Exam 1

Question 1

Three Levels of Analysis

Answer 1

1) “man” Individual level
2) “the State” Level (domestic)
3) “war” (system level)

Question 2

Six Levels of Analysis

Answer 2

Individual
1) Decision makers, education, culture, etc.
2) Role (political position, social status)
The State
3) Government Structure (regime type)
4) societal characteristics (wealth, pop, culture etc)
The System
5) International Relations (bilateral/didactic relations)
6) The global system (balances of power, polarity, wealth distribution)

Question 3

Anarchy

Answer 3

Lack of final-authority government

Question 4

Realism

Answer 4

1) Interests
state dominant actor, state seeks security and power, interests conflict
2) Interactions
Bargaining with coercion as possibility
3) institutions
international institutions are anarchic and represent interests of most powerful states

Question 5

Liberalism

Answer 5

1) interests
no dominant actor/ many diff actors
wealth common goal for actors
actors have common ground for international cooperation
2) Interactions
international politics has scope for cooperation
conflict not inevitable but occurs when states fail to act in common interests
3) institutions
International institutions facilitate cooperation by setting rules for collective decision making
Democratic political institutions reflect common interests of individuals

Question 6

Constructivism

Answer 6

1) Interests
many important actors influenced by culture
Choices reflect norms instead of interests
2) Interactions
Socialize actors and cause alternative understandings to be align with their own
3) institutions
create norms for just behaviors

Question 7

Self-help

Answer 7

1) States can only rely on themselves for security

2) Realist principle and caused by uncertainty of other actors’ intentions and capabilities

Question 8

Zero-Sum game

Answer 8

1) One state’s gain is another’s loss

2) Relist principle

Question 9

Collective Security

Answer 9

1) Security through alliances

2) Collective Security organizations (Nato, UN)

Question 10

Positive-Sum game

Answer 10

1) Interactions that yield a net positive outcome. i.e. at least one state has a benefit and the other states has no loss

Question 11

Sovereignty

Answer 11

1) Internal (Hobbesian)
Authority, control, monopoly on legitimate use of violence in certain area
2) Legal/Judicial (int. law)
authority
recognition by peers
3) External
non-intervention of other nations, self-determination
4) de facto (unofficial) de Jure (by law)

Question 12

The State vs the Nation

Answer 12

State: political entity
Nation: shared culture, identity, values, history, homeland, religion, ethnicity
Nation-states: having a political entity made up of entirely one culture, history, etc.

Question 13

Nationalism

Answer 13

1) desire for political recognition and authority by a distinct group of people

Question 14

Geopolitics

Answer 14

1) how the interests and capabilities of states are affected by their geographical position
2) Factors
stopping power of water
natural resources
climate, famine, etc
ability to support a large population

Question 15

Two Types of Strategic Interaction

Answer 15

1) Cooperation
actors jointly adopt policies that improve the general welfare 
status quo is sub-optimal 
positive-sum scenario
2) Bargaining 
finite good, resource, policy in dispute
Actors divide up/redistribute good
zero-sum scenario

Question 16

Mechanics of Cooperation

Answer 16

1) Paredo frontier (maximizing amount of cooperation that does not make status quo worse)
2) Pareto Improvements (forms of cooperation that do not yield a negative change in the status quo for either actor)
3) Coordination–no incentive cheat
4) Collaboration–incentives to cheat
5) Public goods–non-excludable (available to all) non-rivalrous (not finite, one actor getting more does not make another actor get less)
6) Free-riders–actor who reaps benefits of cooperation without bearing cost of actually cooperating

Question 17

Mechanics of bargaining

Answer 17

1) finite resource
2) status quo division of goof
3) Reservation values–least amount of resource/good actors are willing to accept
4) Bargaining Range–space between reservation values.
5) Risk of reversion outcome–status quo does not change, failure to reach a mutually beneficial conclusion
6) power as key resource

Question 18

The security dilemma

Answer 18

1) One state’s security is another’s insecurity (arming is offensive, capability increase require a response)
2) arming for security reduces security (provokes response, expends resources, increases weapon destructiveness, increases risk for preventative–to stop surpassment in strength and preemptive–to prevent an attack force, security for all decline)
3) Best represented by prisoner’s dilemma
4) arms race likely

Question 19

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Answer 19

1) States can cooperate or defect
2) Defecting is most rational option
3) Both states acting rationally yields a suboptimal outcome
4) Sucker’s pay-off compliance despite other actor’s defection (worst possible outcome)
5) Best representation of the security dilemma

