European Integration Powerpoints Flashcards
Richard Coudenhove?
Pan Europea
Altiero Spinelli
belongs to legicy of restistance groups WWII Integration is a political project. Politicians should take the lead. Abolishment of sovereignity states. He wanted a federal europe.
David Mitrany
Working Peace System. After League of Nations failed. First sectoral integration, then politicians will follow.
It is a bureaucratic process. No ambition to form federation.
Jean Monnet
Functional federalist. Wanted to avoid war. Reconstructing Germany was risky. Work together through institutions and treaties. Aim was a federation. Start with economic cooperation, then further integration will folow. He wanted to establish supranational institutions to make states mutual dependent.
European Congress The hague 1948.
Victory of the intergovernmentalist view on European integration. 1949: Council of Europe: limited output, except in the field of Human Rights (European Declaration HR, European Court of HR),
Neo-functionalism
Ernst Haas & Leon Lindberg (1960’s): 1. Pluralism: Domestic interest groups and private actors influence national governments’ international behaviour.
- Transnationalism: Domestic interest groups bypass national governments and seek contact with each other. Multinational corporations and the European Commission become important actors and allies.
- Functional spill-over: Increasing sectoral integration due to interconnectedness. Governments decide to integrate in a sector, when this works other sectors are inspired and will integrate as well.
- Political spill-over: The learning process that politicians go through. Private actors focus on the international level and lobby political actors to proceed with integration.
- Cultivated spill-over: The European Commission fosters integration empirical problem: national veto’s (De Gaulle!)
Stanley Hoffmann (1960’s):
States are most important in international system. States only look at national interest. When national interests coincide, functional integration is possible to the extent that it serves the individual national interest. Political integration in high politics (security) sectors remain highly unlikely.
Liberal intergovernmentalism
Morasvek. national preferences are shaped by the economic interests of powerful domestic groups in a situation of international interdependence; substantive agreements reflect the constellation of national preferences and bargaining power; and the design of international institutions is a function of the kind and size of co-operation problems they are supposed to manage.
1946: Winston Churchill ‘Zurich Speech’.
Europe has to integrate but it has to be done by states. When it suits the UK’s interests the UK will join. Talked about a United States of Europe but did not mean that in a federalist way.
May 1950: Schuman Declaration
Proposal to establish a supranational organization among France and Germany and an invitation to the Benelux and Italy. The UK was not invited because the French feared that a British reaction of the supranational nature would endanger the integration process. The French were suspicious but were convinced by the ideas of Monnet. Monnet persuades foreign minister Robert Schuman to change the French position towards becoming a supporter of the creation of a supranational organisation to manage the economic sectors of coal and steel. According to Monnet, integration of coal and steel sectors would lead to the integration of the whole economy (spill-over logic). Important because coal was the main source of energy. He sells the idea to Schuman. Schuman’s proposal is supported by Adenauer (BRD) and Acheson/Truman (US). There was need for such a proposal because the Marshall Help given by the US raised the question about German rehabilitation.
Foundation of European Coal and Steel Community
1951: Signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
1952: Foundation of the ECSC (predecessor of the EU).
-Creation of a High Authority – Today: Commission
-Court of Justice
-Council of Ministers
-Common Assembly – Today: Parliament
Common market for coal and steel and common control over production, price-setting and competition.
European Defence Community (EDC)
1950: Pleven-Plan in order to remilitarise (in controlled way through institutions!) Germany under control of other West European States. Germany was important because it was the front of the Cold War.
Proposed by the French, but in the end rejected by the French. De Gaulle was no in power and against it.
In the end, still a little cooperation. West Germany (BRD) becomes NATO-member in a more successful attempt to remilitarise Germany.
Venice: 1956: ‘Report Spaak’
Monnet’s spill-over logic adds a new sector to the integration: atomic energy. Report Spaak proposed to establish two new organisations (atomic energy and common market beyond steal). Treaty of Paris had to be changed. To change a treaty an IGC (Intergovernmental Conference) had to be organized. ECSC member states support the idea. France initially rejects the common market idea (because of overseas territories, agriculture, national industries).
Treaties of Rome
Founding of Euratom and European Economic Community (EEC). New institutions effective in 1958
The High Authority becomes the European Commission
more competencies for the Council of Ministers
The Common Assembly and the Court of Justice remain unchanged
Brussels becomes the ‘Capital of Europe’
De Gaulle
Between 1958 and 1969 De Gaulle dominates European politics.
De Gaulle was a supporter of economic integration:
-Devaluation and economic reform prepare France for the European Customs union, thus making the customs union possible.
