Exam 1 Flashcards

1
Q

What is international organization?

A

It’s not about the organization of the international system, nor about factual details of specific IOs, rather about how states interact when the threat of force is off the table and the interaction is not market based.

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2
Q

What are the foundations of rational choice?

A

Methodological individualism, consistent preferences, instrumental rationality

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3
Q

What is methodological individualism?

A

Explain collective phenomena via individuals and their actions. Ex- Think about the president; he makes his own choices, but what does he represent? What interests? Break it down into interest groups? MI says to think about the next level down, can we get to individuals that affect behavior of others, even though when we talk about state behavior, we tend to aggregate the state.

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4
Q

What are consistent preferences?

A

Preferences are fixed, and they don’t change within the model. Ex- States want to maximize wealth, so that explains how they interact. This doesn’t say what your preferences should be. Preferences are also complete (for examples x and y, an actor must prefer x>y, x<y, x=y) and transitive (if x>y and y>z, then x>z)

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5
Q

What is instrumental rationality?

A

Doing something with goal to satisfy a preference. Maximize expected utility, and self-interest, not social interest (self interest can reflect social interests and include social interests), there is strategic thinking (using all the relevant knowledge you have) and search costs for info. Evaluate probabilities over outcomes, given others payoffs (what could the other person do, given your move). There is no preference over strategies, only outcomes, unless we decide it is part of self-interests

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6
Q

What is the holy trinity of any rational choice model?

A

Preferences, information, and strategies. Every model has to have these things.

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7
Q

What is a rational action?

A

An action is rational if it is the most efficient way of achieving what the agent wants to achieve, given what the agent believes about the world. Doesn’t have to be based on material things (Ex- Making choices based on not wanting to go to hell)

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8
Q

Why isn’t rational choice an empirical theory?

A

It doesn’t make predictions about real world phenomena, it can’t because it makes no claims about preferences. It’s an analytical approach, or a set of simplifying assumptions

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9
Q

Is Axelrod rational choice?

A

Yes, because his model is based on prisoner’s dilemma, is based on the trinity of preferences, information, and strategy. However, he says the model applies even if RC is relaxed and violates strategic thinking, but neither exception is particularly important

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10
Q

What is ALL D?

A

Defect every time, never cooperate.

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11
Q

What is TIT FOR TAT?

A

Does whatever the other player did in the previous round, start by cooperating.

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12
Q

What is TIT FOR TWO TAT?

A

Defect if the other player defects on the previous two rounds, cooperate otherwise.

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13
Q

What is GRIM TRIGGER?

A

Start cooperating, if the other player defects, you defect forever. AKA permanent retaliation.

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14
Q

What is w in a prisoner’s dilemma?

A

The discount parameter or the degree to which the the payoff of each move is discounted relative to the previous move (time preference and impatience for gains and uncertainty over whether the game will continue). W=1 means you do not discount the future at all, so you will be very cooperative for further gains. W=0 means you don’t care about the future at all, so you maximize current gains.

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15
Q

What happened in Axelrod’s round robin tournament?

A

In each round, each actor plays PD with another actor, iterated 200 times. There are as many rounds as actors, and each actor is played between different partners. At the end, actor’s scores are added up highest score wins. Tit for tat emerged as the victor.

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16
Q

What was Axelrod’s round robin median tournament?

A

The same as the regular round robin, except without the known endpoint for each interaction, because with a known endpoint, the incentive to defect will be present at every turn. So Axelrod created the probability the game will end, instead of a hard stop. Tit for tat won again.

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17
Q

What was Axelrod’s ecological tournament?

A

Starts with the regular tournament setup, except each actor has multiple entrants. At the end of the game, the number of low-scoring actors is reduced and the number of high scoring actors is increased. You play again with the new generation, and repeat 1000 times. The winner is the most numerous at the end. Tit for tat won again.

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18
Q

How can Axelrod be applied to economic interdependence?

A

The rise of capitalism led to increasing interaction on the basis of positive sum liberalism

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19
Q

How can Axelrod be applied to democratic peace?

A

Authoritiarianism is all d, a collectively stable strategy, and democracy was a mutant strategy, possibly tit for tat. If there’s just one T4T, they can’t invade the space of ALL D, so democracies invade in small clusters. Democracies thrive because they cooperate more than authoritarians. Democracies also multiply through selection (success in war and alliances) and imitation (diffusion of ideas). Democracies become ecologically dominant.

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20
Q

How can Axelrod be applied to the costs of war?

