English Criminal Law and Evidence

Question 1

R v Stone & Dobinson 1977 1 QB 354

Answer 1

Omissions Liability - Voluntary duty. Stone and Dobinson lived with their unstable and mentally ill sister
They failed to summon medical attention from the sister when required. Stone and Dobinson found liable for her death as they had assumed a responsibility to her by talking her in.

Question 2

R v Ruffel 2003 EWCA Crim 122 (CA)

Answer 2

Omissions Liability - Voluntary duty. The defendant and the victim were friends. When the victim overdosed, the defendant tried to revive him, but when he couldn’t he later just left him on his mother’s doorstep where he died. It was held that, the defendant did owe a duty of care to the victim as he had assumed responsibility for him when he tried to revive him.

Question 3

R v Gibbon and Proctor 1918 13 Cr App R 134

Answer 3

Omissions Liability - Special relationship, A mother and father starved their child. Was this murder? Yes. Gibbon and Proctor where both under a duty to protect their child.

Question 4

R v Hood 2004 1 Cr App R (S) 73 (CA)

Answer 4

Omissions Liability - Special relationship. The defendant was the sole career for his wife and he was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter after he failed to call her an ambulance after she suffered an accident. There was also evidence that she had been neglected as she was very thin and had sores.

Question 5

Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 1993 1 All ER 831 (HL)

Answer 5

Omissions Liability - Medical care. Doctors sought a declaration that it was acceptable to turn off the life support machines which had held a patient in a persistent vegetative state for more than 2 years. Declaration obtained. Where a person is unable to give or withhold their own consent, doctors are entitled to decide what is in that patients best interests.

Question 6

R v Miller 1983 2 AC 161

Answer 6

Omissions Liability - Creation of danger. The defendant was a squatter in a building. He was lying on a mattress In a room and lit a cigarette. He then fell asleep and dropped the cigarette on the mattress setting it alight. He awoke and realised that the mattress was on fire, but he simply got up, walked into the next room and fell asleep in there. The fire spread and caused £800 worth of damage to the house. Defendant convicted of arson.

Question 7

R v Gemma Evans 2009 Crim LR 631 (CA)

Answer 7

Omissions Liability - Creation of danger. Evans gave her sister some heroine, which was self-administered. Following symptoms of overdose, Evans failed to summon medical attention. Although the injection was the voluntary act of the victim, a duty of care of the victim was present, and breached by omission.

Question 8

R v Pittwood 1902 19 TLR 37

Answer 8

Omissions Liability - Contractual duty. The defendant was employed by a railway company to man the gate at a level crossing. The defendant lifted the gate to allow a cart to pass and then went off to lunch failing to put it back down. A train later collided with a horse and cart killing the train driver. The defendant liable for the death of the train driver as it was his contractual duty to close the gate.

Question 9

R v White 1910 2 KB 124

Answer 9

Causation - The defendant put poison in his mothers milk with the intention of killing her. The mother took a few sips and went to sleep and never woke up. Medical reports revealed that she died from a heart attack and not the poison. The defendant was not liable for her murder as his act of poisoning the milk was not the cause of death.

Question 10

R v Rafferty 2007 EWCA Crim 1846 (CA)

Answer 10

Causation - The defendant and two co-defendants robbed R, they also attacked him. The defendant took Rs credit card and took it to the cash machine. On his return he discovered that the co-defendants had drowned R. Defendant was acquitted of manslaughter as him leaving to go to the cash machine was a new and intervening act which subsequently broke the chain of causation.

Question 11

R v Kennedy 2007 UKHL 38 (HL)

Answer 11

Causation - Kennedy supplied heroin to the victim when visiting his room in the hostel which they both lived in. The victim voluntarily self-administered the drugs and died as a result. Did Kennedy cause the death of the victim by law of unlawful act manslaughter? No, conviction quashed. Whilst the supply of drugs was an unlawful act which was a crime, it had not caused the death. The death was caused by the voluntary act of the victim, who it is assumed acted under free will, to ‘help him sleep’.