-Plea for a Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) to support and co-finance the reform of the French agriculture sector. Agriculture is heavily subsidized. Large parts of the French budget had to be used to sustain agriculture because it cannot survive without and countries need food security.
De Gaulle aims to incorporate supranational economic integration in a broader intergovernmental political and military cooperation. Ultimate aim: to establish a European Europe, starring France as the political leader.
1960/1962: Fouchet-plan: attempt to have more foreign and defence policies. It failed because countries feared that it would be to superficial in De Gaulle’s way.
EFTA 1960
By this time the era of decolonization had started and the UK figures that cooperation is beneficial. They are not very eager to cooperate in a supranational way. They only want to cooperate in a intergovernmental. The EEC goes to far.
1960: UK establishes a competitive organization the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Members: UK, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Finland.
1965: Empty chair crisis:
There was a dispute between the European Commission and France with respect to the financing of the Common Agriculture Policy. In order for the European Community to make decisions (about budgeting) and add money to agricultural policy new types of mechanisms are needed. Therefore changed are needed.
Proposal by EEC:
-More money for the budget (own resources)
-More powers for the European Commission and the Common Assembly at the expense of the member states
-Majority voting would replace unanimity.
France then leaves the negotiations and refuses to participate in the meetings of the Council of Ministers. Now the council could not take any decisions anymore because unanimity was needed.
1966: France accepts a compromise (De Gaulle needed to win elections):
-Interim financing of the CAP
-Now own resources
This was unacceptable for France because the lost too much sovereignty.
Ended in Luxembourg Compromise
Luxembourg Compromise
Agreement to disagree. Voting by qualified majority becomes possible. Unanimity can be invoked whenever a member state perceives its national vital interests are at stake. This still exists. Therefore the EU always strives for consensus.
Result: EEC can get back to work, but intergovernmentalism is reinforced. The intergovernmental method becomes even more crucial decision-making procedures are slowed down.
- ‘When issues very important to one or more member countries are at stake, the members of the Council will try, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by all members of the Council, while respecting their mutual interests, and those of the Community.’
- ‘The French delegation considers that, when very important issues are at stake, discussions must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached.’
- The six delegations note that there is a divergence of views on what should be done in the event of a failure to reach complete agreement.’
- However, they consider that this divergence does not prevent the Community’s work being resumed in accordance with the normal procedure.’
UK Applications
1961: EFTA did not do so well. The UK applies a first time for EEC membership. Labour and Conservative’s are divided. PM Macmillan was an Atlanticist and received President Kennedy’s support for EC membership application.
The negotiations were difficult:
- De Gaulle distrusted the UK-US ties and the Atlanticist MacMillan. Saw UK as an American Trojan Horse. The official reason was it would not fit Agricultural policy.
- Discussions with respect to agriculture, Common Wealth and EFTA Nassau-agreement between UK and US, US missiles in the UK.
1963: De Gaulle vetoes British membership.
1667: The UK applies for a second time for EC membership.
De Gaulle reacts fast and declares that the UK is politically and economically not ready for EC membership.
De Gaulle resigns in 1968 after protests.
President Pompidou balances between the inheritance of De Gaulle and the aim to give France a more central position in the European debate. France starts performing less well in economic perspective. Pompidou becomes a supporter of British EC accession to ensure an antidote for German economic hegemony.
Heath applies for EC membership in 1970
Still deeply divided political elites within the UK
Negotiations (1970-1971)
mainly discuss agricultural and financial issues
French referendum accepts UK accession in 1972
UK ratification of the accession treaty in 1972
Together with Denmark and Ireland.
Fusion Treaty (1965):
the EEC slowly recovers from years of stagnation
EEC plus ECSC = European Community (EC)
Successful negotiations of the GATT’s Kennedy-round
The Summit of The Hague (1969)
brings optimism
Completion of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) (financing)
Foreign Policy Cooperation (Davignon)
Monetary Policy Cooperation (Werner)
British accession negotiations as from 1970
Own resources for the EC: all import tariffs and maximum 1% of VAT revenues
! no consideration of the net payer status of future member UK !
European Parliament receives limited powers over the budget
Report Davignon 1970
European Political Cooperation (EPC), outside the existing EC institutional structure
The aim of the EPS in foreign political relations was more to target the European Community through coordinated consultations between foreign ministers of the Member States
Report Werner 1970
Ambitious plan to establish an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) within 10 years.
Political and economic crisis in seventies
1971: End of the Bretton Woods agreement. It brings Europe in a recession and increases the necessity for European Monetary coordination.
