Exam Prep Flashcards

1
Q

Name ways to measure inequality

A
  • Gini
  • Percentile based measurement: 90 - 50
    -Variance based measurement: log - var
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2
Q

What is the PIH? Give some intuition to the theory.

A

Permanent Income Hypothesis: consumers consume approximately the same level of consumption over their lifetime.
Intuition: the agent spreads initial wealth + human capital evenly across all periods and consumes its annuity value (thus, he probably borrows at the beginning of the lifetime, then saves and dissaves after retirement)

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3
Q

How do we introduce uncertainty in the model as discussed in class?

A

Through income (y)

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4
Q

Name the budget constraint for the model as discussed in class. Explain each component.

A

a_t = (1+r) a_ (t-1) + y_t - c_t
a: savings
y: income
c: consumption
r: return

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5
Q

Write and explain the typical model with which we could measure and investigate the PIH (with income uncertainty)

A

Maximize:
max {c_t, a_t} E_0 Σ (from t=0 to T) β^t u(c_t)

Subject to:
a_t = (1 + r) a_{t-1} + y_t - c_t, for all t in {0,1, …, T}

a_T ≥ 0

a_{-1} given

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6
Q

Explain the difference between the deterministic and the stochastic approach.

A

Deterministic: no income uncertainty
Stochastic: includes income uncertainty, thus we have to work with expectation operators

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7
Q

What is the Euler for the deterministic model? What does it imply?

A

u’(c_t) = ß (1+r) u’(c_(t+1))
- This characterises the optimal decision. Typically ß (impatience) <1, (1+r) is the price of moving consumption across periods (r is small positive number)
- c_0 determines the entire consumption path until period T (higher c_0 implies higher uniform consumption profile)
- c_0 must be picked s.t. budget constraint is satisfied and a_T = 0

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8
Q

What is the consolidated budget constraint in the deterministic model? Explain the equation.

A

Σ c_t/(1+r)^t = w_0 + Σ y_t/(1+r)^t
This is the present value of total consumption equals the sum of PVs of total income and initial wealth.

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9
Q

What is the consumption in period t in a deterministic model given that (1+r)ß = 1?

A

c_t = R_0 [w_0 + Σ y_s/(1+r)^s]
where R_0 = Σ 1/(1+r)^s

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10
Q

Does PIH hold in the real world? If yes, how? If no, where does it fail?

A
  • consumption tracks labor income over the lifecycle (consumption is hump-shaped)
  • consumption drops at retirement (consumption retirement puzzle)
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11
Q

What fixes have been proposed to move from the PIH?

A
  • introduce uncertainty & borrowing constraints
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12
Q

Explain the stochastic life-cycle model using z_t to introduce uncertainty. State the assumptions and the model specifications.

A

Problem: consumption in next period depends on income in last period
Let z_t = [ k_1, …, k_t] be the history of all relevant variables up to period t and pi(z_t ) be the unconditional probability of z_t realizing.
Then,
E [u(c_t)] = Σ pi (z_t) u(c_t (z_t))
a_t (z_t) = a_(t-1) (z_t-1) (1+r) + y_t(1+r) - c_t(z_t)

We then sum over all histories that are a continutation of z_t

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13
Q

What is the Euler equation of the stochastic model? Give some intuition.

A

u’(c_t(z_t)) = ß (1+r) Σ pi(z_(t+1)/ pi (z_t) u’(c_(t+1)(z_(t+1))
Simplified: u’(c_t) = ß(1+r) E( u’(c_(t+1))
Where the RHS term in the conditional expectation of the marginal utility

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14
Q

What is the stochastic model with quadratic utility? Give the utility function, the Euler and the implication about consumption growth.

A

Utility function: u(c) = - (c - č)^2
Euler: u’(c_t) = ß (1+r) E_t[u’(c_(t+1)]
Implication about consumption: c_t = E_t(c_(t+1)
Thus, consumption growth: c_t+1 - c_ t = c_t+1 - E_t(c_t+1) –> is the forecast error

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15
Q

Explain the model as introduced by Campbell & Mankiw (1989). State their hypothesis, the model and their findings. Give an interpretation of their findings.

A

Hypothesis: (1)hand-to_mouth consumers (lambda) & (2) PIH consumers ( 1- lambda)
Model: based on consumption growth
change in consumption = lambda change of c(1) + (1- lambda) change of c(2) = lambda change of y + (1 - lambda) e_t
Test: regress consumption growth on income growth and see if lambda = 0
Findings: lambda somewhere between 0.35 - 0.7
Interpretation: there is a substantial fraction of hand-to-mouth consumers (or a substantial failure of the PIH)

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16
Q

Give an intuition why consumption is less cyclical than GDP?

A

People save to self-insure against negative income shocks.

