EPs that suck Flashcards
AFCS Degraded
*1. Safe altitude airspeed - establish (waveoff/ITO as required)
If the AFCS DEGRADED caution appears during a night/IMC coupled or automatic approach, consideration may be given to continuing hover/approach if not disoriented or unstable.
Main Transmission Malfunction
If failure is imminent:
1. Land Immediately
If secondary indications are present:
2. Land ASAP
Indications of imminent transmission failure include yaw attitude excursions with no control input, increase in power required for a fixed collective setting, failure of a main generator or hydraulic pump, increased noise, increased vibration, or abnormal fumes in the cabin.
Operation of the MGB with no oil px may result in failure of the T/R drive takeoff pinion gear and subsequent loss of T/R drive.
Consideration should be given to performing the applicable steps of the IL/D EP and transiting at a min power airspeed and low altitude (approx 80/80) to permit a quick flare followed by an IL/D.
A loss of all main transmission lubricating oil may result in unreliable temperature indications from the main transmission temp guage and temperature caution.
Continued operations in the precautionary range for temp and px are acceptable provided that the ambient conditions and flight regime of the aircraft correspond with the guidance set forth in the transmission limits section.
Dual EGI Failure
- Backup instruments - Scan, as required
- # 1 and #2 EGI power switches - OFF then ON
Do not initiate a manual or auto test via the DIAG page for troubleshooting EGI issues. It will cause the EGI to freeze and require mx to remove the batteries to clear the problem.
Stab Manual Mode
In manual mode the following are not recommended:
- swimmer deployments less than 15 feet AGL
- night takeoffs, approaches, and landings (except for the one time following failure)
- automatic approaches to a hover
- simulated emergencies, to include practice autorotations
- flight in known IMC
Stab angle vs airspeed limits: 0 and 150 10 and 100 20 and 80 30 and 60 40 and 45
STAB AUTO MODE FAILURE (PREPARE THYSELF FOR THE LONGEST SET OF NOTES, WARNINGS, AND CAUTIONS EVER TO BE CURSED UPON THIS GREEN EARTH.)
- PAC calls - “STAB STAB STAB”
- Cyclic - arrest pitch rate
- Collective - DO NOT REDUCE
- MAN SLEW switch - adjust to 0
It is possible for the stab to failure without illumination of the stab caution and associated aural warning tone. In this cause the first indication of a stab failure will be an uncommanded pitch change.
Reengagement of the auto mode after a shutdown results in the auto mode operating for 1 second. If a hardover signal to one actuator was the initial cause of the shutdown and reengagement is attempted the actuator will move before another disengagement is commanded. In this case, subsequent reengagement shall not be attempted since it may result in additional stab movement. If acceleration is continued with the stab in the full down position, then longitudinal control will be lost. The stab shall be slewed to 0 as the aircraft accelerates above 40 KIAS.
With large fixed stab angles, reduction in collective results in increased aft cyclic requirements. Collective reduction during recovery from a trailing edge down stab flight condition should be minimal. If the stab becomes fixed at or near 0, nose-high attitudes may occur at slow speeds.
A combination of high airspeed and low altitude coupled with a runaway down stab (indicated by a significant uncommanded nose pitch change) will necessitate immediate pilot action to maintain control of the aircraft. Primary consideration is to disengage auto mode by activating manual mode slewing capability.
At high airspeed, immediate recognition and flight control input are essential to avoid an unrecoverable attitude. It is essential for the PNAC to slew the stab to 0 immediately to gain control of the aircraft. If acceleration is continued with the stab in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost.
Without stab auto mode, careful aircrew coordinating to manually slew the stab is required to avoid undesirable and potentially dangerous flight regimes and/or aircraft attitudes.
Loss of Tail Rotor Control
- Collective/airspeed - adjust as required to control yaw
Following the appearance of the #1 TR SERVO caution without the associated #2 TR SERVO ON and BACKUP PUMP ON advisories, the aircraft will demonstrate normal flight characteristics not requiring excessive TR performance however at slower airspeeds like below 40 KIAS characteristics of loss of TR control will become more apparent.
Rapid reduction of the collective and PCLs once on deck can cause an excessive and uncontrollable yaw rate to develop.
If there is a cable failure, the hydraulic transients associated with switching the TR SERVO switch from NORM to BACKUP can cause catastrophic damage to the TR control system.
Servo hardovers in the yaw channel may result in loss of TR control. Consideration should be given to securing SAS/BOOST and/or TRIM as appropriate.
A momentary uncommanded right yaw will occur when the TR servo switches from normal to backup in a hover. The rate and magnitude will primarily depend on power required and wind direction and magnitude.