Question 12

R v Pagett 1983 76 Cr App R 279 (CA)

Answer 12

Causation - Upon the police raiding his house, Pagett, the defendant, used his girlfriend as a human shield as he shot downstairs towards the police. In the darkness, the police returned fire, killing Pagett’s girlfriend. The police officer was acting in self-defence. Did Pagett cause the death of his girlfriend? Yes. Although the police fired the shot(s) which factually caused the death, it was a shot fired for the purpose of self-preservation , which can be distinguished from a voluntary act and therefore a foreseeable consequence.

Question 13

R v Smith 1959 2 QB 35

Answer 13

Causation - Medical intervention. The defendant, a soldier, got in a fight at an army barracks and stabbed another soldier. The injured soldier was taken to the medics but was dropped twice on route. Once there the treatment given was described as ‘palpably wrong’. They failed to diagnose that his lung has been punctured. The soldier died. Defendant was convicted of murder and appealed contending that if the victim had received the correct medical treatment he would not have died. Held that the stab wound was an operating cause of the death and therefore the conviction was upheld.

Question 14

R v Malcherek, R v Steel 1981 1 WLR 690 (CA)

Answer 14

Causation - Medical intervention. Two separate appeals were heard together. In Malcherek the defendant had stabbed his wife. In Steel the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting and beating a woman over the head with a stone. In both cases the victims had been taken to hospital and placed on life support machines. The doctors in the respective cases later switched off the life support machines as both victims were not showing any activity in their brain stem. The defendants sought to argue that the doctors actions constituted a nouvos actus interveniens which broke the chain of causation. Held that the test of death is where the brain stem had died. Thus at the time of switching off the machine, the victims were already dead. The doctors could not therefore be the cause of death. Convictions upheld.

Question 15

R v Jordan 1956 40 Cr App R 152 (CA)

Answer 15

Causation - Medical intervention. A victim had almost recovered (in hospital) from stabbing wounds caused by the defendant. The hospital administered antibiotics, knowing the victim was allergic to them. He was also given excessive amounts of intravenous liquids. He died of pneumonia 8 days after admission to hospital. Did the defendants stabbing cause the death of the victim? No. The medical treatment was exceptionally poor, rendering it a supervening event. The original injuries were no longer an operating cause of death.

Question 16

R v Cheshire 1991 3 All ER 670 (CA)

Answer 16

Causation - Medical intervention. Cheshire shot the victim following an argument, During medical treatment, the hospital negligently used a tracheotomy tube. The victim passed away after being unable to breathe. Could Cheshire still be said to have caused the death? Yes, conviction upheld. At the time of death, Cheshire’s shooting was still a more than minimal cause of the death. Causation is a question of fact for the jury to decide upon in accordance with the legal principles of causation. For an act to be supervening a jury must be satisfied that the original cause was made insignificant by the supervening event.

Question 17

R v Blaue 1975 1 WLR 1411 (CA)

Answer 17

Causation - Thin skull rule. Blaue stabbed the victim several times after the victim refused his sexual advances. The victim required a blood transfusion to survive, The victim was a Jehovah’s witness, therefore refusing the blood transfusion. Was Blaue still responsible for the victims death? Yes. Cannot be argued that religious beliefs are unreasonable. The victim was entitled to refuse a blood transfusion.

Question 18

R v Roberts 1971 56 Cr App R 95

Answer 18

Causation - Escape attempts. Roberts gave a lift to the victim, whom he had never met. After refusing Roberts sexual advances in order to escape, the victim jumped from Roberts moving car and sustained actual bodily harm. Did Roberts cause the ABH? Yes. The victims actions were neither daft, nor so unexpected that no reasonable man would have acted in the same way. Escaping does not break the chain of causation if it is seen as reasonable to the jury.

Question 19

R v Marjoram 2000 Crim LR 372 (CA)

Answer 19

Causation - Escape attempts. The defendant inflicted grievous bodily harm by forcing his way into the 16 year old victims room on the third floor of the hostel causing her - in fear - to jump or fall to the ground through the window, receiving life threatening injuries. The defendant was found guilty if such an outcome was foreseeable by the reasonable person in the defendants position (whether or not the defendant had actually foreseen it).

