Exam Flashcards

1
Q

What is cognitivism?

A

Cognitivism is a theory that argues that moral judgments express beliefs about the world (descriptive)

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2
Q

What is Error Theory

A

Error Theory (by Mackie), is a cognitive theory that argues that there exist no moral facts, and that therefore there can be no true moral judgments

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3
Q

Why does Mackie think there are no moral facts?

A

Mackie argues along 3 axes:
1. Queerness: if moral facts did exist they would be unlike anything in the universe. They are odd because they include an inherent to-be-pursuedness irrespective of one’s mental state.
2. Epistemology: if moral facts did exist despite being queer, we would need special faculties to detect them.
3. Relativity: if there were moral facts, how could we explain variance in moral frameworks?

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4
Q

What are reasons?

A

Reasons push us to act in some way. Internalism about reason argues that reasons are inherently linked to motivation, as opposed to externalism.
Reasons can be normative or motivating:
A normative reason is a reason (for someone) to act—in T. M. Scanlon’s phrase, “a consideration that counts in favour of” someone’s acting in a certain way (1998 and 2004). A motivating reason is a reason for which someone actualls does something.

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5
Q

What is internalism about reasons?

A

Internalism about reasons claims that reasons depend upon motivations. There can be no reasons that do not motivate us to act.

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6
Q

What is the difference between normative and motivating reasons?

A

Motivating reasons can explain our actions. Normative reasons are facts that speak in favour of a certain action.

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7
Q

What is descriptivism?

A

Descriptivism argues that moral facts describe something about the world.

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8
Q

What is emotivism?

A

Emotivism is a non-cognitive metaethical stance, that argues that moral judgments merely express an emotional state.

When we say “stealing is bad”, we merely mean to say “stealing” in a particular emotional way (anger, disgust, …).

As such moral judgments cannot be true or false, because they do not say anything about the world.

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9
Q

Why does Ayer argue that there cannot be genuine moral disagreement?

A

Ayer is an emotivist, he argues that moral disagreements are not genuine, as either people disagree upon the underlying natural facts of a situation, and would actually agree if they saw the case in the same way; or if people perceive the facts in the same way, but still disagree, it is merely a product of their differing moral upbringing.

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10
Q

What does Error theory argue for: internalism about reasons or externalism?

A

Error theory does not think there can exist external reasons, i.e. facts that intrinsically give us a reason to act a certain way (non-naturalism)

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11
Q

Cite all possible combination of (anti-)realism and (non-)cognitivism and their related theories.

A
  • Non-cognitivism and anti-realism: Emotivism (Ayer)
  • Non-cognitivism and realism: not a possible combination
  • Cognitivism and realism: natural (Cornell realists, Brink) and non-natural (Schafer-Landau) moral realism
  • Cognitivism and anti-realism: Error Theory (Mackie)
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12
Q

What is the difference between natural and non-natural moral realism?

A

Natural realism argues that moral facts are natural facts, in other words that they can be discovered by scientific methods.
Non-naturalism argues that moral facts are metaphysical facts that are outside the domain of natural sciences and psychology.

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13
Q

What are advantages of natural moral realism as opposed to non-naturalism?

A
  • Natural moral realism does not have to deal with the queerness of moral facts as non-naturalism needs to.
  • It is consistent with a scientific worldview
  • It has explanatory power as to our experience of the world
  • supervenience
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14
Q

What is the striking fact according to Smith?

A

The striking fact is the fact that our motivations change as we change our moral judgments. It serves to argue in favour of internalism about moral judgments.

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15
Q

What is the Humean account of motivation?

A

The humean account of motivation advances that a belief is not enough to move us to act, but that we need in addition a desire to do so.

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16
Q

What is the triad of incompatiblity?

A

The triad of incompatibility argues that one cannot hold to cognitivism, the Humean account of motivation and internalism at the same time.
1. Cognitivism argues that moral judgments are beliefs about the world
2. Internalism argues that moral judgments necessarily motivate
3. The Humean account of motivation argues that beliefs are insufficient to motivate, that desires are also necessary

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17
Q

What are the two types of internalism seen in class?

A
  1. Internalism about reasons: reasons necessarily motivate us
  2. Internalism about moral judgments: moral judgments necessarily motivate
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18
Q

What is Smith’s critique of externalism?

A

He argues that externalists rely upon a general desire to do what is right. However, we rely on certain features of situations to motivate us non-derivatively (the general desire to do the right thing should be irrelevant).

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19
Q

What are the two elements of Brink’s theory?

A
  1. Cognitivism
  2. Moral realism: moral facts and properties exist and they exist independent of our state of mind
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20
Q

What are arguments in favour of Brink’s theory?

