European Integration Powerpoints Flashcards

1
Q

Richard Coudenhove?

A

Pan Europea

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2
Q

Altiero Spinelli

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belongs to legicy of restistance groups WWII Integration is a political project. Politicians should take the lead. Abolishment of sovereignity states. He wanted a federal europe.

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3
Q

David Mitrany

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Working Peace System. After League of Nations failed. First sectoral integration, then politicians will follow.
It is a bureaucratic process. No ambition to form federation.

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4
Q

Jean Monnet

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Functional federalist. Wanted to avoid war. Reconstructing Germany was risky. Work together through institutions and treaties. Aim was a federation. Start with economic cooperation, then further integration will folow. He wanted to establish supranational institutions to make states mutual dependent.

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5
Q

European Congress The hague 1948.

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Victory of the intergovernmentalist view on European integration. 1949: Council of Europe: limited output, except in the field of Human Rights (European Declaration HR, European Court of HR),

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6
Q

Neo-functionalism

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Ernst Haas & Leon Lindberg (1960’s): 1. Pluralism: Domestic interest groups and private actors influence national governments’ international behaviour.

  1. Transnationalism: Domestic interest groups bypass national governments and seek contact with each other. Multinational corporations and the European Commission become important actors and allies.
  2. Functional spill-over: Increasing sectoral integration due to interconnectedness. Governments decide to integrate in a sector, when this works other sectors are inspired and will integrate as well.
  3. Political spill-over: The learning process that politicians go through. Private actors focus on the international level and lobby political actors to proceed with integration.
  4. Cultivated spill-over: The European Commission fosters integration empirical problem: national veto’s (De Gaulle!)
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7
Q

Stanley Hoffmann (1960’s):

A

States are most important in international system. States only look at national interest. When national interests coincide, functional integration is possible to the extent that it serves the individual national interest. Political integration in high politics (security) sectors remain highly unlikely.

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8
Q

Liberal intergovernmentalism

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Morasvek. national preferences are shaped by the economic interests of powerful domestic groups in a situation of international interdependence; substantive agreements reflect the constellation of national preferences and bargaining power; and the design of international institutions is a function of the kind and size of co-operation problems they are supposed to manage.

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9
Q

1946: Winston Churchill ‘Zurich Speech’.

A

Europe has to integrate but it has to be done by states. When it suits the UK’s interests the UK will join. Talked about a United States of Europe but did not mean that in a federalist way.

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10
Q

May 1950: Schuman Declaration

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Proposal to establish a supranational organization among France and Germany and an invitation to the Benelux and Italy. The UK was not invited because the French feared that a British reaction of the supranational nature would endanger the integration process. The French were suspicious but were convinced by the ideas of Monnet. Monnet persuades foreign minister Robert Schuman to change the French position towards becoming a supporter of the creation of a supranational organisation to manage the economic sectors of coal and steel. According to Monnet, integration of coal and steel sectors would lead to the integration of the whole economy (spill-over logic). Important because coal was the main source of energy. He sells the idea to Schuman. Schuman’s proposal is supported by Adenauer (BRD) and Acheson/Truman (US). There was need for such a proposal because the Marshall Help given by the US raised the question about German rehabilitation.

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11
Q

Foundation of European Coal and Steel Community

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1951: Signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
1952: Foundation of the ECSC (predecessor of the EU).
-Creation of a High Authority – Today: Commission
-Court of Justice
-Council of Ministers
-Common Assembly – Today: Parliament
Common market for coal and steel and common control over production, price-setting and competition.

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12
Q

European Defence Community (EDC)

A

1950: Pleven-Plan in order to remilitarise (in controlled way through institutions!) Germany under control of other West European States. Germany was important because it was the front of the Cold War.
Proposed by the French, but in the end rejected by the French. De Gaulle was no in power and against it.
In the end, still a little cooperation. West Germany (BRD) becomes NATO-member in a more successful attempt to remilitarise Germany.

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13
Q

Venice: 1956: ‘Report Spaak’

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Monnet’s spill-over logic adds a new sector to the integration: atomic energy. Report Spaak proposed to establish two new organisations (atomic energy and common market beyond steal). Treaty of Paris had to be changed. To change a treaty an IGC (Intergovernmental Conference) had to be organized. ECSC member states support the idea. France initially rejects the common market idea (because of overseas territories, agriculture, national industries).

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14
Q

Treaties of Rome

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Founding of Euratom and European Economic Community (EEC). New institutions effective in 1958
The High Authority becomes the European Commission
more competencies for the Council of Ministers
The Common Assembly and the Court of Justice remain unchanged
Brussels becomes the ‘Capital of Europe’

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15
Q

De Gaulle

A

Between 1958 and 1969 De Gaulle dominates European politics.
De Gaulle was a supporter of economic integration:
-Devaluation and economic reform prepare France for the European Customs union, thus making the customs union possible.
-Plea for a Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) to support and co-finance the reform of the French agriculture sector. Agriculture is heavily subsidized. Large parts of the French budget had to be used to sustain agriculture because it cannot survive without and countries need food security.

De Gaulle aims to incorporate supranational economic integration in a broader intergovernmental political and military cooperation. Ultimate aim: to establish a European Europe, starring France as the political leader.
1960/1962: Fouchet-plan: attempt to have more foreign and defence policies. It failed because countries feared that it would be to superficial in De Gaulle’s way.

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16
Q

EFTA 1960

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By this time the era of decolonization had started and the UK figures that cooperation is beneficial. They are not very eager to cooperate in a supranational way. They only want to cooperate in a intergovernmental. The EEC goes to far.
1960: UK establishes a competitive organization the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Members: UK, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Finland.

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17
Q

1965: Empty chair crisis:

A

There was a dispute between the European Commission and France with respect to the financing of the Common Agriculture Policy. In order for the European Community to make decisions (about budgeting) and add money to agricultural policy new types of mechanisms are needed. Therefore changed are needed.
Proposal by EEC:
-More money for the budget (own resources)
-More powers for the European Commission and the Common Assembly at the expense of the member states
-Majority voting would replace unanimity.

France then leaves the negotiations and refuses to participate in the meetings of the Council of Ministers. Now the council could not take any decisions anymore because unanimity was needed.
1966: France accepts a compromise (De Gaulle needed to win elections):
-Interim financing of the CAP
-Now own resources

This was unacceptable for France because the lost too much sovereignty.

Ended in Luxembourg Compromise

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18
Q

Luxembourg Compromise

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Agreement to disagree. Voting by qualified majority becomes possible. Unanimity can be invoked whenever a member state perceives its national vital interests are at stake. This still exists. Therefore the EU always strives for consensus.
Result: EEC can get back to work, but intergovernmentalism is reinforced. The intergovernmental method becomes even more crucial decision-making procedures are slowed down.

  1. ‘When issues very important to one or more member countries are at stake, the members of the Council will try, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by all members of the Council, while respecting their mutual interests, and those of the Community.’
  2. ‘The French delegation considers that, when very important issues are at stake, discussions must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached.’
  3. The six delegations note that there is a divergence of views on what should be done in the event of a failure to reach complete agreement.’
  4. However, they consider that this divergence does not prevent the Community’s work being resumed in accordance with the normal procedure.’
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19
Q

UK Applications

A

1961: EFTA did not do so well. The UK applies a first time for EEC membership. Labour and Conservative’s are divided. PM Macmillan was an Atlanticist and received President Kennedy’s support for EC membership application.

The negotiations were difficult:

  • De Gaulle distrusted the UK-US ties and the Atlanticist MacMillan. Saw UK as an American Trojan Horse. The official reason was it would not fit Agricultural policy.
  • Discussions with respect to agriculture, Common Wealth and EFTA Nassau-agreement between UK and US, US missiles in the UK.

1963: De Gaulle vetoes British membership.

1667: The UK applies for a second time for EC membership.
De Gaulle reacts fast and declares that the UK is politically and economically not ready for EC membership.

De Gaulle resigns in 1968 after protests.

President Pompidou balances between the inheritance of De Gaulle and the aim to give France a more central position in the European debate. France starts performing less well in economic perspective. Pompidou becomes a supporter of British EC accession to ensure an antidote for German economic hegemony.

Heath applies for EC membership in 1970
Still deeply divided political elites within the UK
Negotiations (1970-1971)
mainly discuss agricultural and financial issues
French referendum accepts UK accession in 1972
UK ratification of the accession treaty in 1972

Together with Denmark and Ireland.

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20
Q

Fusion Treaty (1965):

A

the EEC slowly recovers from years of stagnation
EEC plus ECSC = European Community (EC)
Successful negotiations of the GATT’s Kennedy-round

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21
Q

The Summit of The Hague (1969)

A

brings optimism
Completion of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) (financing)
Foreign Policy Cooperation (Davignon)
Monetary Policy Cooperation (Werner)
British accession negotiations as from 1970

Own resources for the EC: all import tariffs and maximum 1% of VAT revenues
! no consideration of the net payer status of future member UK !
European Parliament receives limited powers over the budget

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22
Q

Report Davignon 1970

A

European Political Cooperation (EPC), outside the existing EC institutional structure
The aim of the EPS in foreign political relations was more to target the European Community through coordinated consultations between foreign ministers of the Member States

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23
Q

Report Werner 1970

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Ambitious plan to establish an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) within 10 years.

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24
Q

Political and economic crisis in seventies

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1971: End of the Bretton Woods agreement. It brings Europe in a recession and increases the necessity for European Monetary coordination.
1972: Creation of the Currency snake and call for an EMU
1973: Oil crisis worsens the economic crisis, making forecasts to establish a common monetary and energy policy very gloomy.