Question 20

R v Moloney 1985 All ER 1025 (HL)

Answer 20

Indirect intent - In a drunken dare, the victim dared the defendant to pull the trigger of a gun. The defendant did not believe that doing so would injure the victim. Did the defendant have the necessary mens rea for murder? No. Lord Bridge said “it is for the jury to decide whether the defendant intended to kill or cause GHB”. The judge should not expand on the definition of consent.

Question 21

R v Hancock Shankland 1986 1 All ER 641 (CA)

Answer 21

Indirect intent - The defendants threw a concrete block on to the motorway. The intended to block the road used by non-striking miners, however this subsequently resulted in the death of a taxi driver. It was held that the greater the possibility of a consequence occurring, the more likely it was foreseen, and the more likely it was foreseen the more likely it was intended. Foresight of consequences is only evidence of intention.

Question 22

R v Nedrick 1986 3 All ER 1 (CA)

Answer 22

Indirect intention - The defendant poured paraffin through the letter box of a house in which the victim (a child) was located. The defendant did not wish for anyone to die. Did the defendant murder the victim? No. Conviction of manslaughter was substituted due to defective direction given by the judge. Where there is no direct intent, a judge is entitled to direct the jury that intent may be inferred if the resulting death was virtually certain and the defendant appreciated this virtual certainty (two individual requirements).

Question 23

R v Woollin 1999 1 AC 82 (HL)

Answer 23

Indirect intent - The defendant threw his three-moth old son at a wall in anger, but claimed that he did not intent to kill him. The judge directed the jury, applying R v Nedrick 1986, that the defendant could be said to have intended the death of the victim if there was a substantial risk of death which was appreciated by the defendant. Could the defendant be convicted of murder? No. The conviction was unsafe, and one of manslaughter substituted. The judge was incorrect to use the term ‘substantial risk’ in place of ‘virtual certainty’, as doing so blurred the line between intention and recklessness. The Nedrick direction is almost the correct direction to give the jury, but for the replacement of the word ‘infer’ for the word ‘find’.

Question 24

R v Matthews and Alleyne 2003 EWCA Crim 192 (CA)

Answer 24

Rule of evidence - The defendants threw the victim into a river where he drowned, not intending the death of the victim, as the victim should have been able to swim. Did the defendants murder the victim? Yes. Although the conviction was safe, the judge erred in finding that R v Woollin 1999 laid down a rule of law. The Woolin criteria is a rule if evidence: a jury direction which entitles the jury to find intent resulting death was virtually certain; it does not require a jury to find intent from virtual certainty.

Question 25

R v Cunningham 1957 2 QB 396 (CA)

Answer 25

Recklessness - The defendant removed a gas meter from a wall to obtain the money inside. This caused gas to escape, which in turn caused injury. What amounted to intention? Either intent or recklessness. Conviction upheld. If the defendant foresees a rick and takes it, he is liable to the consequences. Subjective approach.

Question 26

R v Stephenson 1979 QB 695 (CA)

Answer 26

Recklessness - The defendant was homeless and schizophrenic. He found refuge in a haystack where he made a hollow and tried to sleep. He was cold and so he lit a fire inside the hollow to keep himself warm. Inevitably the whole haystack caught fire and he ran off. Defendant contended that he never thought of the possibility of the whole stack catching fire. At trial a consultant psychiatrist gave evidence that he had a ling history of schizophrenia and this would mean that the defendant was quite capable of lighting a fire in a haystack without ever thinking of the danger involved. Held that the test should be entirely subjective; if the defendant did not foresee the risk of damage he should not be liable.

Question 27

R v Caldwell 1982 AC 341 (HL)

Answer 27

Recklessness - Caldwell set fire to a hotel while intoxicated causing criminal damage and endangering life. Was Caldwell reckless as to criminal damage and endangering of life? Yes. Recklessness an objective test, satisfied if the reasonable person would have seen the rick to be obvious. The rick was obvious to a reasonable (non-intoxicated) person, conviction upheld. Objective approach.