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17
Q

State the lifecycle model with borrowing limits (but not income uncertainty. Give an intuition on how we expand our model.
Also write up the Lagrangian and the resulting Euler.

Give some intuition on the parameters and the model.

A

Maximize:
max {c_t, a_t} Σ (from t=0 to T) β^t u(c_t)

Subject to:
a_t = (1 + r) a_{t-1} + y_t - c_t, for all t in {0,1, …, T}

a_T ≥ 0
a_t>= - b_t –> this gives an upper limit to debt
a_{-1} given

Lagrangian: L =Σ (from t=0 to T) ß^t {c(c_t) + lambda_t [(1 + r) a_{t-1} + y_t - c_t - a_t] + mu_t [ a_t + b_t]}
Euler: u’(c_t) - mu_t >= ß (1+r) u’(c_t+1)

Intuition:
- marginal utility might be lower in the next period than now
- this can happen with borrowing limits
- complementary slackness: if mu = 0 –> model w/o borrowing constraints, mu >0: borrowing constraint is binding, you eat everything you can (and still not consume enough today)

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18
Q

Explain the model as introduced by Zeldes (1989). Specifically, explain the utility function, give our testable version of the Euler equation (as derived from stochastic Euler), explain this more complicated model specification by Zeldes:

ln( c_t+1/c_t) = X_tß + gamma ln (1+r) + v_t + ln (1 + lambda)

A

Model: with income uncertainty
Utility function: with preference shifter Θ: U(c,Θ) = c^(1-a) / (1-a) * E(Θ)
Testable Euler: 1 = (ßE_t ( (1+r) u*(c_t+1)))/u’(c_t) *(1 + lambda’_t)
where lambda’ denotes stuff that we cannot measure (so the entire term around mu)

His version:
X: controls
r: interest
v: error term
lambda: unobservables

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19
Q

Explain the three tests as used by Zeldes. Also elaborate on how he does about testing these.

A

Process: creation of two samples using PSID
Sample 1: low wealth to income ratio, borrowing constraints hold
Sample 2: high ratio, borrowing constraints do not hold

Test 1: Does the log of disposable income enter the equation significantly?
–> current income does not influence consumption growth if PIH holds
–> high current income influences consumption growth negatively if borrowing constraints hold (y up, c_t up, c_t+1/c_t down)
Results: confirm borrowing constraints story

Test 2: Sum of residuals from regression should be positive for constrained agents
1) Estimate coefficients for group 2
2) Using the coefficients, compute the residuals in sample 1
3) Average residuals over population
Results: weakly significant positive residuals

Test 3: when income is larger (all else equal), borrowing constraints should bind less
- regress residuals for group 1 and test whether sign is negative, tells us the sign of the correlation between lambda and y
Results: confirms the borrowing constraints hypothesis

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20
Q

State the full consumption-saving model with uncertainty & borrowing constraints using the notation with histories (not in Bellman notation).

A

V_0 (z_0) = max {c_s(Z_s), a_s(z_s} Σ (from s=0 to T) pi(z_s) β^s u(c_s(z_s)

Subject to:
a_s(z_s) = (1 + r) a_{s-1}(z_t-1) + y_s(z_s) - c_s(z_s), for all s in {0,1, …, T}

a_T(z_T) ≥ 0
a_s(z_s) >= - b
a_{-1} given

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21
Q

State the Bellman equation for the full consumption-saving model with uncertainty & borrowing constraints using z as the state variable. Give some intuition about the equation.

A

V_t (z_t) = max {c_t(z_t), a_t(z_t} {u(c_t(z_t) + ßE_t(V_(t+1) (z_(t+1)}

Subject to:
a_t(z_t) = (1 + r) a_{t-1}(z_(t-1) + y_t(z_t) - c_t(z_t)
a_t(z_t) >= - b

Intuition: V_t+1 incorporates everything about the future effects of your choice you need to care about

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22
Q

Give the Bellman equation for the for the full consumption-saving model with uncertainty & borrowing constraints using wealth and income as the state variables. Give some intuition.

A

V_t (a_(t-1), y_t) = max {c_t(a_(t-1), y_t) >= b {u((1+r)a_(t-1) + y_t - a_t) + ßE_t(V_(t+1) (a_(t-1), y_t))}

Subject to:
a_t(a_(t-1), y_t)) = (1 + r) a_{t-1} + y_t - c_t
a_t(a_(t-1), y_t) >= - b

The current policy is a function of the current state (a_(t-1), y_t))

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23
Q

Now, give the Bellman equation for the for the full consumption-saving model with uncertainty & borrowing constraints using cash-on-hand as the state variables. Give some intuition.

