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Philosophy A Level > Epistemology > Flashcards

Epistemology Flashcards

1
Q

Acquaintance knowledge

A

‘knowing’ in the sense of knowing a person, place, thing, sensation or feeling. e.g., knowing the taste of coffee.

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2
Q

Ability knowledge

A

knowing how to do something, may be referred to as a skill. e.g., knowing how to tie shoelaces.

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3
Q

Propositional knowledge

A

something which makes a claim about the world and reflects something about reality - something that is or something that was. e.g., knowing that it is snowing in Scotland.

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4
Q

Locke’s definition of knowledge

A

A real definition picks out the real essence of an object. For objects without a real essence a real definition cannot be seeked, always artificial to some extent.

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5
Q

Zagzebski’s definition of knowledge

A
  • knowledge is a concept.
  • to define this concept of knowledge as if it does have a real essence we undergo conceptual analysis.
  • breaking down a concept into its various parts, by exploring what conditions are necessary for a true example of the concept to occur.
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6
Q

Socrates’ definition of knowledge

A
  • believed that true belief and knowledge are not the same.
  • having correct beliefs does not necessarily mean having knowledge.
  • knowledge goes beyond just having correct beliefs.
  • it involves a deeper understanding and justification for those beliefs.
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7
Q

Plato’s definition of knowledge

A

Considers the view ‘true belief accompanied by a rational account is knowledge’ or knowledge is a JTB (Justified True Belief).

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8
Q

The Tripartite View (JTB)

A

S knows that p if and only if:
1. S is justified in believing that p
2. p is true and
3. S believes that p

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9
Q

Issue with truth from JTB: are the conditions individually necessary?

A

knowledge changes overtime as scientific knowledge progresses, people used to think the earth was static and now we believe it is expanding.

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10
Q

Issue with belief from JTB: are the conditions individually necessary?

A

having your memory associate an answer with a question is arguably not the same as truly knowing something. In order to know something, you have to know (or at lest believe) that you know it.

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11
Q

Issue with justification from JTB: are the conditions individually necessary?

A

To know that I am having an experience of redness (looking at something red) requires no justification since it is known immediately with no process of reasoning or inference.

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12
Q

Infallibilism

A

Seeks to strengthen the justification condition in JTB to say it must be certain (no rational doubt).

Criticism - what we can know is limited.
Defence - gettier counter examples not followed by infallibilism because they involve lucky true beliefs.

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13
Q

No false lemmas (k = J + T + B + N)

A

Adds a premise to JTB:
4. It is on true grounds that S believes that P

Criticism - Fake barn county
Defence - effective in dealing with gettier cases.

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14
Q

Reliabilism (k = T + B + R)

A

S knows that p if and only if:
1. P is true
2. S believes that p is true
3. S belief that p is true is caused by a reliable method.

Criticism - faces challenges in explaining how a belief can be justified but still fail to be knowledge due to luck or coincidence.

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15
Q

Virtue Epistemology (k = V + T + B)

A

removes the justification criteria (like reliabilism) and replaces it with epistemic virtue.

Deals with gettier cases effectively by emphasising the importance of the knower’s intellectual virtue in determining whether a belief qualifies as knowledge.

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16
Q

Issue with JTB: are the conditions jointly sufficient?

A

Gettier cases demonstrate that it is possible to have justified true belief that are not considered knowledge. E.g., Jones and Smith both apply for a job, Smith is told by the director of the company that Jones will get the job. Smith counts the no. of coins in Jones pocket and counts 10 coins. From these two pieces of evidence he forms a belief that the person with 10 coins in their pocket will get the job. Smith gets the job - the director lied about Jones getting the job and Smith also happened to have 10 coins in his pocket. This is a lucky true belief, it was justified from what Smith was told by the director and the counting of the coins but it is not considered knowledge.

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17
Q

Direct realism

A

The external world exists independently of the mind. We perceive the external world directly i.e. what you see is what you get!

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18
Q

Issue with direct realism: perceptual variation

A

What we perceive are not physical objects BUT sense-data.
E.g., the table with look a different shape and colour depending on the perceiver and the angle they are perceiving the table from.