A

Technology increases the actual cost of war and the norms about the desirability of war changes (war is glorious, then all but Germany thinks war is horrifying, then all think that). Niceness and forgiveness multiplies due to learning (cooperating on first turn is nice and only punishing one turn is forgiveness). So tit for tat.

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21
Q

How can Axelrod be applied to internationalism?

A

New ideas about benefits of cooperation bubble up in the 1800s. the rise of global and regional cooperation.

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22
Q

How can Axelrod be applied to American hegemony?

A

It looks a lot like the rise of cooperation and the rise of American hegemony can maybe explain why IOs increased. But this can’t be derived from Axelrod, because his models never account for a player becoming big and coercing others.

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23
Q

Is Axelrod a good guide to IR?

A

Mostly good, but what if the goal of the tournament is to win as many rounds as possible, and not score the most points? Or what if states are internalizing growth, instead of reproducing in the ecological tournament? Then TIT FOR TAT may not be the best. What if one player could pay some cost to lower another’s payoff? Axelrod does not account for coercion. What if state’s conceal information? This means a state could get taken advantage of over and over again

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24
Q

What is law?

A

A system of rules that is enforced

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25
Q

What is international law?

A

A system of rules between states that is enforced? But there are difficulties applying domestic systems to international law, less clear codification, and no international police to really enforce the law

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26
Q

What is unanimous consent?

A

In international law, states have to sign the treaty, meaning they have to agree for the law to apply to them, unlike domestic law.

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27
Q

What is pacta sunt servanda?

A

Agreements must be kept, treaties are binding, and must be kept.

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28
Q

What is rebus sic stanibus?

A

“In these circumstance”. Allows escape for treaties if there is a fundamental change in circumstances

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29
Q

Where are the default rules of treaty making codified?

A

In the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

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30
Q

What is required for customary international law?

A

Opinio juris and practice

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31
Q

What does opinio juris involve?

A

An opinion of law and a determination of legal obligation. There has to be no consistent objection.

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32
Q

What does practice for CIL mean?

A

There is a behavioral regularity and be consistent over time and space.

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33
Q

What is Three Miles Rule and how does it apply to CIL?

A

States own three miles out from their coast. Over time, everyone acknowledged this and it became CIL. It became treaty law later.

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34
Q

What is sovereign immunity?

A

The idea that your diplomats can’t be arrested for certain laws, only deported.

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35
Q

What is jus cogens norms?

A

Compelling law with imperative norms. There is a fundamental principle with no consent required and no objection allowed. Examples: crimes against humanity, torture, apartheid, slavery.

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36
Q

What is managerialism?

A

A general propensity of states to comply with international obligations. “Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time”. If states didn’t intend to cooperate, why would they sign. If intentions are good, enforcement is rarely required.

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37
Q

Why do managerialist believe that we observe defection?

A

Treaty ambiguity, capacity limitations, and exogenous shocks.

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38
Q

How is treaty ambiguity solved by managerialists?

A

Increasing clarity, create dispute settlement mechanism. False positive: you think the other side is cooperating and you are exploited. False negative: you think the other side is defection leading to failure of cooperation

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39
Q

What is capacity limitation?

A

Not every state is capable of enforcing the agreements they sign. Providing aid and financial assistance can help.

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40
Q

What are exogenous shocks?

A

Unforeseen circumstances lead to the need to break treaty obligations. Ex: sign a treaty agreement, economy collapses, and tariff revenue is needed to survive. States should engage in discourse and practice forgiveness in this scenario.

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41
Q

What is the biggest criticism of Chayes and Chayes?

A

They are international lawyers, and their jobs rely on them being optimistic about international law.

42
Q

What are the three factors that sustain international law?

A

Reciprocity, retaliation, and reputation

43
Q

What is reciprocity?

A

Benefits of continued cooperation

44
Q

What is retaliation?

A

Punishment for defection

45
Q

What is reputation?

A

Others belief about your willingness to cooperate or info/beliefs about an actor’s type

46
Q

What are the differences in strategy between Axelrod and Downs?

A

Axelrod asks how different strategies cause variation in outcomes, while Downs asks how to deter defection, though both are based on prisoner’s dilemma. Downs has a punishment period, and the other player needs to ask if the temptation is worth the punishment period.

47
Q

How long should x (the punishment period) be to deter defection?

A

The bigger the temptation to defect, the bigger punishment is needed.

48
Q

How do Downs and Axelrod differ on payoffs?

A

Downs makes payoffs exogenous, while Downs makes them endogenous. This means that Axelrod specified the payoffs, while Downs allows the payoffs to change and x to change. Everything is variable, including punishment period and temptation. Downs also assesses the depth of cooperation.