A

Intuition: we do not care about where our resources come from, we just care how much we have

Let coh: x t = (1+r) a(t-1) + y_t

V_t (x_t) = max {c_t,a_t {u(c_t) + ßE_t(V_(t+1) (x_t))}

Subject to:
a_t = x_t - c_t
x_(t+1) = (1+r) a_t + y_(t+1)
a_t >= - b

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24
Q

How do you solve the consumption-saving model using the Bellman equation?

A

Intuition: you solve the value functions backwards
1) Solve for period T: a_t(x_T) = 0, c_T(x_T) = x_t and V_T(x_T) = u (x_T)
2) Solve for T -1: V_T-1(x_T-1) = max {a_T-1 {u(x_T-1 - a_T-1) + ßE_T-1(V_T (a_T-1(1+r) - y_T))}

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25
Define the consumption-savings model with an infinite horizon and give the Bellman equation for it. Give an intuition on how to solve it
maximize: E_0 Σ (from t=0 to infinity) β^t u(c_t) Bellman: v(x) = max {a >= -b} { u (x-a) +ß E [V(a(1+r) + y')} Intuition: start with a policy guess and iterate back wards until the value functions for t and t+1 look similar
26
Why do borrowing constraints not explain everything we see in the data?
Borrowing constraints either lead to: - non-borrowing constrained: perfect smoothing (looks like no borrowing constraint) - constraint is binding: agents eat everything they can
27
What effect does income uncertainty have on agents with quadratic preferences?
Income uncertainty has not effect on consumption decisions
28
What effect does income uncertainty have on agents with CRRA utility?
- Uncertainty decreases consumption for young agents - increases savings (decreases debt)
29
Why do we care about uncertainty in income? Give some intuition.
- welfare is affected: income fluctuations means less smooth consumption and lower utility (risk aversion tells you how big the effect is) - Savings are affected: savings create a buffer (prudence tells you how big the effect is)
30
What is the certainty equivalent? Provide a formula and intuition.
Formula: U(CE) = E(U(x)) - certain amount of salary that would make you as happy as a random amount
31
What is the (equivalent) risk premium? Provide a formula and intuition.
U (x - RP) = E(U(x)) - depends on size of risk and how much agents dislike risk
32
Give an approximation of the risk premium
RP = - U''(E(x))/ U'(E(x)) * Var(x)/2
33
If someone is risk averse, does this automatically mean that they will save more to protect themselves from risk?
Not necessarily, that depends on the marginal utilities. Optimal decisions are unaffected by risk, if expected marginal utility in the next period would be the same w/o risk. You save more if the unhappiness from risk is lower when having more money in the next period.
34
What is the precautionary premium? Provide a formula and intuition.
Intuition: losing this amount form expected consumption leads to same decision as risky consumption. E(U'(C_t+1)) > U'(E(c_t+1)) - consuming the average value for sure leads to too low marginal utility (without uncertainty you should optimally consume less in the next period) U'(E(x) - PP) = E (U'(x)) PP = - U''(E(x))/ U'(E(X)) * Var(x)/2 where prudence is in the first term
35
What is the risk aversion and prudence of a linear utility function?
U(C) = ac Risk aversion = 0 Prudence = 0
36
What is the risk aversion and prudence of a quadratic utility function?
u(c) = - ( c - č)^2 Risk aversion = 1/ ( c - č) >0 Prudence = 0 --> risk has no effect on actions
37
What is the risk aversion and prudence of a CARA utility function?
u(c) = (1 - e)/ a ^(-ac) Risk aversion: a Prudence: a --> harm and response linked to risk does not depend on c
38
What is the risk aversion and prudence of a CRRA utility function?
u(c) = [c ^(1 - g) - 1] / (1-g) Risk aversion : g/c Prudence: (1+g)/c --> relative risk aversion is constant (g)
39
Explain the model as established by Caroll & Samwick (1998). Specifically, explain their setup, model, their regression equation and the construction of their new net worth measure. Also elaborate on the findings.
Setup: 32-50% of wealth is attributable to the extra uncertainty that some consumers face compared to lowest uncertainty group (or: how much lower would the aggregate net worth be if everyone faced the lowest income uncertainty observed?) Model: Maximize: max {c_t, a_t+1} E_0 Σ (from t=0 to T) β^t c_T^(1-g)/(1-g) Subject to: a_t = (1 + r) a_{t-1} + y_t - c_t, for all t in {0,1, ..., T} a_T ≥ 0 log (y_t) = trend + e Regression equation: log (Nw) = ß_0 + ß_1(σ_i^2) + ß_2 log (y_i) + g'X_i + mu where σ_i and y are the mean & variance of household income X is a vector of controls Construction of new net worth measure: log (NW*) = log (NW) - ^ß_1 (σ_i^2) - log ( σ_i^2 * ) where you set σ_i^2 * equal to the variance of the lowest income uncertainty group Findings: 32 - 50% depending on specification
40
What is the intuition behind the findings of Caroll & Samwick (1998). More clearly, what is the intuition behind 32-50% less net worth under the same lowest level of uncertainty for everyone?