Question 28

Elliot v C (a minor) 1983 1 WLR 939

Answer 28

Recklessness - The defendant was a 14-year old girl of low intelligence who had started a fire in a shed she had poured white spirit on the floor and set it alight. Took an objective approach, reasonable prudent person would have seen the obvious risk. Low intelligence no defence.

Question 29

R v G and Another 2003 UKHL 50 (HL)

Answer 29

Recklessness - G (two boys, aged 11 and 12), set fire to newspapers, then left them to burn out near a rubbish bin, which was situated next to a supermarket. The newspapers did not burn out, but set fire to a bin. The bin fire spread to the supermarket, causing £1 million in damage. Were the two boys guilty of recklessly causing criminal damage? No. The Caldwell reasonableness test is incorrect. Lord Bingham held that the recklessness test requires a subjective test - whereby there must be a risk which the defendants were unaware of, therefore were not reckless and were not guilty of causing criminal damage.

Question 30

Thabo Meli v R 1954 1 All ER 373 (PC)

Answer 30

Correspondence and coincidence - The defendant caused the intoxication of the victim, before rolling him off a cliff to kill him. The victim died instead of exposure whilst lying at the bottom of the cliff. Did the defendant cause the death of the victim? Yes. Although the doctrine of coincidence requires the actus reus and mens rea of a crime to coincide in time, the course of conduct of murder continued up until the victims death.

Question 31

R v Fagan 1969 1 QB 439

Answer 31

Continuing act - Fagan was asked to park his car closer to the kerb, which he did. He also parked on a police officers foot, and subsequently refused to move the car. Had Fagan committed an assault on the officer? Yes. Despite the assault having already happened before he refused to move, acknowledging his actions, it was a continuing act.

Question 32

R v Le Brun 1991 3 WLR 653

Answer 32

Continuing act - The defendant pushed his wife knocking her unconscious. He did not intent to cause her serious harm. The defendant attempted to move her body and in the course of doing so dropped her, causing her head to strike the pavement. His wife sustained fractures to her skull that proved fatal. Continuing act of unlawful blow which caused death.

Question 33

Larsonneur (1933) 24 Cr App R 74

Answer 33

Absolute liability - The defendant, a French woman, was deported against her will, from Ireland to England, by the Irish authorities. Upon her arrival she was immediately charged with the offence of ‘being’ an illegal alien. Her conviction was upheld despite the fact that she had not voluntarily come to England.

Question 34

Winzar v Chief Constable of Kent (1983)

Answer 34

D is intoxicated and is brought to hospital by an ambulance, he is released from hospital a few hours later but stays in the hospital causing a nuscience. Police were called to remove him, they dragged him outside and arrested him for being intoxicated on a public highway. He is found guilty under the Licensing Act 1872 and appeal quashed.

Question 35

Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918

Answer 35

The defendant was convicted of selling alcohol to a police officer whilst on duty under to s.16(2) Licensing Act 1872. It was customary for police officers to wear an armlet whilst on duty but this constable had removed his. The appellant therefore believed he was off duty. The statute was silent as to the question of whether knowledge was required for the offence. He was convicted and appealed contending that knowledge that the officer was on duty was a requirement of the offence. The appeal was allowed and his conviction was quashed.

Question 36

Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132

Answer 36

The defendant did not know that students were smoking on his premises. The defendant was convicted of an offence which had no mens rea requirement. Was the defendant’s lack of knowledge relevant? Yes, no conviction. A mens rea aspect will be implied into an offence where there is no contrary intention by Parliament.

Question 37

Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1985] AC 1

Answer 37

The appellant was a builder who had deviated from plans in the construction of a building. It was an offence to deviate from the plans in a substantial way. The appellant accepted he had deviated from the plans but he believed that the deviation was only minor rather than substantial. Held that the offence was one of strict liability and therefore his belief was irrelevant and his conviction upheld.