1972: Creation of the Currency snake and call for an EMU
1973: Oil crisis worsens the economic crisis, making forecasts to establish a common monetary and energy policy very gloomy.
Tensions between Germany and UK (European Fund for Regional Development)
EC – US tension: oil crisis and Israeli - Arab conflict
Tensions between France and Germany: Ostpolitik
British re-negotations
After the UK became a member wants to renegotiate the conditions of British Membership (Wilson). Too much money goes to agriculture. The UK had other problems that needed money.
Prime Minister Wilson (Labour) wants to renegotiate the conditions of British membership Giscard opposes, Schmidt supports the demand The UK seeks to renegotiate more issues (CAP, Commonwealth relations)
Paris Summit (1974)
Agreement with respect to the EFRD (EFRO is vooral voor de minder ontwikkelde regio’s in Europa. Maar ook meer ontwikkelde regio’s kunnen het fonds gebruiken. Zij kunnen met het geld de concurrentiepositie en de werkgelegenheid verbeteren.)
European Commission is asked to investigate a UK correction mechanism
Dublin Summit (1975): agreement with respect to the mechanism
UK Referendum accepts the Dublin compromise
Political consequence:
the UK becomes an ‘awkward’ partner
institutionalizing EC summits
Schmidt and d’Estaing. : birth of the European Council. With direct EP elections as compromise.
European Council meetings don’t succeed in revitalising the EC
EMU-plans frozen (1975)
slacking European Commission
slow and difficult decision-making within the Council of Ministers
rejection of the Tindemans-report (1976) and the ‘Three Wise Men’ report
Tindemans-report (1976)
he Tindemans Report advocated consolidation of the existing institutions and the development of common policies. It wanted to extend the powers and authority of the Commission and, to this end, proposed that the President should be appointed by the Council and approved by the European Parliament. Tindemans also wanted to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament, the Members of which he wanted to see elected by universal suffrage before the end of 1978, by conferring on it the right to propose legislation, a right hitherto the sole prerogative of the Commission. The Report also advocated the extension of majority voting in the Council and changing the period when each Member State held the Council Presidency from the current six months to one year.
Three Wise men report
it proposed concrete activities to enhance cooperation in the areas of politics, economics and science. One of the direct results of the Report was the creation of the NATO Science Programme.
Membership Greece
- renewed Greek – EC contacts after the fall of the dictatorship (1967- 1974)
negotiations start in 1976, economic integration is main issue
First direct elections for the European Parliament in June 1979
MEPs no longer appointed by the member states, but elected
UK and France were opposed to direct elections
Germany, Italy, Benelux and the European Commission were in favour
compromise: direct elections but no legislative power and hardly any controlling power
EMS project
European Monetary System. Launched by president of European Commission Jenkins.
search for monetary stability
necessity to launch a new European project
Germany becomes an enthusiast supporter and persuades France to support the EMS.
Germany and France together launch the EMS proposal in 1978.
European Currency Unit (ECU)
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
EMS starts in March 1979.
half inside, half outside the EC’s institutional structure
important first step towards a full Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
Margaret Thatcher
- Supporter of economic integration (the single market)
- Fierce opponent of political integration
- Opposed to give up British sovereignty
- Defender of British financial interests in the EC.
She wanted that the single market was as neo-liberal as possible because Britain was already in.
She wanted the rest of EU to follow because it would mean they would have an advantage because they already accomplished the neoliberal market.
Fontainebleau Summit (1984):
66% of the British contribution is repaid (the ‘rebate’).
Financial reforms: CAP, VAT-contribution max 1,4% of EU Budget
Green light for accession Spain and Portugal
Why did the UK think they paid too much?
- Because a lot of the budget went to agriculture, but the UK didn’t need that, France did.
Thatcher wanted to solve the declining industrial economy and needed money to invest in this. She wanted a second budget line for regions who suffer economically. - The UK profited a lot from import taxes, which they now had to rewire to the European budget. The UK wanted to be able to keep some of the money themselves.
Thatcher wants to renegotiate the British contribution, at that time unbalanced.
The budget states the same but was split between other countries.
Start of the Dooge-committee:
Early eighties. study of the possible creation of a single market and the accompanying institutional reforms
Etienne Davignon
Early eighties. Campaign towards the private industry sector
- ESPRIT program: research and development investment = a series of integrated programmes of information technology research and development projects and industrial technology transfer measures.
