EXAM The Road To War Flashcards
What were the long term consequences of the peace treaties for Turkey?
t is important to remember that the Treaty of Versailles was not the only peace treaty concluded at the end of WWI. The Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey soon became unenforceable after the rise to power of the able leader Mustafa Kemal ‘Ataturk’, who was nationalistic and competently militaristic. It could be argued that the main long- term consequence of its having been drawn up in the first place was that Turkey was not tempted to side with Germany in WWII: the Turks remembered the high cost of losing in WWI
What were the long term consequences of the Peace Treaties for Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria?
The Treaties with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria (which all involved loss of territory, de-militarisation and punitive reparations) had serious long-term consequences. They left a legacy of bitterness and resentment at perceived injustice that led to extreme nationalist movements in these countries in the 1930s, determined to ‘recover’ lands believed to have been lost. The name given to these movements, whether they were Fascist, Nazi or extreme nationalist in nature, is irredentist movements (i.e. movements which wanted to redeem – that is, recover – lost lands). The ultimate long-term consequence was that Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria all fought on the Nazi side in WWII. Austria had no choice, as it was incorporated into the Reich in 1938, but it could be argued that one consequence of the peace treaties was that there was significant support for Hitler and Anschluss in Austria. In Central Europe and the Balkans, therefore, one important consequence was lack of support for the League of Nations, the creation of which had been written into opening clauses of all the peace treaties.
What were the long term consequences of the peace Treaties for Germany?
Regarding Germany and the Treaty of Versailles, the long-term consequences of the Paris Peace Treaty can hardly be understated. The key clauses explain most of Hitler’s foreign policy between 1933 and 1939: he sought to reverse the terms of the Treaty one by one. Accomplishing this was basic to achieving his remaining foreign policy goals of expanding in Eastern Europe, gaining Lebensraum or ‘living space’ there, and destroying the USSR, which he was convinced was a Jewish- Communist menace to the survival of western civilisation. Promising to reverse the terms of the Treaty of Versailles had helped Hitler to win a degree of support before the Great Depression and mass support during it. One long term consequence of the Treaty therefore was the cross-party resentment they caused in Germany. Almost all Germans wanted rearmament, wanted the Anschluss, wanted the return of the Saar coalfields and the Anschluss. The military clauses of the Treaty were being broken in secret almost from the beginning in the 1920s – not by Hitler, but by the Weimar Republic. Hitler was able to take the concept of Anschluss a stage further with his concept of a greater ‘Reich’ (i.e. empire) incorporating all German-speakers, even those in the Sudetenland, who had never been part of Germany before.
What did the Western democracies think about the Treaty of Versailles?
Here, the most dangerous long-term consequence for the future of international peace was the residual guilt felt by public and politicians. Fuelled by books like Keynes’ on the negative economic consequences, this guilt contributed to dangerous sympathy for Hitler’s foreign policy demands at key moments where he might have been resisted successfully (e.g. over re-armament and the re- militarisation of the Rhineland).
Why was there resentment of the Treaty of Versailles from Italy and Japan?
Finally, another long-term consequence of the Treaty of Versailles was the resentment felt by powers like Italy and Japan, who – rightly or wrongly – arrived at the Paris Peace Conference with a sense of entitlement that was not fulfilled. This helps explain why these countries aligned with Germany during the critical decade of the 1930s, as seen in the Rome-Berlin Axis agreement of 1936 and the Anti-Comintern Pacts of 1936 and 1937. The fear that Italy and Japan might align with Germany, and then the knowledge that they had, were contributing factors to the British and French policy of appeasement, because Britain and France believed they could not fight against Germany in Western Europe and defend their Mediterranean and Far East empires against Italy and Japan at the same time.
Increasing Militarism in Japan?
The beliefs of the Japanese army commanders (who admired the Nazis and Fascists) were similar, in that war is the supreme test of a nation. The greatest glory for the individual citizen was to die for the fatherland in battle: to commit an act of military self-sacrifice for the nation. During the 1930s, Japanese society became increasingly militarised as a direct result of government policy. Japan used propaganda and control of education to try to change the way that society thought about war. Japan had left the LoN in February 1933. The philosophy of the League of Nations was to maintain international peace through collective security: any state leaving it had other views about how international relations should be conducted (i.e. that war instead of peace was the natural state of affairs). In Japan, where over-population and a lack of raw materials created a similar misplaced sense of Lebensraum-entitlement to that which existed in Germany and Italy, there was resentment at the presence of European empires in Asia: these white- ruled empires occupied the very lands where Japan could take what she needed to survive. Japanese General and Education Minister, Sadao Araki, a leading right- wing nationalist, made sure the army’s nationalist, warlike agenda was taught in schools during the 1930s. Japan increased military expenditure and capacity. No less dangerously, they also devoted significant resources and time to changing the way that their citizens thought about war, and increasing their willingness to fight as required. The extent to which they succeeded can be measured in the willingness of the younger generation who came through the educational system to kill without mercy and carry out atrocities,
Increasing militarism in Germany?