Question 38

R v K [2002] 1 AC 462

Answer 38

K, a 26 year old man, was charged with indecent assault on a girl of 14. His defence was that the sexual activity was consensual and that she had told him she was 16 and that he had had no reason to disbelieve her. The trial judge ruled that the prosecution had to prove an absence of genuine belief that the victim was aged 16 or over. The prosecution appealed against that ruling. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that such absence of genuine belief did not have to be proved.

Question 39

R v Brown (Richard) [2013] UKSC 43

Answer 39

The Criminal Law Amendment Act (Northern Ireland) 1923 s.4 was to be interpreted as not requiring proof of the offender’s mens rea as to the age of a girl of whom he had had unlawful carnal knowledge.

Question 40

Cundy v Le Cocq (1884) 13 QBD 207

Answer 40

The defendant was the landlord of a pub. He was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor to a person who was drunk, contrary to s.13 of the Licensing Act 1872. The defendant claimed that he did not know that the person was drunk was not held to be relevant. The offence was one of strict liability.

Question 41

Smedleys Ltd v Breed [1974] AC 839

Answer 41

A small caterpillar was found in one of millions of tins of peas sold by the defendant. The House of Lords imposed strict liability on the defendant after a prosecution under the Food and Drugs Act 1955.

Question 42

Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 2 AC 256

Answer 42

The defendant was found in possession of a box containing a controlled drug. He was convicted of being in unlawful possession of a controlled drug, contrary to s.1(1) of the Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act 1964. The defendant knew that he was in possession of the box, but claimed that he thought it contained perfume. The offence was held to be an offence of strict liability. Thus, the prosecution did not have to prove that the defendant knew that he was in possession of a controlled drug, It was enough that he knew he was in possession of the box and he knew it contained something.

Question 43

DPP v Harper [1997] 1 WLR 1406

Answer 43

The offence of driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle whilst over the prescribed alcohol limit, contrary to s.5 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, is also an offence of strict liability.

Question 44

Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824

Answer 44

The appellant factory owner was convicted of causing polluted matter to enter a river under the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951. The offence related to an underground pipe which had become disconnected due to a blockage. The appellant was unaware of the pollution and it was not alleged that they had been negligent. As a matter of public policy the offence was one of strict liability and therefore the appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

Question 45

Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 831 (HL)

Answer 45

Doctors sought a declaration that it was acceptable to turn off the life support machines which had held a patient in a persistent vegetative state for more than 2 years. Could a declaration be obtained? Yes. Where a person is unable to give or withhold their consent, doctors are entitled to decide what is in the patients best interests. It may be in the best interests of the patient to discontinue treatment.

Question 46

Re A (children)(conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961 (CA)

Answer 46

This case required the court to decide upon the legality of an operation to separate conjoined twins which would inevitably lead to the death of one of the twins. The defence of necessity was relied upon by Brooke LJ to justify the operation and, thus, the killing. However, it is important to note that, whilst the other judges in the Court of Appeal accepted the arguments relating to necessity, their Lordship adopted different reasoning in reaching their conclusions. Thus, their judgements are not clearly based upon necessity.

Question 47

R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2002] 3 WLR 1598 (HL)

Answer 47

The applicant was terminally ill, and entirely dependant upon her husband for care. She foresaw a time when she would wish to take her own life, but would not be able to do so without the active assistance of her husband. She sought a proleptic permission, a promise that he would not be prosecuted. Held that the right to life does not include the right to any particular form of death. Article 2 was rather intended to reflect the sanctity of life. Assisted suicide remained a criminal offence. A refusal to allow the assistance was not discriminatory against those who were unable to help themselves.

Question 48

R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45 (HL)

Answer 48

The appellant suffered a severe chronic illness and anticipated that she might want to go to Switzerland to commit suicide. She would want her husband to accompany her, and sought an order requiring the respondent to provide clear guidelines on the circumstances under which someone might be prosecuted under s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961. The law lords held that the DPP was acting in breach of Ms Purdy’s rights under Article 8 ECHR. As the law stands it is ‘not unlawful for a person to commit suicide in this country, so the primary offence is not illegal. However, it is unlawful to assist a person to commit suicide by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the suicide of another.

