Equity Cross Listings in the US and the Price of Debt Flashcards
What is the main research question?
Do non-U.S. firms benefit from lower debt costs and better bond access after listing equity on a U.S. exchange?
What are the two main hypotheses tested? (2)
- Bonding & Information Hypothesis (greater governance/transparency)
- Liquidity & Visibility Hypothesis (easier access, investor familiarity).
What are the key findings of the study? (2)
- After U.S. equity cross-listing, firms issue more bonds and at lower yields, especially in public and foreign markets
- Benefits strongest for exchange listed firms over OTC or Private ones
What is the paper’s empirical identification strategy? (2)
- OLS regressions with firm, industry, and year fixed effects
- pre/post comparisons also used
How is cost of debt measured in the paper?
Bond yield-to-maturity at issuance for fixed-rate bonds from global databases (Thompson Deals, Mergent FISD).
What types of firms are in the dataset?
24,000+ firms from 46 countries (1992–2012), 5,467 firm-years with bond yield data, mix of exchange, OTC, and private listing types.
How do debt effects differ by bond type? (2)
- Public and foreign bond issuance and yields respond strongly
- Private placements show no significant changes.
Why are U.S. listings valuable for bondholders? (3)
- Increase transparency
- Reduce monitoring costs
- Allow enforcement through U.S. legal channels (e.g., class action lawsuits).
How does home-country institutional quality affect the results? (2)
Benefits stronger when home countries have:
- low private benefits of control
- high debt enforcement efficiency
How does Sarbanes-Oxley affect the results? (2)
- Stronger debt market benefits pre-SOX (before 2002)
- Compliance costs post-SOX reduce attractiveness of cross-listing.
What role does information asymmetry play? (2)
- Public/foreign bondholders benefit from reduced asymmetry via exchange listing
- Insiders like banks already have private access.
Why don’t private placements show the same benefits? (2)
- Private lenders use bespoke monitoring and covenants
- U.S. listing has less impact on information asymmetry.
What is the ‘bonding hypothesis’ in this context?
Cross-listings serve as a commitment to higher standards, but can’t fully substitute for weak home institutions in debt markets.
How do cross-listed firms change bond issuance behavior? (2)
- More public and foreign bonds issued post-listing, at lower yields
- Domestic/private issuance largely unchanged.
What agency problems may offset benefits?
Cross-listings can increase equity-favoring risk-taking, which raises the cost of debt despite improved governance.
How does the “visibility” channel work? (2)
- Listing raises investor awareness and bond demand
- Potentially lowering yields via broader investor base and better liquidity.