- increasing uncertainty also increases savings ( unless quadratic utility) - in data: people with higher income uncertainty hold higher wealth
41
How does wealth inequality arise in our model economy due to income uncertainty? Provide some intuition.
- uncertain income --> savings cushion to smooth consumption - high income today --> positive savings today --> more resources in bad times - low income today --> negative savings today (agents with worse past income shocks will be poorer)
42
Explain the endogenous grid point method in contrast to value function iteration.
Value function iteration: - iterate using Bellman equation using fixed grid for cash OR - iterate using Euler equation using fixed grid for savings Endogenous grid point method: - start with a given level of savings - figure out what optimal consumption would have been - find coh with consumption and savings - interpolate to optain new consumption policy
43
Explain how impatience and precautionary savings interplay in an infinite horizons model. Explain for whom which force is stronger. What happens when we turn them off in our model?
Two economic forces in balance: - impatience: declining consumption would be optimal w/o uncertainty - precautionary savings: want wealth cushion to protect smoothness of consumption from income fluctuations Which one is stronger? Depends on coh poor: precautionary savings motive > impatience rich: precautionary savings motive < impatience --> everyone strives to the same equilibrium wealth (coh path of poor is increasing and of rich is decreasing) Turning them off: - impatience: choose ß > 1/(1+r) --> no steady state, wealth grows to infinity - uncertainty in income: wealth = 0
44
What is the natural borrowing limit in an infinite horizon model?
x_t = c_t + a_t >= - Σ min {y_s}/ (1+r) ^(s-t) = - min {y_s}/r
45
How would you do a welfare comparison between two models?
- use value function: higher V is better - solve both models - compare corresponding value functions ! preferences have to be the same across the two settings
46
How can you quantify welfare differences in a model with CRRA preferences between two models?
With CRRA utility: - imagine you are in setting B and someone increases your consumption by d% every period: E_0 Σ ß^t ((1+d)c_t)^(1-g) / (1-g) = (1+d)^(1-g) E_= Σ ß^t c_t^(1-g9/(1-g) = (1+d) ^(1-g) V_0 (b) - which d would make you indifferent between A and B? (1+d)^(1-g) V_0(b) = V_0(a) Interpretation of d: extra consumption in percents relative to optimal path
47
How to tell if Model A is better "in general"?
- compare average welfare across two economies (utilitarian welfare) - check what the majority prefers - compute consumption equivalence for everybody and take some weighted average of that
48
What is the role of financial markets?
allows to insure away some income risk
48
Describe how inequality (earnings & consumption) evolved within an age group over the life cycle. Give some intuition.
- inequalities rise with age - rise in consumption inequality is less pronounced (nature of idiosyncratic income shocks and precautionary savings) - some income variability is insured away (taxation, redistribution, savings)
49
How do Storesletten et al (STY) model income risk? Explain the components, give the formula for cross-sectional variance of the error term.
Model: log(y) = age + cohort + u_i,t where u_i,t = a_i + e_ih + z_ih and z_ih = p z_ih-1 + n_ih a: household FE e: luck (iid earnings shocks) z: persistent shocks p: tells you how quickly cov dies off var(u) = σ^2_a + σ^2_e + σ^2_n Σ p^(2j) --> shocks seem to be quite sticky in the data
50
Define a life-cycle model with realistic income risk (not uncertainty!). Explain all the parameters.
V(a,t,z_t,x_t) = max {a-t >= 0} (x_t - a_t)1(1-g)/(1-g) + q_t ß E_t V(a,t+1,z_t+1,x_t+1) s.t. x_t+1 = (1+r) a_t + y_t+1 y_t = if t<= 65 E ((a + g_t + k_t + z_t + e_t) y_t = if t > 65 B * Y where z_t = p z_t-1 + n_t a: FE g: economic growth k: age profile B: replacement ratio q: survival probability z: slow moving component
51
How did the model for income risk as discussed in class simplify the paper by STY?
These things were in STY but not our model: - GE - process for labor supply, not earnings - more sophisticated social security (pension depends on average earnings over life cycle) - taxes, balance government budget - allow for borrowing
52
How did we solve our version of the life-cycle model with income risk?
- endogenous grid point method - life-cycle model with borrowing constraints - loads realistic age profile & survival probabilities - future earnings depend on a (FE) and z (persistent) --> become state variables - continuous random variables ( a, e, n) as shocks (which need to be discretisized)
53
Explain the role of the different model components for the findings in the income risk model ( a>=0, g, social security)