Question 49

Re B (consent to treatment: capacity) All ER (HL)

Answer 49

The claimant had suffered catastrophic injuries, leaving her unable to breathe without artificial help. She eventually decided that she wanted to refuse treatment. The health authority took this as an indication of lack of capacity, and refused to disconnect the life support mechanisms.

Question 50

R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice 2014 UKSC 38 (SC)

Answer 50

Almost completely paralysed following a catastrophic stroke, Nicklinson wanted to die, yet his physical incapacity meant that he could not end his life unaided other than through self-starvation. He therefore wished others to assist with his proposed suicide but s.2 Suicide Act 1961 appeared to stand in the way of others doing so lawfully. Mr Nicklinson sought declarations in the High Court to the effect either that it would be lawful for a doctor to terminate or assist in the termination of his life, or that the law preventing such conduct was incompatible with Article 8 ECHR. Mr Nicklinson died long before the Supreme Court gave judgement having lost in the High Court, he declined all food and died of pneumonia. The Court of Appeal subsequently declined to grant the declarations sought.

Question 51

Attorney-General’s Ref (3 of 1994) 1997 UKHL 31 (HL)

Answer 51

The defendant stabbed his girlfriend, who was 24 weeks pregnant. Fewer than 3 weeks later, the girlfriend gave birth severely premature due to the stabbing. Although the girlfriend healed, as a result of prematurity, the baby died 121 days after its birth. Could the defendant cause the death of the baby? Yes. An embryo is not an integral part of its mother. A child cannot be killed until it has lived outside of its mother. Transferred malice s outdated, therefore the defendant did not murder the baby. The defendant, subject to proof by prosecution, could cause the death of the baby by way of unlawful act manslaughter, the unlawful act need not be aimed at the final victim.

Question 52

R v Malcherek and Steel 1981 2 All ER

Answer 52

Two separate appeals were heard together. In Malcherek the defendant had stabbed his wife. In Steel the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting and beating a woman over the head with a stone. In both cases the victims had been taken to hospital and placed on life support machines. The doctors in the respective cases later switched off the life support machines as both victims were not showing any activity in their brain stem. The defendants sought to argue that the doctors actions constituted a novus actus interveniens which broke the chain of causation. Held that the test of death is where the brain stem has died. Thus at the time of switching off the machine, the victims were already dead.

Question 53

R v Moloney [1985] AC 905 (HL)

Answer 53

In a drunken dare, the victim dared the defendant to pull the trigger of a gun. The defendant did not believe that doing so would injure the victim. Did the defendant have the necessary mens rea for murder? No. Lord Bridge: it is for the jury to decide whether the defendant intended to kill or cause GBH; the judge should not expand on the definition of consent.

Question 54

R v Vickers [1957] 2 All ER 741 (CA)

Answer 54

The defendant broke into the house intending to steal. He was confronted by the owner of the house, an elderly woman. In order to prevent her from recognising him, the defendant struck the elderly woman many times, killing her. He was convicted of her murder. He appealed, arguing that s.1 of the Homicide Act 1957 abolished constructive malice, the prosecution had failed to prove that the defendant had the mens rea for murder where the defendant killed the victim in the course of burglary. The Court of Appeal upheld his conviction for murder. The Court held that although s.1 of the Homicide Act 1957 abolished constructive malice, it expressly preserves both express malice (an intention to kill) and implied malice (an intention to cause GBH). As the defendant in this case struck the victim intending to cause her GBH, he had sufficient mens rea to support a murder conviction.

Question 55

R v Cunningham [1981] 2 All ER 863 (HL)

Answer 55

The defendant repeatedly hit the victim with a chair in a pub. The victim died as a result. The defendant did not intend to kill the victim. Could the defendant be convicted of murder? Yes. The mens rea can be satisfied wither by an intent to cause death or an intent to cause grievous bodily harm.

