Epistomology of Mind Flashcards

1
Q

What are the arguments for: Do we have privileged and peculiar access to our own mental states?

A
  1. Background
  2. Armstrong
  3. Rationalism and Transparency
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2
Q

What is privileged access to our mental states?

A

I am more likely to be right about my mental states than that with others’.

  • It seems as though I cannot be wrong.
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3
Q

What example does Byrne use to show that we have privileged access?

A

Jim knows that he believes it is raining, seemingly without possibly being wrong.

He may be wrong about whether Pam believes it is raining.

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4
Q

What is peculiar access of our mental states?

A

I know my mental states in a way that no one else can.

  • Non-Observational or need for evidence.
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5
Q

What is Byrne’s example of peculiar access?

A

Jim must observe and find out whether Pam wants coffee.

But Jim knows directly whether he wants coffee.

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6
Q

What does the materialist object to and why in regards to knowing our own minds?

A

That we have peculiar access.
- This is because we seem to be unable to explain physically what this peculiar access is.

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7
Q

What is Ryle’s argument?

A

A form of behaviourism.
- For privileged but against peculiar.
- To be angry is to be disposed to have certain behaviour.
- We learn from an internal observation.

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8
Q

What does Armstrong claim against Ryle?

A

There is something it is like to be angry even if I do not exhibit certain behaviours.

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9
Q

What does Armstrong believe is the logical connection between mental states and behaviour?

A

Mental states cause behaviours.
- Mental states must be physical for this causal power.

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10
Q

What example can we use to demonstrate the logical connection between mental states and behaviour?

A

What we observe is the behaviour which we name pain, and this is physically caused by the mental state of C-fibres.

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11
Q

What is consciousness for Armstrong?

A

Perception of our own mental states.
- Self-scanning.

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12
Q
A
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13
Q

What does Moran argue for Rationalism and Transparency?

A

That we do have privileged and peculiar access to mental states.

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14
Q

What is Moran’s Transparency?

A

Questions about my mental states are transparent to questions about the outside world.

  • My answer to whether I believe “that p” is the same as the answer to the question “whether p”.
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15
Q

Why must questions about our mental states be transparent to the outside world?

A

Because we are rational agents.

  • If I determine that the evidence means I ought to believe something, then I must believe that thing.
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16
Q

How is transparency privileged and peculiar?

A

Privileged because it is extremely reliable.

Peculiar because only I can use transparency to know my mental states.

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17
Q

What is Nisbett and Wilson’s experiment that goes against rationalism and transparency?

A

The Right-hand bias example:
- We often do not know the causal reasons for our judgements.
- We often make them up.
- We do not know the difference between introspection and confabulating.

18
Q

Why is The Right-Hand bias example against rationalism and transparency?

A

Because the reasons for our beliefs and actions are often not clear for us.

If we had transparency we would know that our judgement is because of our right-hand bias.

Transparency often leads to the wrong results.

19
Q

What is your conclusion for: Do we have privileged and peculiar access to our own mental states?

A

Armstrong and Ryle are against peculiar access but for privileged access.
- For it to make sense with physicalism.

Shoemaker shows that we attribute our mental states to ourselves without observation.

Moran argues for peculiar and privileged.
- This is based on our ethical commitment to rationality.
- Also physicalist.

N&W show that transparency often leads to the wrong results.

20
Q

What are the arguments for: Do we make judgements about the mental states of others by means of a theory?

A
  1. Background
  2. Theory-Theory
  3. Simulation Theory
21
Q

What is the question we ask in regards to other people’s minds?

A

How are we so good at mind reading.

21
Q

What is folk psychology?

A

A common-sense understanding of how other minds work.

22
Q

What is the core idea in Theory-Theory?

A

Mindreading is underpinned by a tacit theory of how minds work.

23
Q

What is a tacit theory?

A

An implicitly known set of laws.
- In contrast to professional sciences.

24
Q

What are some examples of tacit laws?

A

Law of pain: If S is suffering from clear body language, then S will, in normal circumstances, feel pain.

Law of sight: If S is in front of O, S directs her eye-gaze to I, everything being normal, then S will see O.

25
Q

In what way does Theory-Theory relate to functionalism?

A

The tacit laws define the meaning of mental terms.

26
Q

What is the benefit of Theory-Theory?

A

It claims that our common-sensical understanding of other people’s minds is structured like theories.
- It can explain why we seem to be so consistently correct.

27
Q

What are the two issues with Theory-Theory?

A
  • Is it good as a theory?
  • Too much knowledge?
28
Q

Why is Theory-Theory not good as a theory?

A

It assumes it is doing the same work as scientific psychology of causally explaining behaviour.
- But it is based on surface level findings.
- Eliminativists claim that folk-psychology is backwards (analogy?)
- Based on what we know and will likely discover, Theory-Theory will probably be found to be false.

(possible response?)

29
Q

What is the too much knowledge complaint against Theory-Theory?

A
  • It seems we need high-levels of knowledge to mindread.
  • Infants do not seem capable to form hypothesis by we know they can mindread.
  • Theory-Theory implies language use.
30
Q

What is the claim of Simulation Theory?

A

We figure out the mental state of others by exploring our own minds and psychological mechanisms to simulate the mental states and situations of other people.

31
Q

What analogy can we use for Simulation Theory?

A

Learning about plane interactions with air through simulations.

32
Q

What do we use to simulate other people’s mental states?

A

A Decision-making system.
- It takes beliefs and desires as inputs and generate a behaviour as output.

33
Q

What do we do to our mental states when simulating?

A

We quarentine them and replace them with others’.

34
Q

How does Simulation Theory get over the too much knowledge complaint?

A

We do not need to know how this system works.
- No internal set of rules.
- We can primitively simulate others’ minds as infants.

35
Q

What are False Belief Tasks and how does Simulation Theory get around it?

A

FBT: infants being unable to not attribute their own perspective onto others.

  • They simply fail to quarentine their inputs.
36
Q

What are the two issues with Simulation Theory?

A
  • How are we so good?
  • Do we know enough about ourselves?
37
Q

What is the how are we so good complaint towards Simulation Theory?

A

There are so many possible inputs that contribute to people’s behaviour.
- We do not always consider all these factors.
- But we remain consistently correct.

38
Q
A
39
Q

What is the do we know ourselves enough complain against the response to the how are we so good complaint against ST?

A

Nisbett and Wilson showed that we are not infact that good at knowing our own inputs for decision making.
- If our predicting of others is dependent on our knowledge of ourselves, and our knowledge of ourselves is flawed, how do we get it right about others?

If we are always right about inputs (against N&W) then how can we ever be wrong?

40
Q
A
41
Q

What is your conclusion for: Do we make judgements about the mental states of others by means of a theory?

A

Theory-Theory deals well with erroneous predicitons of ourselves and others.
- It is also compatible with physicalism.

It struggles with infants and competing psychology.

ST deals well with infants but struggles with erroneous predicitions of ourselves and others.

We should combine the two, ST for when we a infants, whilst we develop our TT.