Tensions between Germany and UK (European Fund for Regional Development)

EC – US tension: oil crisis and Israeli - Arab conflict

Tensions between France and Germany: Ostpolitik

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25
British re-negotations
After the UK became a member wants to renegotiate the conditions of British Membership (Wilson). Too much money goes to agriculture. The UK had other problems that needed money. Prime Minister Wilson (Labour) wants to renegotiate the conditions of British membership  Giscard opposes, Schmidt supports the demand  The UK seeks to renegotiate more issues (CAP, Commonwealth relations) Paris Summit (1974) Agreement with respect to the EFRD (EFRO is vooral voor de minder ontwikkelde regio's in Europa. Maar ook meer ontwikkelde regio’s kunnen het fonds gebruiken. Zij kunnen met het geld de concurrentiepositie en de werkgelegenheid verbeteren.) European Commission is asked to investigate a UK correction mechanism Dublin Summit (1975): agreement with respect to the mechanism UK Referendum accepts the Dublin compromise Political consequence: the UK becomes an ‘awkward’ partner
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institutionalizing EC summits
Schmidt and d’Estaing. : birth of the European Council. With direct EP elections as compromise. European Council meetings don’t succeed in revitalising the EC EMU-plans frozen (1975) slacking European Commission slow and difficult decision-making within the Council of Ministers rejection of the Tindemans-report (1976) and the ‘Three Wise Men’ report
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Tindemans-report (1976)
he Tindemans Report advocated consolidation of the existing institutions and the development of common policies. It wanted to extend the powers and authority of the Commission and, to this end, proposed that the President should be appointed by the Council and approved by the European Parliament. Tindemans also wanted to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament, the Members of which he wanted to see elected by universal suffrage before the end of 1978, by conferring on it the right to propose legislation, a right hitherto the sole prerogative of the Commission. The Report also advocated the extension of majority voting in the Council and changing the period when each Member State held the Council Presidency from the current six months to one year.
28
Three Wise men report
it proposed concrete activities to enhance cooperation in the areas of politics, economics and science. One of the direct results of the Report was the creation of the NATO Science Programme.
29
Membership Greece
1981. renewed Greek – EC contacts after the fall of the dictatorship (1967- 1974) negotiations start in 1976, economic integration is main issue
30
First direct elections for the European Parliament in June 1979
MEPs no longer appointed by the member states, but elected UK and France were opposed to direct elections Germany, Italy, Benelux and the European Commission were in favour compromise: direct elections but no legislative power and hardly any controlling power
31
EMS project
European Monetary System. Launched by president of European Commission Jenkins. search for monetary stability necessity to launch a new European project Germany becomes an enthusiast supporter and persuades France to support the EMS. Germany and France together launch the EMS proposal in 1978. European Currency Unit (ECU) Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) EMS starts in March 1979. half inside, half outside the EC’s institutional structure important first step towards a full Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
32
Margaret Thatcher
- Supporter of economic integration (the single market) - Fierce opponent of political integration - Opposed to give up British sovereignty - Defender of British financial interests in the EC. She wanted that the single market was as neo-liberal as possible because Britain was already in. She wanted the rest of EU to follow because it would mean they would have an advantage because they already accomplished the neoliberal market.
33
Fontainebleau Summit (1984):
66% of the British contribution is repaid (the ‘rebate’). Financial reforms: CAP, VAT-contribution max 1,4% of EU Budget Green light for accession Spain and Portugal
34
Why did the UK think they paid too much?
- Because a lot of the budget went to agriculture, but the UK didn’t need that, France did. Thatcher wanted to solve the declining industrial economy and needed money to invest in this. She wanted a second budget line for regions who suffer economically. - The UK profited a lot from import taxes, which they now had to rewire to the European budget. The UK wanted to be able to keep some of the money themselves.  Thatcher wants to renegotiate the British contribution, at that time unbalanced. The budget states the same but was split between other countries.
35
Start of the Dooge-committee:
Early eighties. study of the possible creation of a single market and the accompanying institutional reforms
36
Etienne Davignon
Early eighties. Campaign towards the private industry sector - ESPRIT program: research and development investment = a series of integrated programmes of information technology research and development projects and industrial technology transfer measures. - European Round Table: contacts between large companies - European Commission re-launches economic integration through legislative proposals
37
Cassis de Dijon (1979)
Pro integration ruling of the European Court of Justice = an influential judgement in 1979. Concerned free circulation of the French Blackcurrant. The Court ruled that national food standards legislation cannot be invoked to prevent trade between members unless it is related to public health. The principle of mutual recognition = whereby a product produced in one member state must be accepted in another state was established.
38
Genscher-Colombo initiative (1981)
Increasing tension UK and EC early eighties Gas pipeline between the USSR and Western-Europe Deployment of US missiles in Western-Europe Disagreement with respect to the Middle East conflict A lot of European countries realized that they can not rely on the US forever. Because of this they thought of political integration. It triggered the spillover from economic integration to political integration and countries tried to have common positions in foreign policy. More political cooperation within the EC: : more cooperation in the area of Foreign policy (Draft European Act, 1981). - Symbolical ‘Solemn Declaration on the European Union’ (1984) installation of a committee of institutional affairs in the EP - EP resolution: ‘Draft Establishing the European Union’
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Jacques Delors political cooperation
was president of the European Commission at time of more political cooperation in early eighties. He wanted more member states in the EU and tried his best to getting states around the table. 1. He wanted more economic integration (single market) and monetary integration. 2. He wanted more political integration and new decision-making procedures and get rid of unanimity voting.
40
Accession portugal and Spain
1978 and 1979. Pre-accession support by the European Commission Problematic areas: textile, agriculture, fisheries, free movement of employees, administrative reform France slows down the accession process, worried about the consequences for its own agricultural sector Delors (as new president of the European Commission) clears the last obstacles (1985): financing of the ‘Integrated Mediterranean Programs’ Portugal and Spain become EC member on January 1, 1986 Side effect of the enlargement is a renewed support in the overall European integration process
41
Jacques Delors ambitious plan
Completion of the single market by the end of 1992 New attempt to develop an Economic and Monetary Union Reform of the EC’s foreign policy New decision-making procedures Enthusiast support by business lobbies for the single market project ‘White Paper on the Completion of the Single Market by the end of 1992’ by Delors and Cockfield List of 300 measures, including timing, necessary for the completion of the Single Market. The plan touches upon a wide range of policy sectors
42
Single European Act
Merging of White paper of Single market and the report of the ‘Dooge Committee’ on institutional reform: suggestions for new decision-making procedures and more EC competencies IGC (1985-1986): Two sets of discussions… Treaty changes with respect to decision-making procedures Cooperation in the field of foreign policy and defence There was no increased cooperation in foreign policy and defence. Introduction of qualified majority voting for a part of the harmonisation measures. European Parliament: introduction of the cooperation procedure (single market) and the ‘assent procedure’ (external treaties) Little progress regarding the EMU Mixed evaluation: big step forward in the economic integration process, but no progress with respect to political integration.
43
The Checchini Report:
Dispute over the financial package ‘Delors I… liberalisation versus cohesion funds budgetary discipline and reform of the CAP ... but eventually agreement on Doubling of the structural funds CAP reform New budgetary rules
44
Strasbourg Summit’ (1989):
decision to convene a new IGC. Start of two parallel IGCs (1990): - Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): phase II and III - European Political Union (EPU): the Kohl-Mitterand letter ‘Rome Summit’ (October 1990): agreement to start phase II of the EMU on January 1, 1994 Margaret Thatcher is succeeded by John Major (1990
45
1990: German Unification.
There were fears that this unification would create a very dominant economic Germany. The French were the most critical and they saw opportunity to integrate Germany and use it for more integration. How: To tie it completely into integration, to make Germans give up their currency (Deutsche Bank was the pride of Germans) and expansion of political integration.
46
Maastricht Treaty 1993
Dispute regarding European social policy: introduction of the Social Protocol Phase III of the EMU at the latest in 1999 Introduction of two new intergovernmental pillars: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Introduction of the co-decision procedure, more EU competences, more QMV Until now the most important one. Marked the most substantial leap forward in European integration. Name European community also changed into European Union. Three pillars of EU: 1. European Community and EMU (supranational) 2. Common foreign and security policy (Intergovernmentalism) 3. Justice and Home affairs (Intergovernmentalism) Organisation of a New IGC was already agreed upon in the Treaty of Maastricht: the EU should be reformed to be able to cope with the upcoming enlargements
47
European Economic Area
EEA = EU + EFTA (1992) Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland Incorporation of the single market acquis (fisheries, Alpine transport !) Participation in the single market decision-making and judicial control EEA becomes the waiting room for EU membership Economic stagnation in the EEA-countries Fear for exclusion of EMU and decision-making Neutrality is no longer an issue (post Cold War)
48
Applications for EU membership by | Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
1993: the relatively easy negotiations started. They were easy for several reasons: - Rich countries - Developed administrative structures - Rather enthusiast political elites. the acquis communautaire was already present (EEA) issues of discussion: environment, agriculture, energy, fisheries, cohesion, …
49
Consequences of the enlargement EFTA round
- Newcomers are net-payers to the EU budget - New institutional priorities: transparency, participation, openness - New policy priorities: environment, social protection, development cooperation, foreign policy. - Sweden remains sceptic (EMU), Austria and Finland become enthusiast supporters.
50
the ‘reflection group’ of Carlos Westendorp 1995
Representatives of the member states, the EP and the European Commission report (1995) reflect severe disagreement European Council sets priorities: EU’s relevance for the EU citizens the democratic deficit foreign policy
51
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam
more powers for European Parliament, a smaller commission, shifts from unanimity to majority. The treaty of Amsterdam is important for Schengen and a change in immigration and asylum (becomes supranational). 1. Flexible integration: - only as last resort - acquis Communautaire cannot be endangered - Blocking possible by non-participating member states 2. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) - creation of an ‘Analysis and Planning Unit’ - secretary-general of the Council also becomes the ‘High Representative for Foreign Policy’ - introduction of the constructive abstention - incorporation of the ‘Petersberg tasks’ in the Treaty: opens door for integration of the WEU in the EU 3. Decision-making - Somewhat more use of qualified majority voting (QMV) - No agreement on a new system of voting in the Council of Ministers nor on a new composition of the European Commission - European Parliament: more use of the co-decision procedure 4. Free movement of persons: - incorporation of the Schengen Acquis in the Treaty, opt-outs for UK and Ireland - migration and asylum policies are put in the first pillar, with exceptions and delays - Envisaged establishment of the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ 5. Incorporation of the Social Protocol in the Treaty the Treaty of Amsterdam did not succeed in a radical reform necessary to cope with the upcoming enlargement with Central and Eastern European Countries Ratification without any problems Treaty of Amsterdam effective as of May 1, 1999
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Treaty of Nice 2001
New division of votes in the Council of Ministers New division of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) New composition and internal rules for the European Commission New criteria for qualified majority some new domains three conditions to reach qualified majority New rules for enhanced cooperation Starting from the first Commission after the coming into effect of the new treaty: 1 Commissioner per member state (in reality the ‘Barroso Commission’) Starting from 27 member states: the number of Commissioners will be lower than the number of member states: however, no agreement on the modalities of the envisaged rotation system NOT IMPLEMENTED AFTER FAILURE OF IRISH REFERENDUM More power for the president of the European Commission: concerning the division of competences among the Commissioners and the resigning of individual commissioners Evaluation is negative: the Nice Treaty did not succeed in reforming the European Union institutions to prepare the entry of the new member states in 2004 Most important thing Treaty of Nice prepared the EU to accept the new member states in 2004 and 2007. Also, obvious that in contrast to 80’s, in the 90’s and later member states become more and more reluctant to give power to European Union, so integration stagnates. Integration keeps on going, but slowly.