For most of the 1930s, Germany was ruled by Nazis, Nazism and Fascism are ideologies which exalt and glorify war, believing that war is the supreme test of a nation. The greatest glory for the individual citizen was to die for the fatherland in battle: to commit an act of military self-sacrifice for the nation.
In Germany, Hitler set up the Hitler Youth, which did live weapons training. The equivalent for girls (the League of German Maidens) stressed the importance of fitness for motherhood, to bear sons for the Reich to replace those killed in war.
During the 1930s, German, Italian and Japanese societies became increasingly militarised as a direct result of government policy. It isn’t just that the armies/navies/air forces increased significantly in size, though they did – for example, Hitler expanded the German Army in secret from 100,000 to 300,000 men and then declared it publicly in 1935, when he calculated his position was strong enough to allow him to do so, staging an open-air rally to celebrate the fact. He also increased Germany’s warships from 30 just before he came to power to 95 in 1939. Air power was crucial to ‘Blitzkrieg’ (lightning war) tactics, so he increased the Luftwaffe from 36 planes to over 8,000 war planes by 1939. This was made possible by a massive increase in military spending which distorted the economy (by 1939, over 23% of GDP was being spend on armaments). But weapons are useless if people are unwilling to carry them. Just as significant (arguably more significant) is the fact that the governments of Germany, Italy and Japan used propaganda and control of education to try to change the way that society thought about war. It is important when discussing increasing militarism not just to focus on the build-up of weaponry. Important as a statement of Hitler’s outlook and intent are the decisions he took in October 1933 to withdraw German delegates from the Disarmament Conference in Geneva and then from the League of Nations itself. The philosophy of the League of Nations was to maintain international peace through collective security: any state leaving it had other views about how international relations should be conducted (i.e. that war instead of peace was the natural state of affairs). Hitler gave as his reason for withdrawal the refusal of the Western powers to agree to Germany’s demands for military parity with the other major powers. But the deeper reason is that without military parity (by which he meant the freedom to acquire military superiority), Germany could not hope to wage war on the scale that the achievement of Nazi goals required. How else, for example, was Hitler to acquire Lebensraum in the East, or deliver western civilization from what he believed was the threat of the Jewish-Communist conspiracy to take over the world?
Italy, Germany and Japan increased military expenditure and capacity. No less dangerously, they also devoted significant resources and time to changing the way that their citizens thought about war, and increasing their willingness to fight as required.
Increasing militarism in Italy?
During the 1930s, German, Italian and Japanese societies became increasingly militarised as a direct result of government policy. the governments of Germany, Italy and Japan used propaganda and control of education to try to change the way that society thought about war. In Italy, Mussolini put militaristic slogans on huge billboards:
“It is better to live one day as a lion than a hundred years as a sheep.”
“Believe. Obey. Fight.”
These slogans reflect the Fascist belief that the nation should obey the orders of its leader-figure without question and fight for the fatherland when needed. The Italian people (and above all the youth of Italy) were being militarised as a matter of state policy.
What was the Saar?
Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the Saar region of Germany was to be administered by the League of Nations for 15 years, after which a plebiscite (i.e. a vote) would be held among the people living there, to allow them to decide whether or not they wished to return to Germany. A major part of the reason for this term of the peace treaty was that France wanted compensation for her losses during WW1: making the German miners in the rich coalfields of the Saar work for them for fifteen years seemed a good way of getting it. During the 1920s, after Germany had defaulted on a reparations payment, France had sent troops into the Saar region. The German workers had hated working for the French, and strikes and violence had flared up. By 1935, there were two key changes to the situation:
• Hitler and the Nazis had come to power in Germany in 1933
• Since 1933, thousands of anti-Nazis had moved to the Saar, as it was
the only part of Germany still not ruled by the Nazis
What was the result of the Saar?
The election was scheduled for January 13th, 1935. It took place in an atmosphere of intimidation and violence. The Communists and Social Democrats in the Saar had formed a ‘united front’ campaign to try to retain League of Nations status. Saar Nazis, allied with the right-wing Saar Police and helped by the Gestapo, beat them up. Hitler was genuinely scared he might lose the vote.
The League of Nations knew this was going on, but it was afraid to stop the vote in case it led to Nazi-inspired riots. The Nazis grew bolder. Led by Spaniol, 17,000 Nazi Saarlanders who had gone back to Germany to join the SA threatened to invade the Saar and impose Nazi rule. Britain threatened to send troops to prevent this from happening and the British bluff was not called.