- Borrowing constraints: tighter borrowing constraints (a>=0) increases consumption inequality among younger individuals - Risk aversion g: increases precautionary savings substantially (only if ß stays the same) - Social security: without social security, consumption inequality would be too high
54
What are the welfare effects of income risk?
- households would be willing to give up 27% of consumption for a world w/o income shocks over the life cycle - they would give up 20% for a world w/o initial differences but keeping shocks over the lifecycle --> uncertainty over life matters more than being born with differences --> consumption variance tells us how big share of income risk can insure away
55
Define a life-cycle model with a bequest motive. State the assumptions around this economy
V(a,t,z_t,x_t) = max {a-t >= 0} (x_t - a_t)1(1-g)/(1-g) + q_t ß E_t V(a,t+1,z_t+1,x_t+1) + (1-q) E_t Φ (x_t+1 (1-T_b)) s.t. x_t+1 = (1+r(1-T_c)) a_t + y_t+1(1-T_l) y_t = if t<= 65 E ((a + g_t + k_t + z_t + e_t) y_t = if t > 65 B * Y where z_t = p z_t-1 + n_t a_im = p_a * a_im-1 + e_a a: FE g: economic growth k: age profile B: replacement ratio q: survival probability z: slow moving component Φ: bequest utility T_c: capital income tax T_l: labor income tax T_b: bequest taxes Assumption: - closing the economy - pension is financed by: capital income, bequest taxes & labor income taxes - rest of bequest goes to child - child is 25 years younger than deceased parent - abilities are correlated across generations
56
How did our model about bequests simplify in contrast to De Nardi?
- no expectation about receiving bequests - our capital markets are closed (she has a representative firm) - annual model
57
Define the utility derived from bequests in a life-cycle model. Provide some intuition.
Φ(a) = [Φ_1 (1 + a[1 + r * (1 - r* [1 - T_c]) * (1-T_b))]/Φ_2 ^(1-g) Φ_1 & Φ_2: determine the strength of bequest motive and how much it is a luxury good This makes solving the model backwards more complicated because eating everything in the last period is not optimal anymore
58
How would we solve a life-cycle model with bequests in Julia? Specifically also refer to the government budget.
- simulate many generations - once two subsequent generations look similar, you can assume that they accurately represent a generation in this economy - Government budget: needs to be balanced, write a solution function, take a guess for T_l and solve, then compute surplus and iterate --> need to use identical death and income shocks in simulation
59
What are the results from our bequest life-cycle model? Provide some intuition.
- model with bequest motive & productivity inheritance produces quite similar to reality distribution - model has to rely on a very large number of agents with borrowing constraints (more so driven by the bottom of the distribution to generate wealth inequality) - cannot match top 1% of wealth distribution
60
Provide some intuition on how capital income can influence inequality in an economy.
- systematically different r across agents in economy --> rich people have higher r - if r was constant: wealth inequality cannot be larger than earnings distribution - if r is random (or varies): top wealth inequality can be high even with low earnings inequality
61
Explain the idea and assumptions behind the model by Blundell et al. (BPP).
- both earnings and consumption inequality grew a lot in the 80s, then the growth stopped. Consumption inequality flattened out sooner - decompose changes in earnings risk among transitory & permanent income shocks - measure to what extend people can shelter their consumption from income shocks
62
Define the model for income shocks as used by Blundel et al. (BPP).
Model: regress log income and consumption on observables and work with residuals y_it = z_it + e_it and z_it = z_it-1 + n_it where y_it: residual income z: persistent e: random/ transitory shocks
63
State the simplification we introduced when working with Blundell's model.
- p = 1 - no fixed effects - their model for transitory shocks is more complicated
64
How would you calculate income and consumption growth in Blundell's model?
Income growth: Δy_it = y_it - y_it-1 = n_it + e_it - e_it-1 Consumption growth: Δc_it = c_it - c_it-1 = Φ n_it + ψ e_it + ξ_it where Φ & ψ : shows how strongly consumption reacts to income shocks ( 0: no reaction, 1: hand to mouth) ξ: error term n: permanent e: transitory
65
Define the cross-sectional moments in the model by Blundell ( var (Δy_it), var (Δc_it ), cov (Δy_it, Δy_it-1), cov (Δy_it, Δc_it), cov (Δy_it, Δc_it-1),
var (Δy_it) = σ^2_n + 2σ^2_e var (Δc_it ) = Φ σ^2_n + ψ σ^2_e + σ^2_ξ cov (Δy_it, Δy_it-1) = - σ^2_e cov (Δy_it, Δc_it) = Φ σ^2_n + ψ σ^2_e cov (Δy_it, Δc_it-1) = - ψ σ^2_e
66
What are the findings from the model established by Blundel?