53
Conditions to start enhanced cooperation Treaty of Nice
in general: minimum of 8 member states must participate first pillar: Council decides by qualified majority, sometimes EP approval is required, Commission allows new member states in second pillar: Council decides by qualified majority; only for implementation of joint positions, no defence issues, Council allows new member states in, Commission and EP are informed third pillar: Council decides by qualified majority, EP is informed, Council allows new member states in in general: minimum of 8 member states must participate first pillar: Council decides by qualified majority, sometimes EP approval is required, Commission allows new member states in second pillar: Council decides by qualified majority; only for implementation of joint positions, no defence issues, Council allows new member states in, Commission and EP are informed third pillar: Council decides by qualified majority, EP is informed, Council allows new member states in
54
The ‘Laeken Declaration’ (2001)
Written by Verhofstadt: the way we make treaties does not work, countries are afraid because of domestic competition. Let’s change it into an European Convention. Analysis of EU achievements and shortcomings: peace, stability and economic growth versus democratic deficit, lack of transparency, lack of external power list of challenges: division of competences, simplification of the acquis, more democracy, transparency and efficiency, a European Constitution? definition of reform agenda is broadened: from a limited towards a complete open agenda reform method: first, a Convention with broad participation, including a civil society forum second, an IGC to confirm the Convention’s outcome Convention drafted a Constitutional treaty, NOT A CONSTITUTION. The idea was, it comes close to a constitution, very ambitious. But during an IGC the member states found it too ambitious (they could not sell this to the public because they still needed to be re-elected) and it is watered downed. It is still called a constitutional treaty and signed by the member states but must still be ratified by the member states.
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post functionalism
Theory to help explain why integration stagnated after Nice Treaty. - It is not just about economic things anymore - There is not just redistribution between countries but also between regions. - People have identities and preferences. Touches upon identity. There is public opinion and the political parties take up the idea of identity and they tie it to European integration. Integration happened before, because there was permissive consensus with the public, but because identity becomes salient and mobilized by political entrepreneurs, we move from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus.
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Convention Draft Constitutional Treaty: radical reforms
1. European Council - Explicitly mentioned as an EU institution - permanent president for 2,5 years, elected by the European Council - responsibility for external policies 2. Council of Ministers: - Division in: • General Affairs Council (preparation European Council) • Legislative Council • External Affairs Council, presided by a Minister for external affairs - co-decision as general principle, but exceptions - new presidency rotating system 3. European Commission: - 15 members and rotation principle - president elected by the EP, on proposal of the European Council 4. European Parliament: - all legislation by co-decision and QMV, but exceptions - also competent for justice and home affair, not for external relations 5. Qualified Majority: - double majority: 50% of the member states and 60% of the EU populations 6. National parliaments: - ex-ante subsidiarity test 7. Minister of Foreign Relations: - between the Council of Ministers and the Commission
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Constitutional Treaty:
Negotiations start in October 2003, Agreement in June 2004. Less radical reform, but still quite ambitious: - one single text, replacing all former treaties - legal personality for the EU - general application of the legislative procedure, but exceptions - simplification of legal instruments, including ‘European laws’ - Charter of Fundamental Rights incorporated in the Treaty - Council of Ministers meetings as legislator open for public - larger role for national parliaments - less unanimity and more QMV - simplification of QMV rules - more competences in internal security - more competences in external policies: Minister of Foreign Affairs The ratification is rejected by the Netherlands and France, so the treaty does not work because you need unanimity. Especially France had a very salient identity at this point. So it failed -> crisis. What were the reasons for the rejection -> identity issues.
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Treaty of Lisbon 2007 differences constitutional treaty
They watered down the issues and made it clear to the public that sovereignty and identity would not be attacked. In 2007 they reached the Identity reform treaty and they signed it in Lisbon -> named the treaty of Lisbon in 2009. This is the last treaty change. - no replacement of the earlier Treaties • only changes to the ‘Treaty on the European Union’ (TEU) and the ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ (TFU)(formerly known as the ‘Treaty on the European Community’) • the Charter of Fundamental Rights • the Euratom Treaty - opt-outs for the UK in police and justice cooperation - no EU-symbols (flag, hymn, motto) (on Czech and Dutch demand) - no reference to free and unlimited competition (on French demand) - Charter of Fundamental Rights banned to a Protocol, with opt-outs for the UK and Poland - hardly simplification of the legal instruments
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Treaty of Lisbon main innovations
- Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers: • as from November 2014: 55 % of the members of the Council, representing at least 15 member states and 65% of the total EU population - But ‘Ioanina Compromise’ (slowing down the decision-making) is incorporated in a protocol and can be invoked: until 2017 by 75% of the member states of the represented population as from 2017 by 55% of the member states or the represented population - But: additional transition period until 2017 during which a member state can always ask to return to the Treaty of Nice stipulations on QMV - less unanimity and more QMV in the Council - main shifts in agriculture and internal security issues - Permanent European Council president for 2,5 year European Council becomes a ‘European institution’ - The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (!Not: ‘Minister’) becomes vice-president of the European Commission - (as from November 2014: number of Commissioners 2/3 of the number of member states) - legal status of the European Union (merger of the 3 pillars) - national parliaments: ex-ante subsidiarity control - general application of the new legislative procedure: co-decision between Council and European Parliament now also in agriculture, police and justice cooperation. BUT: exceptions remain: foreign policy, defence policy, social security, fiscal issues - EP becomes fully competent regarding the annual budget (together with the Council of Ministers) - more clear division of competences between the EU and the member states - explicit confirmation of the sui generis status of the Common Foreign and Security Policy - more flexible conditions to start enhanced cooperation in those areas where unanimity remains (min. 9 member states); special conditions for flexible integration in CFSP - procedure for voluntary withdrawal from the EU (!) - accession criteria (‘Copenhagen’) incorporated in the Treaty, including the possibility for the Council to add extra criteria - reference to new policy challenges: climate, energy solidarity
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1993: Copenhagen criteria:
stability, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, protection of minorities functioning market economy, capacity to cope with market competitive pressures adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
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1995: Extra Madrid criterion: | full compliance with the ‘acquis communautaire
Negotiations about the Acquis Comm. (the total of EU laws (35 chapters), which must be accepted and implemented by all EU states. • The negotiations on the incorporation of the Acquis Communautaire in the candidate countries are divided in 30 (now 35) chapters. • Each of these chapters must be closed before accession can take place. In principal, a chapter can only be closed when full guarantee is given that the acquis is implemented before accession. • However, in reality transitional periods are necessary to grant candidate countries more time to comply with the acquis during the first years of their membership, especially for difficult chapters such as agriculture, environment and free movement The European Commission has set conditions for these transitional periods: limited in time and scope and accompanied by a clear plan to end Transitional periods can function in two directions: free movement of labour towards ‘old’ member states purchase of real estate in the candidate countries (Must be ratified: all states, European parliament and candidate members. If 1 does not ratify, there is no consensus.)
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1997: Luxembourg European Council:
start enlargement negotiations (1998) with Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus Turkey accepted as candidate member state but no negotiations yet
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1999: Helsinki European Council:
start enlargement negotiations (2000) with Slovakia, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria
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The European Council of Copenhagen (December 2002)
concluded accession negotiations with all candidate countries except Romania and Bulgaria. Still no start of negotiations with Turkey The European Council of Copenhagen (December 2002) decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey at the earliest in 2005, depending on Commission reports in 2004
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Enlargement Bulgaria
Bulgaria concluded negotiations in June 2004 ‘Safeguard clause’: accession can be postponed if the EU thinks that reforms are not implemented (fast) enough Issues: organised crime and corruption, judicial and administrative reforms, nuclear plants Approval of the accession treaty in April 2005 by Bulgaria, the European Parliament and the 25 member states Critical rapport by the European Commission in October 2005 Last European Commission report of May 2006 was positive Full membership on January 1, 2007
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Enlargement Romania
Romania concluded negotiations in June 2004 ‘Safeguard clause’: accession can be postponed if the EU thinks that reforms are not implemented (fast) enough Issues: organised crime and corruption, judicial and administrative reforms, discrimination of the Roma community, press freedom Approval of the accession treaty in April 2005 by Romania, the European Parliament and the 25 member states Critical rapport by the European Commission in October 2005 Last European Commission report of May 2006 was positive Full membership on January 1, 2007
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Seventh Enlargement: Croatia
Application in February 2003 Recognized as applicant member state in June 2004 Issues: discrimination of Serb minority, cooperation with the International Criminal Court on Yugoslavia, judicial reform, corruption Negotiations started on 3 October 2005 after a positive report by Carla Del Ponte of the International Criminal Court on Yugoslavia European Commission report (November 2006): progress in reform but still worrying issues (single market, justice, corruption, … and the cooperation with the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia) June 2011: all chapters closed December 2011: accession treaty signed January 2012: Croatian referendum approves accession (66% in favor) All EU member states and EP also approved: accession on 1 July 2013
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Turkey
``` European Conference (London, 1998) European Council Helsinki (1999): Turkey becomes ‘candidate – candidate – member state’: recognition as candidate – member state, but no negotiations yet ``` (Constitutional) reforms in Turkey (2002-2004) European Council Brussels 2002: the European Council of December 2004 shall decide, based on a report of the European Commission, whether Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria. If so, negotiations can start ‘immediately’. recommendation of the European Commission (October 2004): sufficient reforms to start negotiations suspension of negotiations is always possible negotiations are a process with an ‘open ending’ European Council Brussels (December 2004): negotiations can start in October 2005 Turkey accepts negotiation frame, making a symbolic start of the negotiations possible on 3 October 2005 start technical negotiations (35 chapters) in spring 2006 yearly progress reports of the European Commission explicit ‘open ending’ Since 2006, negotiations have been partially suspended (8 chapters will not be opened and none will be closed) because of unresolved dispute between Turkey and Cyprus March 2016: 1/35 chapters closed, 15 other chapters under negotiation Forecast: Very hard negotiations, accession in the short term highly unlikely, due to developments in Turkey (freedom of speech, AKP/Erdogan policies, reversed secularisation, Kurdish minority, Syrian conflict involvement …) But also: Turkey demands progress in talks in return for helping the EU to stop refugees from entering the EU.
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Enlargement Iceland