A
  1. Convergence: if different societies arrive at the same moral judgments then it seems there exist moral facts.
  2. Phenomenology: moral realism seems to reflect our phenomenology of the world and how we arrive at moral judgments.
  3. Progress: If there exist moral facts then this means there is some standard or benchmark towards which we are progressing.
  4. Disagreement: if moral realism is false, then it seems that we can disagree on moral properties and both be right. However, if only one truth is possible, then this explains how we can disagree.
  5. Truth: a truth depends on something outside of it, so for our moral judgment to appear true there seems to exist moral facts supporting them.
  6. Independence: moral fact seem to be independent of our individual preferences
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21
Q

What are the trends of moral relativism presented in class?

A

Speaker relativism: One judges an action to be moral based on the moral framework of the person who judges.
Agent relativism: One judges an action to be moral based on the moral framework of the person who acts.

22
Q

Name an example that illustrates the difference between the two types of moral relativism seen in class.

A

A soldier who commits murder. Under speaker relativism, we judge the soldier’s actions based on our own moral framework, as opposed to agent relativism where we must judge the soldier’s actions based on his own moral framework.

23
Q

What is the Frege-Geach problem?

A

The Frege-Geach problem contests non-cognitivism. It asks how can non-cognitivist account for the semantic properties of complex sentences when making moral claims, as according to non-cognitivist, phrases do not have the same meaning whether asserted or not.
- When I assert that killing is wrong, I express disapproval, and that determines the meaning of wrong
- When I say if killing is wrong, … I do not express the same thing, and thus both expressions will have different meanings.
Both phrases would then not have the same meaning, and thus could not explain semantic properties of our language (questions, negations, conditionals).

24
Q

What theories does the Frege-Geach problem contest?

A

The Frege-Geach problem contests non-cognitivism. Non-cognitivist cannot explain semantic properties of complex sentences.
Indeed, non-cognitivism argues that moral claims add nothing to the factual content of the world. If that is the case, in the phrase “stealing is wrong” and the question “is stealing wrong?”, wrong would not have a common meaning.

25
Q

What is Blackburn’s answer to the Frege-Geach problem?

A

Blackburn says that statements such as “if stealing is wrong, then murder is wrong” expresses a higher-order attitude of disapproval of the combination of disapproval of stealing and approval of murder.
In that sense, he found a way of still expressing the meaning of disapproval in IF conditions. However, Blackburn’s answer does not account for the whole Frege-Geach problem.

26
Q

What are arguments in favour of non-naturalism according to Schafer-Landau?

A
  • Normativity
  • Open Question Argument
  • Multiple-realizability
27
Q

What is multiple-realizability?

A

Multiple-realizability argues that actions with different natural properties have similar moral properties. As such, it seems that moral properties cannot be reduced to natural properties.
For example the property of being wrong can be realized across many different situations (stealing, killing, etc…) with varying natural properties (harm, pain, etc…), and these situations do not share a single natural property to which wrongness could be reduced.

28
Q

What is the OQA?

A

The OQA by G.E. Moore was an argument against natural moral realism. It basically states that it is impossible to find a definition of moral properties (for instance “good” or “wrong”) that would yield a closed question.
1. If good can be defined as “X”, then the following question is closed: this is “X”, but is this good? (for all this as “X”, i.e. leads to closed questions for all this)
1. e.g. Gambling is pleasurable, but is gambling good?
2. We can generate a question “This is “X”, but is this good?” that remains open no matter what “X” stands for.
3. It follows: good is undefinable

29
Q

What is a closed question?

A

A closed question is one to which the answer is made clear by the meaning of the terms involved.
Is A = B? is closed if the meaning of A and B makes the answer clear by itself.

29
Q

What are challenges to the OQA?

A
  1. There could be definitions where the question remains open (Is water = H2O?)
  2. Paradox of analysis
30
Q

What is the paradox of analysis? And how do we resolve it?

A
  1. Paradox of analysis: There are good reasons to believe that conceptual analysis is informative and good reasons to believe that conceptual analysis is uninformative
    1. When we analyze concepts, we find out new understanding of concepts
    2. To perform conceptual analysis, we already need to know what the concepts mean
    3. Resolution → Knowing “X” then has 2 meanings:
      1. being able to articulate the meaning of “X”
      2. being able to use the concept “X” correctly

Note: Conceptual analysis is the breaking of concepts into its constituent parts.

31
Q

What is a simple notion? Name an example.

A

A simple notion is one that cannot be further decomposed into other constituents. According to Moore, “Good” is simple notion.

32
Q

What is the verifiability argument?

A

Ayer argues that a verifiable claim is truth-apt, and thus adds to the factual content of a claim. He then uses this argument to claim that moral judgments are not verifiable, because they merely express emotions and do not add anything to the factual content of claims.

33
Q

What is the argument about queerness?

A

The argument about queerness has 2 parts:
1. Metaphysical part: if moral facts did exist they would be unlike anything in the universe (to-be-pursuedness: there is a reason giving aspect to moral values irrespective of our mental state)
2. Epistemological part: if they did exist nevertheless, we would require some special faculty to detect them.

