Exam #2

Question 1

For the natures of men are on different levels with respect to [their paths to] assent. One of them comes to assent through demonstration; another comes to assent through dialectical arguments just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstration, since his nature does not contain any greater capacity; while another comes to assent through rhetorical arguments, again just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstrative arguments. (Ibn Rushd, Decisive Treatise n. 16)

Answer 1

• Three natures men has with respect to their paths to assent: demonstration, dialectic, and rhetoric
• rhetoric: least rigorous, necessary for addressing broad audiences
  -dialectic: shows more plausible arguments, more challenging than rhetoric
  -demonstration: ideal but also most difficult, so not always plausible
• These various natures of men will affect their path to assent. Nevertheless, the Law allows for a suitable track for all of these natures to understand it.
• This is thought to be a fairly elitis view, and Rushd even claims that very few people are ever able to be in the demonstration nature cateogry of man
• However, he argues that it’s crucial to have these various natures (and the suitable way of understanding the Law that goes with them) because if someone from a less intelligent class is taught something from a more intelligent class, and they can’t understand it, they are led into disbeleif (which is no good).

Question 2

All Muslims accept the principle of allegorical interpretation; they only disagree about the extent of its application. (Ibn Rushd, Decisive Treatise n. 20)

Answer 2

• Allegorical interpretation: extension of the significance of an expression from rela to metaphysical significance
• There are two ways to interpret Scripture: through it’s apparent meaning and through it’s inner meaning

-Ibn Rushd states that it’s commonly agreed that sometimes you have to interpret the scritpure with it’s allegorical menaing (afterall, it’s not obligatory to take all of the expressions of scriputre in their apparent meaning)

• The disagreeance that does occur happens in debating which part of the scripture should be interpreted allegorically and which parts should not
• Rushd believes that the two ways of interpreting scripture (through apparent meaning and through inner meaning) are in place because people have different capaciities for interpretation (which connects to the three natures of men idea). For example, someone who holds the rhetoric nature is likely not going to be able to understand the Scripture for it’s innner meaning
• According to Rushd, these differeing interpretations are a.) normal and b.) meant to be
• Sometimes these differing interpretations lead to a double standard, which most find troublesome, but Rushd explains is necesssary for stimulating deepering thinking.
• theoretical concepts should be understood via allergorical meaning
• practical concepts should be understood via apparent meaning

-not everyone can understand allegorical meaning because it requires demonstration–so it shouldn’t be taught to the masses

-emphasizes using both philosophy and religion to understand the scripture, if you believe in both they will be consistent

Question 3

In view of all these causes, these matters are only for a few solitary individuals of a very special sort, not for the multitude. For this reason, they should be hidden from the beginner, and he should be prevented from taking them up, just as a small baby is prevented from taking coarse foods and from lifting heavy weights. (Maimonides, Guide, end of ch. 34)

Answer 3

• Maimonides explains that philosophical knowledge is only for the few, and a majority of people shouldn’t bother with attempting to understand it
• He compares this to the idea of a small baby eating hard to eat foods or lifting weights; just as we wouldn’t expect a baby to do these things, we shouldn’t expect the average person to practice philosophy
• He also says that the baby (and the average person) shouldn’t even be exposed to these things (i.e., steak, or complex philosophy) because it may deeply confuse the person. Just like a baby may be confused if you handed them a 20lb dumbell, most people would be confused when you hand them complex philosophy
• He emphasizes that very few people should bother to try to understand philosophy for many reasons. Some of these reasons include:
  1. Philosophy is difficult, obsecure, and subtle
  2. Philosophy is insufficent for the minds of men (people just don’t have time for understanding this divine science)
  3. Philosophy has lengthy preliminaries (people want to know, but it takes so long to get to a place of knowing. People are very impatient, and a lot of people die before they can get to a place of knowing)
  4. it’s difficult to figure out one’s own virtues
  5. we are overly distracted with bodily necesities (i.e., wife, children) and these take up a lot of mans time

Question 4

S: Nothing could be more just or more beautiful than this distinction. But if you can tell me, I would like to hear what sort of advantageous thing this was that the good angels justly spurned and thereby advanced, and the evil angels unjustly desired and thereby fell away.

