Equal Protection Flashcards

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1
Q

Basics of Equal Protection Clause

A

“Rules for thee but not for me.”

The EPC prohibits feds, states, and local govs from treating individuals or classes differently under similar circumstances without sufficient justification.

Textual Origin: No state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 14A Sec 1. The Court has interpreted the 5A Due Process Clause to include EP against the feds too.

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2
Q

3 Steps to Analyze EP Problems

A

1) Identify the trait that the government uses to classify people. Without relative treatment based on different trait, there is no EP claim.

2) Determine which classification that trait falls under (suspect, quasi-suspect, or neither). This will determine the SoR.

3) Evaluate the gov’s actions under that level of scrutiny.

OR

Identify a literal violation of EP and strike it down. If a law makes it more difficult for 1 group of citizens than others to seek help from the government.

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3
Q

Equal Protection Standards of Review

A

Strict Scrutiny Classifications:
1) If a fundamental right is being deprived, courts apply strict scrutiny. The burden is on the government to prove both compelling gov interest + narrowly tailored. This is uncommon because of SDP claims and 1A claims used instead.

2) Suspect classifications also receive strict scrutiny. These include: race, religion, national origin, or lawful alienage. A plaintiff asserting EP claim based on suspect classification must prove discriminatory intent, not just disparate impact. Discriminatory intent need not be sole or primary motivating factor. Absent intent, strict scrutiny does not apply. Intentional racial discrimination always receives strict scrutiny even if benign motives like affirmative action.

Intermediate Scrutiny Classifications:
1) Semi- or quasi-suspect classifications receive intermediate scrutiny. These include: gender or illegitimate birth. Burden is on the gov to prove it is an important gov objective substantially related to achieving its objective.

Rational Basis Classifications:
1) Everything else. There must be legitimate, conceivable gov objective and the means must be rationally related. Burden of proof on P.

Animus:
Fails regardless of SoR

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4
Q

Determining Which SoR to Use for a Classification

A

1) Consider history of group’s discrimination. Past discrimination makes it more suspect.

2) Consider if involvement in the political process will help to solve the issue. If so, this would be a reason not to treat a distinction with greater scrutiny. Sex is quasi-suspect and not fully-suspect because women can vote and take part in political process at least since 1920s which was harder for black people under Jim Crow. This is from Carolene Footnote 4. DISCRETE AND INSULAR

3) Consider immutability. The more immutable, the stricter the scrutiny.

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5
Q

Class Hypo: Contraception ban among people in their 20s

A

P could have many claims:
1) SDP claim about fundamental right to use contraception
2) EP claim based on age
3) EP claim based on classifying people with regard to their ability to exercise a fundamental right

Claim 3 is stronger because Claim 2 only gets RB review whereas a fundamental right receives strict scrutiny

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6
Q

Identifying Suspect and Quasi-Suspect Classifications

A

Generally, both feature immutable characteristics that are usually irrelevant to a government policy. They both have a history of prejudice or discrimination.

Note: Age, mental disability, and sexual orientation do not fall into these categories.

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7
Q

Difference between Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process

A

SDP is absolute; it’s about guaranteeing you a certain right,

EP is relative; it looks at how you are treated compared to other people.

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8
Q

Class Hypo: if the gov denied you the ability to enter a contract and said you have to be male to make a contract, what is the SDP arg and what is the EP arg?

A

SDP: This is not a fundamental right (contracting), meaning we apply RB as our SoR. This law cannot even pass RB though, because there is no legitimate interest in only letting males contract.

EPC: By treating the plaintiff differently from others, the gov must justify that distinction but it can’t.

The driving principle is often a sense of “rules for thee but not for me”.

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9
Q

Fundamental Rights in the EPC Context

A

Note that these differ from the SDP context.

Apply strict scrutiny for the deprivation of a fundamental right under EP.

Fundamental rights for EP include:
1) Vote
2) Access ballot as political candidate
3) Travel to another state
4) Marry, procreate, live as family unit; and
5) Access courts to get justice

How to find fundamental EP right: courts consider whether the Constitution expressly or implicitly guarantees the right, but they stopped doing this in the 70s.

