Exam 2 (Intentional Torts)

Question 1

Civil Battery (4 elements)

Answer 1

Intent
Harmful or offensive contact
Causation
Damages

Question 2

Assault (5 elements)

Answer 2

Intent
Apprehension
Imminent or harmful or offensive contact (no physical injury required)
Causation
Damages

Question 3

False Imprisonment (6 elements)

Answer 3

Act or omission
Intent
Actual Confinement
P's knowledge of actual harm
Causation
Damages

Question 4

Intent (3 points)

Answer 4

Desire
Goal
Substantially certain to occur

Question 5

Substantially certain to occur

Answer 5

Proof that the D knew the act or result was practically certain to occur.

Question 6

Transferred Intent (3 points)

Answer 6

From person to person
From tort to tort (ex: assault to battery)
Manning case
Permits D to be held liable for an intentional tort even if he was neither purposeful nor knowing that the tort would occur or that particular P would be injured.

Question 7

Mistake doctrine of intent

Answer 7

I did not intend the outcome

Ex: shooting a dog that looks like a cyote to protect chickens

Question 8

Insane, immature, infant (intent)

Answer 8

Neither insanity nor infancy typically will shield the D from responsibility for her intentional torts.
Unlike criminal law, need not be hostile.
Garret v. Daily

Question 9

Two types of intent

Answer 9

Lambertson case
Intent could be either harmful or offensive contact or simply intent to make contact. Intent to make the contact or intent to cause the injury. It depends on the jurisdiction.

Question 10

Spivey (element & rule)

Answer 10

Element: Intent (battery)
Rule: Intent is satisfied when a reasonable person in D’s position would believe that the results were substantially certain to follow.

Question 11

Spivey (application & conclusion)

Answer 11

Application: When D intentionally pulled P toward him he was not substantially certain P’s paralysis would occur. The harm suffered by P was an unanticipated injury. D intended to pull P closer to him by wrapping his arm around her neck, and it may have been foreseeable that she could possibly be hurt but D could not have been substantially certain her paralysis would occur since the injury was so bizarre.
Conclusion: Therefore, D did not have the required intent to harm P for an assault and battery but could have foreseen some injury so should be held liable for negligence.

Question 12

Garratt v. Dailey (element & rules)

Answer 12

Element: Intent (battery)
Rule 1: When a minor has committed a tort with force, he is liable to be proceeded against as any other person would be.
Rule 2: Character of an actor’s intention. In order that an act may be done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to a particular person, either the other or a third person, the act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact or apprehension or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain to be produced.

Question 13

Garratt v. Dailey (application & conclusion)

Answer 13

Application: A battery would be established if, in addition to plaintiff’s fall, it was proved that, when Brian moved the chair, he knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair had been. A finding that Brian had no such knowledge can be inferred from the findings made.
Holding: We believe that before the plaintiff’s action in such a case should be dismissed, there should be no question but that the trial court had passed upon that issue hence, the case should be remanded for clarification of the findings to specifically cover the question of Brian’s knowledge because intent could be inferred therefrom.

Question 14

Lambertson (element & rule)

Answer 14

Element: Intent (tort battery)
Rule: According to New York law, “intent” as an element of the intentional tort of battery requires the intent to make contact; not to harm/injure.

Question 15

Lambertson (application)

Answer 15

Application: The appellant wanted the New York District Court to rule that Boslet’s actions were negligent. However, according tot he New York law, “intent” as an element of the intentional tort of battery, requires the intent to make contact; not to harm/injure. The Court of Appeals held that Boslet’s actions showed that he intended to make contact but that he did not intend to cause the appellant’s injuries. Boslet’s actions did not rise enough to satisfy the intent element of the tort of negligence which requires the intent to cause harm/injury. Instead, Boslet’s actions satisfied the intent element of the tort of battery which only requires that he intend to make contact with appellant. Boslet did not have to be substantially certain that he would cause the defendant injury. After appellant was injured, Boslet said he was sorry and witnesses testified that they did not think Boslet meant for appellant to be injured as a result of his actions. Therefore Boslet intended contact; not harm. Boslet intended to make contact with appellant when he jumped on appellant’s back. However, Boslet did not intend for his contact to be harmful or offensive because: (1) after appellant was injured, he apologized; and (2) witnesses to the incident testified that they did not believe Boslet intended to cause appellant’s injuries.

Question 16

Lambertson (conclusion)

Answer 16

Therefore, Boslet satisfied the rule for battery in this jurisdiction by intending to make contact with the appellant but not intending his contact to be harmful or offensive.

Question 17

McGuire (element & rule)

Answer 17

Element: Intent (insanity)
Rule: An insane person, capable of entertaining intent and actually intending to damage another’s person or property by his act, is liable for damage done thereby though delusion or other consequence of his affliction caused him to entertain such intent or normal person would not have entertained it.