Iceland is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA – 1994) and of the Schengen-zone (2001) 16 July 2009: Iceland applies for EU membership Application motivated by the bad economic situation caused by the financial crisis; Iceland considers that EU and above all EMU membership can prevent future crises. Accession negotiations running since July 2010 Issues: fisheries, agriculture, rural development, environment, free movement of capital and financial services Until 2013: 11 chapters closed, 16 more opened In 2014 negotiations have been suspended: the new Icelandic government does not pursue EU membership In March 2015 Iceland withdrew its application: ‘Iceland should not be regarded as a candidate country for EU membership".
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North Macedonia
Stabilisation and Association Agreement since 2004 application in 2004 candidate member state since 2005, but no negotiations yet
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Montenegro
Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed in 2007; application for EU membership in 2008 Accepted as candidate member state since December 2010 Negotiations started in June 2012, 3 chapters closed, 30 chapters opened
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Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Stabilisation and Association into force in 2015 | Formal application in February 2016, no negotiations yet
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Serbia
Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed in 2008: however, ratification by EU member states has been suspended after non-cooperation with the International Criminal Court and Serbia’s position on Kosovo; Accepted as candidate member state in March 2012, negotiations have started in January 2014, 2 chapters closed, 16 chapters opened.
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Albania
Stabilisation and Association Agreement since 2009; application for EU membership in 2009, Candidate status in 2014, no negotiations yet
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Kosovo (‘under UNSCR 1244’):
The EU has recognized ‘the European perspective’ of Kosovo. The EU provides assistance in the fields of economic development and security. Stabilisation and Association Agreement in effect in 2016
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European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP):
framework to foster economic growth, democratic governance and stability in EU’s neighbour regions: Eastern partnership: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine Southern Neighbourhood: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia (make them accept EU laws, and help these countries to have a stable economy)
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In which ways can the EU shrink?
Suspension of membership (article 7 of TEU): a member state cannot be forced to leave the EU its membership rights can be suspended when all other member states judge that basic values of the EU are violated unanimous decision of the European Council required 2000: almost invoked against Austria (FPÖ in government) 2020: calls for activating article 7 against Poland and Hungary Secession of a part of a member state declaration of independence by a region of a member state discussion about the status of such an independent region: can a region inherit EU membership? does a region have to reapply for membership? and if so, what will be the procedure? Voluntary withdrawal of a member state: Exit clause in the Treaty of Lisbon no unilateral right to withdraw, but a negotiated withdrawal extremely complicated and burdensome process Brexit! Scotland (referendum in 2014), Catalonia (referendum in 2017)
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Institutional consequences for the EU Brexit
institutional reform: number of MEPs; composition of the European Commission; British EU officials; relocation of EU agencies budget: how to cope with the losses and gains of the UK contribution? politics: how will the changed composition play out in terms of political power in the European Parliament and the (European) Council?
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New Institutionalism
Institutions are both formal organizations and rules (parliaments, governments, laws,..) and informal patterns of structured interaction (norms, habits, ‘ways of doing things’, …)
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Rational Choice Institutionalism (New institutionalism)
presupposes rational, utility maximizing actors ‘logic of consequentialism’ focus on the constraints that formal institutions impose on actors: understanding the behaviour of individual actors by analysing the impact of rules and other actors principal - agent theory: what explains the degree of autonomy of supranational actors (agents) under control of the member states’ governments (principals)
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Historical Institutionalism ((New institutionalism))
focus on the time perspective: decisions are made according to perceptions and within constraints that are structured by pre-existing institutional relationships ‘time, timing and tempo’ path dependence, lock in: past decisions determine later options for action (either restrictive or opportunity creating) unanticipated and unintended outcomes, institutionalization
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Sociological Institutionalism (new institutionalism)
linked to the ‘constructivist’ turn as a rejection of the rational choice approach broad concept of institutions: including cognitive scripts, moral templates ‘logic of appropriateness’ preferences are socially constructed, socialisation
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Policy networks:
a descriptive tool to map relations between EU policy-making actors glue is resource interdependence continuum ranging from tight policy communities to loose issue networks supersystemic – systemic – subsystemic levels of decisions
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Epistemic communities:
knowledge based groups | conditions of uncertainty in international policy coordination
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Multi-level Governance
rooted in neo-functionalism, opposed to intergovernmentalism but often applied to governance of the EU in stead of to the integration process national governments loose control different levels take part in the EU decision-making process EU is a nested political system (no separation of levels) participation of non-state actors (interest groups) changing nature of the role of the nation states, and therefore also of the nature of democratic accountability
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The EU as a Multi-level Governance system
The European Union should not be considered as a level floating above the Member States, but as one political system with several governance levels: European - intergovernmental: e.g. Council of Ministers European - supranational: e.g. European Commission, European Parliament, Court of Justice national: member states (governments and parliaments) subnational: regions e.g. Belgian Regions and German Länder Decision-making continuously jumps from one level to another or even develops simultaneously at several levels. e.g. ordinary legislative procedure
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governance
a particular way of governing more governing in networks than in hierarchical relations blurring of the divide between public actors (authorities) and private actors (interest groups) mode of governing differs according to the policy sector or even the issue at hand main type of policies concern regulation of (economic) sectors, not redistribution of resources next to traditional legislation, there is much use of alternative policy instruments: guidelines, soft law, bench-marking, best practices
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Interest Groups
Almost all regional and national interest groups have created European level organisations in order to play the multi-level game social-economic interest groups: employers, trade unions, commercial sector, services, agriculture, … non-governmental organisations: NGOs, new social movements, consumer organisations, political movements, think tanks, … public actors: regions, cities, international organisations, non-EU states professional lobbyists: public affairs firms, consultancies, law firms Interest representation is characterised by a large variation in strategies and styles.
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Regulatory polices
rules with respect to the single market and flanking policies such as competition, social polices and environmental policies (including the external dimension of these policies) ``` Negative integration (deregulatory policies) by means of abolishing obstacles for international trade and fostering international competition single market: abolishment of physical, technical and fiscal obstacles competition policy: fighting cartels, mergers and state intervention ``` ``` Positive integration (reregulatory policies): to complement the single market; EU level regulation to compensate for abolished national regulation in e.g. environmental policy and social policy ```
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Redistributive policies
allocation of resources from the EU-budget to a social group or region, mainly through agriculture and cohesion subsidies Compared to member states’ budgets, the EU budget is very limited. Hence, the EU’s resources to organise redistributive policies are very small. The total annual budget of the EU is less than 1% of the sum of member states’ GNI’s. Main redistributieve policy domains are: (in percentage of the current total EU budget): natural resources / the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): ca 42% economic policies, including structural and cohesion funds: ca 45%
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Justice and home affairs policies:
policies to guarantee the economic, social and political rights of EU-citizens in the area of justice, asylum, migration and police The EU wants to create an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ to guarantee the fundamental rights of its European citizens (civil rights, political rights, economic and social rights). 1 Freedom of movement of individuals between EU member states: to make it possible to work, study and live in another EU member states; abolishment of border controls (Schengen) 2 Civil rights for EU-nationals in other EU member states: equal opportunities, political rights 3 Migration policies: visa policy, refugees policy, asylum policy, immigration policy 4 Police and Justice Cooperation in Criminal Matters: fight against drug traffic, terrorism, international crime, illegal migration
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External policies
policies of the EU as one single actor towards the rest of the world with respect to trade, development, external security and defence External trade policy (supranational) common regulations with respect to import in the EU common bilateral and multilateral trade policy (e.g. CETA, WTO) ``` International Cooperation (supranational) trade and aid with respect to developing countries (e.g. Yaoundé, Lomé, Cotonou Conventions) ``` European Security and Defence Policy (intergovernmental) foreign security policy of the EU vis-à-vis third countries defence policy
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Macro-economic policies
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) policies (including fiscal policies and economic governance) Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) monetary policies single currency (euro) for the Eurozone member states main institution: European Central Bank Economic Governance economic and budgetary policies European Semester main institutions: European Commission / Council / European Council / European Parliament
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Exclusive EU Competences
regulation of the Single Market, customs union, external trade, monetary policy (eurozone only), CAP price setting and subsidies, fisheries
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Shared EU and Member States Competences
social regulation, environment, consumers, public health, cohesion, free movement of persons, transport, energy
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Coordinated Competences
Macro-economic policies, foreign and defence policies, policing and criminal justice, health, culture, education, tourism, youth, sport, vocational training
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Exclusive Member State Competences
all other (taxation and public spending, including social security)
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Decision-making. Regulatory, redistributive and internal security policies:
supranational decision-making : monopoly of initiative by the European Commission consultation or co-decision by the European Parliament decision or co-decision by the Council of Ministers (often QMV)
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Decision-making. Foreign security policy
intergovernmental decision-making: initiative and decision by the Council of Ministers (often unanimity) very limited involvement of the Commission and Parliament (consultation)
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Macro-economic policy
supranational / intergovernmental / delegated decision-making: decisions by Council / European Council / EP / EC / ECB
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Regulation (supranational)
binding laws for all member states, directly applicable within the member states (no transposition required)
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Directive (supranational)
binding laws for all member states with respect to the result of the policies (transposition required, relative free choice of means and instruments)
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Decision (supranational)
binding laws for all those that are targeted (can be member states as well), directly applicable
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Recommendation and opinion (supranational)
general scope, but not binding
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Executive decisions (supranational)
comitology decisions, delegated acts
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Macro-economic decision-making:
Mix of supranational, intergovernmental and delegated decision-making: Decisions by the European Central Bank (e.g. with respect to interest rates within the euro-zone), to a certain extent monitored and controlled by the Council of Ministers (Euro-X-Council) EU-level legislation (e.g. budgetary issues) decided through the supranational ordinary legislative procedure Guidelines decided by (intergovernmental) open method of co-ordination procedures
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The European Commission: composition