Question 20

Four Strategies for survival in anarchy

Answer 20

1) Balancing–arms production, mobilization, etc.
internal–through econ stimuluation
external–treaties, loans, trade etc.
2) Buck-passing–passing issue to another actor
“best” strategy if successful
potential advantage to buck-passer
3) Band-wagoning–allying with a stronger country
strategy for the weak
4) Appeasement–making concessions to an aggressive actor in hopes that they will be satisfied

Question 21

Balance of Power

Answer 21

1) roughly equal distribution of capabilities across a system
2) no single actor can credibly threaten others
3) Imbalances lead to survival strategies
4) Self-enforcing equilibrium

Question 22

Distribution of Power

Answer 22

1) Creates unique structure
2) System is anarchic, but has structure because of relative power
3) Informala hierarchy and spheres of influence

Question 23

Structure and Polarity

Answer 23

1) total major actors= polarity, major actor = pole
2) three structures
Unipolar–one pole, invites challengers
Bipolar–arms race? , most stable (Contemporary view)
Multi-polar–balanced multi polarity (no individual pole capable of defeating other) concert of Europe most stable in classical view, unbalanced (one pole stronger) least stable (contemp. view)

Question 24

War and Incomplete Information/Information Asymmetry

Answer 24

1) Info Asymmetry–unequal amounts of information across sides of an interaction
2) Actors lack info about another’s resolve (will to go to war) and capabilities—overestimation cap. underestimate res. imprudent demands, risk-return trade-off (trade-off between trying to get a better deal and avoiding war, incentives to misrepresent, bluffing

Question 25

Costly Signals

Answer 25

1) Used as a way to prove credibility and establish a clear bargaining space
2) Military tactic like tying hands and facing audience costs
3) goal to credibly convey willingness to fight

Question 26

War and Commitment Problems

Answer 26

1) Assuming complete information, inability to commit to a bargained outcome
shifts in power and preventative war, first-strike advantage and preemptive war, bargaining process affects relations

Question 27

Issue Indivisibility

Answer 27

1) Issues that cannot be divided without sacrificing its value
2) Core values that cannot be compromised
3) Solutions: power sharing

Question 28

Compellence vs deterrence and Nukes

Answer 28

1) Compellence–threatening use of force to change the status quo
2) Deterrence–threatening use of force to maintain the status quo
3) contrast with security dilemma’s uncertainty with overt threats
4) Nuclear weapons and second-strike capability (ability to survive a nuclear attack and retaliate with unacceptable damage) key resources in deterring/compelling
5) MAD two nations in conflict that both have second-strike capability
6) Nuclear Triad–nuclear sear, air, land based nuclear weapons

Question 29

Brinksmanship and The Chicken Game

Answer 29

1) Brinksmanship–bargaining strategy that involves increasing likelihood of highly-destructive outcome in hopes that the other actor will cave.
2) Chicken Game–represents brinksmanship risking worse outcome in order to make other actor concede to a sub optimal outcome

Question 30

Strategies for successful Deterrence/brinksmanship/compellence

Answer 30

1) Second-strike capability
2) antiballistic missile shield
3) devolve decision making power
4) tying hands–fixated your decision based on making unacceptable risks in wake of backing-out
5) convey irrationality

Question 31

Preemptive vs preventative strikes

Answer 31

1) preventative–prevent one power from surpassing another in strength
2) Preemptive–striking before the other actor does

Question 32

Arms Control vs Disarmament

Answer 32

1) Arms Control–managing production, deployment, maintenance, and use of certain weapons (Non-proliferation treaty)
2) Disarmament–reduce or eliminate weapons (START I)

Question 33

Audience Costs

Answer 33

1) Audience costs–electoral consequences of issuing empty threats or failing to honor comitments (diplomatic failure)
2) Can be used to tie-hands (reelection) allows leaders to better signal resolve

Question 34

The Rally effect and Diversionary Incentives

Answer 34

1) The rally effect–tendence in democratic nations for public support to spike at the beginning of a conflict
2) Diversionary Incentive–incentive to use a war as a distraction from domestic/economic/personal failures
3) UK/Argentina and Falklands War

Question 35

Democratic Peace

Answer 35

1) tendency of democratic nations to avoid fighting major wars with one another
2) LIberal-Dem culture
3) constraints of Dem institutions
4) Transparency and signaling (Audience cost and free press)

Question 36

Military-Industrial Complex

Answer 36

1) Alliance between military, legislators, and industries that benefit from defense spending
2) Iron Triangle
3) Eisenhower’s warning 1961
4) pros–national security, employment, research and development
5) cons–unnecessary militarization, dom pressure vs external threat, potential security issue, global instability, political corruption, narrows bargaining range