- European Round Table: contacts between large companies
- European Commission re-launches economic integration through legislative proposals
Cassis de Dijon (1979)
Pro integration ruling of the European Court of Justice =
an influential judgement in 1979. Concerned free circulation of the French Blackcurrant. The Court ruled that national food standards legislation cannot be invoked to prevent trade between members unless it is related to public health. The principle of mutual recognition = whereby a product produced in one member state must be accepted in another state was established.
Genscher-Colombo initiative (1981)
Increasing tension UK and EC early eighties
Gas pipeline between the USSR and Western-Europe
Deployment of US missiles in Western-Europe
Disagreement with respect to the Middle East conflict
A lot of European countries realized that they can not rely on the US forever. Because of this they thought of political integration. It triggered the spillover from economic integration to political integration and countries tried to have common positions in foreign policy.
More political cooperation within the EC:
: more cooperation in the area of Foreign policy (Draft European Act, 1981).
- Symbolical ‘Solemn Declaration on the European Union’ (1984) installation of a committee of institutional affairs in the EP
- EP resolution: ‘Draft Establishing the European Union’
Jacques Delors political cooperation
was president of the European Commission at time of more political cooperation in early eighties. He wanted more member states in the EU and tried his best to getting states around the table.
- He wanted more economic integration (single market) and monetary integration.
- He wanted more political integration and new decision-making procedures and get rid of unanimity voting.
Accession portugal and Spain
1978 and 1979. Pre-accession support by the European Commission
Problematic areas: textile, agriculture, fisheries, free movement of employees, administrative reform
France slows down the accession process, worried about the consequences for its own agricultural sector
Delors (as new president of the European Commission) clears the last obstacles (1985): financing of the ‘Integrated Mediterranean Programs’
Portugal and Spain become EC member on January 1, 1986
Side effect of the enlargement is a renewed support in the overall European integration process
Jacques Delors ambitious plan
Completion of the single market by the end of 1992
New attempt to develop an Economic and Monetary Union
Reform of the EC’s foreign policy
New decision-making procedures
Enthusiast support by business lobbies for the single market project
‘White Paper on the Completion of the Single Market by the end of 1992’ by Delors and Cockfield
List of 300 measures, including timing, necessary for the completion of the Single Market. The plan touches upon a wide range of policy sectors
Single European Act
Merging of White paper of Single market and the report of the ‘Dooge Committee’ on institutional reform: suggestions for new decision-making procedures and more EC competencies
IGC (1985-1986): Two sets of discussions…
Treaty changes with respect to decision-making procedures
Cooperation in the field of foreign policy and defence
There was no increased cooperation in foreign policy and defence.
Introduction of qualified majority voting for a part of the harmonisation measures.
European Parliament: introduction of the cooperation procedure (single market) and the ‘assent procedure’ (external treaties)
Little progress regarding the EMU
Mixed evaluation: big step forward in the economic integration process, but no progress with respect to political integration.
The Checchini Report:
Dispute over the financial package ‘Delors I…
liberalisation versus cohesion funds
budgetary discipline and reform of the CAP
… but eventually agreement on
Doubling of the structural funds
CAP reform
New budgetary rules
Strasbourg Summit’ (1989):
decision to convene a new IGC. Start of two parallel IGCs (1990):
- Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): phase II and III
- European Political Union (EPU): the Kohl-Mitterand letter
‘Rome Summit’ (October 1990): agreement to start phase II of the EMU on January 1, 1994
Margaret Thatcher is succeeded by John Major (1990
1990: German Unification.
There were fears that this unification would create a very dominant economic Germany. The French were the most critical and they saw opportunity to integrate Germany and use it for more integration. How: To tie it completely into integration, to make Germans give up their currency (Deutsche Bank was the pride of Germans) and expansion of political integration.
Maastricht Treaty 1993
Dispute regarding European social policy: introduction of the Social Protocol
Phase III of the EMU at the latest in 1999
Introduction of two new intergovernmental pillars:
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
Introduction of the co-decision procedure, more EU competences, more QMV
Until now the most important one. Marked the most substantial leap forward in European integration. Name European community also changed into European Union.
Three pillars of EU:
- European Community and EMU (supranational)
- Common foreign and security policy (Intergovernmentalism)
- Justice and Home affairs (Intergovernmentalism)
Organisation of a New IGC was already agreed upon in the Treaty of Maastricht: the EU should be reformed to be able to cope with the upcoming enlargements
European Economic Area
EEA = EU + EFTA (1992)
Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
Incorporation of the single market acquis (fisheries, Alpine transport !)