Electrical Power Failure/Dual Generator Failure
- Safe altitude and airspeed establish
- STAB - check position slew as required
- APU emergency start procedure - perform
- CMPTR PWR, SAS 1, SAS 2, TRIM, AUTOPILOT, and STAB AUTO CONTROL PB - ON
Exceeding airspeed vs stab angle limits may result in unrecoverable pitch angles. (No power to AC ESNTL BUS means stab auto mode is inop yo)
The stab position indicator will be inoperative with no power to the AC ESNTL BUS. Attempt to check visually.
Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine AA activation regardless of engine AA or DEICE MASTER switch position, reducing max TRQ available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning engine inlet AA valve up to 49% TRQ available can be lost.
The capability of slewing the stab is retained via the DC ESNTL BUS using battery power. Travel is limited to 35 degrees if full down or 30degrees if full up when a power failure occurs.
LEFT NWC for External Engine Fire / APU Fire
HF transmissions, sunlight filtered through smoke, haze, water, or at sunrise or sunset may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication.
The safety of the helicopters occupants is the primary consideration when a fire occurs. If airborne, the most important single action that can be taken by the pilot is to land the helicopter safely as soon as possible.
Cockpit Fire/Cabin Fire
If source is known:
1. affected power switches and CBs - off/pull
2. portable fire extinguisher - as required
If fire continues or source is unknown:
3. cabin/doors/vents/ECS - close/OFF as required
4. unnecessary electrical equipment and CBs - off/pull
If airborne and fire continues
5. Land as soon as possible
Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine AA activation regardless of engine AA or DEICE MASTER switch position, reducing max TRQ available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning engine inlet AA valve up to 49% TRQ available can be lost.
Severity of the fire and conditions present will determine if an IL/D is required.
Vapors from the portable fire extinguisher agent, although not poisonous, can cause asphyxiation by displacement of oxygen in a confined space. The cabin should be ventilated as soon as practicable.
It may not be advisable to secure all electrical power, thus losing AFCS, ICS, and flight instruments prior to achieving VMC or landing/ditching
If source of fire is unknown, consideration should be given to securing MSN PWR immediately when securing unnecessary electrical equipment to prevent system damage.
Consideration should be given to selecting the DIAG page in order to identify failing components.
Immediate Landing/Ditching
- Crew/Pax - Alert
- Should harness - lock
- External cargo/stores/fuel - jettison/dump as required
- Searchlight - as required
- MAYDAY/IFF - transmit/emergency
In the flare: - windows - jettison as required
After landing: - PCLs - OFF
- Rotor brake - ON
- Copilot Collective stow
- Pilot HCU stow
After all violent motion has stopped: - Egress
Time permitting, consideration should be given to performing the APU emergency start procedure to provide electrical/hydraulic power after rotor disengagement.
After actuation, the position of the emergency jettison window lever may cause snagging of personal survival gear, impeding egress. Time permitting, reset jettison handle to the aft position prior to egress.
Failure to remain strapped in aircraft until all violent motion or inrushing water has stopped may result in injury or incapacitation.
Stores jettisoned a descent rates greater than those listed in the NATIP have not been tested. It is possible to for stores to impact the fuselage or rotor system.
Underwater Egress
- Emergency breathing device - as required
- Cords - disconnect
- Doors/windows - jettison
- Place hand on a known reference point
- Shoulder harness release
- Exit helicopter
After egress: - Swim clear of helicopter and inflate LPU
The downward stroke of the seat will change the frame of reference needed for egress. Extended handles, windows, and controls will not be located in the same relative position. Keep legs clear from under seat area. Downward travel of seat may cause injury or entrapment.
Do not inflate LPU until outside helicopter.
Water px my prevent opening the emergency egress windows until the cabin fills with water. The windows should be jettisoned prior to water entry to optimize the ability of the crew to safely egress. Failure to disconnect ICS cord can impede egress. Personal survival gear may snag during egress, notably on collectives, FLIR HCUs, parking brake and RAST release handles, PCLs/Fuel selectors/fire T-handles/ or extended emergency jettison window handles.
If entanglement or disorientation delays egress, hold onto a reference point with one hand. Using the other hand, place the emergency breathing device second stage regulator in your mouth, clear water from your mouthpiece and continue with egress.
1 PS or TM Leak
Be prepared for loss of tail rotor control.
Failure to ensure BACKUP PUMP switch is in AUTO or ON position prior to landing with a #1 RSVR LOW or #1 HYD PUMP caution present will result in loss of T/R directional control when the weight on wheels switch is activated.
2 PS or TM Leak
Failure to ensure BACKUP PUMP switch is in AUTO or ON prior to landing with a #2 HYD PUMP caution will result in a loss of PASA when the weight on wheels switch is activated.
Be prepared for loss of the PASA.