Question 56

R v Lidar (Narinder Singh) [2000] 4 Archbold News 3 (CA)

Answer 56

The victim had been clinging onto the defendant’s car as they fought, but he fell off and was run over. The defendant appealed against his conviction for manslaughter. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and held that subjective reckless manslaughter was a valid head of involuntary manslaughter.

Question 57

R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981 (CA)

Answer 57

Two boys were experimenting with a revolver. Not realising that revolvers revolve before firing, one of the boys accidentally killed the other. Was the killer guilty of unlawful act manslaughter? No. The act was not intentional, only foolish, it is enough of a punishment for the boy to have to live with killing his friend for the rest of his life.

Question 58

R v Slingsby [1995] Crim LR 570 (CA)

Answer 58

The victim sustained cuts when the defendant inserted his hand into her vagina and anus with her consent. The cuts were caused accidently by a ring that the defendant had been wearing. The victim failed to recognise the severity of her injuries and she contracted septicaemia from which she later died. The defendant was charged with unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter, which required proof of a battery that caused her death. It was held that as the injuries had been accidently caused as a result of consensual sexual activity between the parties, the defendant should not be criminally liable.

Question 59

R v Meeking [2013] EWCA Crim 641 (CA)

Answer 59

The defendant was the passenger in a car which her husband was driving. She pulled on the handbrake when the car was moving and without warning. The car spun across the road and collided with another car, killing her husband. The act of pulling on the handbrake constituted an offence of interference with a motor vehicle and this was sufficient to found a conviction of unlawful act manslaughter.

Question 60

R v Church [1965] 2 ALL ER 72 (CA)

Answer 60

The victim in this case mocked the defendant for failing to satisfy her sexually. A fight ensued and the defendant struck the woman, knocking her unconscious. Believing her to be dead, the defendant then threw her in a river. She died from drowning. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had misdirected the jury in relation to unlawful act manslaughter. Test for dangerousness in unlawful act manslaughter is an objective assessment of whether the defendant’s act might cause some harm

Question 61

DPP v Newbury & Jones [1976] 2 ALL ER 365 (HL)

Answer 61

Two 15 year old boys threw a paving slab off a railway bridge as a train approached. The paving slab went through a glass window on the cab of the train and struck the guard killing him. The boys were convicted of manslaughter. The Court of Appeal dismissed the boys’ appeals. The boys appealed to the Lords with the following certified question of law: “can a defendant be properly convicted of manslaughter, when his mind is not affected by drink or drugs, if he did not foresee that his act might cause harm to another?” Held there is no requirement that the defendant foresees that some harm will result from his action.

Question 62

R v Dawson [1985] CR APP R 150 (CA)

Answer 62

The defendants attempted to rob an attendant at a petrol station. The defendants entered the kiosk at the petrol station. They covered their faces with a balaclava and a stocking and were carrying a pickaxe handles and imitation firearms. The attendant at the kiosk, the attendant suffered a heart attack and died. The three men were convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. The Court of Appeal quashed their convictions and held that the defendants could not be guilty of manslaughter because the victim’s heart condition would not have been obvious to the reasonable person if he were present at the scene. The dangerousness test should be carried out as if the reasonable person had only the knowledge of the defendant at the time.

Question 63

R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 (HL)

Answer 63

The defendant, a doctor, failed to notice that a respiratory tube had become disconnected from the patient during an operation. The disconnection would have been obvious, and the patient died from cardiac arrest. Did this satisfy the requirements for an offence of gross negligence manslaughter? Yes. Established the Adomako four-part test.

Question 64

R v Winter & Winter [2010] EWCA Crim 1474 (CA)

Answer 64

Convictions imposed on employees of a fireworks company for gross negligence manslaughter after a cameraman working for the fire service was killed during an explosion at the company’s premises were safe, as it was reasonably foreseeable that a civilian employee of the fire service might come on to the site of a fire in order to film or photograph it for training purposes. The fact that the cameraman had failed to comply with instructions to leave the site did not mean that he was not owed a duty of care.

