Exam 1 Flashcards
What is international organization?
It’s not about the organization of the international system, nor about factual details of specific IOs, rather about how states interact when the threat of force is off the table and the interaction is not market based.
What are the foundations of rational choice?
Methodological individualism, consistent preferences, instrumental rationality
What is methodological individualism?
Explain collective phenomena via individuals and their actions. Ex- Think about the president; he makes his own choices, but what does he represent? What interests? Break it down into interest groups? MI says to think about the next level down, can we get to individuals that affect behavior of others, even though when we talk about state behavior, we tend to aggregate the state.
What are consistent preferences?
Preferences are fixed, and they don’t change within the model. Ex- States want to maximize wealth, so that explains how they interact. This doesn’t say what your preferences should be. Preferences are also complete (for examples x and y, an actor must prefer x>y, x<y, x=y) and transitive (if x>y and y>z, then x>z)
What is instrumental rationality?
Doing something with goal to satisfy a preference. Maximize expected utility, and self-interest, not social interest (self interest can reflect social interests and include social interests), there is strategic thinking (using all the relevant knowledge you have) and search costs for info. Evaluate probabilities over outcomes, given others payoffs (what could the other person do, given your move). There is no preference over strategies, only outcomes, unless we decide it is part of self-interests
What is the holy trinity of any rational choice model?
Preferences, information, and strategies. Every model has to have these things.
What is a rational action?
An action is rational if it is the most efficient way of achieving what the agent wants to achieve, given what the agent believes about the world. Doesn’t have to be based on material things (Ex- Making choices based on not wanting to go to hell)
Why isn’t rational choice an empirical theory?
It doesn’t make predictions about real world phenomena, it can’t because it makes no claims about preferences. It’s an analytical approach, or a set of simplifying assumptions
Is Axelrod rational choice?
Yes, because his model is based on prisoner’s dilemma, is based on the trinity of preferences, information, and strategy. However, he says the model applies even if RC is relaxed and violates strategic thinking, but neither exception is particularly important
What is ALL D?
Defect every time, never cooperate.
What is TIT FOR TAT?
Does whatever the other player did in the previous round, start by cooperating.
What is TIT FOR TWO TAT?
Defect if the other player defects on the previous two rounds, cooperate otherwise.
What is GRIM TRIGGER?
Start cooperating, if the other player defects, you defect forever. AKA permanent retaliation.
What is w in a prisoner’s dilemma?
The discount parameter or the degree to which the the payoff of each move is discounted relative to the previous move (time preference and impatience for gains and uncertainty over whether the game will continue). W=1 means you do not discount the future at all, so you will be very cooperative for further gains. W=0 means you don’t care about the future at all, so you maximize current gains.
What happened in Axelrod’s round robin tournament?
In each round, each actor plays PD with another actor, iterated 200 times. There are as many rounds as actors, and each actor is played between different partners. At the end, actor’s scores are added up highest score wins. Tit for tat emerged as the victor.
What was Axelrod’s round robin median tournament?
The same as the regular round robin, except without the known endpoint for each interaction, because with a known endpoint, the incentive to defect will be present at every turn. So Axelrod created the probability the game will end, instead of a hard stop. Tit for tat won again.
What was Axelrod’s ecological tournament?
Starts with the regular tournament setup, except each actor has multiple entrants. At the end of the game, the number of low-scoring actors is reduced and the number of high scoring actors is increased. You play again with the new generation, and repeat 1000 times. The winner is the most numerous at the end. Tit for tat won again.
How can Axelrod be applied to economic interdependence?
The rise of capitalism led to increasing interaction on the basis of positive sum liberalism
How can Axelrod be applied to democratic peace?
Authoritiarianism is all d, a collectively stable strategy, and democracy was a mutant strategy, possibly tit for tat. If there’s just one T4T, they can’t invade the space of ALL D, so democracies invade in small clusters. Democracies thrive because they cooperate more than authoritarians. Democracies also multiply through selection (success in war and alliances) and imitation (diffusion of ideas). Democracies become ecologically dominant.
How can Axelrod be applied to the costs of war?
Technology increases the actual cost of war and the norms about the desirability of war changes (war is glorious, then all but Germany thinks war is horrifying, then all think that). Niceness and forgiveness multiplies due to learning (cooperating on first turn is nice and only punishing one turn is forgiveness). So tit for tat.
How can Axelrod be applied to internationalism?
New ideas about benefits of cooperation bubble up in the 1800s. the rise of global and regional cooperation.
How can Axelrod be applied to American hegemony?
It looks a lot like the rise of cooperation and the rise of American hegemony can maybe explain why IOs increased. But this can’t be derived from Axelrod, because his models never account for a player becoming big and coercing others.
Is Axelrod a good guide to IR?
Mostly good, but what if the goal of the tournament is to win as many rounds as possible, and not score the most points? Or what if states are internalizing growth, instead of reproducing in the ecological tournament? Then TIT FOR TAT may not be the best. What if one player could pay some cost to lower another’s payoff? Axelrod does not account for coercion. What if state’s conceal information? This means a state could get taken advantage of over and over again
What is law?
A system of rules that is enforced
What is international law?
A system of rules between states that is enforced? But there are difficulties applying domestic systems to international law, less clear codification, and no international police to really enforce the law
What is unanimous consent?
In international law, states have to sign the treaty, meaning they have to agree for the law to apply to them, unlike domestic law.
What is pacta sunt servanda?
Agreements must be kept, treaties are binding, and must be kept.
What is rebus sic stanibus?
“In these circumstance”. Allows escape for treaties if there is a fundamental change in circumstances
Where are the default rules of treaty making codified?
In the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
What is required for customary international law?
Opinio juris and practice
What does opinio juris involve?
An opinion of law and a determination of legal obligation. There has to be no consistent objection.
What does practice for CIL mean?
There is a behavioral regularity and be consistent over time and space.
What is Three Miles Rule and how does it apply to CIL?
States own three miles out from their coast. Over time, everyone acknowledged this and it became CIL. It became treaty law later.
What is sovereign immunity?
The idea that your diplomats can’t be arrested for certain laws, only deported.
What is jus cogens norms?
Compelling law with imperative norms. There is a fundamental principle with no consent required and no objection allowed. Examples: crimes against humanity, torture, apartheid, slavery.
What is managerialism?
A general propensity of states to comply with international obligations. “Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time”. If states didn’t intend to cooperate, why would they sign. If intentions are good, enforcement is rarely required.
Why do managerialist believe that we observe defection?
Treaty ambiguity, capacity limitations, and exogenous shocks.
How is treaty ambiguity solved by managerialists?
Increasing clarity, create dispute settlement mechanism. False positive: you think the other side is cooperating and you are exploited. False negative: you think the other side is defection leading to failure of cooperation
What is capacity limitation?
Not every state is capable of enforcing the agreements they sign. Providing aid and financial assistance can help.
What are exogenous shocks?
Unforeseen circumstances lead to the need to break treaty obligations. Ex: sign a treaty agreement, economy collapses, and tariff revenue is needed to survive. States should engage in discourse and practice forgiveness in this scenario.
