EVERYTHIIIIING Flashcards
Information Assymmety
When one party has more /different information than the other
Adverse selection (hidden information)
When sellers have information that buyers dont or vice versa
Screening
Increasing observability: The seller can screen and select the buyer with the desired characteristics
Moral Hazard (Hidden action)
One party has better information than the other after signing the exchange contract
Signalling
Attempt at showing hidden information so that buyer can be sure of the quality
Mutual insurance companies
Customers are also shareholders of the firm (no abusive claims)
Ex ante
Before contract is signed (risk of Adverse Selection)
Ex post
After contract is signed (risk of moral Hazard)
Game Theory
A formal way to analyze/conceptualize strategic interaction among a group of rational players who behave strategically
Three steps of Analysis
- Problem formula (question)
- Model building (who, what, payoffs etc)
- Decision (using game theory analysis)
Assumptions of Game theory
- Players aim to maximize profits
- Rationality (all players are perfect calculators) #
- Common rules
Coordination Game
Players must coordinate their decisions in order to reach the outcome that is best
2-Entry game
A number of players have to decide simultaneously if they want to enter a market
Prisoners Dilemma
Situation where if both settle, there is minimum payout but if one confesses and the other doesnt, one of them gets maximum profits while the other looses. If both confess both loose.
Dominant strategy
The best strategy whatever the other player does
Nash equilibrium
A set of strategies one for each player such that each players strategy is a best response to other strategies (no incentive to unilaterally change my strategy)
Auctions
When there are several people involved in buying one thing
Dutch auction
The auctioneer starts very high and goes down until someone says they’ll take it
Agency theory
Defining the best reward structure in the context of incomplete information and conflicting interest
Positive Theory of agency
How do contracts affect behavior of participants
What can be done to reduce agency cost
Which governance mechanisms can solve agency problems
Theory of principal and agent
How should the principal design the agents reward structure
Which contract will be the efficient/optimal under different levels of risk attitude outcome uncertainty, task measurability, information asymmetry
Outcome based incentives (Rent contrat)
Agent is rewarded based on the outcome achieved
E.g. Annual bonuses, commissions, profit sharing or stock options
Benefits of Information enhancing systems
Principal can asses the behavior and performance of agents
shareholders have information to control behavior of managers
Bonding
Arrangement that penalise agents (managers) for acting in ways that violate the interst of principals (shareholders) or reward them for achieving principals goals
Monitoring
Observing the behavior and performance of agents
Unrelated acquisitions
A firm is acquiring another firm that uses very different assets, resources and capabilities (costly for shareholders and almost never increase profits of the nerwly formed firm)
Stock option
Holding of firms sock by managers –> more likely to make decisions consistend with the shareholders interests
Behavior based contract
wage contract
Fixed salary –> wage contract
(if the principal can accurately evaluate the effort of the agent he/she can reward on the basis of the real effort invested
Forcing contract
Principal promises to pay a certain amount if the agents effort reaches a predetermined level. If that level is not attained the agent gets nothing
Behavioral theory of the firm
Focuses on firms behavior and decision-making
Bounded ratinonlity
No one is a human calculator…
Local search
Solutionas similar to the current operating process
Path dependency
Tendency to replicate decisions from the past
Behavioral theory of the firm stuff to keep in mind
- Firms are complex entities dealing with several contradictory objectives
- Individuals participating in firms are boundedly rational and can make suboptimal choices because of incomplete information
- Firms generally tend to manage more efficiently current operating procedures rather than trying out new ideas
- This causes systematic and significant differences in performance among firms (heterogeneity)
- -> Managers are required! Influence behavior and decision making of the organization
Transaction cost economics
The decision to “make” vs to “buy”
Vertical integration
internalizaton (do it internally within a firm) of vertical transactions formerly done on the market (the combination in one firm of two or more stages of production normally operated by separate firms.
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Main Argumment of TCE
In some cases the cost of using the market increases substantially and surpasses the technical efficienceis provided by the market
Transaction costs
Price + specific transaction costs, which agents (buyer and or seller) have to bear
Two main behavioral assumptions of TCE
Bounded rationality & Opportunistic behavior
cost of bounded rationality
Identifiyng the needed resources, searching for the right supplier (costly &time) writing contracts (time), contracts are risky
Opportunism transaction costs are determined by
Asset specificity Uncertainty and frequency.
The greater these are the more expensive the use of the market and the more efficient is in house production
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Asset specificity
Assets are specific when the supplier cannot redeploy them to an alternative use (eg. sell them) without a significant reduction in value
Frequency
How frequent are transactions? (Indirect/reinforcing impact on make or buy decisions)
Three core topics of economic theory
- How is economic activity coordinated
- What explains input/output prices
- How to understand the dynamics
Economic theory Two approaches
- Population ecology –> organizational ecology –> Industry level
- Theory of evolution –> Evolutionary economics –> firm level
The VSR principle
- Variation given spiecies
- Selection of the fittest
- Retention or heredity
Variation EE
Two main types:
- Exploitation (Firms refine existing process)
- Exploration (firms try out new ideas)
Factors driving variation
- Prior routines –> Path dependency
- Information available & bounded rationality
- Satisfying rather than optimizing
Corporate strategy
Defines the scope of the business in terms of the industries and markets in which it competes
Business Strategy
Is concerned with how the firm competes within a particlular industry or market
Funcional strategy
The detailed deployment of resources at the operational level (eg. Marketing)
Competetive advantage
A firm has a competetive advantage if it is able to create more economic value than rival firms