1 commissioner per member state one president and (after Brexit) 26 ‘portfolio commissioners’ president proposed by the European Council (‘taking into account the EP election results’), approved by simple majority by the European Parliament other members proposed by the European Council and president elect, collectively approved by the EP (after individual hearings) and appointed by the European Council by QMV collegial body: common proposals and responsibility ‘independent’ supporting multinational ‘cabinets’ the administrative level: the services of the European Commission Ca. 35.000 civil servants (incl. translators, interpreters and researchers) ca. directorates-general (‘DGs’) complementary services: press, anti-fraud, legal service, … Agencies: more for policy preparation/support than for policy implementation
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The European Commission: agencies
Decentralised agencies technical, scientific and managment tasks European Food Agency, European Environment Agency, Frontex Executive Agencies to manage the EU programmes (Erasmus) Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) Euratom Agencies ITER Agencies under Common Security and Defence Policy European Defence Agency
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The European Commission: policy-making and decision-making
guardian of the treaties and of the common European interest policy initiative and development: monopoly of initiative with respect to supranational legislation no formal power of initiative in foreign security policies decision-making: preparations by civil servants, political decisions by the College of Commissioners the goal is to reach consensus; but majority voting within the College is possible if no consensus is found preparation by expert committees (national experts) and consultative committees (interest groups / stakeholders)
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The European Commission: implementation
implementation of European policies: direct implementation by the Commission is rare (exception: competition policy) multi-level implementation by the member states and their subnational authorities ‘comitology’: hinge between decision-making and implementation monitoring of problematic implementation and introduction of administrative procedures if necessary external representative and negotiator: external trade, international cooperation, enlargement, Brexit, migration, climate management of the EU’s budget conciliation in the ordinary legislative procedure
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The European Parliament: composition
direct election since 1979 9th legislature since June 2019: 751 MEPs elected (705 after Brexit) elections based on national constituencies and electoral arrangements MEP’s are divided in political groups which are based upon the European party federations 23 functional committees and a plenary multi-site: Brussels: political groups, parliamentary committees and ‘mini’-plenary sessions Strasbourg: plenary sessions Luxembourg: part of the secretariat
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The European Parliament: competencies
participation in EU legislation: ordinary legislative procedure (standard procedure): co-legislation post-Lisbon: also in justice, police, trade and agriculture policy special legislative procedures: consultation procedure (EP consulted, Council decides) consent procedure (EP must give consent) Participation in external security policies: Post Lisbon: more competencies in external trade policies and international treaties no new formal competencies, but extra opportunities (bv: EEAS)
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Budgetary competencies EU Parliament
EP enjoys full parity with the Council of Ministers for the annual budget ! European Council decides over the financial perspectives ‘after obtaining the consent of the Parliament’
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The European Parliament: control task
with respect to the European Commission approval of the president and of the college, inc. the High Representative dismissal of college (absolute majority) research committees, questions with respect to the Council of Ministers and the European Council approval of the High Representative very limited tools: questions, reports and information
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The Council of Ministers: composition
composed of representatives from the governments of the member states composition based upon policy domains (formations) General Affairs Foreign Affairs 8 functional council formations (Ecofin, environment, competitiveness, …) Euro-X-Council rotating presidency of 6 months, trio presidency for 18 months chairs all levels and all Councils, except Foreign Affairs and Euro-X-Council agenda-setting, brokering, external representation discontinuity, workload secretariat-general of the Council supports the rotating presidency composition based on the working level: Council: ministers negotiations are rare (‘B’-points) most of the time just ‘rubberstamping’ (‘A’-points) COREPER / Comité des Représentants Permanents: diplomats (and civil servants) COREPER II: ambassadors, preparation of the EC, GA, FA, Budget, Ecofin (Antici) COREPER I: deputy ambassadors, preparation for other Council formations (Mertens) SCA: Special Committee for Agriculture PSC: Political and Security Committee / Military Committee / CIVCOM Employment Committee EFC: Economic and Financial Committee CATS / SCIFA: Justice and Home Affairs (article 71) Article 207 Committee: Trade working parties: civil servants
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The Council of Ministers: tasks and decision-making
Tasks: legislation, together with the European Parliament policy-initiative and policy-making: foreign affairs decision-making: voting by unanimity or by qualified majority (QMV) the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’
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Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers:
as from November 2014: 55 % of the members of the Council, representing at least 15 member states and 65% of the total EU population BUT: ‘Ioanina Compromise’ (slowing down the decision-making) is incorporated in a protocol and can be invoked: until 2017 by 75% of the member states of the represented population as from 2017 by 55% of the member states or the represented population BUT: new system will only be effective as from November 2014, including an additional transition period until 2017 during which a member state can always ask to return to the Treaty of Nice stipulations on QMV
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The European Council: composition
installed in 1974, slowly becoming more institutionalised, since Lisbon a full institution of the EU ‘summitry’ trend; reinforcement of the member states; coordination, external exposure composed of the Heads of State and Government Leaders (joined by the President of the EC and the High Representative) Permanent president for 2,5 years meetings: twice a year: formal conclusion of the presidency informal economic ‘Spring Summit’ and ‘Autumn Summit’ ‘Extraordinary European Councils’ preparation by the General Affairs Council
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The European Council Permanent President
‘elected’ by the members of the European Council for 2,5 year prepares the meetings of the European Council chairs the debates and draws conclusions need for close cooperation and understanding between the EC Permanent President, the President of the European Commission, the High Representative and the rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers puts the Prime Minister / President of the state holding the rotating Presidency to the background Position designed to bring continuity and leadership in the European construction and policies
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The European Council: activities
relative freedom due to the absence of treaty stipulations and the participants’ status : evocation / appeal for the Council of Ministers: brokering, ultimate decisions determination of broad orientations with respect to institutional reform, enlargement, economic and monetary policy, external relations, climate change and energy… exposure towards the public opinion personal and informal contacts between ‘les chefs’ however, often disappointing results overload of (technical) issues high expectations extreme mass media exposure
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The European Courts
The European Court of Justice 27 judges and 11 advocates-general appointed by the Council for a (renewable) period of 6 years The (General) Court 54 judges appointed by the Council for a (renewable) period of 6 years Specialised Courts Civil Service Tribunal
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The Court of Justice actions
proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation: Commission/member state vs. member state proceedings for annulment: institutions / individuals vs. legislation proceedings for failure to act: ECJ vs. institutions actions for damages appeals preliminary rulings: interpretation of treaties and legislation based on questions by national courts
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The Consultative Committees
Economic and Social Committee 329 members from civil society, mainly social-economic interest groups non-binding opinions compulsory consultation with respect to social-economic policy initiatives Committee of the Regions 329 members from regional entities non-binding opinions compulsory consultation with respect to regional policy initiatives
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Why is there an increase in interest groups
- growing number of competencies is transferred to the EU level evolution of the European Commission and European Parliament’s role in the decision-making processes openness of European institutions snowball effect: interest groups attract each other
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institutionalised: (neo-)corporatism
formal representation in the Economic and Social Committee social dialogue among social partners less important than in (some) member states dominant in some policy domains (agriculture)
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Lobbying: pluralism
competitive system of informal contacts resembles the US system dominant style on the EU level
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Why is commission interesting target for interest groups:
interesting target for interest groups: Commission sets the legislative agenda Commission holds the initiative monopoly (except foreign affairs) Commission elaborates technical details of proposals
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Why is the Commission open for contacts with interest groups:
Commission needs information | Commission builds coalitions with interest groups against member states
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Why is parliament target for Interest and other way around
The growing powers of the EP attracts a growing number of interest groups The EP needs information Relatively more ‘soft’ groups: consumer organisations, human rights organisations, environmental organisations
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Interest Groups and the Council of Ministers / European Council
The Council is a hard to catch target | Indirect lobbying through the member states’ national governments and the member states’ delegations
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Multilevel lobbying
national interest groups lobby national governments | European interest groups lobby the European Commission and the European Parliament
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The budget touches upon core issues of European integration:
Financing through member state contributions as if the EU were a traditional International Organisation OR financing through ‘own resources’ as if the EU were a state? Level of the budget implies the scope of EU competencies vis-à-vis the scope of Member States’ competencies Choice of expenditure defines the character and substance of the EU polity and its policies Ideological discussion between the redistributive (Keynesian) or regulatory (monetarist) approaches of the European economy
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Yearly budgetary discussions in the 70’s and 80’s …
French agricultural interests vs. the UK regional funding interests and rebate demand European Commission and European Parliament vs. Council of Ministers
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multi-annual budgetary programs next to the yearly budgets
Less frequent negotiations, but still two outspoken contentious issues: Budgetary ceiling: net contributors vs. net recipients (incl. the British rebate) expenditure: agriculture subsidies / structural funds and economic development / migration / climate change / …
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Previous multi-annual financial perspectives
1988 – 1992 (‘Delors I’) Increase of EC financial resources Extra ‘own resource’: GNI based contribution Limits on the growth of CAP expenditure Continuation of the UK rebate Doubling of expenditure for structural funds 1993 – 1999 (‘Delors II’) Continuation of the UK rebate Maximum levels of expenditure More financial flows to poorer regions 2000 – 2006 (Agenda 2000) Consolidation of resources; no increase Continuation of the UK rebate 2007 – 2013 Phased and limited adjustment of the UK rebate Reduction of the contributions of Sweden and the Netherlands (and Germany and Austria) Continued shift from agriculture to economic development Shift inside agriculture from farmers subsidies to rural development
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Revenues EU budget
Compared to the member states, the EU has only a very small budget at its disposition: the EU has only limited instruments for (re)distributive policies 2018 EU-Budget is 160,1 billion Euro (ca. 1% of total GNI of EU member states)
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EU revenues come from 4 categories
Agriculture levies on the import of agricultural products custom duties on the import of goods - ‘own resources’ (ca. 16%) VAT (harmonised and max. 1% of the EU-GNP) - ‘own resources’ (ca. 12%) ``` Contributions of member states, based on their GNP (complementary) (ca. 71%) Corrections for UK rebate: NL/SWE/GER/AUS rebate on the rebate NL/SWE/DK lump sum correction NL/GER/SWE reduced VAT rates ``` Complementary other resources (ca 1%) (e.g. external revenues)
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Expenditure EU
