Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process Flashcards
A state law that is substantially under inclusive does not necessarily violate the Equal Protection Clause because a state may rationally decide to address a public problem in phases.
The New York legislature stated that it was seeking to address a traffic congestion problem. Railway argued, however, that to be rationally related to this legitimate public purpose, the law should have regulated the trucks operating in New York—not the content of the advertising on those trucks.
This case was analyzed under rational basis review.
Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York
A law that does not affect a fundamental right or discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or alienage, is constitutional if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
New Orleans (defendant) enacted an ordinance prohibiting all pushcart food vendors from operating within the French Quarter, but provided an exception for vendors who had been operating in the French Quarter for at least eight years. Dukes (plaintiff) did not qualify under the exception, and challenged the ordinance.
New Orleans v. Dukes
The substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual’s right to autonomy in medical decision-making, including the right to refuse life-saving or life-preserving medical treatment.
Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri Department of Health
There is no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.
Washington v. Glucksberg
The United States Supreme Court held that the right to marital privacy prevented states from criminalizing the use of contraceptives for married couples.
Griswold v. Connecticut
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not outlaw distribution of contraception to unmarried persons.
Eisenstadt v. Baird
A Wisconsin statute prevented members of a certain class of residents from marrying without first obtaining a court order granting them permission to marry. This class was defined by the statute to include any Wisconsin resident required by court order or judgment to pay child support to a minor that was not in his custody. A court order granting permission to marry could be obtained if a member of this class submitted proof of compliance with his or her support obligation and, in addition, demonstrated that the children covered by the support order were not then or not likely to later become public charges.
The right to marry is a fundamental right. Because the state has numerous other means for ensuring compliance with child support orders, its interference with the right to marry is overly broad, unnecessary, and unconstitutional.
Zablocki v. Redhail
For laws that draw a distinction based on gender, intermediate scrutiny applies. The government must show that the law or policy was substantially related to an important government objective.
An Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of “non-intoxicating” 3.2 percent alcoholic beer to males under the age of twenty-one, but permitted the sale of such beer to females over the age of eighteen. Craig (plaintiff), a liquor vendor in Oklahoma, brought suit against Boren (defendant), an Oklahoma state official, in federal district court on the grounds that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Craig v. Boren
Courts will not invalidate a facially neutral law for violating the Equal Protection Clause merely because the law leads to disparate outcomes.
Davis (plaintiff) was an African American man who, along with another African American man, applied for admission to the Washington, D.C. police department. Both men were turned down and brought suit in federal district court against Washington (defendant), the mayor of Washington, D.C., alleging that the police department used racially discriminatory hiring practices by administering a verbal skills test (Test 21) disproportionately failed by African Americans.
Washington v. Davis
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that (1) supporting student body diversity is a compelling state interest and (2) a policy that looks at the individual student without having any set quota is narrowly tailored to further this interest.
The University of Michigan Law School followed an unofficial policy that sought to achieve student body diversity by giving substantial weight to the race of each applicant in making admissions decisions, in addition to its consideration of other academic and non-academic variables. Barbara Grutter (plaintiff) was a Caucasian Michigan resident who applied to the Law School with a 3.8 grade point average and 161 LSAT score. The Law School rejected her application, and she filed suit in federal district court against Bollinger, the university president, and other university officials (defendants) alleging her denial of admission was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Grutter v. Bollinger
In 1980, the Cleburne Living Center (Center) (plaintiff) filed an application for a special use permit with the City of Cleburne, Texas (City) (defendant). The Center sought a permit to build a residential facility for mentally disabled men and women. The facility would house up to thirteen persons, who would be supervised at all times. The City denied the permit application, and the Center brought suit in federal district court challenging the denial.
Courts apply a standard of minimum scrutiny or rational basis review to discriminatory laws that deny non-fundamental rights to individuals or target non-suspect classifications of individuals.