49
Q

What is depth of cooperation?

A

The size of the payoffs. Ex- Tariff lowered by 5% is shallow vs tariff lowered by 50% is deeper.

50
Q

What is the enforcement school’s beliefs?

A

Greater depth of cooperation leads to higher temptation payoff relative to cooperation payoff leads to greater incentive to defect which means a larger punishment needed to defer defection.

51
Q

What is Downs finding about the depth of international cooperation?

A

It is actually quite shallow. States rarely do much more than they were already going to do. There are a few cases of deep cooperation, they depend on extensive enforcement. Ex: WTO/GATT.

52
Q

What does the enforcement school believe causes states to violate agreements?

A

Out of greed, to satisfy domestic interest groups. Contra managerialism. Some agreements are designed to be forgiving to allow for defection by pressured politicians

53
Q

Do changes in technology strengthen or weaken cooperation?

A

It could be either, with transaction costs going down over time leading to a greater incentive to cooperate, but could make something that seemed far reaching became less costly, leading to the violation of an agreement (ABM treaty)

54
Q

What is a mixed motive game?

A

A game where cooperation is hard, because you have incentive to defect unilaterally. Ex: Prisoner’s dilemma.

55
Q

What is coordination game?

A

Cooperation is easier because there is no incentive to defect unilaterally. Ex: Pure coordination, battle of the sexes

56
Q

What is coincidence of interest?

A

When both states have the incentive to make the cooperative move. There is no strategy, so this is not a game.

57
Q

What is a Nash equilibrium?

A

A set of strategies in which no player can benefit by changing their strategy unilaterally, while other players keep their strategies unchanged. Ex: In PD, row and column defect. Payoffs do not have to be equal.

58
Q

What is pure coordination?

A

2 Nash equilibriums in which neither benefits from changing strategy unilaterally. Row preferences: cc, dd, dc=cd. Column preferences: cc, dd, dc=cd

59
Q

What is a battle of the sexes?

A

Once you’re in a NE, neither player will unilaterally defect, but there are two Nash equilibriums, and each player prefers a different one. Row’s preferences: cc, dd, dc=cd. Column’s preferences: dd, cc, dc=cd.

60
Q

What is chicken?

A

The opposite of the Battle of Sexes. Neither player benefits from changing from dc and cd. Think of a real game of chicken- defect=not swerving, cooperate=swerving. It’s best for the other person to swerve, but crashing is the worst. Row’s preferences: dc, cd=cc, dd. Column’s preferences: cd, dc=cc, dd.

61
Q

What is a principled type?

A

High costs (or low benefits) of defection. They don’t like to defect. This doesn’t mean they never defect, but the benefits have to be higher.

62
Q

What is the opportunist type?

A

Low costs (or high benefits) of defection. This doesn’t mean they always defect, benefits are just lower of defection.

63
Q

Why is it important that type is private information?

A

Only you know your type for certain. Others have belief about your type, and they update their beliefs in response to new information. You often have incentives to mislead others about your type. Ex: Hitler wanted to be viewed as moral and that he had limited aims.

64
Q

How do states update beliefs about reputation?

A

Observed cooperation increases your reputation for being a principled type. There is a stronger effect in mixed motive games, because you have an incentive to defect. On the other side, observed defection increases your reputation for being an opportunistic type, with a stronger effect in coordination games. Unobserved actions do not affect your reputation. Actions which are harder to interpret have less effect on reputation than actions that are easy to interpret.

65
Q

What is the value of reputation?

A

Actors are more likely to cooperate with you if you have a reputation for being principled. Even in some cases where w may be too low to sustain cooperation in an iterated PD, you still won’t defect because you care about reputational costs.

66
Q

What is generalized reputation?

A

Reputation is observed by everyone and applied to every game (Chayes and Chayes)

67
Q

What is specific reputation?

A

States have multiple reputations because they care more about some issues than others (Downs and Jones)

68
Q

What is cheap talk?

A

A signal that is costless to send. It generates a pooling equilibrium: both principled and opportunistic types will send cheap talk signals.

69
Q

What are costly signals?

A

Signals that are costly to send, cost varies by type. Less costly for the principled type, because they don’t intend to break it. Ex: Putin demanding Senate ratification, because he wants confidence the US will not defect. It can created a separating equilibrium: all principled types will send, all opportunistic types will not. Could also result in a semi-separating equilibrium: principled actors will send, opportunistic actors might send

70
Q

What is screening?

A

Setting up a test to try and generate a separating or semi-separating equilibrium

71
Q

What is the problem with the Melian dialogues and signaling?