T: I don’t know what it was. But whatever it might have been, all we need to know is that it was something they were able to attain, which they did not receive when they were created, in order that they might advance to it by their own merit. (Anselm, Fall of the Devil ch. 6)

Answer 4

• Here the distinction that the student and teacher are discussing is the idea that: those who cleave justice can will no good that they do not enjoy, and those who abandon justice can will no good that they do not lack.
• Put more simply, this distinction explains that the good angels willed justily (they willed good that they can enjoy) whereas the bad angels did not will with justiced, and willed something which they were not lacking
• The good angels followed justice and willed what they lacked, whereas the evil angels unjustly willed what they already had in abundance
• include info about how angels experienced time T and had to make a decision regarding whether or not they would will happiness justly or abandon justice
• The specifics regarding what exactly they willed is unclear, but here’s what’s known: 1. they willed what they already had that they did not lack, and 2. they abandoned justice to do so

Question 5

Therefore, since he cannot be called just or unjust for willing only happiness or for willing only what is fitting when he wills in that way out of necessity, and since he neither can nor ought to be happy unless he wills to be happy and wills it justly, God must create both wills in him in such a way that he both wills to be happy and wills it justly. (Anselm, Fall of the Devil ch. 14; note that the translation contains a mistake here, in that this speech belongs to the Teacher, not to the student)

Answer 5

• justice: the good of the will, doing what God orders
• According to Anselm, God created two wills: The will for happiness and the will for justice
• When these two wills are used together, man cannot will what he ought not to, as he wills happiness and wills it justly
• Willing happiness alone does not determine whether or not the man is just or unjust, it is only when man turns his back to justice and wills what he ought not to that he becomes unjust
• man needs the two wills combined to achieve happiness that was willed justly
• justice governs mans will for happiness, it keeps it in check
• man who abandons justcie deserves to be derivied of happiness all together.

Question 6

So it is vice that makes us disposed to sin-that is, we are inclined to consent to what is inappropriate, so that we do it or renounce it. This consent is what we properly call “sin,” the fault of the soul whereby it merits damnation or is held guilty before God. For what is this consent but scorn for God and an affront against him? God cannot be offended by injury but he can by scorn. For he is the ultimate power, not diminished by any injury but wreaking vengeance on scorn for him. (Abelard, Ethics n. 7)

Answer 6

• For Abelard, sin is not the vice, not the act itself, but the “consenting” to the will
• It goes as follows: We have a vice, we consent to that vice, and we consequently sin
• This consenting (consenting to sin) is what merits us to damnation, it’s a fault of the soul
• Here is a good example to understand sin, accoridng to Abelard: Say you have a vice to have premarital sex. You consent to the act of having premarital sex; however, this consent doesn’t necessarily mean doing the act itself (i.e., having the premarital sex) but rather you are accepting the idea that if the opportunity were to present itself ot have premarital sex you would take it. According to Abelard, it is not the will for the vice to have premarital sex alone that makes you sin, but rather it is your act of consenting to it.
• This consent goes against God’s law, and because God is the ultimate power, going against his law is what will result in damnation.
• we can have a will for a vice (that would be a sin if one consented to it) , but so long as you don’t consent to it, you have not sinned. Turn down your will for a vice to avoid sin.