Participation in the single market decision-making and judicial control
EEA becomes the waiting room for EU membership
Economic stagnation in the EEA-countries
Fear for exclusion of EMU and decision-making
Neutrality is no longer an issue (post Cold War)
Applications for EU membership by
Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
1993: the relatively easy negotiations started. They were easy for several reasons:
- Rich countries
- Developed administrative structures
- Rather enthusiast political elites.
the acquis communautaire was already present (EEA)
issues of discussion: environment, agriculture, energy, fisheries, cohesion, …
Consequences of the enlargement EFTA round
- Newcomers are net-payers to the EU budget
- New institutional priorities: transparency, participation, openness
- New policy priorities: environment, social protection, development cooperation, foreign policy.
- Sweden remains sceptic (EMU), Austria and Finland become enthusiast supporters.
the ‘reflection group’ of Carlos Westendorp 1995
Representatives of the member states, the EP and the European Commission
report (1995) reflect severe disagreement
European Council sets priorities:
EU’s relevance for the EU citizens
the democratic deficit
foreign policy
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam
more powers for European Parliament, a smaller commission, shifts from unanimity to majority. The treaty of Amsterdam is important for Schengen and a change in immigration and asylum (becomes supranational).
- Flexible integration:
- only as last resort
- acquis Communautaire cannot be endangered
- Blocking possible by non-participating member states - Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
- creation of an ‘Analysis and Planning Unit’
- secretary-general of the Council also becomes the ‘High Representative for Foreign Policy’
- introduction of the constructive abstention
- incorporation of the ‘Petersberg tasks’ in the Treaty: opens door for integration of the WEU in the EU - Decision-making
- Somewhat more use of qualified majority voting (QMV)
- No agreement on a new system of voting in the Council of Ministers nor on a new composition of the European Commission
- European Parliament: more use of the co-decision procedure - Free movement of persons:
- incorporation of the Schengen Acquis in the Treaty, opt-outs for UK and Ireland
- migration and asylum policies are put in the first pillar, with exceptions and delays
- Envisaged establishment of the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ - Incorporation of the Social Protocol in the Treaty
the Treaty of Amsterdam did not succeed in a radical reform necessary to cope with the upcoming enlargement with Central and Eastern European Countries
Ratification without any problems
Treaty of Amsterdam effective as of May 1, 1999
Treaty of Nice 2001
New division of votes in the Council of Ministers
New division of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)
New composition and internal rules for the European Commission
New criteria for qualified majority
some new domains
three conditions to reach qualified majority
New rules for enhanced cooperation
Starting from the first Commission after the coming into effect of the new treaty: 1 Commissioner per member state (in reality the ‘Barroso Commission’)
Starting from 27 member states: the number of Commissioners will be lower than the number of member states: however, no agreement on the modalities of the envisaged rotation system
NOT IMPLEMENTED AFTER FAILURE OF IRISH REFERENDUM
More power for the president of the European Commission: concerning the division of competences among the Commissioners and the resigning of individual commissioners
Evaluation is negative: the Nice Treaty did not succeed in reforming the European Union institutions to prepare the entry of the new member states in 2004
Most important thing Treaty of Nice prepared the EU to accept the new member states in 2004 and 2007. Also, obvious that in contrast to 80’s, in the 90’s and later member states become more and more reluctant to give power to European Union, so integration stagnates. Integration keeps on going, but slowly.
Conditions to start enhanced cooperation Treaty of Nice
in general: minimum of 8 member states must participate
first pillar: Council decides by qualified majority, sometimes EP approval is required, Commission allows new member states in second pillar: Council decides by qualified majority; only for implementation of joint positions, no defence issues, Council allows new member states in, Commission and EP are informed third pillar: Council decides by qualified majority, EP is informed, Council allows new member states in in general: minimum of 8 member states must participate first pillar: Council decides by qualified majority, sometimes EP approval is required, Commission allows new member states in second pillar: Council decides by qualified majority; only for implementation of joint positions, no defence issues, Council allows new member states in, Commission and EP are informed third pillar: Council decides by qualified majority, EP is informed, Council allows new member states in
The ‘Laeken Declaration’ (2001)
Written by Verhofstadt: the way we make treaties does not work, countries are afraid because of domestic competition. Let’s change it into an European Convention. Analysis of EU achievements and shortcomings:
peace, stability and economic growth versus democratic deficit, lack of transparency, lack of external power
list of challenges: division of competences, simplification of the acquis, more democracy, transparency and efficiency, a European Constitution? definition of reform agenda is broadened: from a limited towards a complete open agenda reform method: first, a Convention with broad participation, including a civil society forum second, an IGC to confirm the Convention’s outcome
Convention drafted a Constitutional treaty, NOT A CONSTITUTION. The idea was, it comes close to a constitution, very ambitious. But during an IGC the member states found it too ambitious (they could not sell this to the public because they still needed to be re-elected) and it is watered downed. It is still called a constitutional treaty and signed by the member states but must still be ratified by the member states.
post functionalism
Theory to help explain why integration stagnated after Nice Treaty. - It is not just about economic things anymore
- There is not just redistribution between countries but also between regions.