0 < Φ < ψ > 1 - people can ensure away part of income shocks - transitory shocks have a lower effect on consumption (insignificant) - in a complete market infinite horizon model, ψ = r and Φ=1 - wealthy and more educated households react less to income shocks
67
What is the intuition behind the findings by Blundel (by the model with different types of income shocks)?
- it is harder to insure permanent income shocks, so the consumption response to such shocks is larger - in the early 80s, permanent shocks became larger --> consumption inequality followed - in the mid-80s, transitory shocks became larger --> consumption inequality flattened out Why increase in risk? - sectoral changes - unions getting weaker - increasing self-employment
68
What are the determinants of wealth inequality?
1) Precautionary savings, savings for retirement, borrowing constraints, luck in labor market 2) Adding uncertainty in life-spans and bequest motives
69
Why do we choose to model wealth inequality using entrepreneurs? Why do they want to save?
Entrepreneur: someone who owns their business/ is self-employed - can be combined with dynasty effects - usually have higher r - being richer --> hold large share of wealth - lots of entrepreneurs among the very rich (81%) Why do they want to save? - banks do not want to provide the needed liquidity to finance projects - entrepreneurs can earn high returns on their ability after overcoming borrowing constraints --> can make more of their talent when they are richer
70
Explain the setup of the life-cycle model to explain wealth inequality using entrepreneurs by De Nardi & Cagetti.
Model: - infinite horizon model - probability of getting old and dying does not depend on how long they have been old (young) for - each individual has the potential to be an entrepreneur or a worker (Θ: talent of entrepreneur, y: idiosyncratic income of worker) - entrepreneurs have their own technology: Θk^v (with decreasing returns to scale) - workers work in corporate sector with Cobb-Douglas technology - entrepreneurs want to borrow a lot of money to finance their projects (make firm capital k high) --> imperfect enforceability of contracts
71
What is the life-cycle of a young person in Cagetti & De Nardi? Name the process and define the value functions for workers and entrepreneurs.
- have both entrepreneurial & worker talent --> can chose what to function as in each period - if a young entrepreneur gets old. she forget her worker ability and becomes an old entrepreneur - if a young worker becomes old, she forgets all skills and becomes a retiree Value function (worker): V_w(a,y,Θ) = max {c,a'>= 0} u(c) + ß π_y EV(a', y', Θ') + ß (1-π_y) E W_r(a') s.t. a'= (1+r) a + (1-T) wy - c where π_y: probability of being young W_r(a'): value function of a retiree Value function (entrepreneur): V_e(a,y,Θ) = max {c,k>= 0, a'>= 0} u(c) + ß π_y EV(a', y', Θ') + ß (1-π_y) E W (a',Θ') s.t. a'= (1-δ) k + Θk^v - (1+r) (k - a) - c u(c) + ß π_y EV(a', y', Θ') + ß (1-π_y) E W (a',Θ') >= V_w(k*f, y, Θ) where W (a',Θ'): value function of old entrepreneurs δ: depreciation
72
What is the life-cycle of an old person in Cagetti & De Nardi? Name the process and give the value functions for retirees and old entrepreneurs.
Process: - retirees: only consume & safe, assets are inherited by newborn young - old entrepreneur: has choice to either continue the enterprise or retire, after death their assets are inherited by a newborn young w/ positively correlated entrepreneurial ability Value function (retiree): W_r(a) = max {c,a'>= 0} u(c) + ß π_o W_r(a') + η ß (1-π_o) EV(a', y',θ') s.t. a' = (1+r) a + p - c where π_o: probability to stay old η: care about the utility of heir EV(a', y',θ'): value function of the young heir with y',θ' being random Value function (entrepreneur): W(a,θ) = max {W_e(a,θ), W_r(a)} where: W_e(a,θ) = max {c,k,a'>= 0} u(c) + ß π_o EW(a', θ') + η ß (1-π_o) EV(a',y',θ') s.t. a'= (1-δ) k + Θk^v - (1+r) (k - a) - c u(c) + ß π_o EW(a', θ') + η ß (1-π_o) EV(a',y',θ') >= W_r(f*k) --> incentive compatibility constraint EV(a',y',θ'): heirs value function with θ' conditional on entrepreneurs θ
73
Define the general equilibrium in Cagetti & De Nardi. Define specifically the sector maximization problem.
- individuals: all individuals solve their utility maximisation problem - household wealth is used as capital in either of the two sectors: K_c + K_e = Σ a_i - total labour supply = labour input of the corporate sector: L = Σ y_i - aggregate entrepreneurial capital = sum of capital used by entrepreneurs: K_e = Σ K_i - corporate sector production function: Y_c = K_c ^α L ^(1-α) - Total output in entrepreneurial sector: Y_e = Σ θ_i k_^γ Corporate sector maximisation problem: max profit s.t. r = α K_c ^(α-1) L ^(1-α) - δ (marginal product wrt capital w = (1-α) K_c^α L ^-α Government budget: Σp = T_l w Σ y_i (we do not tax the income of entrepreneurs
74
What are the findings from the model by Cagetti & De Nardi?