Question 7

Surely it has no bearing on merit whether you give alms to one in need. Charity may make you prepared to give alms and your will may be ready, although the means are absent and the power to do so doesn’t remain in you, no matter what chance event it is that impedes you. Surely it is plain that deeds appropriately done or not are equally carried out by good people as by bad. The intention alone separates the two cases. (Abelard, Ethics n. 56)

Answer 7

• This is the first point in Abelard’s ethics that he mentions the idea of “intention”
• Intention is not the same as consent. Intention refers to the end goal of an action, whereas consent refers to the means that is immediately chosen
  EX: in the present, you consent to give money/food with the intention of helping the poor
• For consent there is either: 1. consent without the following act, or, 2. consent with the following act (you may consent to something without actually doing the thing)
• For intention, there is either 1. An act with good intention, or, 2. An act with bad intentions (this is where the moral standing comes from, a good mroal standing will follow from good intention and a bad moral standing will follow from bad intention)
• It is not the consenting to an act itself that determines goodness and badness, but it is intention that ultimately determines it
• He later uses the example similar to this: lets say you consent to helping the poor, but then all of your money gets stolen. Despite not actually doing the act, you consented to doing it and had good intentions with it (That is, intentions of helping the poor). So, you are practicing goodness
• better example: hanging someone, one hangs them because the person went against the law and they’re practicing their civic duty, the other person hangs them because they have a grudge. Same consent, same action, completly different intentions, completly different moral standings.

Question 8

Similarly, appetite is supremely perfectly perfected by the three moral virtues, if they are supremely perfect; for they perfect the appetite both with respect to others and things desirable for others, and with respect to oneself and things desirable for oneself, whether primarily and directly or secondarily, on account of those primary things. And my understanding of these four cardinal virtues is that none of them is numerically one habit in a given person—a universal, all inclusive temperance or justice, one that concerns everything [within the domain of the relevant virtue]—but rather someone possesses particular species of justice for the particular matters [that fall within that domain]. (Scotus, Ordinatio III.34 n. 29)

Answer 8

• Scotus says that there are three moral (theological) virtues and four cardinal virtues– he explains that these 7 virtues are all you need to be perfected as the wayfarer
• The three theological virtues include: faith, hope, and charity. These virtues are infused by God himself
• The four cardinal virtues include: Prudence, justice, temperence, and courage
• of the four cardinal virtues there are three moral virtues (justice, temperance, and courage) and one intellectual virtue (prudence)
• The four cardinal virtues cannlt be thought of as one act or a singular habit, and are not things that can be infused by God. Rather, these are practiced differently in various situations, and in every situation there is a different “species” of the virtue at hand– this is how the cardinal virtues are contrasted with the theological ones.

-“Appetite” is not actually wanting to eat, but a desire for the good. OUr appetites as the desire of the good can be perfected by the three moral virtues (justice, temperance, and courage) which will allow us to feel “satiated” in our desires by channeling them towards the good

Question 9

But this is not what we should say in general about all the precepts of the second Table, since the nature of the things that they command or prohibit does not ground unqualifiedly necessary practical principles or unqualifiedly necessary conclusions. For there is no goodness in the things that those precepts command that is necessary for the goodness of the ultimate end, and there is no badness in the things they prohibit that necessarily turns one aside from the ultimate end: thus, if that good were not commanded, the ultimate end could still be attained and loved, and if that evil were not prohibited, the attainment of the ultimate end would still be possible. (Scotus, Ordinatio III.37 n. 18)

Answer 9

There are 10 commandments. #1-3 directly relate to God whereas #4-10 relate to moral actions.

The first three commandments (that relate to God) are not changeable, and are rooted in the idea of us following God. These commandments cant even be changed by God himself, because basic respect for God can’t be changed. These are what will ultimately lead us closest to the ultimate end (human flourishing, on the more relaxed view, and God’s good, on the more extreme view) because the connection one has with God is greatly important, according to Scotus.

The other commandments (#4-10) can be changed by God. These are moral rules that are not absolutely necessary for obtaining the ultimate end

For example, if one always refrains from stealing (while this is a good action to do) it will not be the turning point for how a person ends up achieving the ultimate end.

Following these moral commandments are not absolutely necessary for achieving the ultimate end. This shows why they can be changed

Mini conclusion: moral rules are helpful for showing us how to live in harmony with others, but they are not necessary for achieving the ultimate end.