore, 2 additional empirical facts:
1. Income distribution = skewed
2. Product of distribution of independent, non-negative distributions will be even more skewed than underlying distributions
Skewness of Giving
3 observable factors
- Percentage rate of giving varies immensely across households
- Income also varies across households
- Little correlation between the amount of income + share of income it donates
Experience effects of household model
Assumption 6 & 7
Additional assumptions to add some realism to model:
- Assumption 6: As individuals and households produce religious commodities, they also accumulate a stock of “religious human capital” that enhances the satisfaction they derive from subsequent religious activity.
- Assumption 7: Most religious human capital is “context specific,” enhancing the real or perceived value of the particular activities, group, and religion that occasioned its accumulation.
Experience effects of household model
Testable implications + critique
- Denominational mobility: rather unlikely, because very costly, most prevalent between similar denominations
- Religious intermarriage: most prevalent between similar denominations
- Timing of conversions: at young ages
- Age-profile of religiosity: participation increases as people get older as religious capital had time to accumulate and participation can become more productive, old people substitute their work relationships with religious community
- Critique: testable implications are no “surprise”, if strong religious identity and strongly embedded socially, already follow - not necessarily specific from RCT
2nd model:
From risks to religious groups
Assumption 8, 9 and 10
Assumption 8: “Most religious commodities are risky, promising large but uncertain benefits.”
Assumption 9: “Collective production tends to reduce the risk and raise the value associated with religious activities.”
- Also other side effects: information about business opportunity, meet interesting people or potentially partner
Assumption 10: “Collective religious activities are susceptible to free-rider problems.”
- People just consume (i.e. free and valuable information, interesting people and opportunities) and don’t contribute as much to Church
Religious groups are important (i.e. for credibility) but difficult to maintain -> how can religious groups solve free-rider problem?
- Introduction of costly demand (time, rituals, dress in a specific way which increases intergroup anxiety, so automatically others will not approach you) = leaves only the strongly committed & rules out half-hearted members + increases demand for internal substitutes for less feasible external consumption (social barrier to mainstream society, i.e. internal rather than external parties)
- So, participation and commitment increases even further -> self-feeding process by which strict churches “survive” through time and flourish (evolutionary argument)
3rd model: Religious market model
Assumption 12
Assumption 12: Churches are profit-maximizing firms that specialize in production of religious goods/services, motivated by same sort of self-interest like secular workers
* Iannaconne says himself that very unlikely but included for the sake of model - rather rare in other parts of sociology
Competition vs Monopoly
- where consumers are free to choose –> shape religious commodities + structure of institutions
- more visible where less regulated & highly competitive as more competition -> catering to the demands of religious people which will vitalize religiousness of people
3rd model: Religious market model
USA
US has not always been religious country but evolved over time bc there has been fierce competition of religious groups
3rd model: Religious market model
Scandinavia
Very different with monopoly churches like Scandinavia where almost everyone is a member by birth but no one attends church, churches don’t need to cater to needs of population
Final words
- Different models that make different simplifying assumptions but strong methodological reasons to do so: testable implications - very different from other sociological approaches
- There is a virtue to being abstract, building on simple models, trying to understand implications, can be very fruitful. If model doesn’t hold, add complexity later on and progress
Lindenberg’s assimilation argument
In the receiving country immigrants are confronted with social production functions that are already valid and often different from those in their home country, to produce higher-level goals as efficiently as the natives, immigrants must bring the same input. As a result, assuming they are equally interested in physical well-being and social approval, they will, in principle, have to follow similar investment strategies concerning lower-level goals
- Economic assimilation: o If we assume immigrants are interested in fair amounts of income, status, and prestige, it can be expected that they invest according to the valid rules in the labour market, therefore seeking the same skills or resources and aspiring to the same jobs as the natives in the course of time
- Assimilation concerning family behavior: Act of migration (especially education) will presumably lead to a fundamental change in the evaluation of parity (No. of children) and/or in the relative value attributed to children
- Spatial assimilation: As the degree of acculturation (language skills, values, and manners) and socio-economic status rise, immigrants are more and more likely to seek the same amenities as the natives do, i.e. schools (as well-educated children are instrumental to social approval). Over time, immigrants try to settle in neighborhoods where better schools are located typically located in the suburbs where the majority population predominates