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10
Q

Differences between Facially Discriminatory and As-Applied

A

A facial challenge asserts that a law discriminates on its face by drawing a distinction between similarly situated persons in its text.

An as-applied challenge asserts that in practice, the challenged law is being administered in an unconstitutional way.

Examples:
Legislative Facially Discriminatory: VMI. Only males can attend according to the law itself.
Executive Facially Discriminatory: A cop says he only pulls over black people for speeding.
Executive Non-Facially Discriminatory: Enforcing a neutral law by race - like only pulling over black people for speeding.

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11
Q

Test for a Non-Facially Discriminatory Law

A

To show that a classification is being made, P must show that both 1) discriminatory effect / disparate impact AND 2) discriminatory intent/purpose exists.

If missing either, there is no non-facial classification being made.

Examples:
Yick Wo = non-facial executive classification violated EP clause

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12
Q

Tussman and Tenbroek Summary

A

1 succeeds any SoR

1) All T’s are M’s and all M’s are T’s
Perfectly reasonable
2) No T’s are M’s
Perfectly unreasonable
3) All T’s are M’s but some M’s are not T’s
Underinclusive
4) All M’s are T’s but some T’s are not M’s
Overinclusive
5) Some T’s are M’s; some T’s are not M’s; and some M’s are not T’s
Both under- and over-inclusive

#2 fails any SoR
#3 is underinclusive because lots of bad guys that should be getting hit by the law aren’t getting off scot-free. HOWEVER, underinclusive is usually ok because the gov has to start somewhere
#4 is overinclusive because innocents are getting caught in the cross-fire
#5 is a typical venn diagram

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13
Q

Railway Express Agency v. NY and the Toleration of Underinclusivity

A

NY was trying to cut down driving distractions so they banned ads on the side of trucks for companies other than the truck’s business.

This was really underinclusive because they singled out a tiny piece of the distracted driving problem. But the law survived because EPC generally tolerates underinclusivity.

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14
Q

Underinclusivity Rules

A

Rule: A law that is underinclusive per se can still be constitutional.

Policy: The gov has to start somewhere, and it’s ok if it starts small. Better to let lots of guilty go free than to start by punishing innocents (i.e. better underinclusive than overinclusive).

Exception: Underinclusivity could be a sign of something else, like animus.

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15
Q

US Dept of Ag v. Moreno

A

This is an example of the exception at work, where underinclusivity is not tolerated if it is actually a sign of animus.

The fed gov distinguished between people who were eligible for foodstamps based on if they were living with relatives or not. Court detected animus against hippies who lived in communes with non-family so they struck it down.

Even though this was RB SoR, the court struck it down because if the actual reason was just hostility, that isn’t legitimate even under RB. Fails regardless of SoR.

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16
Q

Plessy v. Ferguson (Separate But Equal)

A

The EP clause is about political equality (as distinguished from social equality) according to Plessy court. Political equality includes voting, juries, etc.

“Separate but equal” was still sort of useful for civil rights lawyers to point out unequal facilities in terms of “tangible factors”. This is distinguished in Brown v. Board where even the act of separation is considered inherently unequal.

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17
Q

Hirabayashi

A

This case preceded Korematsu. The P was Japanese but a US Citizen by birth. Went to college at U of Wash where he faced curfew law. Court upheld his conviction and said the law was “reasonable” in a RB-sort-of-way.

18
Q

Korematsu

A

This was the first case in which Strict Scrutiny was the standard used for racial discrimination (unlike Hirabayashi), but the Court still upheld the law. Court justified it based on limited time to investigate/priorities of war.

Even though there was a compelling gov interest to prevent sabotage, the means were arguably not narrowly tailored because it was so overinclusive (applied to all Japanese Americans living in certain areas, with no distinction with respect to their individual loyalties/risk).

Chief Justice Earl Warren was responsible for a lot of the internment sentiment and he eventually wrote the 9-0 opinion in Brown v. Board to try and redeem himself (probably).

19
Q

Brown v. Board

A

Court struck down Separate But Equal on the grounds that psychological studies showed it made kids feel inferior. The Court never actually explained why segregation is legally a violation of EP. Reliance on psychological studies put the Court on somewhat shaky ground because it depends on factual details rather than legal logic.