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19
Q

Issue with direct realism: illusions

A

What we perceive is not necessarily what the world is like.
E.g., a straw in water will look bent but we know that it is actually straight it’s just the water distorts the view of the straw.

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20
Q

Issue of direct realism: hallucinations

A

We can experience perceptual hallucinations: visual, auditory and olfactory.

Like illusions, hallucinations can be subjectively distinguishable from veridical perception (perceiving things as they truly are, without an distortion.)

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21
Q

Issue with direct realism: the time-lag argument

A

It takes 8 mins for light to reach earth, so when you are looking at the sun you seeing it as it was 8 mins ago. You are not perceiving the sun directly.

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22
Q

Indirect realism

A

The external world exists independently of the mind BUT we perceive the external world indirectly via sense data.

The immediate object of perception is sense data. This sense data is caused by and represents , the mind-independent external world.

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23
Q

Issue with indirect realism: mind independent ideas cannot be lile mind independent objects

A

the example of perceptual variation. As the example of when looking at a table and how it can change from looking square to looking diamond shaped suggests that my sense data changes, however in reality the table does not change. So how can sense data resemble the real world if sense data changes depending on my perception but in reality the object does not change.

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24
Q

Issue with indirect realism: Scepticism + the veil of perception

A

We have no way of telling if the sense-data we perceive is an accurate representation of the external world OR if there even is an external world.

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25
Q

Issue with indirect realism: The external world is the best hypothesis

A

Russell comes up with this and uses the example of a cat and the dwindling fire.

Berkeley could say there is no external world and the cat doesn’t exist if perceived and Russell could respond BUT Berkeley could further respond with: God perceives it so that’s why it moves places when you return to the room.

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26
Q

Issue with indirect realism: 2 responses to scepticism from Locke

A
  1. The involuntary nature of perception -> we can’t choose what we see, I can’t suddenly changed from seeing a white wall to a spotty wall, I don’t have that control.
  2. The coherence of different senses -> sense work together, I know that I am writing because I can see it, read what i’ve wrote etc. (Cockburn develops on this)
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27
Q

Idealism

A

The view that what is real depends upon the mind, the claim that the material world does not exist outside the mind.

Note: to be an idealist is to take an anti-realist stance regarding matter.

28
Q

Berkeley’s Master Argument

A

Can we imagine a tree hidden deep in some uninhabited forest where no one can perceive it?

Idealists say that if the tree falls it makes no noise because no mind is perceiving it, it doesn’t exist.

29
Q

Issue with idealism: trap of solipsism

A

The master argument can lead directly to solipsism by saying it is impossible to conceive of anything beyond my own mind so only my mind can be known to exist.

30
Q

Issue with idealism: the continued existence of things

A

Idealism states that objects appear and reappear when observed - no explanation for the gap of when it’s not perceived e.g., dwindling fire example.

31
Q

Issue with idealism: regularity of the universe

A

Idealism appears to not be able to explain regularity and predictability of our experiences and where our ideas have come from.

Would Berkeley say God?

32
Q

Issue with idealism: the problem with the role of God

A

The existence of God goes against the idealist claim that we can’t know anything other than our own minds - because we wouldn’t be able to perceive God.

  1. God = external world unchanging so my perceptions constantly change.
  2. God = doesn’t feel pain
    My perceptions = include pain
33
Q

Innatism: Plato’s slave boy argument

A

P1: The slave boy has no knowledge of geometry or squares.
P2: Socrates only asks questions; he does not teach the boy about squares.
P3: By the end of the questioning, the slave boy is able to grasp an eternal truth about geometry.
P4: This external truth was not derived from the boy’s prior experience or from Socrates.
C: The eternal truth must have existed innately within the body.

34
Q

Innatism: Descarte’s argument

A

Ideas come from: innate knowledge, experience, invented by us.