A

The Athenians didn’t want to send the signal that they are nice, they want to be seen as murderous brutes. They want a reputation for carrying out threats, especially in the middle of war. So, not all valuable reputations are about being moral. Dovish (doesn’t always carry out threats) vs hawkish (carries out threats)

72
Q

In what way is multilateral treaty cooperation not truly multilateral?

A

It usually originates as a proposal from a great power, then the proposal is bilateral or multilateral, made to other great powers, then other great powers reach agreement and present it to the rest of the world.

73
Q

How do G&P think multilateral treaty law is enforced?

A

A state defect, then a small number of the most harmed states punish the defector, and other signatories protest, but do not participate in punishment. Ex: Iran hostage crisis, punishment only by the US, not all states

74
Q

What are the attributes of collective goods?

A

Nonexcludable and nonrival

75
Q

What does nonexcludable mean?

A

Available to all within the community

76
Q

What does nonrival mean?

A

Consumption does not decrease availability

77
Q

What are goods that are rival and nonexcludable?

A

Commons goods

78
Q

What is a commons good?

A

A good that is rival and nonexcludable. The result is the exhaustion of the public good. The large exploit the small, and this only works with limited resources.

79
Q

What goods are rival and excludable?

A

Private goods

80
Q

What are private goods?

A

Goods that are rival and excludable. Something you won and your consumption prevents someone else from using it.

81
Q

What goods are nonrival and nonexcludable?

A

Public goods

82
Q

What are public goods?

A

Goods that are nonrival and nonexcludable. Can’t prevent anyone else from doing it, but it doesn’t take away from you. The small exploit the large. Every state wants to reduce its contribution, but everyone wants the good provided.

83
Q

What goods are nonrival and excludable?

A

Club goods without congestion

84
Q

What are club goods without congestion?

A

Goods that are nonrival and excludable. They are easy to share, and there are no incentives to defect. Excluded because of cost. Ex: Intelligence.

85
Q

What goods are partially rival and excludable?

A

Club goods with congestion

86
Q

What are club goods with congestion?

A

Goods that are partially rival and excludable. The more who use it the more rivalrous it gets. Ex: Toll road: If a road has a lot of traffic, it becomes rivalrous. The solution is to raise the till, so less people get on.

87
Q

What is a privileged group?

A

At least one member benefits from providing the collective good on its own

88
Q

What is an intermediate group?

A

A few members who can take on higher costs of providing a good, but none who are able to pay on their own. Cooperation to provide the collective good is possible, but not guaranteed.

89
Q

What is a latent group?

A

A lot of members who can’t take on the higher costs, so all must contribute. Cooperation is impossible without selective incentives, due to large numbers.

90
Q

How can homogeneity of membership help group formation?

A

Shared tastes lead to less need for bargaining leading to lower transaction costs

91
Q

How does heterogeneity help good provision?

A

People with strong preferences and the money will provide the good. Larger members will contribute more.

92
Q

What are selective incentives?

A

Prestige with being in critical roles

93
Q

What is a joint product?

A

Similar to a selective incentives, a bundled collective and private goods. Ex: Greece spends so much on defense in NATO because they are very worried about Turkey. Collective: NATO, private: protection against Turkey

94
Q

What is asymmetric information?

A

One cooperator knows more than other cooperators.

95
Q

What is moral hazard (hidden action)?

A

Provision of insurance disincentivizes action to minimize risks. Ex: If your insurance covers any and all damages you do if you get into a car accident, you will be more likely to drive a little riskier.

96
Q

What is adverse selection (hidden type)?

A

Bad risks drive good risks out of the insurance market. Ex: Insurance premiums are driven up as more risky patients are added to the pool.

97
Q

What is summation aggregation technology?

A

Each contribution adds identically and cumulatively to the collective good. Strategic form: PD or chicken

98
Q

What is a weighted sum aggregation technology?

A

Contributions are weighted by contributors characteristic before summation. Ex: Acid rain technology needs to be installed on the right stacks.

99
Q

What is the weakest link aggregation technology?

A

The smallest contribution fixes the quantity of the collective good for everyone. Ex: Airport security. A coordination game

100
Q

What is a threshold aggregation technology?

A

Contributions must hit a certain level for a good to be provided. Ex: Peacekeeping force.

101
Q

What is a bets shot aggregation technology?

A

Largest single contribution provides collective good. Ex: Meteor hurtling towards Earth, only one rocket is needed to take it out. Battle of the sexes.

102
Q

What are the implications of CA for IO?

A

Many different kinds of CA problems. No one size fits all approach to solve the problem. Privileged group=hegemonic stability theory.