Brown 2 = desegregate “with all deliberate speed”

20
Q

Johnson v. Virginia

A

Because Brown v. Board only held that separate but equal was not ok in schools exclusively, Johnson v. Virginia did the work of holding that the gov could not segregate gov facilities at any time (places like public theaters, golf courses, beaches etc could no longer be segregated by race. Private facilities do not count (but later civil rights act reaches private discrim by businesses).

21
Q

Aftermath of Brown v. Board

A

States tried to avoid compliance with de facto segregation. The court said that states violating Brown may be taken under supervision of a fed court. Fed courts ordered busing/redrawing districts etc.

The fed district courts couldn’t order inter-district remedies unless all of the involved districts were violators of Brown.

To be free of fed court supervision, a court would have to show no segregation remaining nor effects of segregation. That would give the district “unitary” status. School districts want that because it means no more needing to go to a fed judge to get permission to change local policy.

Example: This means you could have a city and a district that violates Brown, meaning it is now under fed ct jurisdiction. But as city grows and white flight goes to suburbs and big income disparity emerges, those suburbs arise post-Brown, so they had no history of discrimination, harder to prove Brown violation. So SCOTUS said you can’t impose inter-district remedies. Can’t use test scoring to prove intent to avoid system of segregation.

22
Q

Students For Fair Admission v. Harvard (2023)

A

Struck down affirmative action using strict scrutiny (because racial classification). This case was about higher ed schools that took race into account for the sake of being inclusive. “Benign” racial classification no longer allowed in admissions.

14A didn’t control Harvard but Title 6 did so this case applies to both private and public schools.

The difference between this and the earlier cases is that the Court demanded metrics/timelines. It said the colleges’ justifications weren’t measurable under strict scrutiny rubric and they were too amorphous to receive meaningful judicial review. Hard to be narrowly tailored without details.

What CAN colleges still do regarding race? You can ask applicants about their experiences related to race, but it needs to be about how their lived experiences affected them. You can ask applicants to talk about their race and make individualized assessments about whether that person has experiences that end up being useful for educational benefits.

Scholarships = states probably can’t give minorities preferential scholarship treatment anymore

23
Q

Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke (1978)

A

A public university may not discriminate on the basis of race even for benign admissions if it does so by setting aside seats for certain races or using quotas.

Powell’s concurrence is the swing vote that ends up very influential. He looked at Harvard’s program and said it was fine to take into account race for broad substantive diversity, but can’t just focus on racial diversity because there is no clear educational purpose to that alone. Meant to be holistic.

24
Q

Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger (2003)

A

U of Michigan had a system that gave non-white applicants 20 out of 100 points by default, kinda like UC Davis in Bakke.

Meanwhile, their law school said they needed a CRITICAL MASS of diversity, which the Court could not get them to define clearly. They said “just trust us”. The majority 5-4 said sure ok, but we expect it won’t be necessary in 25 years.

25
Q

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District (2007)

A

Seattle district tried to assign kids to schools based on overall racial proportions using race as tiebreaker. Court applies strict scrutiny and struck it down because it did not meet either compelling interest where it’s ok to use racial qualifications in education: 1) remedying past discrimination OR 2) promoting diversity among student body in higher ed (though that was overturned by SFFA). And even if it did meet either, it wasn’t narrowly tailored because how much diversity do you need for “general socialization benefits”?

Districts MUST take race into account when trying to remedy its own past segregation.

Districts MAY (until SFFA v. Harvard in 2023) take race into account as part of a multifaceted diversity consideration.

Kennedy’s Concurrence/Dissent:
Wanted to reject strict scrutiny in benign motive cases and reject colorblind approach. He thought the schools did have a compelling interest in racial diversity. But he had a problem with the means. He didn’t want mechanical means, but rather indirect ones like giving the Hispanic school a new football field to make more races want to go there. But he thought the schools cannot treat kids as “racial chits”. Kennedy’s concurrence/dissent ended up controlling because he split the vote.

This may or may not be good law still depending on how SFFA is interpreted. Pettys thinks we need another case to know.