He considers where his ideas of God come from: ‘The only remaining alternative is that my idea of God is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate within me’

35
Q

Innatism: Leibniz’s argument

A

P1: The senses can only give us individual instances.
P2: A collection of instances can never show the necessity of truth.
P3: We can grasp and prove many necessary truths (such as mathematics).
C1: Therefore, the necessary truths that we grasp with our minds do not derive from the senses.
C2: The mind is the source of the necessary truths.
C3: These ideas are innately known.

36
Q

Issue with innatism: transparency of ideas

A

Locke argues that our minds are transparent so for any idea to be ‘in’ your mind you must have thought of it or been conscious of it once.

37
Q

Issue with innatism: the tabula rasa

A

Locke argues our minds are blank slates and uses the example of a baby; a baby learns about the world through life experience such as hearing people talk so they learn how to talk.

38
Q

Issue with innatism: no ideas are universally held so none is innate

A

Universal consent doesn’t exist e.g., a child who hasn’t been taught geometry can’t answer questions on it.
- relies on ockham’s razor.
- we see colour with our ideas, it is likely that our experience gives us knowledge of colour.

39
Q

Response to the transparency of ideas

A

Leibniz argues for the idea of taking in information subconsicously

E.g., you ‘absorbed’ a song playing in the background
- not immiately accessible in yuor mind but recognisable if you heard it so ‘in’ you.

40
Q

Response to the tabula rasa

A

do all simple ideas come from impressions?

but what about mathematical truths?

41
Q

Response to no ideas are universally held so none is innate

A

Leibniz says not all universally held ideas are innate

e.g., tobacco was adopted by many nations back then but that doesn’t make it innate

42
Q

Descartes’ intuition and deduction thesis: Descartes’ method

A
  1. Doubt everything.
  2. Recognise ‘I think, therefore I am’.
  3. Trust clear and distinct ideas.
  4. Rely on God - trust God would not deceive him.
  5. Build knowledge through reason.
43
Q

Descartes’ intuition and deduction thesis: clear and distinct ideas

A

Clear = present and accessible to the attentive mind.

Distinct = As well as clear, it is sharply separated from all other perceptions.

44
Q

Descartes’ intuition and deduction thesis: intuition and deduction

A

Intuition = ability to behold intellectual truths without evidence from the senses - A PRIORI TRUTH.

Deduction = each stage of deduction involves the mind intuiting that the next truth necessarily follow.

45
Q

Descartes’ intuition and deduction thesis: the cognito

A

‘I think, therefore I am’

He cannot doubt that he exists even if the evil demon is deceiving him there must be something for the demon to deceive in the first place. Descartes can doubt his own existence so he must exist.

46
Q

Descartes’ trademark argument (argument for God’s existence)

A

P1: If I can clearly and distinctively perceive something as true, then it must be true.
P2: I can clearly and distinctly perceive the existence of God.
P3: God is not a deceiver.
C: Therefore, my clear and distinct perception of God’s existence must be true.

47
Q

Descartes’ contingency argument (argument for God’s existence)

A

I created myself - NO, I would have made myself perfect, I would be God.

I have always existed - NO, I don’t conserved myself in existence, I would be aware of always existing.

My parents created me - NO, they don’t conserve me in existence either.

God created me - YES, by elimination only God could have created me

48
Q

Descartes’ ontological argument (argument for God’s existence)

A

P1: I have an idea of a God, that is to say a perfect being.
P2: A perfect being must have all perfections.
P3: Existence is a perfection.
C: Therefore, God exists.

49
Q

Descartes’ proof of the external world: Step 1

A

Step 1: Sensations come from outside of me
1a:
P1: The will is part of my essence.
P2: Sensation is not subjective to my will.
C: Sensations must come from the external world rather than within us.

1b:
P1: My nature or essence is unextended.
P2: Sensations are ideas of extended things.
C: Sensations come from outside of us.

50
Q

Descartes’ proof of the external world: Step 2

A

Step 2: Sensations originate in matter
P1: There are two possible sources for the origin of sensation - God OR matter.
P2: I have a strong natural inclination to believe they come from matter, and I have no faculty to correct this belief.
C1: So, if the origins were in God, God would be a deceiver.
P3: God is not a deceiver.
C2: Therefore, sensations originate in matter.