Pre-Lisbon: distinction between: ‘compulsory expenditure’ (ca 45%) Expenditure that follows directly from the Treaty or from secondary law Mainly agricultural subsidies Council of Ministers decides (i.e. the Council can reject the EP amendments) ‘non compulsory expenditure’ (ca 55%) regional policy, scientific research, … EP decides (i.e. Council can only change the EP amendments) Post-Lisbon: EP and Council share the budgetary competence on all expenditure Multi-annual financial perspectives will become EU laws, reinforcing the status quo of the budget
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Current 2014 – 2020 MFF
2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF 1) Start of Commission preparations (MFF) in 2010 Proposal of the European Commission in June 2011 Informal discussions between Commission, EP and European Council February 2013: European Council Agreement on MFF 2014-2020 November and December 2013: approval by Council and EP Negotiation issues: revenue, expenditure ceiling, expenditure types 1 regulation, 5 legislative acts in own resources and 70 sector specific legislative acts
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issues next MFF
Brexit implications (lower revenue, but also lower expenditure, others compensate for lower revenue, but how, …) Total budget depends on future options of the EU Carrying on, doing less together, some do more, radical redesign, doing much more together Balance Member State contributions versus own resources New own resources (Corporate tax, Plastics tax, Emmission trading)? Payments conditional to Rule of Law compliance? European commission (and EP) versus (most) Member States Traditional expenditure (agriculture and cohesion) versus new policy priorities (internal and external security, climate)
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Current stae of play MFF 2021 - 2027
The European Council so far failed to find agreement in its February 2020 meeting Big net contributors (GER/NL/DK/SWE/AUS) refuse a budget above 1% EU GNI and want parts of their rebates to stay Net recipients want to limit cuts in regional funding (Southern and Eastern MS) and agricultural funding (France) The Commission, the majority in the EP and some MS (France) want a bigger budget to implement the EUs ambitious policies (Green Deal, migration, economic investment, …) Some countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic) do not want payments conditional on rule of law compliance … The European Council needs to agree AND have the EP consent before the summer of 2020 as the new MFF should start in January 2021
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Economic reasons single currency
fair play: avoiding competitive devaluations - reducing exchange rate risks within a single market - reducing transaction costs - increasing price transparency
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Political reasons single currency
- turning a de facto German monetary leadership into a common leadership (France!) - EMU means full incorporation of Germany in the European project - Monetary union is one of the ultimate steps of integration
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EMU: early attempts
Plan Werner (1970): plan to achieve EMU by 1980 (reaction to monetary instability caused by the end of the Bretton Woods system): failed European Monetary System (1979): plan to keep exchange rate fluctuations within strict margins (Exchange Rate Mechanism - ERM) Single European Act (1987): start of the single market and explicit reference to the establishment of EMU in the long term
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the Delors Report (1989) EMU
``` Delors Report (1989): three out of four conditions for a European Economic Union were implemented or were being introduced (single market, cohesion policy and competition policy); the only condition still to be fulfilled was macro-economic coordination ``` Three more measures (stages) need to be taken in this respect: 1 free movement of capital and close cooperation between member states’ central banks with respect to monetary and macro-economic policies 2 introduction of a European System of Central Banks to supervise the cooperation and to achieve smaller exchange rate margins within the ERM 3 eventually, the irreversible fixation of the member states’ currencies and the transfer of monetary policies to the European level (European Central Bank) For all these measures, a new Treaty was necessary (treaty of Maastricht) Core of the discussion: national sovereignty: France: EMU means de facto regaining (pooled) monetary sovereignty (instead of DMark dominance) UK: EMU is ultimate loss of national sovereignty and thus not acceptable Germany: EMU (loss of DM) as trade off / price to be paid for the reunification Other issues of discussion (already in 1990!!!): Is the EU an ‘optimal currency area’? (economic heterogeneity, labour mobility, tax competition?) Is the EMU ultimately an economic or a political project? Can EU monetary union survive in the long term without EU economic and political union (including EU tax and budgetary policies)?
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Treaty Maastricht EMU focus
Explicit mentioning of the single currency as the ultimate aim of economic integration Introduction of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) to supervise the commitments of the participating member states Introduction of the ‘Maastricht criteria’ member states need to comply with Price stability: inflation cannot be higher than 1,5% of the average of the three best scoring member states Budgetary discipline: budget deficit cannot be higher than 3% of GDP and public debt cannot be higher than 60% of GDP Exchange rate stability: exchange rate of the national currency should remain within ERM-margins for two years without using devaluations Interest rate stability: long term interest rate cannot be higher than 2% of the average of the three best scoring member states Stage 3 of the EMU due on Jan 1, 1997 or at the latest Jan 1, 1999: fixation of exchange rates and installation of the European Central Bank (ECB)
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the ‘post-Maastricht’ crisis EMU
Ratification problems in Denmark (1992), also related to the EMU ERM-crisis (1992/93): speculative pressure against several national currencies devaluation of Italian Lira withdrawal of the Lira and the British Pound from the ERM-System devaluation of Spanish Peseta and Portuguese Escudo loosening of the ERM margins from 2.5% to 15% ERM-crisis makes the participation of Italy and the UK in stage 3 very unlikely Public opinion becomes sceptical but political support remains intact Economic crisis makes the first deadline of 1997 impossible European Council of Madrid (1995) postpones stage 3 to Jan 1, 1999
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Preparations for EMU stage 3
European Council of Madrid (1995) decides on the name ‘euro’ Stability and Growth Pact (European Council of Dublin, 1996): permanent budgetary discipline (3% budget deficit) after the introduction of the EMU, including fines in case of infringements (excessive debt procedure) Broad Economic Policy Guidelines: coordination of national structural reform plans (embryo of economic governance coordination) Discussion on the political control over the ECB: introduction of the ‘Euro-X’-Council: Finance Ministers of the EMU countries to monitor the ECB Deadline of Jan 1, 1999 becomes feasible: German and French commitment, economic revival, softening of the criteria, no mobilisation of the public opinion against the EMU January 1, 1999: start EMU January 1, 2002: introduction of euro coins and notes 9 EU member states have introduced the euro as single currency
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Institutions of EMU
European System of Central Banks: European Central Bank and 28 National Banks Eurosystem: European Central Bank and 19 National Banks of Member states that have adopted the euro ``` European Central Bank (ECB): General Council (28 plus Executive Board): intergovernmental Governing Council (19 plus Executive Board): intergovernmental Executive Board (President, Vice-President plus 4 members): supranational ``` Euro 19 Council / Eurogroup (subset of ECOFIN): Economic coordination of the Eurozone
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Main policy goal of the Eurosystem / European Central Bank:
``` price stability (fighting inflation) support of EU’s economic policies ``` adaptation of basic interest rates is main instrument policy up to 2008: cautious interest policy, balancing between sufficiently low interest rates to support economic growth and sufficiently high interest rates to keep inflation low since 2008: very low basic interest rate or even negative interest rate and very cheap lending to commercial banks to fight the economic impact of the banking and sovereign debt crises 2019: first sign that basic interest rate could increase again 2020: basic interest rate very likely to remain very low due to the economic fall out of the covid-19 crisis
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Euro – Dollar exchange rate
exchange rate started 1:1 in 1999 but evolved significantly since: until 2002 US Dollar was stronger, since then the Euro became stronger reaching record heights of (1: 1,58 in April 2008); rise of the euro in the last year (currently – March 2020: 1:1,08) current policy (joined ECB/ECOFIN competence): keeping the euro rather weak to stimulate EU economy (by supporting EU export to the US and elsewhere), although this is problematic for energy prices within Europe.
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Eurozone functioning:
ECB sets single interest rate and monitors common exchange rate ECB monitors price stability (=inflation) through money supply: lending money to member banks and private banks purchasing sovereign debt (bonds) of member states
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Risks Eurozone
One single ECB interest rate doesn’t fit all eurozone members Eurozone members cannot use the instrument of changing interest rates Eurozone members cannot use exchange rates for a competitive devaluation. Internal devaluation (lower wages) is the only option.
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Banking crisis -> Sovereign debt crisis
All went well until the banking crisis erupted (first in the US – Lehman Brothers): Private banks within the Eurozone are regulated per member state Some banks (Ireland, Spain) lent too much for the housing market Housing market collapse threatened these banks with bankruptcy and capital leaving the country Debt of the banks had to be taken over by the states, causing public debt Debt of the states could not be solved by devaluation (Eurozone rules!) Private banks ended up with owning public debt and lost confidence of investors who distrusted the creditworthiness of the banks and ultimately also of the states Private banks stopped lending money to companies and households States start austerity programs to decrease their sovereign debt -> spill over of banking crisis into sovereign debt crisis
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EU policies to deal with the banking crisis:
European Council Recovery Plan (2008): coordination, but member state level implementation Legislation on increased regulation of the banks (2010 - 2014), insurance firms and financial markets (European Systemic Risk Board) Rescue funds can be used for bailouts of private banks (2012) Single Supervisory Mechanism (2013) Agreement on the Banking Union (2014): single supervision, single resolution and single rulebook (e.g. capital requirements) Institutional effect: wider policy role for the ECB January – April 2010: Excessive Greek sovereign debt (over 12%) triggered speculation against the euro: €30 bil. emergency aid for Greece is approved, but speculation is not stopped. May 2010: Council agrees on rescue package: guaranteed loans by member states and the IMF Markets keep doubting the willingness of the EU to oblige member states to cut deficits (BEPGs are not binding; SGP needs unanimity in the ECOFIN Council) Both European Council and the Commission launch proposals to strengthen economic governance. October 2010: European Council adopts ‘European semester’ to monitor member states economic reform and budgets, making use of the Lisbon Treaty article 136 on adopting measures concerning Eurozone countries in order "to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of their budgetary discipline" and "to set out economic policy guidelines for them“.
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Eurogroup:
informal gathering of Eurozone Finance Ministers, aim is economic policy coordination of EMU countries, now also recognized in the Lisbon Treaty.
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Stability Mechanisms: helping out individual member states
2010: European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF): bilateral lending by Member States 2011: temporary European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM): lending by the EU 2012: replaced by the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) €700 bil. to recapitalize member states by purchasing national bonds under strict conditions 2018: proposals to turn the ESM into a permanent European Monetary Fund (EMF) which has yet to materialize…
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Permanent measures to prevent similar future problems
2011: Euro Plus Pact Targets for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, incorporated in the European Semester … not enough to satisfy financial markets because too voluntary 2011: ‘six pack’: EU legislation for surveillance of economic and fiscal policies. reinforced SGP: preventive action, budgetary monitoring added to the European Semester reinforced SGP: corrective action: Excessive Debt Procedure and Excessive Imbalance Procedure with financial sanctions (Reversed Qualified Majority!) … not enough to satisfy financial markets because not backed by national legislation 2012 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG - Fiscal Pact) Parallel to the ‘six pack’, but on top also the requirement for all Member States to include budget and debt targets in national provisions (preferably even in the constitution). 2013 enduring policy of low interest rates by the ECB to stimulate the economy 2014 start of recovery in the affected countries 2015 ECB starts quantitative easing (buying state bonds) Syriza electoral victory in Greece: refusal to comply with EU and Troika program Greece risks to go bankrupt in May 2015, but Greek Government gives in 2016-2017 ongoing negotiations between Greece – IMF/EU about implementation of reform program in exchange for support 2017-2018 gradual return of Greece to lending by itself on financial markets 2019 Phasing out of quantitative easing Outside the EU treaty because UK and Czech Republic refused to sign Emphasis on austerity over solidarity and growth 2012: ‘Two-pack’: EU legislation: Extra surveillance of budgets of Euro-zone Member States Operationalization of TSCG: preventive through the European Semester, corrective action possible by excluding member states from ESM funding