34
Q

What is supervenience? What does it argue against, how is it countered?

A

If moral facts supervene natural facts, it means that any two identical situations in their non-mental aspects should also lead to identical mental aspects. It would then seem that any moral situation could not change without a change in non-moral descriptive aspects. Without this fact, the moral world would be out of control.

Supervenience is taken as a background truth in some sense. It is a major challenge to non-naturalism, as it seems to challenge the idea that there are non-natural facts independent of natural facts.

Schafer-Landau counters this argument by saying that non-natural facts are constituted of natural facts, but that they are not equivalent or identical to those. Taken in conjunction with multiple realizability, it makes for a coherent view.

35
Q

What is the Moorean shift?

A

The Moorean shift is an answer to Mackie’s error theory. It pits error theory against our moral beliefs and is valid logically.
1. “Killing innocents is wrong” is true.
2. If error theory is correct, “killing innocents is wrong” is false.
3. Error theory is wrong.

36
Q

What is McDowell’s challenge to Error Theory?

A

McDowell uses the exemple of colours to challenge Mackie’s view that for something to exist it needs to be mind-independent.
He argues that colours appear as they are to people under normal circumstances. Even if people seized to exist, we could say that if people did exist, colours would appear as they are. Colours would then effectively exist and be mind-dependent.

37
Q

Why does Brink argue that moral realism is the metaphysical starting point?

A

People usually begin as realists, and only under compelling metaphysical and epistemological evidence do they become anti-realists.

38
Q

What is some phenomenological evidence that we are realists according to Brink?

A
  • We express moral judgments in a declarative mood.
  • We believe in the objectivity of ethics
  • We think that moral mistakes are possible
39
Q

What position do the Cornell realists defend? Give an example.
What other argument do they counter?

A

Cornell realists are synthetic moral realists. They argue that moral facts and properties must exist, as they have explanatory power regarding the content of the world.
They take the example of soldiers killing babies. We do not need scientific analysis to know that what they are doing is wrong. The explanatory power of the property wrongness in that situation is sufficient to postulate its existence.
Their argument counters the OQA

40
Q

What is the difference between analytical and synthetic moral realists?

A

Analytical realists think we discover moral facts and properties via a priori conceptual analysis.
Synthetic moral realists think that we discover moral facts and properties a posteriori through experience.

41
Q

What are advantages of non-cognitivism?

A

Economy: non-cognitivism is less “expensive” in terms what exists. It must explain fewer facts.
Practicality: non-cognitivism can explain very easily why we are moved to act in certain ways.

42
Q

What is Harman’s argument for Hitler’s actions?

A

He argues for agent relativism. He says that no amount of deliberation would lead Hitler to have a reason to change his actions. If he has no reasons to change his actions, then it seems odd to say that he ought to.
a. Harman’s argument:
1. Hitler does not have a reason not to give the order to execute Jews
2. No amount of deliberation can motivate him to change his mind.
3. Internalism about reasons: whether an agent has a reason depends on his motivations
a. Agents have a reason to act in a certain way only if it is possible for them to be motivated to do so.

43
Q

What is a major problem of speaker relativism? And how do we resolve it?

A

Some people argue that speaker relativists actually talk about different things when they disagree. Therefore, it seems that moral relativists cannot genuinely disagree.
One possible answer is that moral propositions have truth values relative to the perspective. So when person A says “killing is wrong” and person B denies it. One person is asserting and the other denying the same exact fact.

44
Q

What is the key difference between internalists and externalists (about moral judgments)?

A

Internalists think that the link between judgment and motivation is NECESSARY. Whereas externalists think that the link is CONTINGENT.

45
Q

What is the epistemic regress argument and its possible outcomes?

A

The epistemic regress argument invites us to question how we arrive at moral knowledge. We form knowledge on the basis of beliefs justified by other beliefs, themselves justified by other beliefs…
This leads to 4 possible conclusions:
1. This goes on to infinity (infinite regress)
2. The regress stops without justification of the first belief (sceptic)
3. The regress stops at beliefs that are non-inferentially justified (intuitionism)
4. The regress stops at beliefs that are justified as part of a coherent framework of beliefs (coherentism)

46
Q

What is knowledge and how is it acquired?

A

The epistemic regress argument argues that to have knowledge of something we must be justified in believing it. Justification is thus required for knowledge.
1. A knows P if:
1. A believes P
2. A’s belief that P is justified
3. P is true.

47
Q

What is justification (epistemic regress)?

A

A belief is justified if we have good reasons to believe that it is true.

48
Q

How can we acquire moral knowledge according to intuitionism?

A

A posteriori knowledge: experience
A priori knowledge: self-evidence (Schafer-Landau)

49
Q

How does coherentism evaluate the coherence of beliefs?

A

Coherentism evaluates a framework of beliefs along 4 axes:
- Size
- Logical consistency
- Evidential consistency
- Connectedness