- People have identities and preferences. Touches upon identity.
There is public opinion and the political parties take up the idea of identity and they tie it to European integration. Integration happened before, because there was permissive consensus with the public, but because identity becomes salient and mobilized by political entrepreneurs, we move from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus.
Convention Draft Constitutional Treaty: radical reforms
- European Council
- Explicitly mentioned as an EU institution
- permanent president for 2,5 years, elected by the European Council
- responsibility for external policies - Council of Ministers:
- Division in:
• General Affairs Council (preparation European Council)
• Legislative Council
• External Affairs Council, presided by a Minister for external affairs
- co-decision as general principle, but exceptions
- new presidency rotating system - European Commission:
- 15 members and rotation principle
- president elected by the EP, on proposal of the European Council - European Parliament:
- all legislation by co-decision and QMV, but exceptions
- also competent for justice and home affair, not for external relations - Qualified Majority:
- double majority: 50% of the member states and 60% of the EU populations - National parliaments:
- ex-ante subsidiarity test - Minister of Foreign Relations:
- between the Council of Ministers and the Commission
Constitutional Treaty:
Negotiations start in October 2003, Agreement in June 2004. Less radical reform, but still quite ambitious:
- one single text, replacing all former treaties
- legal personality for the EU
- general application of the legislative procedure, but exceptions
- simplification of legal instruments, including ‘European laws’
- Charter of Fundamental Rights incorporated in the Treaty
- Council of Ministers meetings as legislator open for public
- larger role for national parliaments
- less unanimity and more QMV
- simplification of QMV rules
- more competences in internal security
- more competences in external policies: Minister of Foreign Affairs
The ratification is rejected by the Netherlands and France, so the treaty does not work because you need unanimity. Especially France had a very salient identity at this point. So it failed -> crisis.
What were the reasons for the rejection -> identity issues.
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Treaty of Lisbon 2007 differences constitutional treaty
They watered down the issues and made it clear to the public that sovereignty and identity would not be attacked. In 2007 they reached the Identity reform treaty and they signed it in Lisbon -> named the treaty of Lisbon in 2009. This is the last treaty change.
- no replacement of the earlier Treaties
• only changes to the ‘Treaty on the European Union’ (TEU) and the ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ (TFU)(formerly known as the ‘Treaty on the European Community’)
• the Charter of Fundamental Rights
• the Euratom Treaty - opt-outs for the UK in police and justice cooperation
- no EU-symbols (flag, hymn, motto) (on Czech and Dutch demand)
- no reference to free and unlimited competition (on French demand)
- Charter of Fundamental Rights banned to a Protocol, with opt-outs for the UK and Poland
- hardly simplification of the legal instruments
Treaty of Lisbon main innovations
- Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers:
• as from November 2014: 55 % of the members of the Council, representing at least 15 member states and 65% of the total EU population - But ‘Ioanina Compromise’ (slowing down the decision-making) is incorporated in a protocol and can be invoked: until 2017 by 75% of the member states of the represented population as from 2017 by 55% of the member states or the represented population
- But: additional transition period until 2017 during which a member state can always ask to return to the Treaty of Nice stipulations on QMV
- less unanimity and more QMV in the Council - main shifts in agriculture and internal security issues
- Permanent European Council president for 2,5 year European Council becomes a ‘European institution’
- The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (!Not: ‘Minister’) becomes vice-president of the European Commission
- (as from November 2014: number of Commissioners 2/3 of the number of member states)
- legal status of the European Union (merger of the 3 pillars)
- national parliaments: ex-ante subsidiarity control
- general application of the new legislative procedure: co-decision between Council and European Parliament now also in agriculture, police and justice cooperation. BUT: exceptions remain: foreign policy, defence policy, social security, fiscal issues
- EP becomes fully competent regarding the annual budget (together with the Council of Ministers)
- more clear division of competences between the EU and the member states
- explicit confirmation of the sui generis status of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
- more flexible conditions to start enhanced cooperation in those areas where unanimity remains (min. 9 member states); special conditions for flexible integration in CFSP
- procedure for voluntary withdrawal from the EU (!)