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Features of the current Economic Governance
Elaboration of the European Semester Focus on structural improvement of public finances debate: investing vs. austerity (Keynes vs. Friedman) Focus on better enforcement of the rules Slow but steady evolution towards more common EU fiscal and economic policies Institutional changes: growing role for ECB and member states, declining role for European Commission and European Parliament, hence a more intergovernmental European Union, but nevertheless an EU level approach
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Degrees of economic integration
WTO rules Default option of preferential trade agreements (EU-China) Free Trade Area No tariffs for goods within area, but individual external commercial policies (and tariffs) (EFTA, NAFTA) Customs Union No tariffs for goods (and services) within the union, single tariff towards third countries, common customs legislation (EU-Turkey Customs Union) Single Market No tariff or non-tariff barriers within the union, common external tariff, free movement of capital and labour within the union (EU and EEA) (Economic and) Monetary Union Single currency and single monetary policy (plus macro-economic coordination) on top of the single market (Eurozone)
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Treaty of Rome (single market)
decision to install a single market in the long term: - agenda-setting by Belgium and the Netherlands (BENELUX – experience) - double aim: avoid protectionism and promote economic growth - first a customs union, than free movement of goods, people (as economic subjects, i.e. labour), services and capital
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Single market early stages
1960’s: rapid reduction of internal tariffs for goods, creation of a common external tariff: completion of the customs union in 1968 1960’s: slow progress towards a Common Agriculture Policy (De Gaulle) 1970’s: several economic crises prevent progress and sometimes even lead to renewed protectionist measures (state-aid, safety regulations) 1980’s: consequences of globalisation for member states and entrepreneurship inside the European Commission (Delors) lead to the ‘White Paper’ and the Single European Act (SEA).
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The ‘Europe 92’ programme (white paper)
The ‘Europe 92’-programme (the ‘White Paper’) introduced the creation of a Single Market by means of abolishing a substantial amount of obstacles Abolishment of physical obstacles regarding the free movement of goods: = cutting customs red tape and border controls Abolishment of physical obstacles regarding the free movement of people: = the freedom to study, work, live and retire in any European Union country !!! ≠ Schengen area, which deals with free movement by not executing border checks / passport controls Abolishment of technical obstacles regarding the free movement of goods: goods can circulate freely within the Single Market if they meet the required common standards Harmonisation of norms and standards has been a slow and difficult process. Mutual recognition of product standards, testing methods and certificates, as an alternative instrument to harmonisation. CEN / CENELEC: standard authorities that grant the CE label, allowing products to be sold in every member state (as a result of the ‘Cassis de Dijon’ judgement - 1979) Harmonisation was nevertheless necessary in many sectors that touched upon health and safety issues, such as food, machinery, toys, pharmaceutical products External frontier control needs to be organized on common grounds: this means common rules with respect to import and export of endangered animal species, waste transport, cultural heritage goods, dual-use goods, …
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Over 90% of the envisaged directives of the White Paper had been voted by Council and EP, but:
- transposition and enforcement (compliance) of directives proved to be more difficult - some problematic areas remained unresolved - the White Paper did not deal with a range of issues, necessary to reach a complete single market
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Compliance with single market directives is a problematic issue. Why?
member states sometimes hesitate to implement because of economic (competition) or political (elections) reasons member states sometimes bump into domestic capacity problems or into the technical complexity of directives
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Sutherland-rapport:
call for a complete implementation and monitoring of implementation white paper issues
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Internal Market Strategy (2003):
‘single market scoreboard’: naming, shaming and blaming member states for not complying with single market directives; first 1,5% and now 1% implementation deficit target Main problematic areas: non standardised sectors (SOLVIT) and public procurement
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Tax Harmonisation is still not achieved, despite pressure:
- spill-over from the internal market principle of freedom of goods: consumers purchase in member states with lower VAT levels (e.g. alcohol) - spill-over from the internal market principle of freedom of capital: competition between member states with respect to the taxes on savings (e.g. Luxembourg)
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European Company Statute:
2001: Statute of European Company (SE) allows firms to operate in more than one member state with a single set of accounting and reporting rules, with special rules concerning the involvement of employees in these companies. The resulting compromise was too complex to make the Statute really work: only a small number of companies signed in.
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Telecommunication and Energy were left out from the White Paper. This became increasingly problematic:
- growing GDP proportion of services sector compared to industrial production - industrial producers rely on telecom and energy - international pressure: liberalisation within WTO
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The ‘Bolkestein’ directive
Commission proposal in January 2004: free movement of services based on freedom of settlement and freedom of supply of services within the single market Commission proposal was considered to be too neo-liberal by some member states (e.g. France) and some EP political groups (social-democrats and greens) Issues of discussion: scope of application: what is ‘a service’? Exceptions for particular sectors (education, health, …) what about the ‘country of origin principle’? Approval of a watered down directive by Council and EP in December 2006 Implementation by the member states by December 2009 envisaged, but not yet fully completed by 2020.
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Single Market Act (April 2011): ‘relaunch’ of the Single Market:
Twelve areas within the Single Market that receive special attention as they are considered to be crucial elements for growth and reform in the EU worker mobility, taxation, digital single market, services, …
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Juncker Commission (2014-2019) (single market):
single market as main tool for the encompassing growth agenda better regulation agenda to reduce bureaucracy, and increase transparency and participation upgrading the single market: digital single market, capital market, labour mobility
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Von der Leyen Commission (2019-2024) (single market)
As all previous legislatures: pledge to close the loopholes and ‘complete’ remaining areas of the single market Special attention for digital policies, data, data-protection, artificial intelligence
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Aim Competition Policy
to ensure free competition among economic actors within the single market. Competition policy is an essential part of the single market. Policies with regard to private companies: anti-trust measures and merger controls government authorities: anti-subsidy policies, liberalisation and privatization policies Competition policy is applicable to all economic actors that are active within the single market: both EU and non-EU companies (=> international trade disputes) Competition policy is applicable to all member states governments: no protectionist policies allowed (=> limiting national governments’ policies)
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Five areas competition policy
Five areas: a prohibition on agreements between firms that limit competition (cartels) a prohibition on the abuse of a dominant position by one or more large firms the control of mergers which create a dominant market position the control of state aid given by a member state to a firm or category of firms liberalization / privatization : abolishment of member states’ policies that favour domestic / state owned utilities and infrastructure industries
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Private companies: anti trust - cartels
The Treaty forbids deals among companies that distort free competition, i.e. cartels among companies with respect to price setting, production limits, dealer exclusivity, export bans, market shares The Treaty forbids abuse of dominant market position (price setting, low production, conditional sales) of monopoly / oligopoly firms Examples: Volkswagen (1998), de Post (2001), Interbrew and Alken-Maes (2001), Boeing (1996-1997), Formula 1 (1996-2000), Microsoft (2007), Luminus – EDF (2009), Star – One World (2009), Google (2019) The European Commission is the anti-trust agency of the EU. The European Commission enjoys far-reaching powers to monitor free competition in the single market. It can investigate cases on its own initiative or following a complaint. The European Commission can also issue fines in case of infringement.
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Private companies: mergers (competition policy)
A 1989 regulation has granted the European Commission to examine mergers and take-overs of private companies. In case these actions create dominant positions for companies, the Commission can block the merger or set conditions (selling parts of the new company). In case of infringement, fines are possible. Example: General Electric and Honeywell (2001), Kirsch and Bertelsmann (1997-1998), Vattenfall – Nuon, KLM – Martinair (2009), Siemens – Alsthom (2019)
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State subsidies competition policy
The Treaty grants the European Commission the right to monitor state subsidies from member states governments. National governments must ask for permission to give state subsidies in extraordinary situations. In some cases related to social policies or environmental policies, the Commission allows for subsidies within a certain time frame. The Commission can take member states to the European Court of Justice in case of infringements. Examples: Sabena, Maribel, Credit Lyonnais, Ryanair, recently also investigations regarding the anti-crisis measures of member states The European Commission uses competition policy to push member states in the direction of liberalisation of state industries and state run services (energy supply, telecom, transport, …) The Treaty stimulates liberalisation but also stresses that supply in these sectors cannot be jeopardized. Examples: German Landesbanken, bpost, Belgacom, Electrabel,
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Role Commission external trade
negotiates On behalf of the 28 Member States | reports regularly to the Council and the EP on the progress of the negotiations
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Role Council external trade
decides the mandate for the negotiations follows the negotiation process approves the results of the negotiation (generally by qualified majority, except for issues touching upon cultural and linguistic diversity and effective national health, education and social policies, which require unanimity)
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Role Council external trade
gives its consent to the adoption of the results of trade negotiations on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis co-decides on implementation of trade legislation
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’mixed treaties'
treaties that touch upon EU and national competencies, ratification of national (and some regional parliaments) is required (see e.g. CETA) !!! These ‘mixed treaties’ focus increasingly on norms and standards, investment, services and less next to import and export of goods and agricultural products.
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The EU supports the liberalization of world trade:
low import duties for goods | exceptions: agriculture and audio-visual products
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Multilateral: World Trade Organization (GATT, GATS, TRIP’s)
EU is de facto member and dominates the discussions (with the US) Doha Development Round (since 2001!): further reduction of trade barriers, objective is further trade liberalization agenda-setting by the EU regarding the current round: telecom, ICT, financial services, direct investments, agricultural products very slow progress, even slower after election of Trump
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Multilateral: Inter-regional policy
European Economic Area (EEA): one single trade block of the EU and the EFTA states. Stabilisation and Association Agreements: agreements with accession countries also include trade related issues
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Bilateral policy: Free Trade Agreements between the EU and third countries
Under negotiation: India, Brazil, … Finished, ratification pending: Singapore Finished, provisionally applied: Canada In place: South Korea, South Africa, Japan
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‘Everything but Arms Policy’:
unlimited access for the 48 Least Develop Countries (LDCs), but exceptions for large parts of agriculture products
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The Agenda for Change (2011):