26
Q

Marks Doctrine

A

When you have a split opinion, you want to look to the justice who agrees with a majority about who wins and loses. At least 5 authors must agree about a winner and loser. But if there is no majority for the rationale, you as a lower court follow the opinion that gives the loser the most flexibility going forward and gives the loser the loss on the most favorable terms.

The Marks Doctrine does not allow you to mix opinions. Can’t take part from Roberts and part from Kennedy with respect to one issue.

In other words, it’s better for the school district to lose on Kennedy’s terms.

27
Q

Early Cases addressing Sex-Based Classifications under EP

A

Bradwell v. State (1873):
Married woman wanted right to practice law. Court said her marital duties would interfere with practice of law and upheld it. Court had not considered EP for anything but race.

Goesaert:
Woman wanted to be licensed bartender. Michigan state said only ok if you’re a wife/daughter of bartender. SCOTUS said apply RB review for men/women classification (1948). This is later changed to IS with Craig v. Boren.

Reed v. Reed:
Statute gave preference to fathers over mothers in determining who administered deceased child’s estate. State said that the statute saved the court time in determining who is the administrator. Court struck down the law. Said it would apply rational basis, but didn’t actually do that.

28
Q

Frontiero v. Richardson (1973)

A

A law said if you are a military married man, the law will presume your spouse is dependent on you. But it said to women that they had the burden to prove that their husband was a dependent.

Court splits and Justice Brennan writes for plurality saying ought to apply SS as the SoR. Other justices wanted RB review.

Eventually, this split led to the court deciding that sex-based classifications deserved IS.

29
Q

Craig v. Boren (1976)

A

A state had a law that made the drinking age higher for men than women because men were getting more DUIs.

The Court adopted Intermediate Scrutiny to address sex-based classifications.

Note that IS does not necessarily fall in the middle between RB and SS. Nobody really knows where it is.

30
Q

The Equal Rights Amendment

A

Would have said: “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.”

Ended up failing to pass because people were worried that women would get drafted and because for practical purposes, sex-based protections have already been accomplished through various means like civil rights acts and the EPC.

31
Q

US v. Virginia (VMI)

A

VMI took second look at its all-male admissions policy in the 1980s because intermediate scrutiny applied to sex-based classifications in a 1982 case.

Sex-based classifications require an “exceedingly persuasive justification” so VMI decided to create a separate school for women. Separate but equal might have been ok for the sexes and might still be ok.

The Court found in VMI that the women’s school was worse than the male one so it gave VMI a choice of 1) creating an actually equal women’s program (which was impossible because the reputation/alumni value was built over time) or 2) admitting women to the male school; or 3) privatizing VMI.

Scalia dissent: Court should not take lead on big societal changes unless Constitution is explicit.

Exceedingly Persuasive Justification Test: this was added to the Intermediate Scrutiny test in VMI. Scalia said it made IS more like SS, but Ginsburg said no, sex-based classifications should not get SS because of inherent physical differences.

32
Q

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (1985)

A

Facts

A city denied a permit for a mentally disabled home giving weak reasons like nearby school bullying (even though that school had disabled kids).

Holding

Court claimed to apply RB review because it doesn’t want to get into the factual details of mental disabilities. But it still struck down the city’s law despite RB because the city had no legitimate reason to do what it did, and it might have even given off a bit of animus vibe (even though its underinclusive, it fails). Normally a court doing true RB analysis would not dig into the facts as much as the court did here.

Standard of Review

The SoR for mental disabilities is complicated. On its surface, it’s RB because:
1) Mentally disabled have different capacities and states have a legitimate interest in providing for them, but the courts don’t want to elevate the SoR because it would require second-guessing facts. Deference because of complexity.
2) They’re being treated well by lawmakers so it seems they have political power. However, it is immutable.
3) Many regulations make it clear they have had political influence to protect their rights
4) Finding the mentally disabled a quasi-suspect class would pose problems in the future for classifying other groups.

33
Q

Romer v. Evans

A

Colorado passed a law banning anti-discrimination laws for LGBT. Amendment did not ban laws protecting heterosexual people.