- accession criteria (‘Copenhagen’) incorporated in the Treaty, including the possibility for the Council to add extra criteria
- reference to new policy challenges: climate, energy solidarity
1993: Copenhagen criteria:
stability, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, protection of minorities
functioning market economy, capacity to cope with market competitive pressures
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
1995: Extra Madrid criterion:
full compliance with the ‘acquis communautaire
Negotiations about the Acquis Comm. (the total of EU laws (35 chapters), which must be accepted and implemented by all EU states.
• The negotiations on the incorporation of the Acquis Communautaire in the candidate countries are divided in 30 (now 35) chapters.
• Each of these chapters must be closed before accession can take place. In principal, a chapter can only be closed when full guarantee is given that the acquis is implemented before accession.
• However, in reality transitional periods are necessary to grant candidate countries more time to comply with the acquis during the first years of their membership, especially for difficult chapters such as agriculture, environment and free movement
The European Commission has set conditions for these transitional periods: limited in time and scope and accompanied by a clear plan to end
Transitional periods can function in two directions:
free movement of labour towards ‘old’ member states
purchase of real estate in the candidate countries
(Must be ratified: all states, European parliament and candidate members. If 1 does not ratify, there is no consensus.)
1997: Luxembourg European Council:
start enlargement negotiations (1998) with Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus
Turkey accepted as candidate member state but no negotiations yet
1999: Helsinki European Council:
start enlargement negotiations (2000) with Slovakia, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria
The European Council of Copenhagen (December 2002)
concluded accession negotiations with all candidate countries except Romania and Bulgaria.
Still no start of negotiations with Turkey
The European Council of Copenhagen (December 2002) decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey at the earliest in 2005, depending on Commission reports in 2004
Enlargement Bulgaria
Bulgaria concluded negotiations in June 2004
‘Safeguard clause’: accession can be postponed if the EU thinks that reforms are not implemented (fast) enough
Issues: organised crime and corruption, judicial and administrative reforms, nuclear plants
Approval of the accession treaty in April 2005 by Bulgaria, the European Parliament and the 25 member states
Critical rapport by the European Commission in October 2005
Last European Commission report of May 2006 was positive
Full membership on January 1, 2007
Enlargement Romania
Romania concluded negotiations in June 2004
‘Safeguard clause’: accession can be postponed if the EU thinks that reforms are not implemented (fast) enough
Issues: organised crime and corruption, judicial and administrative reforms, discrimination of the Roma community, press freedom
Approval of the accession treaty in April 2005 by Romania, the European Parliament and the 25 member states
Critical rapport by the European Commission in October 2005
Last European Commission report of May 2006 was positive
Full membership on January 1, 2007
Seventh Enlargement: Croatia
Application in February 2003
Recognized as applicant member state in June 2004
Issues: discrimination of Serb minority, cooperation with the International Criminal Court on Yugoslavia, judicial reform, corruption
Negotiations started on 3 October 2005 after a positive report by Carla Del Ponte of the International Criminal Court on Yugoslavia
European Commission report (November 2006): progress in reform but still worrying issues (single market, justice, corruption, … and the cooperation with the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia)
June 2011: all chapters closed
December 2011: accession treaty signed
January 2012: Croatian referendum approves accession (66% in favor)
All EU member states and EP also approved: accession on 1 July 2013
Turkey
European Conference (London, 1998) European Council Helsinki (1999): Turkey becomes ‘candidate – candidate – member state’: recognition as candidate – member state, but no negotiations yet
(Constitutional) reforms in Turkey (2002-2004) European Council Brussels 2002: the European Council of December 2004 shall decide, based on a report of the European Commission, whether Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria. If so, negotiations can start ‘immediately’.
recommendation of the European Commission (October 2004):
sufficient reforms to start negotiations
suspension of negotiations is always possible
negotiations are a process with an ‘open ending’
European Council Brussels (December 2004): negotiations can start in October 2005
Turkey accepts negotiation frame, making a symbolic start of the negotiations possible on 3 October 2005
start technical negotiations (35 chapters) in spring 2006
yearly progress reports of the European Commission
explicit ‘open ending’
Since 2006, negotiations have been partially suspended (8 chapters will not be opened and none will be closed) because of unresolved dispute between Turkey and Cyprus
March 2016: 1/35 chapters closed, 15 other chapters under negotiation
Forecast:
Very hard negotiations, accession in the short term highly unlikely, due to developments in Turkey (freedom of speech, AKP/Erdogan policies, reversed secularisation, Kurdish minority, Syrian conflict involvement …)
But also: Turkey demands progress in talks in return for helping the EU to stop refugees from entering the EU.