The plebiscite was held on the 13th January 1935. It was judged to be a fair vote by international observers. 90.8% of voters wished to be part of Germany. 8.8% voted to remain under a League of Nations mandate. Only 0.4% voted to become part of France. Hitler declared that “This is the first of the injustices of Versailles to be reversed.”
What was the significance of the Saar plebiscite?
• Hitler’s popularity increased in Germany.
• Hitler’s credibility was boosted: a hated term of the Treaty of Versailles
had been reversed and Hitler received the credit for it. The recovery of
the Saar region made him seem like a man who kept his promises.
• The achievement did not cost Germany in lives or money. It had the air of
a military achievement, without actually being one. This was perfect for Hitler in 1935, because he was still limited in what he could do by the military restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles.
• It could be argued that the Saar plebiscite provided further evidence of the weakness of the League of Nations, which did nothing to stop the intimidation of voters and violence against them. This was noted by the Nazis.
What was the Remilitarisation of the Rhineland?
Soon after coming to power in 1933, Hitler began breaking the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, moving cautiously each time to see what he could get away with. In secret, he tripled the size of Germany’s army (reduced at Versailles to 100,000 men) and then openly announced it in 1935. When nothing was done by Britain and France, he re- introduced conscription. As he got away with more, he gradually became bolder. Good at sensing fear, he was equally good at exploiting it. In 1935, he recovered the Saar. Next on his list was the re-occupation or re-militarisation of the Rhineland.
One of the most bitterly resented terms of the Treaty of Versailles was the term that forbade Germany to keep troops in the Rhineland. For the sake of French security, this zone on the Franco-German border was kept de-militarised. Hitler had originally thought he might have to wait until 1937 before he was strong enough to do this, as it was taking time to re-build the Germany army to a credible fighting force, but international events played into his hands:
What political events allowed Hitler to remilitarise the Rhineland?
In particular, Italy became involved in a controversial war in Abyssinia. This kept her occupied in Africa, and also worsened her relations with Britain and France. So Hitler suspected he could bring his plans forward in time, as he would not face a united front from Britain, France and Italy.
• Also, Britain and France had been hit by the Great Depression and wished to avoid war.
• Another key factor was Hitler’s awareness that most people in Britain did not see why Germany should not have troops in any part of her own country. Would Britain support military action by France if Hitler sent troops into the Rhineland? It might be worth gambling that she would not. And if Britain refused to help, would France do anything on her own?
What was the result of the Rhineland remilitarisation?
In April 1936, he sent a token force into the Rhineland, with strict orders to withdraw if it met with resistance. There was no resistance. Hitler, to his surprise and delight, realized that he had got away with it.
What were the consequences of the remilitarisation of the Rhineland?
- Hitler achieved another major foreign policy triumph, boosting his popularity and credibility within Germany; again, as with the Saar crisis, he seemed to be a man who kept his word that he would reverse the hated terms of the Treaty of Versailles. This was a bigger success than the Saar Crisis, because France at least and Britain too could have been expected to use military force to resist the re-militarisation. It was also a bigger success than the Saar Crisis because the de-militarisation of the Rhineland was a term of the Treaty of Versailles that was more bitterly resented.
- Hitler became bolder in his foreign policy. His contempt for western democracies increased. Britain and France had been too scared to oppose him when their own interests were directly at stake. Why should they oppose him as he moved gradually east, reversing the terms of the Treaty of Versailles as he went?
What was the build up to the Spanish civil war?
In 1936, a general election in Spain returned a coalition government (i.e. a government made up of many different parties). The groups which united to form the government were the liberals, the socialists, the communists and the anarchists. Extreme right- wingers in Spain refused to accept the result of the election. Later that year, the army rose in rebellion against the government. This revolt was supported by the landowning aristocracy of Spain and also by the Catholic Church. Three generals led the revolt, but the one who soon emerged as the overall leader was Francisco Franco, the commander of the Spanish Foreign legion, which was based in Africa. To make the revolt against the legally-elected government effective, Franco had to find a way of transporting his army from Africa to Spain. He could not go by sea, because the Spanish Navy had stayed loyal to the government. Therefore, he approached Hitler, requesting that the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) provide planes to transport over 15,000 troops. Hitler’s initial response was a cautious one. Yet he soon agreed to the request for aid.
Why did Hitler intervene in Spain?
