exam Flashcards
Lenin, “Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the
Democratic Revolution,” July 1905 - 5 main ideas
against ‘populist’ (Narodnik) idea
that no need for the ‘bourgeois’
political liberties
- against anarchism rejecting all
participation of the proletariat in
bourgeois politics
- the revolution needs first liberties
and progress of capitalism
- Russia rousing Europe that will then
support the socialist Revolution in
Russia
- but the proletarian revolution must
go further, as the bourgeoisie “will
inevitably turn to the reaction.”
main new idea of lenin in the 1910s
-Don’t be satisfied with bourgeois leadership of the
bourgeois revolution because the liberals will not
push the revolution to achieve its maximum gains
(cf. 1905).
- Don’t be satisfied with the meagre liberties provided
by the Stolypin regime (1906-10).
- Search for the most radically democratic allies
among the non-elite classes.
- Preserve at all costs a party base in the illegal
underground that is the only space in Russia for
truly free speech.
3 major changes in 20th century communism/new version of class narrative
1) the sense of betrayal by Western Social Democracy
2) the apocalyptic world war
3) the Bolshevik experience as a ruling party, Oct 1917-1922
Pons on the impact of WW1 on Bolshevik rethoric
Brutalisation of society creates a war mentality that pushes Bolshevik mentality to be ultraviolent and radical. WW1 is an opportunity to radicalise the masses, life is so awful and apocalyptic they are more likely to accept political radicality and revolutionary ideas
April theses of Lenin (1917)
-not a parliamentary republic, but a bottom-up representation (counclis everywhere to tell the gov. what to do)
-abolition of army, police and bureaucracy
-A new International: We must take the initiative in creating a Revolutionary international, an international against the social-chauvinists [socialists, such as the Menshevik, Georgii Plekhanov, who enthusiastically supported the war against Germany] and against the ‘Centre’.” […]
Pons and commintern
Socio-traitors”, “socio-chauvinists” and “Centrists” are enemies of the Socialist cause and to join, Communist parties must be made of reliable radicals who won’t fold under pressure
> These communist parties aren’t equal members, but subordinate to the head commie party in Moscow (French or Italian communist must follow the way dictated by Moscow, even if it goes against their national interests), other commie parties are politically and financially subordinate to the chad Russians, only Commies who actually have done revolution and therefore are allowed to give orders
- Bolshevization of CP
2 stages of soviet FP after WW1
- 1924-5 “Partial stabilization”: normalization of relations with capitalist europe
- 1925-27: FROM “CAPITALIST ENCIRCLEMENT” (LENIN) TO “SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY” (STALIN), less about fighting capitalism in one country and more about protecting communism in USSR
Stalin’s views presented at the 1927 party congress
> The interests of the USSR and those of the world revolution are two sides of the same coin
With the world on the verge of crisis and war, and a “fascisticisation of bourgeois govts” Communism has to radicalise. Bukharin’s idea of “peaceful coexistence” with European capitalists is obsolete, communists must radicalise and support the USSR, reject any alliance with moderate leftist Social Democrats who will betray the cause if war breaks out.
Soc Dems also annoy Commies because, by being moderate, they tend to take over bigger swaths of the leftwing electorate. Commies see Soc-Dems as the main enemy in their political fight for power, because they dilute the votes and can’t be trusted.
At the Congress, Stalin also says the Commie party must put on hold any plans to support national liberation in other countries, and put first the defence of the USSR
Decision taken in FP after Lenin’s death motivated by
- the understanding by the Soviet leaders, of the security of the revolutionary state
- purely domestic developments: 1) Lenin’s succession fight; 2) Stalin’s brutal policies
after 1928
2 U turns before WW2
- Litinov (jewish), join LON, multilateral org, tries to secure a collective defense pact with France or UK
- Soviet-germano pact and its secret clauses, better to have a deal with the devil than no deal at all
S. Dullin
She shows that russian diplomats weren’t just Stalin’s puppets but very professional and smart, analysing what the West was tolerating and how to act accordingly, and acted on their own accord in a pragmatic way (until Stalin’s 1936 authoritarian turn)
KhlevnYuk
led a deep investigation into Stalin’s archives to understand what motivated him to lead the Great Purge, and prves Stalin’s growing fear of war and that this war would start from inside his country because of a corrupted “fifth column”.
KhlevnIuk
-Stalin’s modernization was only aimed at buildinding the military
-underscores how the regime was centred around repression, by focusing on pointing at the many (now) known cases of popular resistance to it, as well as at the unprecedented scope of repressions.
-Insists that the formal distinction between ‘political’ sentences and ‘common law’ sentences does not make much sense as the Stalinist system criminalized so many actions (infractions to work discipline, f.i.) and punished them so harshly that those condemned are also victims of the regime. (There were two courts of law in Soviet Russia, you could be condemned for crimes against society (rape/murder etc) by common courts, but also of crimes against the Party by the Party courts. However, because the Party controlled everything, if a Party court blacklisted you forex, in effect, the condemnation spanned further than you “just” being fired from the Party/your job, you became blacklisted from everywhere. KHLEVNIUK argues that condemnations from both courts were equal in repercussion)
-Stalin actively chose a more radical and repressive approach out of a sense of “political adventurism”
Harris
-Stalin continually misread the intelligence he received»_space; believed in the
threat of invasion from coalitions of anti-Soviet capitalist powers, though no
such threat existed before the late 1930s
-Reasons for that misinterpretation: ideology (Lenin’s theory of imperialism /
war / antagonism socialist vs capitalist worlds); actual experience of foreign
‘intervention’ in 1918-20; bias in the way info was collected; disposition of
Soviet leaders to discount counter-evidence.
Zdhanov doctrine
capitalist countries are imperialists devil, rejection of anything Western friendly
Stalin’s post-war plan
- rearmament
- autarky (only trading with communist countries)
- Zhdanov doctrine
this leads to economic austerity
1947 turning point
Truman doctrine
Containment
Marshall plan
Cominform
Stalin is dead! all potential new leaders agree that:
reduce the international tension,
▪ reach a peaceful solution for Korea,
▪ relax the Soviet Union’s domestic regime by commencing the rehabilitation of the
purged and the slow dismantlement of the Gulag,
▪ reduce the pressure on the member states of the Soviet bloc by mitigating the
more extreme consequences of its militarization
Budapest repression
1956, Nagy, end of CP monopoly, repression
auto-editing
samizdat, consequence of budapest repression
publishig book abroad
Tamizdat
crumbling of “peaceful coexistence”
Eisenhower doctrine (1957) : rollback on communism
Castro
missile crisis
2nd Berlin crisis
Sino-soviet split
Begins with Khrushchev’s policies (1955-6)
- Gets worse with the 22° Congress of the CPSU in Oct 1961 (new phase of
destalinization)
- China/Taiwan incidents (1962)
- Tacheng incident and repatriation of Soviet citizens from Xinjiang (1962)
- Breznev doctrine is seen as a potential justification for interference in China
- Beijing calls the URSS “revisionist” (1964)
- Border disputes and clash (1968)
Pons reason for communism being the broadest it has been in the 60s, but super internally divided
the raison
d’être of Soviet communism was to be “an
antagonist of world politics” offering “its own
modernizing project.” That why “The
epiphany of the crisis of communism in the
last decade of its existence arose from a
gradual but irreparable loss of cohesion,
influence, and credibility.