Question 65

R v Wacker [2002] EWCA Crim 1944 (CA)

Answer 65

A lorry driver, driving 60 illegal immigrants into the UK, closed a vent which allowed oxygen into the lorry’s storage area to pass safely through border control
He omitted to open the vent after passing through, resulting in the death of 58 of the immigrants. Had the defendant committed gross negligence manslaughter? Yes. A duty could be imposed not just on the basis of tort, but also on the grounds of public policy. This duty was breached dangerously and resulted in death

Question 66

R v Litchfield [1998] Crim LR 508 (CA)

Answer 66

D, owner and master of a ship which crashed and three crew members died. D owed the crew a duty of care, through contract. Breached by steering unsafe course and relying on failing engines. D guilty of gross negligence manslaughter.

Question 67

DPP, ex parte Jones [2000] Crim LR 858 (DC)

Answer 67

Jones was decapitated by the jaws of grab bucket on a crane. The Jaws of the bucket had been adapted so that open bags could be attached to hooks fitted within the bucket which had made them dangerous. The action was brought to challenge the decision not to prosecute the employer for gross negligence manslaughter. The CPS made the decision based on the lack of subjective recklessness on the part of the managing director. Held: The CPS were wrong to base their decision on the lack of subjective recklessness since a conviction does not require the defendant to be subjectively reckless.

Question 68

R v Misra and Srivastava [2004] EWCA Crim 2375 (CA)

Answer 68

The defendants (appellant doctors) sought to challenge the circularity of offence of gross negligence manslaughter following their conviction for the neglect of their patients. Did the offence of gross negligence manslaughter breach Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to non-retroactive criminal punishment)? No. Although R v Adomako [1995] requires a jury to decide, in order find a defendant guilty of a crime, whether his breach of duty was sufficient to be classed as a crime, this test is not circular as it is merely a question of fact put to the jury and is indicative of an objective standard of care which is severely below that which is acceptable
This test provides enough prospective certainty to render it compatible with Article 7 ECHR

Question 69

R v Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932 (CCA)

Answer 69

The appellant attacked and killed her husband with a hammer and hatchet whilst he was sleeping in bed. He had subjected her to violence throughout their marriage. Devlin J gave the classic definition of provocation as “provocation is some act, or series of acts done (or words spoken) which would cause any reasonable person and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his or her mind”. In this case it was said that revenge means a person has had time to think.

Question 70

R v Thornton (1) [1992] 1 All ER 306 (CA)

Answer 70

The appellant killed her alcoholic, abusive and violent husband.On the day in question the deceased returned home drunk and an argument erupted. At one point he asked her to leave and started throwing her clothes out. She then left the house with her husband’s son. She returned later to find her husband asleep on the sofa. She went and changed into her night clothes and came down and asked her husband to come to bed. He called her a whore and told her to get out or he would kill her. She went to the kitchen got a knife and sharpened it then returned to the living room. Woke her husband and again asked him to come to bed. He made further abusive comments. She plunged the knife into his stomach which killed him. At her trial she raised the defence of diminished responsibility based on a personality disorder. She did not raise the defence of provocation but the judge directed the jury on provocation. She was convicted of murder. Confirmed ‘sudden and temporary loss of control’ (old provocation law).

Question 71

R v Ahluwalia 1993 96 Cr App R 133

Answer 71

The defendant was raped and violently abused by her husband for more than 10 years. Her religious beliefs prevented her from leaving him. One night, after he had beaten her, the defendant waited for her husband to fall asleep and then poured petrol over him and set him alight. He died from his burns. The defendant was charged with his murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that provocation could be left to the jury where there was evidence of a time lapse between the provoking words or conduct and the killing. However the longer the delay and the stronger the evidence, the more likely it will be that the defence of provocation will be negated.

Question 72

R v Camplin [1978] 2 All ER 168 (HL)

Answer 72

The defendant in this case was a 15-year-old boy who was raped by his employer. The employer began to gloat and laugh about the rape, at which point the defendant struck him on the head with a pan, killing him. The defendant was charged with his murder and pleaded provocation.