Enlargement Iceland
Iceland is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA – 1994) and of the Schengen-zone (2001)
16 July 2009: Iceland applies for EU membership
Application motivated by the bad economic situation caused by the financial crisis; Iceland considers that EU and above all EMU membership can prevent future crises.
Accession negotiations running since July 2010
Issues: fisheries, agriculture, rural development, environment, free movement of capital and financial services
Until 2013: 11 chapters closed, 16 more opened
In 2014 negotiations have been suspended: the new Icelandic government does not pursue EU membership
In March 2015 Iceland withdrew its application: ‘Iceland should not be regarded as a candidate country for EU membership”.
North Macedonia
Stabilisation and Association Agreement since 2004
application in 2004
candidate member state since 2005, but no negotiations yet
Montenegro
Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed in 2007; application for EU membership in 2008
Accepted as candidate member state since December 2010
Negotiations started in June 2012, 3 chapters closed, 30 chapters opened
Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Stabilisation and Association into force in 2015
Formal application in February 2016, no negotiations yet
Serbia
Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed in 2008: however, ratification by EU member states has been suspended after non-cooperation with the International Criminal Court and Serbia’s position on Kosovo;
Accepted as candidate member state in March 2012, negotiations have started in January 2014, 2 chapters closed, 16 chapters opened.
Albania
Stabilisation and Association Agreement since 2009; application for EU membership in 2009, Candidate status in 2014, no negotiations yet
Kosovo (‘under UNSCR 1244’):
The EU has recognized ‘the European perspective’ of Kosovo. The EU provides assistance in the fields of economic development and security.
Stabilisation and Association Agreement in effect in 2016
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP):
framework to foster economic growth, democratic governance and stability in EU’s neighbour regions:
Eastern partnership: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
Southern Neighbourhood: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia
(make them accept EU laws, and help these countries to have a stable economy)
In which ways can the EU shrink?
Suspension of membership (article 7 of TEU):
a member state cannot be forced to leave the EU
its membership rights can be suspended when all other member states judge that basic values of the EU are violated
unanimous decision of the European Council required
2000: almost invoked against Austria (FPÖ in government) 2020: calls for activating article 7 against Poland and Hungary
Secession of a part of a member state
declaration of independence by a region of a member state
discussion about the status of such an independent region: can a region inherit EU membership?
does a region have to reapply for membership?
and if so, what will be the procedure?
Voluntary withdrawal of a member state:
Exit clause in the Treaty of Lisbon no unilateral right to withdraw, but a negotiated withdrawal extremely complicated and burdensome process Brexit! Scotland (referendum in 2014), Catalonia (referendum in 2017)
Institutional consequences for the EU Brexit
institutional reform:
number of MEPs; composition of the European Commission; British EU officials; relocation of EU agencies
budget:
how to cope with the losses and gains of the UK contribution?
politics:
how will the changed composition play out in terms of political power in the European Parliament and the (European) Council?
New Institutionalism
Institutions are both formal organizations and rules (parliaments, governments, laws,..) and informal patterns of structured interaction (norms, habits, ‘ways of doing things’, …)
Rational Choice Institutionalism (New institutionalism)
presupposes rational, utility maximizing actors
‘logic of consequentialism’
focus on the constraints that formal institutions impose on actors: understanding the behaviour of individual actors by analysing the impact of rules and other actors
principal - agent theory: what explains the degree of autonomy of supranational actors (agents) under control of the member states’ governments (principals)
Historical Institutionalism ((New institutionalism))
focus on the time perspective: decisions are made according to perceptions and within constraints that are structured by pre-existing institutional relationships
‘time, timing and tempo’
path dependence, lock in: past decisions determine later options for action (either restrictive or opportunity creating)
unanticipated and unintended outcomes, institutionalization
Sociological Institutionalism (new institutionalism)
linked to the ‘constructivist’ turn as a rejection of the rational choice approach
broad concept of institutions: including cognitive scripts, moral templates
‘logic of appropriateness’
preferences are socially constructed, socialisation
Policy networks:
a descriptive tool to map relations between EU policy-making actors
glue is resource interdependence
continuum ranging from tight policy communities to loose issue networks
supersystemic – systemic – subsystemic levels of decisions
Epistemic communities:
knowledge based groups
conditions of uncertainty in international policy coordination
Multi-level Governance
rooted in neo-functionalism, opposed to intergovernmentalism but often applied to governance of the EU in stead of to the integration process
national governments loose control
different levels take part in the EU decision-making process
EU is a nested political system (no separation of levels)
participation of non-state actors (interest groups)
changing nature of the role of the nation states, and therefore also of the nature of democratic accountability