Kennedy majority said law violates EP because:
1) It discriminated against a particular group without any rational reason (in reality, animus). State claimed to be trying to protect homeowners who don’t want to rent out rooms to same-sex couples, but the law is much broader than that.

2) EPC requires EP of the laws. Colorado said you (as LGBT) cannot turn to state laws and would need a state constitutional amendment, making it more difficult for one group to obtain aid from the gov. This made it a very literal denial of EP.

34
Q

Summary of Poe v. Ullman and Washington v. Glucksberg

A

Poe Dissent:

Fundamental rights should be identified in a non-formulaic approach using a BALANCING TEST:
Liberty of the individual vs. demands of organized society
Consider 1) history and traditions as well as 2) traditions from which it broke

Glucksberg Majority:
2 reqs for recognizing fundamental rights
1) The fundamental right must be deeply rooted in history and tradition
2) To analyze that history and tradition, one must provide “a careful description of the asserted right”. Fact-specific descriptions are favored at a detailed/narrow level of abstraction. Narrow framing is more conservative whereas broader framing is more liberal.

Example of Framing Differences in the Context of Physician-Assisted Suicide:
Very Broad: Do you have the right to hire doctors for medical work?
Somewhat Broad: Do you have the right to end your pain when in agony?
Narrow: Do you have the right to kill yourself?

35
Q

Obergefell v. Hodges

A

Kennedy says the Constitution gives right to define your own IDENTITY. He does not use a clear SoR. He identifies 4 principles in the due process tradition and calls marriage fundamental:
1) Right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. See Loving v. Virginia
2) Right to marry is fundamental because it supports a 2-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals
3) Marriage safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of child rearing, procreation, and education.
4) Previous cases and American tradition make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.

Kennedy says that banning gay marriage is demeaning to same-sex couples and their children and denies them dignity. He uses a cluster of concepts common in many of his opinions: identity, autonomy, self-definition, demeaning, dignity, stigma, humiliate, self-expression. Not a concrete doctrine, perhaps dormant, but these are tools in the litigant’s toolbelt.

36
Q

Yick Wo v. Hopkins

A

Yick Wo shows that a non-facial classification can violate the EP clause. All non-Chinese applicants for laundry permits got them, while no Chinese applicants did. The law was administered with an “evil eye and unequal hand.” There were clearly discriminatory effects AND purpose.

Discriminatory effects MIGHT be so powerful that they can PROVE PURPOSE. Gerrymandering voting districts based on race is another example where the map’s results show such a start discriminatory effect that you can straight up infer it was intentional.

37
Q

Washington v. Davis and Palmer

A

Alongside Palmer, this case shows how to prove discriminatory effects AND purpose.

Palmer court found no discriminatory effects when a town shut down its pool to avoid integrating, because whites and blacks were affected equally by the closure.

In Washington, where 2 black men were denied police jobs because of a language test that disproportionately affected them, the Court held that a P must not only show discriminatory effects but also PURPOSE/INTENT. How does a court find purpose/intent? By looking at the totality of the circumstances/context. Look for regularity (or deviations) in usual decision-making process.

38
Q

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp

A

This case shows how to find discriminatory purpose/intent. The discriminatory purpose doesn’t have to be the main reason the law was passed. But the P must at least show that a reasonable person could conclude that discrimination based on the relevant trait was a MOTIVATING FACTOR. Without this classification, the EP claim should fail.

If P does show discriminatory intent was a motivating factor, then the burden shifts to the gov to show that if there were no such motivating factor, it would have passed the same law anyway.

39
Q

Burden Shifting Framework for Proving Discriminatory Purpose

A

The test for purpose is where the burden-shifting framework applies.

P must at least show that a reasonable person could conclude that discrimination based on the relevant trait was a MOTIVATING FACTOR. Without this classification, the EP claim should fail.

If P does show discriminatory intent was a motivating factor, then the burden shifts to the gov to show that if there were no such motivating factor, it would have passed the same law anyway.

40
Q

How to Find 1) Discriminatory Effects and 2) Discriminatory Purpose

A

1) Look at results of the law. Disparate results between groups must exist but do not necessarily prove discriminatory purpose.

2) Look to the full context. The purpose need not be the main or only purpose.