Non-suspect classifications generally target individuals based on criteria not included in the other levels of scrutiny, such as age or disability.
The court of appeals erred in applying heightened scrutiny to the denial of the permit application. The mentally disabled are not a quasi-suspect class, and thus rational basis review of the City’s decision is appropriate. Firstly, it is undeniable that mentally disabled persons require special care for functioning in the everyday world, so legislative judgments are likely to be rational and should not be scrutinized more closely. Secondly, on a national scale, federal lawmakers have shown great appreciation for the plight of the mentally disabled and enacted significant legislation prohibiting discrimination against them. Applying heightened scrutiny and requiring the legislature to show that these efforts are substantially related to an important governmental purpose might actually discourage the legislature from continuing to act to protect the mentally disabled.
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center
In 1983, the City of Richmond, Virginia (defendant) adopted the Minority Business Utilization Plan (MBUP) that required primary contractors to whom the City awarded construction contracts to subcontract at least 30 percent of the dollar value of the contract to one or more Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs). The 30 percent set-aside did not apply to primary contractors that were themselves controlled by minority groups. The City adopted the plan after studies suggested that very few contracts were awarded to MBEs despite the city’s large minority population. No direct evidence existed, however, of any discrimination against MBEs by the City or its prime contractors. The J.A. Croson Co. (plaintiff), a primary contractor, lost its contract with the city after failing to designate 30 percent of the value of its contract to MBEs. Croson sued the City of Richmond in federal district court, which upheld the constitutionality of the MBUP.
Without evidence of past particular race-based discrimination, a city may not enact a plan to provide a race-based set-aside to exclusively promote minority business enterprises, as this does not constitute narrowly tailored means geared towards accomplishing a compelling state purpose.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
In cases involving claims of gender discrimination, intermediate scrutiny applies if there is either: (1) a gender-based classification on the face of the statute or (2) an intent to discriminate based on gender.
The State of Massachusetts enacted a veteran preference statute providing that all veterans qualified for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying non-veterans. Feeney (plaintiff) was a female non-veteran applicant for the civil service that scored very highly on a number of competitive civil service exams. However, she was passed over for employment opportunities by males with lower scores who were veterans. Feeney challenged the veteran preference statute in federal district court against the Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts (defendant), alleging that the statute disadvantaged women and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To prove a discriminatory purpose as required for an Equal Protection Clause challenge, Feeney must prove that the Massachusetts legislature adopted the veteran preference law because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon women. Nothing in the record indicates the legislature enacted the law to discriminate against women.
Personal Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney
There is no reason that Virginia’s stated goal of training competent future leaders cannot be extended to include women. Without further proof, Virginia falls short of establishing the “exceedingly persuasive justification” required for a sustainable gender-based classification. In addition, the VWIL is different and substandard when compared to VMI on many levels. The creation of this school does not provide a meaningful educational alternative for women seeking to attend VMI. Thus Virginia’s policy of excluding women from VMI is unconstitutional.
United States v. Virginia
Racial segregation of public schools in the District of Columbia violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Bolling (plaintiff) was one of a group of African-Americans who filed suit in the federal court for the District of Columbia to challenge the constitutionality of racial segregation in the district’s public schools.
Racial segregation of public schools in the District of Columbia violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We have held that the states are prohibited from racial discrimination in public schools by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The difficulty in this case arises from the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states and not to the District of Columbia. The Fifth Amendment does apply to the District of Columbia, but it does not contain an equal protection clause like the Fourteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, the concepts of equal protection and due process are closely related. Equal protection affords a somewhat higher level of protection against impermissible discrimination than due process guarantees, but invidious discrimination may rise to the level of a due process violation. The term “liberty” encompasses more than mere restrictions against bodily freedoms and applies to every endeavor that an individual is free to pursue. Liberty may not be restricted except to serve a legitimate government interest. Public school segregation serves no legitimate government interest. Differential treatment of African-American children deprives them of liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.
Bolling v. Sharpe