Question 18

McGuire (application & conclusion)

Answer 18

Application: for this case, it is enough to say that where an insane person by his act does intentional damage to the person or property of another, he is liable for that damage in the same circumstances in which a normal person would be liable. This means that in so far as a particular intent would be necessary in order to render a normal person liable, the insane person, in order to be liable, must have been capable of entertaining that same intent and must have entertained it in fact.
Conclusion: D is liable.

Question 19

Manning (element & rule)

Answer 19

Element: Transferred intent (assault or battery)
Rule: An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if intending to cause a third person to have an imminent apprehension of harmful bodily contact, the actor causes the other to suffer harmful contact.

Question 20

Manning (application & conclusion)

Answer 20

Application: We, unlike the district judge, are of the view that from the evidence that Grimsley was an expert pitcher, that on several occasions immediately following heckling he looked directly at the hecklers, not just into the stands, and that the ball traveled at a right angle to the direction in which he had been pitching and in the direction of the hecklers, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Grimsley intended (1) to throw the ball in the direction of the hecklers, (2) to cause them imminent apprehension of being hit, and (3) to respond to conduct presently affecting his ability to warm up and, if the opportunity came, to play in the game itself.
Holding: The foregoing evidence and inferences would have permitted a jury to conclude that the defendant Grimsley committed a battery against the plaintiff.

Question 21

Fisher (element & rule)

Answer 21

Element: harmful or offensive contact (civil battery)
Rule: “To constitute an assault and battery, it is not necessary to touch the plaintiff’s body or even his clothing; knocking or snatching anything from the plaintiff’s hand or touching anything connected with his person, when, done in an offensive manner, is sufficient.

Question 22

Fisher (application & conclusion)

Answer 22

Application: In order to commit a harmful or offensive contact, the defendant need not touch the plaintiff’s actual person because any object that is attached to the plaintiff’s person such as clothing or an object that the plaintiff is holding is considered a part of the plaintiff’s person. Since the plaintiff in this case was holding the plate in his hand, the plate was a part of the plaintiff’s person when the harmful or offensive contact was committed by the defendant. The defendant’s act of snatching the plate away from the plaintiff was shouting in front of plaintiff’s associates that “Negros” could not be served at the club was considered offensive. Therefore, the defendant satisfied the harmful or offensive contact element of civil battery.
Conclusion: Yes. The defendant, Flynn/Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc. satisfied the harmful or offensive contact element of civil battery when he snatched the plaintiff’s plate away from his hand and shouted, in front of plaintiff’s associates, that plaintiff, Fisher (a “Negro”) could not be served in the club.

Question 23

Mohr (element)

Answer 23

Consent (civil battery)

Question 24

Western Union (element & rule)

Answer 24

Element: assault & battery
Rule: To constitute “assault,” there must be intentional and unlawful offer to touch another in rude or angry manner such as to create in mind of assaulted person fear of battery, coupled with apparent ability to effectuate attempt, if not prevented.

Question 25

Western Union (application & conclusion)

Answer 25

Application: The trail judge agreed with the testimony that tended to prove, notwithstanding the evidence of the width and height of the counter, Sapp would have been able to reach six to eighteen inches beyond the counter. Sapp’s comment coupled with his action to reach for her and his ability to successfully make contact with her caused Mrs. Hill to jump back. Mrs. Hill wouldn’t have needed to jump back if she was not in fear of imminence of a threatened contact by Sapp and his ability to cause harm to her by carrying out the actions he suggested in his rude comment.
Conclusion: Yes; the defendant, Sapp, satisfied the imminence of threatened contact/present ability to cause harm element of assault when he twice offered to fix the plaintiff’s wife, Mrs. Hill’s clock if she would let him “love and pet” her while he reached across the counter in an effort to make contact with Mrs. Hill’s left arm, causing her to jump back. Reversed and remanded to lower court of decide if Sapp’s actions satisfied the imminence of threatened contact/present ability to cause the harm element of assault.

Question 26

Parvi (element & rule)

Answer 26

Element: awareness of confinement (false imprisonment)
Rule: The elements of the tort of false imprisonment are that “the plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.”

Question 27

Parvi (application)

Answer 27

Application: The victim has to know of their confinement or be harmed by it in order to bring a cause of action for the tort of false imprisonment. Parvi stated that he did not have any recollection of his confinement. The district court failed to distinguish between a later recollection of consciousness and the existence of that consciousness at the time when the imprisonment took place. The alcohol that Parvi consumed or the injury he sustained from the impact of the car could have contributed to his lapse of memory. However, there is evidence to prove that Parvi was aware of his confinement when it took place. Parvi responded to the officers’ command that he and Dugan get into the police car, his conversation with officers during the drive to the abandoned gold course, and his request to be let off at a different location on the way were all indicative of his consciousness and awareness of his confinement.

Question 28

Parvi (conclusion)

Answer 28

The Appellate Division’s judgement of a dismissal of Parvi’s case should be reversed, the cause of action of false imprisonment should be reinstated, and Parvi should be given a new trial.