- model matches wealth inequality well (slightly overestimates the tale) - savings rate for entrepreneurs high all the way - savings rate for workers drop --> the more you have, the less you save - altruism does not matter much for wealth inequality
75
Give some intuition behind introducing taxes in an economy.
Policy makers can choose a combination of - labour taxes - consumption taxes - capital income taxes - wealth taxes Purpose: maximize the welfare of societies Trade-offs: - if taxes are not lump-sum, they bring about distortions - government has exogenous financing needs - there is demand for redistribution
76
Define optimal taxation in a representative agent economy with no uncertainty and no borrowing limits. Derive the Euler equation.
max Σ ß^t u (c_t, l) s. t. l_t = 1 - n_t c_t (1+ T_c) + a_t+1 + T = (1- T_n) w_t n_t + (1+ (1-T_a)r_t) a_t where T_c: consumption tax T_n: labor tax T_a: capital income tax Euler: u'_c(c_t, l_t) (1+T_c_t+1)/(1+T_c_t) = ß u'_c (c_t+1, l_t+1) [1+ (1-T_a_t+1)r_t+1] u'_l(c_t,l_t) = u'_c(c_t,l-t) (1-T_n_t)/(1+T_c_t) w_t
77
What is the effect of taxation on labor choice? (in a model without uncertainty and borrowing constraints) using u'_l(c_t,l_t) = u'_c(c_t,l-t) (1-T_n_t)/(1+T_c_t) w_t
- agents will consume less goods than optimal - they will work too little (consume too much leisure) - consuming goods is punished while not consuming leisure is punishes - fraction with taxes in total is <= 1 - implication: government should subsidise work instead of taxing it
78
What is the effect of taxation on consumption? (in a model without uncertainty and borrowing constraints) using u'_c(c_t, l_t) (1+T_c_t+1)/(1+T_c_t) = ß u'_c (c_t+1, l_t+1) [1+ (1-T_a_t+1)r_t+1]
- Ignoring the labor choice issue, consumption taxes are distortive if they change over time (so not distortive when constant)
79
What is the effect of taxation on capital? (in a model without uncertainty and borrowing constraints) using u'_c(c_t, l_t) (1+T_c_t+1)/(1+T_c_t) = ß u'_c (c_t+1, l_t+1) [1+ (1-T_a_t+1)r_t+1]
- capital income taxes are always distortive - in some ways, it is like an ever increasing consumption tax (you pay income tax several times on part of savings you keep for several years) --> higher taxes on part that you consume later - makes you give less weight to future
80
Give a common wisdom about capital income taxes.
In steady state, capital income taxes should be zero.
81
How would you compare the welfare effects of a tax change in a representative agent model versus a heterogenous agent model?
Representative agent mode: compare steady states Heterogeneous agents model: compare steady state before and after tax change (inequality changes, redistribution) (How happy would people in the old setting be assuming a surprise change in tax system?)
82
Why does redistribution matter for welfare?
1) Utility function is concave --> value function is concave ( taking away from rich and giving to poor increases average welfare) 2) Wealth helps people insure against idiosyncratic income shocks. In presence of shocks, it sucks to be poor (--> 1!) 3) When hitting the borrowing constraint, one cannot smooth consumption, then it sucks to be poor (--> 1!) Ideally we want to tax more constrained/poor agents less!
83
Name some taxation and redistribution strategies for welfare improvements.
- Wealth-dependent consumption taxes (e.g. VAT lower on necessary goods) - age-dependent consumption taxes (e.g. tax deduction on mortgage payments) - capital income taxes: can mimic a consumption tax that rises in wealth but creates distortions - progressive labor income taxes (e.g. transfer wealth from high earners to low earners) - age-dependent income taxes
84
Explain the setup of the study by Domeij & Heathcote (2004).
Idea: what is the implication of incomplete financial market + idiosyncratic earnings stock + prudence for optimal taxation? - study welfare gains from capital income tax of 39.7% to a new range of taxes (0 - 50%) Note: higher (lower) capital taxes need to be compensated by lower (higher) labour taxes to satisfy the government budget constraint. GE model, labour supply is fixed Comparison of three settings: 1) representative agent: no redistribution no earnings risk 2) no earnings risk: redistribution is on, earnings risk is off 3) Benchmark: idiosyncratic earnings risk and incomplete markets
85
Explain the results found by DH when comparing the three settings of their model.
Representative agent model: - 0% capital tax optimal - GE effects: lower savings --> lower capital, lower output, lower wages No earnings risk model: - same distortions as above - but capital tax helps redistribute from rich to poor --> good for average welfare - negative distributional component Benchmark: - optimal capital tax at 39.7% - small aggregate component: precautionary motives --> extra demand for savings --> savings is less sensitive to after tax returns --> GE effects diminished - negative distributional component Other results: - 73% of households prefer not to abolish a capital income tax - with variable labor supply, capital income taxes are even more painful for households - replacing capital income taxes with consumption taxes: redistributive effect is smaller (rich people who consume more are also taxed more), capital tax abolishment is less bad - ignoring transitions & comparing steady states: abolishing capital taxes is welfare improving (but transition is quite painful as people have to sacrifice consumption to acquire wealth)