• The Spanish Civil War offered Hitler a chance to try out new weapons and tactics and men: this made military sense, given that Germany was now rearming seriously
• Hitler calculated that fighting on the same side as Mussolini would bring the Italian dictator closer to himself and pull him further away from Britain and France. This was vital for the Anschluss because it had been Mussolini’s decision to move troops to the Italo-Austrian border which had prevented it happening in 1934
• Anti-Communism: Franco, like Hitler, was anti-communist. Fighting in Spain alongside Franco’s troops allowed Hitler to prove his boast that he was one of the world’s leading enemies of communism. It is important to bear in mind that it was not only Fascists and Nazis who were anti-communist in the 1930s. Many right-wing democrats were strongly opposed to communism, as was the Catholic Church. Sending aid to Franco won Hitler good publicity in some
circles, as well as bad publicity in other circles
• Useful future allies: Hitler was well aware of the fact that Spain had a border
with France. Being on the winning side in Spain could be of benefit later, if there was a general war in Europe, as Spain might fight on Hitler’s side, or at least allow German armies to operate from Spain in a war against France
• Raw materials: Hitler hoped to drive a hard bargain and force Franco to supply him with raw materials his re-armament programme lacked, such as iron, copper and mercury
What was the double game Hitler played in the Spanish civil war?
Hitler now played a double game. In public, he signed a Non-Intervention Agreement in September 1936, in which, together with Britain, France, Italy and the Soviet Union, he agreed not to get involved in the war. Behind the scenes, he smuggled military aid to the so-called ‘Nationalists’ via Portugal.
What help did Hitler provide in the Spanish Civil War?
Basically, Hitler provided quality in sufficient quantity. Mussolini, by contrast,
merely provided quantity.
• Transport planes: in July 1936, Hitler provided about 30 transport planes which took over 15,000 troops of the Spanish Foreign Legion from Africa to Spain. This was of fundamental importance, as it made the revolt a military reality.
• Once it became clear that Franco was not going to win a quick victory (due to the timely arrival of the ‘International Brigades’ to prevent the capital city, Madrid, from falling), Hitler provided the ‘Condor Legion’ (below), an integrated fighting force (i.e. a force which had its own planes, tanks and men – this made it easier to co-ordinate attacks). During the three years of the war, about 20,000 German soldiers served in Spain in the Condor Legion. Mussolini sent 60,000 men, but they were poor in quality.
• The German contribution was vital to Franco’s success, as it helped him to control the skies for much (though not all) of the conflict. Also, German troops fought in all the major offensives, including the last great Republican attack of the war, the Ebro River offensive of 1938, which the German helped to halt.
• As prototype planes were produced by major German companies like Heinkel, Junkers and Messerschmitt, they were immediately sent out to Spain to be tested and refined. This helped to counteract the effect of the new Soviet planes that Stalin was sending to help the Republican government. A total of 16,953,700 kilos of bombs was dropped by the Condor Legion, which shows just how much help was given.
• The Condor Legion embarrassed Franco by carrying out an experiment in ‘terror bombing’ at the small market-town of Guernica. The outrage led to the Republican government commissioning the artist Pablo Picasso – then living in Paris - to do his famous painting (see separate sheet).
What did Hitler gain from involvement in the Spanish Civil War?
- Invaluable military practice and knowledge: the tactics which the Condor Legion tried out in Spain were refined into the Blitzkrieg=’Lightning War’ tactics which Hitler used to overrun Western Europe in World War II and to achieve spectacular early success on the Eastern Front during the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.
- Military prestige: this boosted Hitler’s standing, as he had been on the winning side, and his help had been one of the main reasons for Franco’s victory.
- This military prestige had important political and diplomatic consequences. Images of the bombing of Guernica were shown all over the world and helped to reinforce the widespread belief that ‘the bomber will always get through’. During the negotiations which led to the ‘Munich Agreement’ to give the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia to Hitler, the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was conscious (too conscious?) of the damage that Hitler’s bombers could do to British cities.
- Raw materials: Franco drove a hard bargain (Hitler once said that he would rather have four teeth extracted than face another meeting with the Spanish general) but Hitler’s rearmament programme benefited from raw materials he would otherwise have lacked.
- Hitler’s credibility as an opponent of communism received a major boost: from 1936 until the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, Hitler seemed to practice what he preached when it came to fighting communism. This seemed crucial to anti- communists the world over, as Stalin was helping the Republic.
- As Hitler had foreseen, Mussolini’s involvement in Spain brought him closer to Hitler and further away from Britain and France. This made it easier for Hitler to re-militarise the Rhineland in 1936, and also to achieve the Anschluss at the second attempt in 1938.
- Strategic gains: final victory for Franco in March 1939 meant that France had three Fascist/Nazi/Extreme Right-Wing regimes on her borders: Italy, Germany, and Spain.
What was the Anschluss?
Anschluss is a German word which can mean either ‘union’ or ‘annexation’. Both senses of the term have been used to describe what happened between Germany and Austria in 1938. The Nazis (and their sympathisers) claimed it was a ‘union’, but opponents, pointing to the ways in which force was applied between 1934 and 1938, argue that ‘annexation’ is the more appropriate sense of the term.