51
Q

Philosophical scepticism

A

A method of doubting knowledge and the justification from knowledge in order to establish what we can know with certainty.

52
Q

Normal incredulity

A

A state of scepticism or doubt that arises when faced with claims or beliefs that seem implausible or difficult to accept.

Natural response to arguments that challenge our existing beliefs or expectations.

53
Q

Local scepticism

A

One idea or discreet topic e.g., doubting one’s memory of an event/date.

In philosophical scepticism it is about a specific topic in philosophy e.g., doubting the existence of moral facts.

54
Q

Global scepticism

A

Is an approach that doubts all knowledge e.g., doubting that all of one’s memories are real OR doubting the existence of any facts.
(Brain in a vat and Descartes theories are also examples)

55
Q

Descartes’ first wave of doubt

A

Doubting the senses
- In the past things have looked a way that they are not e.g., things in the distance look smaller.
- BUT these examples are from unusual perceptual conditions so don’t give us reason to doubt all senses.

56
Q

Descartes’ second wave of doubt

A

The dreaming argument
- questions whether we can tell what reality is like from what we experience.
- Descartes doubts whether he is awake, sometimes we dream the most mundane things.
- E.g., I could be dreaming that I’m looking at a piece of paper. I could even have the thought while I’m dreaming that I’m not dreaming.

57
Q

Descartes’ third wave of doubt

A

The evil demon argument
- questions whether God may have deceived him.
- suppose that God does not exist.
- Suppose worse, that all my experiences are produced in me by an evil demon who wants to deceive me.
- If this were true, I wouldn’t know because my experience would be exactly the same.
- So, I cannot know that I am not being deceived by an evil demon.

58
Q

Locke’s response to scepticism

A

Two responses:
1. Perception, unlike imagination, is involuntary which suggests that perception is caused by something external to my mind.

  1. My different perceptions e.g., sight, sound etc. are coherent, suggesting that there is a common reality that causes both.
59
Q

Hume’s response to scepticism

A

He questions the reliability of our senses and reasoning. He argues that we cannot be certain of anything but we can still rely on our experiences and observations to make reasonable judgements.

60
Q

Russell’s response to scepticism

A

He adjusts ‘the external world is the best hypothesis:
Either:
A - the external world and causes my perceptions.
OR
B - the evil demon exists and causes my perceptions

  • I can’t prove A or B indefinitely.
  • So I have to treat A and B as hypotheses.
  • A is a better explanation of my experience than B.
  • So, mind independent objects exist and causes my perceptions.
61
Q

Berkeley’s response to scepticism

A

He argues that his perceptions must be caused by something outside of him and given the complexity of these perceptions, he concludes that this cause must be the mind of God.

God is causing my perceptions, but rather than being a deception, those perceptions are just what reality is.

62
Q

Direct realism as a response to scepticism

A

The belief that our perception of the world is accurate and trustworthy

we can rely on our sense to give us the true picture of reality so skepticism is unecessary.

63
Q

Reliabilism as a response to scepticism

A
  • suggests that our beliefs are justified if they are formed through a reliable process.
  • If our beliefs are the result of reliable methods, such a perceptual experiences or logical reasoning, then they can be considered justified and trustworthy.
64
Q

Reliabilism as a response to scepticism (premise form)

A

P1: If our cognitive processes are reliable, the beliefs are justified.
P2: Our cognitive processes are reliable.
C: Therefore, our beliefs are justified.

65
Q

Response to innatism: how can we distinguish innate ideas from other ideas?

A

Locke argues that if we do have innate ideas but if they come into our minds later in life how can we tell which ideas are innate and which derive from experience

66
Q

response to: how can we distinguish innate ideas from other ideas?

A

Leibniz suggests that we can distinguish because innate ideas are true in a different way, they are necessarily true.

67
Q

Cottingham’s innate argument

A

suggest descartes innate argument can be compared to the way information is held in a book.

ideas we have are always in us but not always present in our minds.

through careful ‘reading’ we can come to understand which ideas are innate and which aren’t.

Philosophy A Level (4 decks)

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