priorities for the 2014-2020 planning period: reducing poverty, human rights, democracy, inclusive and sustainable growth for human development, partnership, mainstreaming of development policies
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Yaoundé Conventions (1963 and 1969):
development aid to ex-colonies
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Lomé Conventions (1975, 1979, 1984, 1989) with ACP-countries
aid preferential trade partners STABEX: guaranteed export prices for natural resources gradually more focus on environment, human rights, integration, democratisation, good governance
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Cotonou Agreement (2000, revision 2005, runs until 2020): with 77 ACP-countries:
dialogue regarding application of funds | more co-operation with local authorities and civil society
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European Political Cooperation (EPC)
Ostpolitik, Middle-East (1973), OSCE general orientations by heads of state and government Foreign Affairs Ministers meet ‘in the framework of EPC’, i.e. outside he EC institutional framework Institutions: Political Committee, working groups and European correspondents intergovernmental, consensus driven, no voting, slow decision-making
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Common Foreign and Security Policy: Post Maastricht
Only a limited number of successful joint actions : Stability Pact (Central and Eastern Europe) Mostar (ex-Yugoslavia) reconstruction (co-operation with WEU) Deadlock in decision-making: unanimity requirement rotating presidency results in low degree of continuity Disastrous failure with respect to the Yugoslavian crisis ineffective institutional framework diverging preferences among member states no EU level military capacity Radical reform was needed and also envisaged in the 1996 IGC
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Common Foreign and Security Policy: Post Amsterdam
Introduction of 4 policy instruments principles and general guidelines (broad orientations – European Council), common strategies (European Council) joint actions and common positions (Council of Ministers) Decision-making procedures: unanimity remains the general rule introduction of the constructive abstention New actor: ‘High Representative for External Affairs’ New body: ‘Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit’
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Common Foreign and Security Policy: post Nice
``` European Council: principles, general guidelines and common strategies to implement the broad orientations General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC): common positions and joint actions (unanimity) implementation decisions (QMV) ``` European Commission: ‘associated’ (i.e. it is consulted) European Parliament: consulted High Representative for External Relations and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit: preparation and implementation of Council decisions
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European Security and Defence Policy
Failure of the European Defence Community (1954) Western European Union (WEU) Petersberg-tasks (1992): peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, Combined Joint Task Forces (1994): WEU can borrow NATO resources Treaty of Maastricht (1993): own EU defence policy is envisaged, but was not installed recognition of the WEU as an ‘integral part’ of the EU Treaty of Amsterdam (1997): no complete incorporation of WEU in EU, only incorporation of the Petersberg-tasks in the EU Bilateral Franco- British Saint-Malo Summit (1998) both countries support the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy Cologne European Council (1999): start of building up to own EU intervention forces Helsinki European Council (1999): decision to build an autonomous capacity to develop EU operations without consent of NATO but in close contact with NATO no ‘European Army’ envisaged creation of a civil and military capacity to support the CFSP: the European Rapid Reaction Force formulation of Headline Goals Commitment Conferences’ (2000 - 2004): Headline Goal 2010 attribution of forces and material by the member states for the Rapid Reaction Force (problems with transport and intelligence) Laeken European Council (2001): ESDP is declared ‘partially’ operational EU – NATO Agreement (December 2002): Use of NATO resources by non EU members / NATO members in the framework of an EU operation (Turkey!) European Security Strategy (Solana, December 2003): ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’
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European Security and Defence Policy Institutions:post Nice
European Council: principles, general guidelines and common strategies to implement the broad orientations ``` General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC): common positions and joint actions (unanimity) implementation decisions (QMV) ``` Political and Security Committee (COPS/PSC) ambassadors of EU member states, implementation of ESDP decisions EU Military Committee (EUMC): military representatives of the member states to advise Council and COPS EU Military Staff: inside the Council, to implement Council decisions
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CFSP and CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty
Separate chapter, explicitly intergovernmental: CFSP remains CFSP European SDP becomes Common SDP Together they cover: - All areas of foreign policy - All questions relating to the Union’s (external) security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy It establishes: - the European External Action Service - a restyled ‘High Representative’ - a restyled Foreign Affairs Council Mutual defence clause: Support of member states in a spirit of loyalty and mutual support (military attacks, terrorist attacks, natural disasters) European Defence Agency (EDA): common development of arms and military resources CSDP is confined to (extended) Petersberg tasks: crisis management, military operations and civilian missions Athena: financing instrument for operations and missions (outside budget) No development of an EU Army Possibility for enhanced co-operation Policy instruments: - actions and positions - diplomatic channels (statements, declarations) - economic instruments (sanctions, using agreements with third countries to stimulate or to punish) - operations and missions (confined to Petersberg tasks or within NATO framework)
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The EU wants to create an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. What is this?
to guarantee the fundamental rights of its citizens (civil rights, political rights, economic rights and social rights). 1 Freedom of movement of individuals between EU member states: to make it possible to work, study and live in other EU member states (free movement in the Single Market) abolishment of border controls (Schengen) 2 Civil rights for EU-nationals in other EU member states: equal opportunities, political rights: Charter of Fundamental Rights 3 Migration policies visa policy, asylum policy, refugee policy, migration policy 4 Police and Justice Cooperation in Criminal Matters fight against drugs trafficking, terrorism, international crime, illegal migration, …
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Internal security: early co-operation -->Trevi-group (70’s)
(‘Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale’): informal and intergovernmental information exchange between high level civil servants of the members states’ home affairs ministries – in the beginning limited to issues of terrorism (UK), later also with respect to organised crime
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Internal security: early co-operation --> | Single European Act (1987):
introduction of free movement of people required new instruments of co-operation in flanking policy fields (visa, asylum, migration, police, justice); However, no concrete measures taken within the confines of the Treaty.
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Schengen-agreements
1985 (‘Schengen’): agreements between the Benelux-countries, France and Germany to start negotiations with respect to the policy measures to be taken in case of the abolishment of internal border controls 1987 (SEA): Denmark, UK and Ireland refuse to go along with the Schengen countries; Schengen countries Incorporation of Schengen in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)
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1990 (‘Schengen II’): agreements to implement earlier agreements
institutional structure outside the Treaty common list of countries and rules concerning visa cooperation to fight illegal migration agreements concerning which country needs to treat which asylum request EUROPOL (many limitations!) minimal judicial cooperation Schengen Information System (SIS): linking national databases Implementation of Schengen II is postponed due to political reasons (fear for migration and loss of sovereignty) and technical reasons (SIS)
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Dublin-agreements (1990):
intergovernmental agreements between all member states but outside the Treaty Slow implementation, but new states join Schengen: Italy (1990), Portugal and Spain (1991), Greece (1992)
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Schengen: current issues
Refugee crisis since 2013 has triggered calls for restrictions Temporary border controls for forseeable events or cases requiring immediate action in place - migration related, terrorist threat related - COVID-19 related EES (Entry/Exit System) and ETIAS (visa free entry exit system): legislation adopted, operationalisation in preparation
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Introduction of the third intergovernmental pillar: ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ In Maastricht Treaty
1 border controls, asylum, migration, anti-fraud policy, judicial cooperation on civil matters (passerelle clause to change to QMV, but unused) 2 judicial cooperation in Criminal matters, custom cooperation, police cooperation (without passarelle clause) Unanimity required in the Council for common positions and conventions Commission: non exclusive right of initiative for the first series of issues European Parliament: ‘informed and consulted’ European Court of Justice: no jurisdiction
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Maastricht Treaty: implementation JHA
Hardly any concrete common policies because: - politically sensitive area - unanimity requirement Crisis in Yugoslavia confronts the EU with its incapacity to act New IGC (1996) puts the reform of the third pillar on top of its agenda
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Amsterdam Treaty JHA
The EU expresses the ambition to create an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ to guarantee the rights of EU citizens, to be implemented before a 5 year deadline after the start of the new treaty. Shift of policy issues of border controls, asylum, migration, visa and judicial co-operation in civil matters to the first pillar. until May 2005: consultation with EP and unanimity in the Council as from May 2005: co-decision with EP and QMV in the Council (exception for legal migration) legal instruments: directives and regulations opt-outs for UK, Ireland and Denmark Judicial co-operation in criminal matters remains in the third pillar unchanged decision-making procedures and instruments introduction of flexibility (enhanced co-operation) Incorporation of Schengen in the Amsterdam Treaty
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Tampere European Council (1999): Tampere programme
- Development of the Charter of Fundamental Rights - ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’: making the Amsterdam Treaty articles more concrete Common asylum and migration policy: partnerships with countries of origin, common asylum systems, fair treatment of third country nationals, management of migration flows Development of a common Judicial Area: mutual recognition of court judgements, gradual convergence in civil law Fight against criminality: EUROPOL and EUROJUST
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Nice Treaty JHA
Nice European Council: approval and proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights ``` Nice Treaty: transition period remains unchanged installation of EUROJUST confirmation and new rules for flexibility Reform of EU Courts ```
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The Hague European Council (2004): The Hague Programme
Common asylum system and procedures to be operational by 2010 Measures concerning third country nationals that reside legally in the EU; framework for integration for third country nationals Strengthening of partnerships with third countries to fight illegal migration Common policy concerning return policies Biometrical identification systems and information exchange
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Lisbon Treaty JHA
illars abolished: Community method also applicable to police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters and legal migration New title V in the ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’: ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ - common asylum, migration, including legal migration and border policy - judicial co-operation in civil matters - judicial co-operation in criminal matters - police cooperation in criminal matters all by means of the ordinary legislative procedure (QMV in the Council), with exceptions (passports, family law, operational police cooperation) Commission initiates (in some cases ¼ Member States) Full ECJ jurisdiction Charter of Fundamental Rights: not in the Treaty but directly legally binding Protocols and declarations with opt-outs and opt-ins for the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Poland.
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Stockholm Program (2010 – 2014) JHA
Promoting citizenship and fundamental rights A Europe of law and justice A Europe that protects A Europe of responsibility, solidarity and partnership in migration and asylum matters The role of Europe in a globalised world – the external dimension
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2015 - 2020 multiple JHA challenges
refugee flows plus terrorist attacks put pressure on internal security policies Failing implementation of common asylum policy; Dublin regulation Limits of current police and justice cooperation Very limited shared intelligence Temporary exceptions to Schengen rules: border controls reinstalled Limited capacity of external border controls Fall out to other policies and issues: relationship with Turkey budgetary implications impact on single market / trade / growth rise of populist parties in the EU