86
What is the aggregate component when introducing a tax change?
- computed in a hypothetical world where aggregate variables do as predicted, everyone consumes what they would in a non-tax world - measurement of efficiency
87
What is the distributional component when introducing a tax change?
- difference between full effect & aggregate component - smaller in economies with earnings risk --> households move around the wealth distribution due to shocks, so distributional effects are not permanent
88
What are the takeaways from DH on optimal taxation?
- low-wealth households are the losers of a reform that decreases capital income taxes --> larger marginal utilities --> aggregate welfare effect is negative - due to incomplete financial markets, individuals over-accumulate wealth --> increase capital stock --> suppress interest rates, government can correct by upping capital taxes and redistributing
89
Explain the model by Guvenen et al. on return heterogeneity. Name also the key differences from Cagetti & De Nardi.
- similar to Cagetti & De Nardi: entrepreneurs and return heterogeneity - credit constraints --> productive entrepreneurs keep on saving - productive entrepreneurs earn higher returns than the rest of the population Key differences: - more elaborate entrepreneurial talend - entrepreneurial and corporate sectors are not detached - endogenous labor supply
90
What are the findings in Guvenen et al.?
Replace CIT (25%) with a wealth tax in a revenue-neutral fashion (T_w = 1.19%) > reallocates wealth towards more productive entrepreneurs > higher efficiency, higher output, higher wages, higher welfare > higher average lifetime utility (7% in consumption equivalence) > more dispersion > lower tax burden on the wealthy > primarily financed through higher labor tax income > young gain more: high future gains from higher wages and CI > retirees & old entrepreneurs: wealth with little future income > young entrepreneurs: gain most since they are the biggest losers of CIT
91
What are the implications of the optimal wealth tax in the Guvenen paper?
3% optimal wealth tax (welfare effect of 9% in consumption equivalence) - lower T_l since wealth tax is less distortive - capital stock is barely different, welfare gain mainly due to more efficient capital allocation
92
What are the implications of the optimal capital income tax in the Guvenen paper?
OKIT: 13.6% capital income subsidy is optimal (financed by a huge increase in T_l income) - welfare effect: 4.2% in consumption equivalence > huge positive aggregate effect > negative distributional effect > productive entrepreneurs skyrocket (high output and wages), more unequal economy
93
How do the findings by Guvenen contrast the findings be DH?
- return heterogeneity! In Guvenen: CIT is more distortive since it makes capital allocation more inefficient
94
Compare the welfare in the Guvenen paper between OWT and OKIT.
- OWT wins: due to more equality in the economy, in spite of lower consumption & output than OKIT - contrast is larger in transitions: OKIT implies a welfare loss in this case (gains only come after a long period of saving capital) >> higher T_l would be particularly painful to finance CI subsidies
95
Why is wealth tax not more wide spread in reality?
- capital flight --> not reversible - how to tax different kinds of wealth? - book or market value (Guvenen: BV)
96
Why do governments care about economic policy?
- need for financing government expenditures - desire to redistribute wealth across agents - stabilization (business cycles & recession) --> business cycles are costly, avoid too low consumption levels and encourage consumption for feedback effect
97
How can a government help to stabilize the economy during a turbulent business cycle?
- give money to most vulnerable (to increase welfare effects)
98
What is the MPC? Give a definition, formula and intuition.
MPC = (C (coh + extra) - C(coh))/extra In theory: R = r/ (1+r) = MPC Estimate: 20 - 50% --> steepness of consumption function Intuition: getting a unit of extra income, which fraction of it do you spend now? - depends on length of time-period considered - size of the extra
99
Why is the empirical MPC so much higher than the theoretical one?
- a lot of rich hand-to-mouth consumers: lots of assets are illiquid - Optimal consumption is depressed by risk and borrowing limits --> higher derivatives, higher MPC